

The Latin *Renovatio* of Byzantium

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The Latin *Renovatio* of Byzantium

The Empire of Constantinople (1204–1228)

By

Filip Van Tricht

Translated by

Peter Longbottom



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To my loving parents

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PREFACE

The present book has been in the making for a long time. I first came into contact with the Latin Empire of Constantinople in 1995 during my history studies at the University of Ghent when a professor of mine, dr. Thérèse de Hemptinne, suggested Henry of Flanders/Hainaut—the second Latin Emperor of Constantinople—as a possible subject for my licentiate's thesis. The prospect of writing a biography of such a valiant knight, as he is for instance portrayed in Henry of Valenciennes' chronicle, appealed to me instantly.

Since my childhood days I have been interested in the Middle Ages and, of course, especially in the knightly lifestyle. On our many holidays in France my parents always took me and my older brothers to visit the nearby castles, abbeys and cathedrals. Carcassonne was unforgettable. The sight of the magnificent ruins of the so-called Cathar strongholds in the Pyrenees, such as Peyrepertuse, captured my imagination. Closer to home my favourites were, and still remain, the castle of Beersel (near Brussels)—which functioned as the setting of an episode of an in Belgium well-known comic book—and the unique Count's Castle in my hometown of Ghent, which my now six year old stepson Stan is also very fond of. It is true to say that my mother and father with these and other cultural excursions nurtured in me a deep love for human history, with a clear partiality for the medieval period. As a kid I consequently built many a Lego fortress, fought many a fierce battle with my Playmobil army and—last but not least—enthusiastically dressed up as a Templar knight.

After I had successfully completed my licentiate's thesis, I obtained a scholarship enabling me to prepare a doctorate's thesis. It went without saying that I would continue my research concerning the Latin Empire, which had aroused my interest with its complex and fascinating relations between the various peoples and cultures involved. The dissertation that I embarked upon in short aimed at unravelling the political identity of the Latin Empire in the years 1204–1261. In the Spring of 2003 this work was finished.

The publication at hand is to be considered as a thoroughly reworked version of the first part of my dissertation. A number of revisions were indeed in order in the context of the relative flood of publications

that appeared in the wake of the 800th anniversary of the crusader conquest of Constantinople in 2004. Professionally I had meanwhile taken on a job as a parliamentary assistant, in which capacity I passed as it happens on a regular basis the first Latin Emperor Baldwin of Flanders/Hainaut's somewhat forgotten statue, portraying him in imperial robes, in the entrance hall of the federal parliament building in Brussels.

Because of the international character of the chosen topic there were many challenges I had to overcome while writing this book. These were mainly related to the varied nature, *inter alia* linguistically and typologically, of the available source material and of the already existing literature. The path often seemed uncertain, the road ahead a slippery slope. However, in the years that have past since I began my research, I have been fortunate in being able to rely on the never failing aid and support of a number of people, whom I would all like to thank warmly.

My promotor, the kindhearted prof. dr. Thérèse de Hemptinne, without doubt deserves a special mention. She inspired me to undertake this work and motivated me to finish it. I also want to single out prof.-em. dr. Edmond Voordeckers, who encouraged me while still working on my licentiate thesis and who has managed to pass on to me his passion for Byzantium, though he most likely is unaware of his influence. Further I should thank prof. dr. David Jacoby, prof. dr. Walter Prevenier, prof. dr. Jeannine Vereecken and dr. Krijnie Ciggaar for their valuable remarks. On a more personal level I am indebted to my good friends Kim and Stijn, who—at a time when morale was low—jestingly made me solemnly promise that one day I would complete this book. Of course I also thank my mother-in-law Chris for providing the beautiful cover painting and my brother Peter for skillfully photographing it. Last but certainly not least I want to thank my sweetheart Borg (you truly are the love of my life), my dear stepson Stan—who likens himself to Constantine the Great and aspires to be a knight one day, or an astronaut or a racing cyclist for that matter—and my little daughter Juno Guinevere for the happiness and joy they daily bring to me. Ultimately I would like to thank my ever caring mother and father, without whom this book would never have been written and to whom it is thus dedicated.

MAPS



Map 1: The Empire of Constantinople (circa 1212–1217—approximative borders).

INTRODUCTION

The Latin Empire of Constantinople, under which name the political construction that ensued from the conquest of the capital of the Byzantine Empire by a Western crusading army in 1204 is known in literature, has often been treated in contemporary historiography in a rather step-motherly manner. This can be explained because, from a thematic point of view, the Latin Empire lies at the crossroads of two domains of study, both of which can be looked upon as sub-disciplines of medieval studies, on the one hand Byzantine studies and on the other Crusades studies. For Byzantinists, the Latin Empire unvaryingly remains a regrettable anomaly in the history of glorious Byzantium. The violent Latin occupation of Constantinople, as well as that of a number of surrounding territories, was to herald the definitive beginning of the end of the Byzantine Empire. As the consequence of the Fourth Crusade, crusade historians for their part view the Latin Empire as a blot on its escutcheon. The crusade against fellow Christians is judged as an unparalleled act of ignominy that further weakened the already difficult position of the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine.

The consequence of the virtually invariable negative image that the Latin Empire has had to bear, has been that it has in itself scarcely formed the object of in-depth or extensive research. It has generally only received indirect attention from an explicit crusading or Byzantine perspective. For example, in the more recent monographs on the neighbouring Byzantine principalities of the Latin Empire—the empire of Nicaea and the state of Epiros, the later empire of Thessalonike—we therefore receive a not very elucidating, even biased image of the Latin Empire, which has then been adopted in more general works on the history of the Byzantine Empire.¹ Of course there has already been some research into various sub-aspects in respect of the Latin take-over of former Byzantine territories. However, the emphasis in this lay principally on socio-economic themes, whilst politico-institutional

¹ A few references: Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile*, London, 1974. Langdon, *John III Ducas Vatatzes' Byzantine empire in Anatolian exile*, Ann Arbor, 1980. Prinzing, *Studien zur Provinz- und Zentralverwaltung im Machtbereich der epirotischen Herrscher*, 1982–83. Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessalonike*, Thessalonike, 1996. Madden, *Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice*, Baltimore, 2003.

subjects were treated only in detail studies with limited scope.² The most recent world-language monograph about the Latin Empire—Longnon's *Histoire de l'Empire latin de Constantinople*—dates back to 1949 and was set up mainly as a narrative history of the empire.³ Up to this very day there has been no modern monograph on the political history of this empire, such as that in existence for Nicaea and Epiros. Rather, as a consequence of this, until now our knowledge about the Latin Empire in this domain has remained somewhat superficial. It is the intention that this book will provide a contribution to remedying this unsatisfactory situation.

DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

The concrete aim that we have in the formulation of this work is the writing of a politico-institutional history of the Latin Empire in the period 1204–1228. The commencement date of this period speaks for itself in the light of the fact that the Latin occupation of Byzantium started in the year 1204. The end date is inspired by the finding that around the year 1228 some very fundamental changes occurred in the character of the Latin Empire. Suffice it to say here that in the mid-1220s the Latin Empire lost permanently some very considerable territories, which was to change the face of the empire drastically and irrevocably.

In writing this political history we would like to examine two postulations that currently dominate the historiography with respect to the Latin Empire. The first of these is that the Latin Empire was a political construction that can be characterized as fundamentally Western, both as regards its institutional organization and its political elite. Byzantine administrative mechanisms will, if at all, have been retained only at a local level. Further, the political elite of the Latin Empire will to a great extent have been Latin, whereby at the very most there would be a place in the administration only at local level for the Byzantine aristocracy and population. In line with this, Latin-Byzantine relations

² Cf. the publications of, inter alia, Antonio Carile, Benjamin Hendrickx, David Jacoby, Jean Longnon and Robert Lee Wolff.

³ Longnon, *L'empire latin de Constantinople*, Paris, 1949. Recently in Polish: Petnek, *Cesarstwo łacinskie 1204–1261*, Poznań, 2004. Like Longnon the author adapts a narrative approach, without being either innovative or thorough.

in the Latin Empire are usually described in negative terms. The second postulation is that the empire, which was built on the basis of feudalistic principles, formed to only a very small extent a real political entity. The feudal principalities and regions in the empire, which were in principle dependent on the Latin emperor's suzerainty, would de facto have formed practically independent entities. Moreover, with regard to these two postulations, in general only little attention is paid to any possible evolutions that might have taken place.⁴

Taking these two hypotheses in the current literature as our starting point, we come to the two central issues of this study. Firstly, we shall examine the way in which the Latin Empire formed a real political entity, if indeed it did so. Essentially, this comes down to making a comparative assessment between the centripetal and centrifugal political forces in the feudally structured empire. What was the relationship between the imperial authority in Constantinople and the regional, feudal authorities? Secondly, we ask the question as to the extent to which the Latin Empire in its administrative organization can now be characterized as Latin or as Byzantine. Central to this will be the nature of the administrative mechanisms and the constitution of the political elite at the various levels of policy. The combination of both questions must make it possible to chart the essence of the political system of the Latin Empire in the years 1204–1228.

In order to address these issues, we designed the following plan for this study. To ascertain the political identity of the Latin Empire, we have divided this work into two large sections. We discuss in the first section the internal administrative organization of the empire. In the various chapters we examine in succession the context in which the Latin Empire came into being, the imperial ideology that the Latin emperors endeavoured to build up, the reality of the imperial authority and its relationship with the feudal princes and lords in the empire, the concrete administrative organization of both the imperial domain and the diverse feudal entities within the empire, the constitution of the central political elite of the empire and, finally, the role of a number of supraregional, religious institutions. In the second section we examine the empire's international position, and in particular the position

⁴ Runciman, *The Kingdom of Acre*, pp. 124–125. Mayer, *The Crusades*, pp. 191–193. Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean*, 162. Treadgold, *A History of the Byzantine State and Society*, pp. 710–733. Lilie, *Byzanz. Das Zweite Rom*, pp. 465–475. Jacoby, *After the Fourth Crusade: The Latin Empire of Constantinople*, pp. 759–778.

taken by the empire in the eastern Mediterranean basin. In this, we make a distinction between two sub-regions, the Byzantine space and the Latin Orient. Although the examination of the relations between Latin Romania and the more distant, West European powers—in itself a subject for an exhaustive, separate study—would certainly have provided us with useful information concerning our question, from a practical point of view it was not possible for us to carry out in-depth research into this subject too. However, in the course of the various chapters the relations with, *inter alia*, the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire certainly are dealt with.

SOURCES

The source material that is available for the study of the political structure of the Latin Empire of Constantinople can be described as being both comprehensive and very limited at the same time. An abundance of sources of diverse origins report on the Latin Empire, but most of them can provide us with only a modest amount of information. In this work we have tried to collate these numerous sources as exhaustively as possible, with the intention of reconstructing an as complete and multifaceted possible picture of the political essence of the Latin Empire. In this we focus principally on published source material, since, with respect to the politico-institutional history of the Latin Empire scarcely any archival material has been handed down to us. Nonetheless, a small-scale examination of archives in Venice introduced us to a number of interesting documents about which up to now little or nothing was known. On the basis of their language and origin, the source material can be categorized as coming from Latin, Byzantine and Eastern sources, and we provide a brief discussion of the available material in each of these categories.⁵

The Latin sources form a diverse entity. Firstly, there are the sources that originated in the Latin Empire itself. As regards narrative material, for the early years of the empire we have at our disposal the comprehensive chronicles from the pen of Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Henry of Valenciennes and Robert of Clari. As marshal of the Empire,

⁵ Recent critical overviews of sources about the Byzantine space in the 13th century: Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessalonike*, pp. 42–56. Karayannopoulos & Weiss, *Quellenkunde zur Geschichte von Byzanz*, t. 2, pp. 459–490.

Villehardouin was one of the most influential Latin barons at the imperial court in the first two decades of the empire. However, his chronicle encompasses only the early years of the imperium (1204–1207).⁶ The clerk Henry of Valenciennes was part of the entourage of the second Latin Emperor, Henry of Flanders/Hainaut. In some way, his chronicle forms the chronological sequel to that of Villehardouin, and covers the period 1208–1209.⁷ Because of their prominent position at the imperial court, each of these chroniclers can be seen as spokesmen of an official, imperial view of the Latin Empire. In contrast, Robert of Clari, who had already left the imperium in 1205, was a minor knight in the army of the Fourth Crusade. He voiced the feelings of the bulk of this army that took Constantinople in 1204 and laid the foundations for the Latin imperium. His chronicle contains information about the Latin Empire in the years 1204–1216, but concentrates mainly on the years 1204–1205, during which he was still present in the empire.⁸

The three above-mentioned contemporary chroniclers regarded the Western take-over of the Byzantine imperial throne in an almost matter-of-fact manner as completely legitimate, an element that should be constantly borne in mind in the critical reading of their chronicles. Incidentally, the same comment also applies to all Western accounts of the Fourth Crusade, which for the greater part also deal with the first years of the Latin Empire. An example of this is Gunther of Pairis' account of the Fourth Crusade and the first years of the Latin Empire. This chronicle was drawn up on the basis of the word-of-mouth account that Martinus, abbot of the Cistercian Abbey of Pairis and participant in the Fourth Crusade, gave to the monk Gunther after his return to his home province in the West.⁹ After circa 1210 there are scarcely any narrative sources available to us that have their origins in the empire itself, with the exception of a few narrative imperial letters sent to friendly Western princes and authorities.¹⁰ One exception is the fourteenth-century Chronicle of Morea, extant in four different

⁶ Geoffroy de Villehardouin, *La Conquête de Constantinople*, E. Faral (éd.), Paris, 1961.

⁷ Henri de Valenciennes, *Histoire de l'empereur Henri de Constantinople*, J. Longnon (éd.), Paris, 1948.

⁸ Robert de Clari, *La Conquête de Constantinople*, Ph. Lauer (éd.), Paris, 1924.

⁹ Gunther von Pairis, *Hystoria Constantinopolitana*, P. Orth (ed.), Hildesheim, 1994.

¹⁰ A few references: Prinzing, *Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs von Konstantinopel*, pp. 395–431. Duchesne, *Historiae Francorum Scriptores*, t. 5, 1649, pp. 424–426.

languages and versions, which for the first decades of the thirteenth century, however, is strongly tinted with legend and offers only little relevant information.¹¹

Just as the narrative sources, the diplomatic material originating in the Latin Empire itself can be described as very limited. Of the Latin emperors there are only a few charters known. Furthermore, most of these documents relate to the relations with Western powers, rulers and institutions. There are virtually no imperial documents available that provide information about the internal administration of the empire.¹² The same also applies to the regional rulers in the empire, and to the religious institutions, the bishoprics, monasteries and convents. For example, of the Latin patriarchs of Constantinople there are only five known charters.¹³ There is rather more diplomatic material that throws light on the administrative structure of the empire at our disposal from the archives of the city of Venice, an important partner in the Latin Empire. However, this is material that offers us information from a principally Venetian point of view, and relates to those territories where La Serenissima had interests to defend.¹⁴ Notarial material from Venetian merchants based in Constantinople or elsewhere in Latin Romania occasionally provides interesting information.¹⁵

In addition to the sources emanating from the empire itself there is an abundance of Latin sources available; these originated either in the West or in the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine. Of the Western chronicles from the Holy Land it is in particular the continuations of William of Tyre's twelfth-century chronicle *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum* that are of interest.¹⁶ Diplomatic material from religious institutions in the Holy Land with possessions

¹¹ Aerts, *Was the author of the Chronicle of Morea that bad?*, pp. 133–136.

¹² Hendrickx, *Regestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople*, pp. 7–221.

¹³ Santifaller, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des lateinischen Patriarchats von Konstantinopel*, Weimar, 1938.

¹⁴ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig*, Wien, 1856–1857. Cessi, *Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio di Venezia*, Bologna, 1930–1934.

¹⁵ Morozzo Della Rocca & Lombardo, *Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI–XIII*, Roma, 1940.

¹⁶ Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, De Mas Latrie (éd.), Paris, 1871. *Continuation De Guillaume De Tyr De 1229 A 1261 Dite Du Manuscrit De Rothelin*, Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Historiens Occidentaux, t. 2, Paris, 1859.

in the Latin Empire provided limited additional information.¹⁷ Of the Western chronicles with more than a local perspective there are only few that contain any amount of data on the Latin Empire. Nonetheless, a few universal chronicles provide substantial information. One of these is that of Aubry of Trois-Fontaines. The work of this monk from the Cistercian abbey of the same name in the county of Champagne provides information about the Latin Empire from 1204 to 1241. A second interesting author is Philippe Mouskes from Tournai, a town in the border area between the French crown domain and the county of Flanders. His *Chronique Rimée* runs until circa 1243. Interesting data is also to be found in the historic works of Matthew of Paris, a monk of the Benedictine monastery of Saint Albans in England. The chronological ending point van Paris' oeuvre is the year 1259.¹⁸ The information provided by these authors, despite their considerable geographic separation, can generally be looked upon as reliable. The chroniclers, some of whom provide highly detailed information, generally appear—either directly or indirectly—to have relied on the accounts of travellers and pilgrims who had visited the Latin Empire or on those of envoys who had been sent from Constantinople to the West.

A number of Venetian chronicles also provide some interesting information, albeit invariably from a Venetian viewpoint. Apart from the very brief *Chronicon Venetum* and the equally fragmentary *Historia Ducum Veneticorum*, most of the chronicles were composed after the Byzantine recapture of Latin Constantinople in 1261, which had its repercussions on the description of the former vicissitudes of the empire.¹⁹ An important chronicle is Martin da Canal's *Estoires de Venise*, which was written in the second half of the thirteenth century. Canal, a lower Venetian functionary, possibly wrote by order of Doge Rainerio Dandolo (1253–1268). Essential too is the somewhat later *Chronica per extensum descripta* from the pen of Doge Andreas

¹⁷ Bresc-Bautier, *Le cartulaire du chapitre du Saint-Sépulcre de Jérusalem*, Paris, 1984.

¹⁸ Albericus Trium Fontium, *Chronica*, Scheffer-Boichorst (ed.), Hanover, 1874. Philippe Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, De Reiffenberg (éd.), Bruxelles, 1938. Matthew of Paris, *Historia Anglorum*, Madden (ed.), London, 1866–1869. *idem*, *Chronica Majora*, Luard (ed.), London, 1872–1883.

¹⁹ *Chronicon Venetum Quod Vulgo Dicunt Altinate*, Simonsfeld (ed.), Hanover, 1883. *Historia Ducum Veneticorum*, Simonsfeld (ed.), Hanover, 1883.

Dandolo (1343–1354).²⁰ Also containing interesting information are the works of Marino Sanudo Torsello, and in particular his *Istoria del Regno di Romania*. The author completed a number of diplomatic missions to Latin Romania and the regained Byzantine Constantinople, and thus had the chance—inter alia from his relatives, the princes of the *ducatus* of Naxos—to gain information, as it were, on the spot.²¹

One last type of Western narrative sources that provides information about the Latin Empire is formed by the relatively numerous hagiographic texts that were written as a result of the transference of valuable relics from Latin Romania to various Western countries, and in particular France, the homeland of most Western barons in the Latin Empire, and Venice. Although in the main this material reports on the relations between the empire and the West, nevertheless these texts occasionally contain information about the internal administrative organization of the empire, and in particular about the local political elite.²²

A wealth of Western diplomatic material concerning the Latin Empire is available in the papal registers. This series of sources indeed offers interesting and indispensable information for a study on the subject of the political structure of the Latin imperium. In addition, also available is diplomatic material from the various different Western rulers, authorities and institutions with which successive Latin emperors—and regional princes in the empire—had contacts. Whilst this material mainly concerns the Western interests of the Latin emperors, princes and barons, it also occasionally contains information about the internal organization of the empire.

As regards the above-mentioned Western material from outside the Latin Empire, we emphasize that this too generally presents the Latin Empire as the obvious legitimate successor to the Byzantine Empire.

²⁰ Andreas Dandolo, *Chronica per extensum descripta*, Pastorello (ed.), Bologna, 1938–58. Martin Da Canal, *Les Estoires de Venise. Cronaca veneziana in lingua francese dalle origini al 1275*, Limentani (ed.), Firenze, 1973.

²¹ Marino Sanudo Torsello, *Istoria del Regno di Romania*, Hopf (éd.), Paris, 1873. *idem*, *Liber secretorum fidelium crucis super terrae sanctae recuperatione et conservatione*, De Bongars (ed.), Hanover, 1611. Wolff, Hopf's so-called 'Fragmentum' of Marino Sanudo Torsello, pp. 149–159.

²² Gerardus Sancti Quintini, *Translatio Sancte Corone Domini Nostri Ihesu Christe*, Golubovich (ed.), Firenze, 1913. Gualterius Cornutus, *Historia Susceptionis Corone Spinee*, Riant (ed.), Genève, 1876. *Translatio Corporis Beatissimi Theodori Martyris Heracleensis Cum Multis Miraculis*, Riant (ed.), Genève, 1876. Petrus Calo, *Translatio Sancti Ioannis Alexandrini*, Riant (ed.), Genève, 1876.

It is also important to note that this Western source material, both diplomatic and narrative, does not always cast an equally adequate light on the administrative structures of the Latin Empire in the sense that it is quite often the case that these are translated to fit a typical Western political frame of reference. These two considerations make cautious treatment of these sources essential.

Under the Byzantine sources that can be used in a study about the Latin Empire we understand both the Greek and Old Slavic sources that came into being in the Latin Empire's neighbouring states within the entire Byzantine space. Byzantine source material from the Latin Empire itself is virtually non-existent. Furthermore the narrative material is almost exclusively limited to the empire of Nicaea. A first important chronicler is Niketas Choniates (1155/57–1217), prior to 1204 a senior official in the imperial administration and in 1204 an exile who eventually resettled at the imperial court in Nicaea, where he would no longer gain a prominent position. In addition to his chronicle, which provides an overview of the history of the Byzantine Empire in the years 1204–1207, there are from his pen a number of orations too, these being addressed to the first Nicaean Emperor Theodore I Laskaris (1204–1222).²³

A second interesting author is Nicolas Mesarites (circa 1163–post 1214), prior to 1204 member of the patriarchal clergy and after 1204 initially a leading figure among the Byzantine clergy that had remained in Constantinople. After negotiations in the years 1204–1207 about the union of the Churches had not achieved the desired result, Mesarites settled in Nicaea, where he obtained a position in the entourage of the Byzantine patriarch in exile. He later became metropolitan of Ephesos. Mesarites wrote a number of texts in which he reported on the discussions in the years 1204–1206 and in 1214 about the union of the Churches, as well as about the re-establishment of a Byzantine patriarchate and emperorship in Nicaea circa 1207–1208. Mesarites was closely involved in all these matters. Although in the first place the texts deal for the greater part with theological matter, they also provide a large amount of information about Latin-Byzantine relations

²³ Niketas Choniates, *Niketæ Choniatae Historia*, Van Dieten (ed.), Berlin, 1975. *idem*, *Orationes et epistolae*, Van Dieten (ed.), Berlin, 1972.

in Constantinople and about the relations between the Latin and the Nicaean Empire.²⁴

George Akropolites (1217–1282) wrote an extensive chronicle about the period 1204–1261. Born in Latin Constantinople, his father sent him to Nicaea, where he built up a fruitful political career for himself. He occupied the highest positions in the state administration of the Nicaean emperors, and thereafter at the court of Michael VIII Paleologos (1258–1282). Important to the interpretation of his work is that he wrote his chronicle at a time that Constantinople was once more in Byzantine hands and the Latin Empire and the Byzantine Empire of Thessalonike had fallen. His description of the historical evolutions that took place in the period 1204–1261 can be viewed in the light of this final Nicaean victory.²⁵

From the period following the Nicaean taking of Latin Constantinople in 1261 there is also the chronicle of Nikephoros Gregoras (1295–1361), which covers the years 1204–1354. Although Akropolites' work was an important source of information for the period until 1261, Gregoras also occasionally consulted other sources for these years. Just as Akropolites, the author who held a prominent position at the imperial court, voices a historiographical view of the developments after 1204 from the standpoint of the Nicaean recapture of Constantinople in 1261. That is also the case for the verse chronicle of the early fourteenth-century author Ephraem Aenius, over whose societal background we have no specific details. His *Historia Chronica*, which is in essence based on the work of Niketas Choniates and George Akropolites, nonetheless offers in a number of passages some original and very interesting detailed information about the Latin imperial administration.²⁶

In reading the above-mentioned works it is important to bear in mind that, in so far as is known, the authors belonged to the imperial elite. Consequently, the view that they voice prior to 1261 is that of the Nicaean establishment, and after 1261 that of the Byzantine imperial court of Constantinople. Bredenkamp recently drew attention to this in the context of his study of the Byzantine Empire of Thessalonike. For example, the author states quite correctly that Akropolites cannot

²⁴ Heisenberg, *Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Kaisertums*, I–III, 1922–1923.

²⁵ Georgios Akropolites, *Historia*, Heisenberg (ed.), Leipzig, 1903.

²⁶ Ephraem Aenius, *Historia Chronica*, Lampsidis (ed.), Athene, 1990.

possibly be seen as an objective spokesman for the Western Byzantines of the empire of Thessalonike. Quite the reverse, the chronicler unvaryingly portrays the Doukai of Epiros and Thessalonike, the direct rivals of the Nicaean emperors, in negative terms.²⁷ As the extension of this, we may assume that Akropolites and the other authors could not possibly be seen as the spokesmen of the Byzantine elite and population of the Latin Empire.

From the Slavic region of the Byzantine space there are a few Serbian hagiographies that provide information about Latin-Serbian relations and about the internal organization of the Latin Empire that are worthy of mention.²⁸ Also in the case of these hagiographic sources, the main purpose of which was not to provide an accurate historical account, we must bear in mind the specific intentions of the authors. They had, via the biographies of Saint Symeon (†1199) and Saint Sava (†1236) who could be described as national saints of Serbia, the intention of underpinning the secular independence and ecclesiastical autonomy of the budding Serbian principality, and later kingdom.

The Byzantine diplomatic material that can be used for the purposes of this study is relatively limited. A number of documents of the Byzantine emperors and the Byzantine patriarchs in Nicaea provide information about the Latin-Byzantine relations in the ecclesiastical-religious sphere.²⁹ Further, there is in the main the correspondence from a number of prominent prelates in the state of Epiros, later the empire of Thessalonike. A leading figure in this category is John Apokaukos (†1233/34), metropolitan of Naupaktos. In his correspondence, which covers the period 1212–1232, Apokaukos occasionally provides information about, *inter alia*, the situation of the Byzantine population under Latin rule and also about the confrontations between the rulers of Epiros and the Latin kingdom of Thessalonike.³⁰ In addition, there is the canonistical correspondence of Demetrios Chomatenos (†1236/40), the Archbishop of Achrida, who in some instances refers to the Latin-Byzantine relations in the contiguous regions of the Latin Empire (the principality of Achaea and the kingdom of Thessalonike),

²⁷ Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessalonike*, pp. 281–291.

²⁸ Obolensky, *Six Byzantine Portraits*, pp. 122–123.

²⁹ Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten der Keiserurkunden des Oströmischen Reiches*, t. 3, München, 1977. Laurent, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople*, t. 1/4, Paris, 1971.

³⁰ Lambropoulos, *Ioannis Apocaucos*, Athens, 1988.

to the relations between the Latin and Nicaean imperial courts, and to the military confrontations of Theodore Doukas, ruler of Epiros—and later Emperor of Thessalonike—with the Latin Empire.³¹ The limited corpus of letters of George Bardanes, metropolitan of Corfu († circa 1238/39), here and there also contains data that are interesting within the framework of this study.³²

In the interpretation of the works of the above-mentioned three authors it is important to bear in mind that these prelates, just as the Nicaean chroniclers, cannot be seen as the spokesmen for a generalized Byzantine view of the developments that took place after 1204. After all, they were closely allied to the court of the local princes of Epiros (and later of Thessalonike), whose interests they defended and propagated. Their work, and in particular what they report about Latin-Byzantine relations in Romania, should therefore be read in this light.³³

A last important Byzantine author is Michael Choniates (†1222), the elder brother of the earlier mentioned Niketas Choniates and, prior to 1204, metropolitan of Athens. After 1204, in the context of the Latin conquests he felt the necessity to retreat in exile. For many years he remained on the island of Kea, off the coast of Attica, after which he went to live in a Byzantine monastery close to Bodonitza in Beotia, a region that was under Latin rule.³⁴ In his extensive, well-preserved correspondence, this prelate provides unique information about the Latin-Byzantine relations in the Latin territory. However, the exceptional character of this source must not allow us to forget that Choniates should not per se be seen as the spokesman for the entire Byzantine population living under Latin rule. We emphasize here that in his letters this author first and foremost expressed his own personal views and, as an extension of this, the views both of the people in his entourage and of those with whom he was in correspondence.

Lastly, a small number of sources that could be catalogued as Eastern appeared to be useful for this study. These are principally chronicles with a universal perspective, written by Christian—Armenian and Syrian—historiographers and by Islamic authors from, inter alia, the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia, from the Seljuk Sultanate of Konya,

³¹ Demetrios Chomatenos, *Ponemata Diaphora*, G. Prinzing (ed.), Berlin, 2002.

³² Hoeck & Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otrante*, Ettal, 1965.

³³ Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessalonike*, pp. 47–51.

³⁴ Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, F. Kolovou (ed.), Berlin, 2001.

from the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine, and from the neighbouring Islamic principalities.³⁵ Some diplomatic documents from the rulers of Cilician Armenia also contain relevant information.³⁶ Whilst these sources were in geographical terms a considerable distance from the Latin Empire, on occasion they do provide some fascinating and, in exceptional cases, even unique information.

LANGUAGE ISSUES, TRANSLITERATION AND TERMINOLOGY

A practical difficulty facing the execution of the present study was that of language. The study of a highly international theme such as the Latin Empire means that the sources and literature available to us are in a large number of different languages. We are by no means master of all these languages. The most serious obstacle was that we ourselves do not have a firm grasp of Greek. However, we do have available to us reliable translations of most of the narrative Greek sources. As a rule, these translations follow the division in chapters and paragraphs used in the source editions, which means that reference to them does not cause problems. For those sources that are not available in translation, mainly sources of a diplomatic nature such as collections of letters, we were fortunate in receiving the intensive help of a translator who is highly proficient in Byzantine Greek. As regards the modern literature, from sheer necessity we felt obliged to restrict ourselves to the studies written in the Western languages. We endeavoured to overcome this problem to some extent by devoting special attention to the works written by Greek and Slavonic authors in Western languages, in order that their perceptions were not completely lost to us.

Following on from the issues of language, we must make mention of the fact that, for practical reasons, we have opted to reproduce Greek and Slavic terms, words and references via transliteration in Latin characters. A practice such as this is certainly not new or revolutionary in the historiography concerning Byzantium and is used, for example, in the authoritative *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*.³⁷ We endeavoured to carry out the transliteration as consistently as possible,

³⁵ Bar-Hebraeus, *The chronography of Gregory Abu'l Faraj*, Budge (tr.), London, 1932. *La Chronique Attribuee Au Connetable Smbat*, G. Dédéyan (tr.), Paris, 1980.

³⁶ Langlois, *Le Trésor des chartes d'Arménie*, Venise, 1863.

³⁷ Kazhdan (ed.), *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, Oxford, 1991.

but absolute consistency did not always seem to be appropriate as the result of a number of terms having been established in common use. For example, the letter beta is represented either as 'b' or as 'v', and the letter upsilon as 'u' or 'y'. In addition, we have generally written the names of persons and places in the commonly used anglicized versions. Here again, absolute consistency appeared to be fundamentally wrong, since a number of less familiar names would possibly become unrecognizable if we were to adhere blindly and without exception to our principle.

Finally a word on our use of the terms Latins and Byzantines. With the term Latins we in general refer to the conglomerate of peoples or nations of Western Europe, who religiously speaking in principle all belonged to the Roman Church headed by the Pope. More specifically we use the term for the Westerners who in the context of the Fourth Crusade, or in the wake thereof, established themselves in Romania. With the term Byzantines we refer to the autochthonous and ethnically varied population of the Byzantine Empire as it was shaped by the beginning of the thirteenth century. This population, the ensemble of the subjects of the Byzantine Emperor, included of course Greeks, who were the dominant ethnic group, but also for example Bulgarians and Armenians.

PROLOGUE

The inevitable starting point of any study of the Latin Empire of Constantinople is the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204), for during the final phase of this turbulent expedition, the crusade leaders determined to bring the Byzantine Empire under Latin control. In this, lines in the sand were drawn within which the Latin take-over of Byzantium would take shape. In view of the fact that in the historiography on this subject this crusade is viewed as the culmination of the Latin-Byzantine tensions that had gradually built up in the preceding century, we begin by taking a brief look at the broader Latin-Byzantine relations in the period prior to 1204.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE LATIN WORLD TO BYZANTIUM PRIOR TO THE FOURTH CRUSADE

In the early Middle Ages, the two halves of Christendom generally maintained rather limited relations with one another, but from the late eleventh century and throughout the entire twelfth century the contacts were to intensify.¹ However, with a number of Western powers, the Byzantine empire had maintained privileged relationships for centuries: the Holy Roman Empire, the papacy and a number of other political powers on the Italian peninsula, where the Western and Byzantine ranges of influence met.²

The relationship between Byzantium and the Holy Roman Empire concerned on the one hand the respective influence of each of the empires in Italy, something that lost most of its importance after the Norman conquest of the last Byzantine territories in Southern Italy in 1071 and, on the other hand, relates to the so-called ‘two-emperors-problem’. In both matters the papacy was usually an inevitable third actor. Under the German Hohenstaufen and the Byzantine Komnenoi,

¹ Ciggaar, *Western travellers to Constantinople*, pp. 322–354.

² Ebels-Hoving, *Byzantium in Westerse ogen*, p. 9.

and later the Angeloi, the issue maintained its currency in the twelfth century.³

The relationship of Byzantium to the papacy was determined principally by the area of tension between the Roman and Byzantine Churches. In essence, a conflict had arisen between the two Churches, the crux of which was the papal claim to be not only the honorary but also the actual religious leader of the whole of Christendom, something that the Patriarch of Constantinople could not possibly accept. This fundamental difference of opinion crystallized in divergences of views relating not only to questions of dogma, but also concerning ceremonial and liturgical matters. In 1054 it was to culminate in a more formal breach with the mutual excommunications of papal legate Humbert, cardinal-bishop of Silva Candida, and patriarch of Constantinople Michael Kerularios. What was in fact a conflict between Churches often became linked with political issues, such as the papal and Byzantine relations with the Holy Roman emperorship or their respective influences in Italy.⁴

The Norman principalities in Southern Italy, later to be united in the Kingdom of Sicily, formed a third power with which Byzantium maintained closer links. In 1071, the Norman conquerors gained control of the last Byzantine territories in Southern Italy. Following on from this, from the end of the eleventh century the Norman rulers and kings repeatedly undertook military expeditions against the heartlands of the Byzantine Empire. Conversely, until far into the twelfth century the Byzantine emperors did not give up the hope of re-conquering parts of Southern Italy.⁵

The city of Venice was a fourth Western power that had special bonds with the Byzantine Empire. Since her coming into being in the sixth century, Venice had been a part of this empire, but from the eighth century developed into an autonomous Byzantine enclave within the Holy Roman Empire, becoming de facto wholly independent towards the beginning of the eleventh century. The continuing Venetian

³ Brezeanu, *Das Zweikaiserproblem in der ersten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts*, pp. 249–267. Kahl, *Römische Krönungspläne im Komnenenhause?*, pp. 259–320. Tinnfeld, *Byzanz und die Herrscher des Hauses Hohenstaufen*, pp. 105–127.

⁴ Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz*, Berlin, s.d. Hussey, *The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire*, p. 167. Angold, *Church and Society in Byzantium*, p. 505. Bayer, *Spaltung der Christenheit*, pp. 203–213.

⁵ Chalandon, *Histoire de la domination normande*, p. 185. Matthew, *The Norman Kingdom of Sicily*, pp. 263–281. Norwich, *The Kingdom in the Sun*, p. 129, p. 185, p. 323.

interest in Byzantium was inspired by the commercial interests of her merchant political elite in the Byzantine territories. The Byzantine emperors saw in Venice an ally that could lend them essential naval military support. The relations between Venice and Byzantium were generally good in the course of the twelfth century, although not always without tension. Several serious crises at the end of the century did not prevent Venice and Byzantium continuing to see each other as partners for fruitful collaboration, as is evidenced by the renewal of earlier commercial treaties in 1198.⁶

In summary, it may be stated that the situation at the end of the twelfth century was not so that the above-mentioned Western powers formed a threat to the continued existence of the Byzantine Empire. As Ebels-Hoving has so convincingly established, neither the papacy, the Holy Roman Emperor, the city of Venice, or the Kingdom of Sicily nursed plans to conquer the Byzantine imperium. Nor did they yet adopt an increasingly hostile attitude to Byzantium in the run-up to 1204.⁷

As a result of the crusades, regions other than those already mentioned increased their contacts with Byzantium from the end of the eleventh century. To be sure, Constantinople had functioned for centuries as a point at which pilgrims on their way to the Holy Land would sojourn, and mercenaries from Scandinavia and England in particular had long been serving in Byzantine armies, but now tens of thousands of pilgrims and crusaders from all social levels came into contact with Byzantine culture.⁸ The crusades also changed the geopolitical significance of Byzantium for the West. After all, Byzantium was an important actor in the Latin principalities in Syria-Palestine, the welfare of which was close to the hearts of West European Christendom.⁹

Prior to their arrival in Constantinople, therefore, the participants in the Fourth Crusade already had a perception of the Byzantine Empire.

⁶ Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, pp. 29–62. Gill, *Venice, Genoa and Byzantium*, pp. 57–73. Lilie, *Handel und Politik zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den italienischen Kommunen*, Amsterdam, 1984. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, pp. 1–123.

⁷ Ebels-Hoving, *Byzantium in Westerse Ogen*, p. 35.

⁸ Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader*, pp. 9–10. Blöndal, *The Varangians of Byzantium*, p. 141. Kazhdan & Epstein, *Change in Byzantine Culture*, p. 173. Ciggaar, *Flemish mercenaries in Byzantium*, pp. 44–75.

⁹ Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States*, Oxford, 1993. Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, Oxford, 1996.

In this respect, Ebels-Hoving indicates that, in comparison with the first half of the twelfth century, Western attention for the Byzantine world increased significantly in the years 1180–1204.¹⁰ Moreover, there was special attention for the wonders and riches of the capital Constantinople in particular. Apart from that, there prevailed a number of stereotypical prejudices with regard to the Byzantines, which stemmed originally from the literature of the classic antiquity: they were cowardly, wicked and haughty. Lastly, from the late twelfth century the Byzantines were often accused of being heretics. Ebels-Hoving concludes that there existed a certain feeling of alienation with respect to the Byzantine world, but at the same time opposes the idea still popular in the more recent literature of a growing, generalized Latin enmity toward Byzantium on the eve of the Fourth Crusade.¹¹

THE FOURTH CRUSADE AND THE LATIN CONQUEST OF CONSTANTINOPLE

The deviation of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople is a controversial issue in historiography. For more than 150 years, successive generations of medievalists and Byzantinists have substantiated widely divergent views of the facts. It is the opinion of past, and also a number of present-day and influential Byzantinists, that the deviation to Constantinople was the result of a conspiracy of the West against Byzantium, the inevitable consequence of a Latin threat to Byzantium that had grown in the course of the twelfth century.¹² As has been discussed above, a real threat to Byzantium towards the end of the twelfth century appears not to have existed. More important, however, is that the aforementioned authors completely ignore the internal dynamics of the crusade. Authors who were aware of this factor have made it plausible that the Latin taking of Constantinople in 1204 was neither inevitable nor the result of an anti-Byzantine conspiracy. These authors do not fail to take into account the Latin ambitions

¹⁰ Ebels-Hoving, *Byzantium in Westerse ogen*, pp. 244–245, 251–252, 258–259, 264–265.

¹¹ Ibidem, pp. 38–39, 266–269. Idem, *Byzantium in Latin Eyes before 1204*, pp. 28–29.

¹² Queller, *The Latin Conquest of Constantinople*, New York, 1971. More recently: Brand, *Byzantium confronts the West*, pp. 206, 234. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, pp. 119–120. Browning, *The Byzantine Empire*, p. 188.

with respect to Byzantium, but they do not regard these as an all-determining factor.¹³

In the first year of his pontificate, Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) proclaimed a crusade for the recapture of the city of Jerusalem. In late 1199 and early 1200, a number of French feudal princes, barons and knights took the cross. The initial leaders—Louis, Count of Blois, Chartrain and Clermont, Baldwin IX (VI), Count of Flanders and Hainaut, and Hugh IV, Count of Saint-Pol—chose as their commander-in-chief Boniface II, Marquis of Montferrat, as the result of which enthusiasm for the crusade also grew in Northern Italy, Burgundy, the Rhine area and a number of other regions belonging to the Holy Roman Empire.¹⁴ The crusade leaders decided at the start to travel by sea to the Holy Land, and early in 1201 reached agreement about this with the city of Venice.¹⁵

Whilst preparations for the expedition continued, in the autumn of 1201, Alexios (IV) Angelos, son of the deposed Byzantine Emperor Isaac II Angelos (1185–1195), arrived in the West from Constantinople. His objective was to seek support at the court of his brother-in-law *rex Romanorum* Philip of Swabia (1198–1208) for his endeavours to take the Byzantine throne himself. Philip, brother of the late Holy Roman Emperor Henry VI (1191–1197) was, however, not in a position to offer his brother-in-law the support he requested. Negotiations with the papal court to use the impending crusade to fulfil Alexios's ambitions met up with Innocent's veto.¹⁶

In June 1202 the crusading army mustered in Venice. It very soon became apparent that there was no possibility of their being able to pay the sums of money promised to Venice for transport. Despite great internal dissension within the army, the leaders of the crusade accepted the proposal that while en route to the crusade they should, in return for deferment of payment, recapture the Dalmatian coastal city of Zara, which was at that moment in the hands of the Christian

¹³ Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade* (2nd edition), Philadelphia, 1997. Madden, *Outside and inside the Fourth Crusade*, pp. 733–734. Phillips, *The Fourth Crusade*, pp. 311–312.

¹⁴ Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, pp. 1–8. For a detailed discussion of the participants in the crusade: Longnon, *Les compagnons de Villehardouin*, Genève, 1978.

¹⁵ Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, pp. 9–20.

¹⁶ Ibidem, pp. 21–39. Angold, *Byzantine politics vis-à-vis the Fourth Crusade*, pp. 62–63.

Hungarian King Emmerich I (1196–1204), for La Serenissima. With this, the Doge of Venice himself, together with a large number of his fellow citizens, now determined to join the expedition. In the early October of 1202 the crusading fleet departed from Venice, and in mid-November Zara was taken without difficulty, despite a message from Pope Innocent explicitly forbidding this. A crusading army fighting Christians was nothing entirely new: for example during the Third Crusade while on his way to the Holy Land King Richard I of England had already lead his army against the towns of Bagnara in Calabria and Messina in Sicily.¹⁷

At Zara arrived emissaries from both Philip of Swabia and pretender to the throne Alexios (IV), who made a very attractive proposition to the crusade leaders. In exchange for enthroning Alexios on the Byzantine throne, the latter promised to submit the Byzantine Church to the authority of Rome, to provide 200.000 marks of silver and supplies for the crusading army, Byzantine participation in the expedition with a 10.000-strong army, and the maintenance of a garrison of 500 knights in the Holy Land for the rest of his life. Despite major dissension once again in the Crusaders' camp, the leaders of the crusade accepted the proposition. Boniface of Montferrat and the Doge of Venice had their own motives for accepting the offer. The Venetian interests in the Byzantine Empire would doubtless benefit from having a friendly emperor on the throne of Constantinople. At the end of the twelfth century Boniface's father and brothers held not unimportant positions at the Byzantine court, as a result of which he possibly nursed the ambition of following in their footsteps.¹⁸

At the end of June 1203 the Crusading fleet arrived at Constantinople. The city refused to receive Alexios as emperor, upon which the crusading army embarked on a siege. After a few inefficient attempts at military resistance, Emperor Alexios III fled the city in early June. The Byzantine aristocracy thereupon recognized the deposed Emperor Isaac II as the legitimate emperor. A compromise was reached with the crusading army that Alexios IV would become Isaac's co-Emperor, and Isaac ratified the agreement into which his son had entered. It quickly became apparent that this was inoperable in the short term,

¹⁷ Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, pp. 40–78. Painter, *The Third Crusade*, pp. 58–59.

¹⁸ Hoffman, *Rudimente von Territorialstaaten*, pp. 28–31. Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations*, pp. 110–111, 418–419. Barker, *Late Byzantine Thessalonike*, pp. 10–11.

and the crusade leaders decided to remain in Constantinople until March 1204.¹⁹

Once in power, Alexios IV, under the influence of the imperial court, quickly failed to fulfil his obligations to the crusading army. Hereupon, crusaders embarked on pillage in the vicinity of Constantinople in order to raise the money promised to them. As the result of the failure of Alexios IV to take efficient retaliatory action, at the end of January 1204 the Byzantine aristocracy and populace rebelled against his rulership. In the ensuing chaos Alexios Mourtzouphlos, *protovestiarios* at the emperor's court, succeeded in capturing—and later killing—Alexios IV and seizing power. The violent take-over of power also meant the end for the aged and ailing Emperor Isaac II, who had already been obliged to relinquish the actual administration to his son. The crusade leaders did not recognize Alexios V as the legitimate emperor and saw him rather as the murderer of their erstwhile ally, although a halfhearted attempt at negotiations with the new ruler did take place.²⁰

The death of Alexios IV meant that the agreement entered into with him was no longer valid. Despite its difficult financial and material situation, there was in principle no longer anything to prevent the army from setting sail for the Holy Land.²¹ However, in March 1204 the leaders of the crusade in the name both of the Venetian and non-Venetian components of the crusading army entered into an agreement, the object of which was to conquer the city of Constantinople and subdue the entire Byzantine Empire. The context in which the leaders of the Crusade decided to take the singular step of seizing the Byzantine Empire is an important element that has received only little attention in the historiography of the Fourth Crusade.

The take-over of the Byzantine Empire was not the only option left to the crusading army in the period February–March 1204. For example, the army could have decided to extort the necessary finances and supplies from the Byzantine cities along the coast of Asia Minor during their voyage to the Holy Land. The arguments of Queller and Madden that the fleet would have been unable to put to sea in March

¹⁹ Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, pp. 79–134.

²⁰ Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, pp. 168–169. Madden, *Vows and contracts*, pp. 445–460. Phillips, *The Fourth Crusade*, pp. 210–212, 225. Angold, *Byzantine Politics vis-à-vis the Fourth Crusade*, pp. 64–67.

²¹ Madden, *Vows and contracts*, pp. 461–462.

because of the unfavourable season, that the crusaders did not dare embark because of a possible Byzantine sortie, or that the resumption of the expedition to Syria with an impoverished army was psychologically problematic for the crusade leaders, in our opinion don't sound very convincing or compelling.²²

One component of the crusading army however would have had much to loose if there were a hostile emperor on the Byzantine throne, as Queller correctly stated in the first edition of his study of the Fourth Crusade. The Venetian trading interests in the Byzantine Empire would surely suffer heavy and possibly irreparable damage.²³ From this point of view, it was essential for the Doge that the Byzantine question be solved. Put simply, that solution was the installation of a friendly emperor. However, who from the Byzantine aristocracy could at this point be considered as being trustworthy from a Venetian or Latin point of view? For the Venetians there can only have been one conclusive remedy: a Latin emperor on the throne of Constantinople. In any event, the Venetians had one strong card: without their fleet the crusading army was going nowhere.

The following arguments will probably have played a part in convincing the rest of the crusade leaders.²⁴ The conquest of the Byzantine Empire offered Latin Christendom two major advantages. Firstly, the Byzantine Church would be brought under the control of papal authority. Secondly, in Byzantium a government would come into power that could offer dependable support to the crusader states in Syria and Palestine.²⁵ In addition, the Venetians perhaps appealed to the pride of the feudal princes that had been hurt by Byzantine 'treachery'. Doubtless the opportunities of personal enrichment also will have played a role. The leading churchmen of the expedition were next found willing to provide the necessary justification for an attack on Constantinople, presenting such a war as a just war or even a crusade in its own right and granting the crusading indulgence to those who would die in the assault, to win over the bulk of the crusader army.²⁶

After a first failed assault on 9 April 1204, the crusading army carried out a successful attack on the city of Constantinople on 12 April

²² Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, pp. 170–173.

²³ Queller, *The Fourth Crusade*, p. 138.

²⁴ Madden, *Vows and contracts*, p. 463.

²⁵ Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States*, pp. 227–245.

²⁶ Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, pp. 173–174.

1204. In the night of 12–13 April, Emperor Alexios V Mourtzouphlos fled the city, which was then pillaged for three days long, the customary period of time for the sack of a conquered city.²⁷ In the historiography, the taking and plundering of the city, in combination with the fires that had destroyed parts of the city during the military actions of 1203–1204, is often referred to as extremely violent and merciless, and frequently quoted as being the cause of a supposed definitive abhorrence of the Byzantine population to the Latin invaders.²⁸ Given that the attitude of the Byzantine population of Constantinople towards the Latin invaders is of great importance within the framework of the development of the Latin Empire after 1204, it is worthwhile examining whether the Latin conquest was indeed extremely violent and destructive.

Until quite recently, the prevalent opinion was that the successive conflagrations of the years 1203–1204 reduced one-third to one-half of Constantinople to ashes.²⁹ Madden, however, has hypothesized that no more than one-sixth of the city was burnt down.³⁰ This last postulation is in our view to be nuanced further in the sense that approximately one-sixth of the area of the city suffered *to a greater or lesser extent* from the successive fires. For example, Madden's argumentation concerning the destruction of the Church of the Anastasis is not convincing. In 1207 it was attested that a Latin chapter was housed in the church, which indicates that the church had perhaps suffered some fire damage, but had certainly not been destroyed completely.³¹ Furthermore, contrary to Madden's findings Jacoby has pointed out conclusively that the Venetian quarter (from before 1204) was not touched by the flames.³²

The Latin acts of violence—murder, sexual assault, the plundering of churches, palaces and houses, all manner of vandalism, mockery of

²⁷ Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, pp. 177–203. Callegari, *Il sacco di Costantinopoli*, passim.

²⁸ Runciman, *The Kingdom of Acre*, p. 130. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, pp. 143–144. Angold, *Byzantium in exile*, p. 543. Housley, *The Thirteenth-Century Crusades in the Mediterranean*, p. 571.

²⁹ Charanis, *A Note on the Population and Cities*, p. 257.

³⁰ Madden, *The Fires of the Fourth Crusade*, pp. 88–89. Followed by: Jacoby, *The Urban Evolution of Latin Constantinople*, p. 280.

³¹ Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, t. 215, col. 1376 (XI, 52). Cf. Madden, *The fires of the Fourth Crusade*, pp. 79–80. On this church: Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, pp. 20–25.

³² Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, p. 41.

Byzantine traditions—are described in numerous sources, both Latin and Byzantine. However, at the same time are also described examples of mercy shown to the defeated population, and of respect for Byzantine nuns. An exact idea of the scale of the violence cannot be gained from the subjective, mostly hyperbolic character of the sources. Nonetheless, the sources are in agreement about one matter: the material spoils were gigantic.³³ The description of the Latin conquest written by the Byzantine author George Akropolites (1217–1282), who had spent his youth in Constantinople, gives perhaps the most accurate assessment of the events of 1204: Constantinople underwent the fate of a conquered city. In this context it should not be forgotten that the sack of the Byzantine capital was not an unprecedented event: during Alexios I Komnenos' military coup in 1081 Constantinople was also plundered for several days by his army composed predominantly of foreigners, which was soon joined by part of the metropolitan population: all kinds of acts of violence, including murder and the desecration of churches, were committed on a large scale throughout the city.³⁴

THE INITIAL BYZANTINE REACTION TO THE LATIN TAKING OF CONSTANTINOPLE

A determining factor as to whether or not the planned Latin re-creation of the Byzantine empire would be a success was the initial reaction of Byzantine society to the Latin taking of Constantinople and to the planned Latin take-over of the Byzantine Empire. There is, however, no consensus about this in the historiography. The preponderant image is that of intense loathing on the part of the Byzantine elite and populace against the Latins because of the outrages committed during

³³ Niketas Choniates, *Orationes et Epistulae, Logoi*: n° 13–14, n° 16–17. Stilbes, *Mémoire*, pp. 56–57. Mesarites, *Reisebericht*, p. 35. Magdalino, *A neglected authority for the history of the Peloponnese*, pp. 316–323. Cf. also: Irmischer, *Nikāa als "Mittelpunkt des griechischen Patriotismus"*, pp. 114–137. Prinzing, *Das Byzantinische Kaisertum im Umbruch*, pp. 129–183. Brand, *Byzantium confronts the West*, pp. 259–269. Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, pp. 193–203.

³⁴ Akropolites, §4. An account of the 1081 events based on the chronicles of John Zonaras and Anna Komnena: Chalandon, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis Ier Comnène*, pp. 49–53.

the taking of Constantinople, from which a general unwillingness to co-operate with the new Latin rulers is derived.³⁵

The approach to the question by the authors who argue against the idea of a Byzantine preparedness to co-operation with the Latins after 1204 is open to criticism. This applies in particular to the relatively uncritical manner in which the available material is dealt with. The Byzantine authors who witnessed the occurrences of 1204 or those who wrote after the recapture of Latin Constantinople in 1261 and who to a man severely condemned the Latin invasion, were all representatives of the former pre-1204 imperial aristocracy or of the Nicaean political elite, who were to return to Constantinople in 1261. We should therefore not be surprised by the intensely anti-Latin position of these authors from their descriptions of the occurrences of 1204. However, there is no reason to assume that they were *the* voice of Byzantine opinion. Indeed, viewing the Byzantine population in their reaction to the occurrences of 1204 as a uniform mass appears to us to be unjust. A fresh analysis of the Byzantine reaction to the occurrences of 1204 is essential.

As mentioned above, from the end of the eleventh century Byzantium's relations with the West became more intense.³⁶ The numerous economic, political, diplomatic and military contacts caused quite a considerable number of westerners to dwell in the Byzantine Empire, and particularly in Constantinople, in the course of the twelfth century. In this way, the Byzantine elite and general populace came into direct contact to an increasing extent with the West.

³⁵ Runciman, *The Kingdom of Acre*, pp. 130–131. Karpozilos, *The ecclesiastical controversy*, p. 47. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, pp. 143–144. Dendias, *Sur les rapports entre les Grecs et les Francs*, pp. 371–376. Angold, *Byzantine 'nationalism' and the Nicaean Empire*, pp. 49–50. Idem, *Greeks and Latins after 1204*, pp. 67–68. Irmscher, *Nikäa als "Mittelpunkt des griechischen Patriotismus"*, pp. 120–121. Prinzing, *Das Byzantinische Kaisertum im Umbruch*, p. 130. Ahrweiler, *L'expérience nicéenne*, p. 23. Papagianna, *The echo of the events of 1204 in Byzantine documents*, pp. 313–322. Many Greek scholars have assigned a pivotal role to the Fourth Crusade and its consequences for Byzantium in the development of a Greek national consciousness and a Greek nation (cf. Sansaridou-Hendrickx, *The Awakening of Greek National Consciousness during the 13th Century*, pp. 156–167).

³⁶ Geanakoplos, *Interaction of the 'Sibling' Byzantine and western cultures*, pp. 55–117. Idem, *Important recent research in Byzantine-Western relations*, pp. 60–78. Laiou, *Byzantium and the West*, pp. 61–79.

In the earlier, and to a certain extent also in more recent historiography, there is a predominant perception that from the end of the eleventh century to the end of the twelfth century a general and quite strong anti-Latin feeling had grown in the various different social sections of Byzantine society.³⁷ Ahrweiler in particular has even argued that such an anti-Latin attitude formed part of the Byzantine political and ideological system.³⁸ However, several decades ago Geanakoplos put forward the postulation that the anti-Latin feelings in Byzantium were to take on a more generalized nature only after 1204.³⁹ More recently, in the same sense Kazhdan sketched a more subtle and convincing picture of the Byzantine attitude towards the Latin West in the twelfth century. The author concludes that in several areas, Byzantine society became increasingly open to the West, which resulted both in forms of collaboration and in a certain mutual animosity. Kazhdan however, sees no place for a generalized and deep-rooted anti-Latin sentiment, which in addition would have formed part of Byzantine ideology. Page has recently proposed that the prejudices against Latins of (part of) the Constantinopolitan elite were inter alia balanced by a more benevolent attitude among businessmen in provincial market towns.⁴⁰

A more convincing element in Byzantine political thinking concluded by Ahrweiler is the emergence in the twelfth century of a regionalist tendency, coupled with an anti-Constantinopolitan attitude, which would culminate in a series of separatist disturbances in the period 1180–1204, which seriously put to the test—and eroded—the territorial integrity of the empire.⁴¹ The background for the coming into being of these regionalist and separatist tendencies has not yet

³⁷ Nicol, *The Last centuries of Byzantium* (2nd edition), pp. 4–6. Angold, *Church and Society*, p. 507. Idem, *The Road to 1204*, pp. 272–278. Runciman, *The Eastern Schism*, p. 124. Bayer, *Spaltung der Christenheit*, pp. 203–213. Herrin, *The Collapse of the Byzantine Empire*, pp. 191–193.

³⁸ Ahrweiler, *L'idéologie politique de l'Empire byzantin*, pp. 75–87.

³⁹ Geanakoplos, *Byzantine East and Latin West*, pp. 1–4.

⁴⁰ Kazhdan & Epstein, *Change in Byzantine Culture*, pp. 172–196. Kazhdan, *Latins and Franks in Byzantium*, pp. 83, 91–99. Page, *Being Byzantine*, pp. 68–69. Cf. also: Laiou, *Byzantium and the West*, pp. 65–79. Idem, *Byzantium and the Crusades in the Twelfth Century*, p. 16. Ferjancic, *Rapports entre Grecs et Latins après 1204*, pp. 171–176. Jacoby, *From Byzantium to Latin Romania*, p. 6. Hrochova, *Le destin des artisans et des marchands byzantins*, pp. 161–175.

⁴¹ Ahrweiler, *L'idéologie politique*, pp. 88–102. Angold, *The Road to 1204*, pp. 261–278.

been clarified sufficiently in the historiography, but nonetheless, two interesting partial explanations can be touched upon: the economic emancipation of these provinces vis-à-vis the capital and the growing indifference of the imperial administration in Constantinople to the welfare of the provinces. This indifference was linked to rather generalized sentiments of superiority among the Constantinopolitan elite, who seem to have considered themselves as the only true *Romaioi*, resulting in a growing dissatisfaction with imperial rule in the provinces.⁴²

The development of a negative attitude in the provinces vis-à-vis the central authorities in Constantinople, together with the growth of a desire for more regional autonomy in the later twelfth century, are two tendencies which, in the context of the Latin take-over of the Byzantine empire, will prove to be more important than the latent anti-Latin sentiment within the Byzantine population.

If we now examine the question as to what the initial reaction of the Byzantine population was to the Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204, we limit ourselves to the imperial elite domiciled in Constantinople, since the sources provide scarcely any information concerning the broader strata of the capital's inhabitants. This imperial elite was in essence made up of the families whose members held rank within the hierarchy of the imperial court, occupied a high civil or military office in the imperial administration, or carried out an important ecclesiastical function in the patriarchal church of Constantinople. This political elite was at the same time the cultural, intellectual and socio-economic elite. They can be divided into two sub-groups: the military aristocracy, with inter alia the clan of families related to the imperial lineages of the Komnenoi and the Angeloi, and the civil aristocracy.⁴³

⁴² Herrin, *Realities of Byzantine provincial government*, pp. 252–284. Lilie, *Die Zentralbürokratie und die Provinzen*, pp. 65–75. Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations*, p. 427. Hoffman, *Rudimente von Territorialstaaten*, pp. 77–140. Page, *Being Byzantine*, pp. 49–50, 69–70. Cf. also: Angold, *Byzantine politics vis-à-vis the Fourth Crusade*, p. 57.

⁴³ Kazhdan & Ronchey, *L'aristocrazia bizantina*, p. 330. Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations*, p. 191. The magnitude of the imperial court at the end of the ninth century, on the basis of the number of invitations for the traditional Christmas banquets, has been estimated at around 1600 (male) persons (or more cautiously between 1000 and 2000), including most higher military officers, civil servants, court dignitaries and patriarchal clerics (Kazhdan & McCormick, *The Social World of the Byzantine Court*, pp. 176–182).

In order to examine the reaction of the aforementioned elite to the Latin conquest of Constantinople, we work with two complementary methods. The first method consists of discovering what information the narrative source material has to offer with respect to concrete individuals. By means of the second method we endeavour to transcend the limitations of this source material by tracing in the subsequent period those families that prior to 1204 belonged to the Byzantine imperial elite.

Niketas Choniates (1155/57–1217), who prior to 1204 as *logothetes ton sekreton* was a senior functionary in the imperial administration, indicates how the Latin leaders, after the taking of Constantinople permitted those members of the Byzantine population wanting to leave the city to do so.⁴⁴ Choniates states that upon this, throngs of people from the class to which he belonged left Constantinople.⁴⁵ He makes mention of a few specific persons: himself and his family, a judge with whom he was friendly, and the Patriarch of Constantinople, John X Kamateros. The group of which Choniates was a member travelled to the fortified Thracian city of Salymbria, approximately 100 km from Constantinople, where for the time being their journey ended. As a reason for the exodus, Niketas Choniates states that the Latins were not prepared to coexist with the Byzantines, they turned them out of their houses, robbed, insulted and drove them away.⁴⁶ George Akropolites (1217–1282), who grew up in Latin Constantinople and later occupied senior functions at the Nicaean imperial court, subsequently doing the same in the re-conquered Constantinople, confirms that part of the Byzantine aristocracy fled the city shortly after its Latin conquest.⁴⁷ Nicolas Mesarites (ca. 1163–post 1214), who until 1204 belonged to the patriarchal clergy of Constantinople, confirms that numerous inhabitants of the capital left Constantinople after it was conquered, but he indicates at the same time that some members of the Byzantine aristocracy—including himself, his brother John Mesarites and his mother—remained in the capital.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Niketas Choniates, p. 587. A short biography of Choniates in: Page, *Being Byzantine*, pp. 73–75.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, pp. 588–594.

⁴⁶ Ibidem, pp. 586–587.

⁴⁷ Akropolites, §6.

⁴⁸ Mesarites, *Der Epitaphios*, §48. Ook: *Chronista Novgorodensis*, p. 343.

Geoffrey of Villehardouin, one of the most important leading barons of the Fourth Crusade and later marshal of the Latin Empire, tells likewise how after the taking of Constantinople *li halt home de Grece* left the city of Constantinople. A considerable number travelled to Byzantine Asia Minor, but others fled to other imperial provinces. In this, each endeavoured to build up his possessions in the region where his own personal domains lay.⁴⁹ This last fact indicates that with *li halt home de Grece* Villehardouin meant in particular the class of major landowners, the military aristocracy. One of the most important figures in this group was Theodore Laskaris, the son-in-law of Emperor Alexios III (1195–1203) and in that capacity until 1203 the most likely heir to the throne. In the period 1204–1208 he built up in north-west Asia Minor a principality with as its capital Nicaea, which claimed to be the legitimate successor to the Byzantine Empire. Robert of Clari confirms that on the taking of Constantinople the Byzantine political elite fled the city, as the result of which only the ‘*povre gent*’ remained.⁵⁰ Gunther of Pairis supports Clari’s assertion by stating that it was especially women, children and the elderly—who were not in a position to flee—that were left behind in the city.⁵¹

The question now is how the attitude of the Byzantine imperial elite evolved in the period that followed the chaotic days of the taking and sacking of Constantinople. There were two options: either return to Constantinople, or build a new life elsewhere, whether in territories that came to fall under Latin imperial suzerainty, or in the neighbouring, burgeoning independent Byzantine states.

After his flight from Constantinople, Niketas Choniates stayed until mid-1206 in Salymbria, which in the meantime had fallen under Latin rule. He then travelled to Latin Constantinople, where he lived for some six months, to depart at the end of 1206 or the beginning of 1207 to Nicaea. Did Choniates in vain try in the first instance to continue his career as functionary in the imperial administration in Latin Constantinople in 1206? However, in Nicaea too,—apparently

⁴⁹ Villehardouin, §266.

⁵⁰ De Clari, §§79–80.

⁵¹ Gunther Van Pairis, p. 157. *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, p. 92: ‘*Sequenti die Greci omnes ceciderunt ante pedes marchionis, et se et sua omnia in manus eius dederunt. Tunc hospicia accepimus, et Greci a civitate fugerunt.*’ *Anonymi Suessionensis De Terra Iherosolimitana Et Quomodo Ab Urbe Constantinopolitana Ad Hanc Ecclesiam Allate Sunt Reliquie*, p. 7.

Choniates' second choice—he was unable to obtain any top-ranking political position, and his exile there was a relative disillusionment.⁵² Choniates also describes the fate of two partners in adversity. Patriarch John X Kamateros spent his remaining years in Didymoteichon (†1206), without ever again playing a role of any significance.⁵³ Remarkably enough, he refused an invitation from the self-proclaimed Byzantine Emperor in exile, Theodore Laskaris, to join his court in Nicaea.⁵⁴ Constantine Tornikes, who prior to 1204 as *logothetes tou dromou* held a very senior function in the Byzantine imperial administration, initially went into the service of the Latin Emperor Baldwin, and after the latter's defeat at Adrianople in 1205 defected to the Bulgarian camp.⁵⁵ Michael Doukas too, who was related to the imperial lineages of the Angeloi and the Komnenoi, and who had held responsible positions in the imperial administration, initially chose to take up duties with the Latins. At the end of 1204 he departed with Boniface of Montferrat on his campaign of conquest through Macedonia and Thessaly. However, en route Doukas opted for a different political future and he determined to develop his own autonomous principality in Epiros.

The episode of the Byzantine uprising in Thrace with Bulgarian support in the period 1205–1206 offers further interesting information about the initial attitude of the Byzantine imperial elite to the new Latin rulers. The initiative for this action originated within the entourage of emperor Alexios III, who—having fled Constantinople in 1203—was taken captive in 1204 by Boniface of Montferrat during the latter's advance through Thessaly. Alexios's entourage had offered the marquis to join his service, but Boniface had declined. Emperor Baldwin also refused to take them into his service. This segment of the Byzantine aristocracy, with the help of the Bulgarian sovereign Kalojan, then unleashed an uprising in Thrace against the Latin dominion, the hotbeds of this being the cities of Didymoteichon and Adrianople, the local elites of which were prepared to support the rebellion. However, in the spring of 1206 the rebelling Byzantine aristocracy in question reached an agreement with the Latins: the region round Adrianople and Didymoteichon became a feudal principality dependent on Latin imperial suzerainty under the government of the Byzantine magnate

⁵² Kazhdan, *Niketas Choniates*, p. 428.

⁵³ Niketas Choniates, p. 633.

⁵⁴ Akropolites, §73.

⁵⁵ Niketas Choniates, p. 643.

Theodore Branas, who from April 1204 onwards had consistently chosen the Latin camp.⁵⁶ As a result of this Latin-Byzantine agreement, some of Alexios II's Constantinopolitan entourage settled—probably definitively—in this region, and it is quite possible that others returned to Constantinople to join the service of the Latin emperor. In any event, chronicler George Akropolites indicates in general terms that under the Latin Emperor Henry (1206–1216) numerous members of the ancient Constantinopolitan elite obtained important civil and military positions.⁵⁷

In circa October 1206 Nicolas Mesarites sketched the situation of the former Byzantine imperial elite as follows: some of the Constantinopolitan aristocracy had stayed in the capital, other groups departed to Bulgaria, to Nicaea, the region under Emperor Theodore I Laskaris, to Paphlagonia, the region under the Byzantine magnate David Komnenos, and even to the Seljuk Sultanate of Konya.⁵⁸ Mesarites himself, disillusioned by the attitude of the Latin ecclesiastical leaders to the aspirations of the Byzantine metropolitan clergy, was in 1207 to depart for Nicaea in order to carry on his clerical career successfully there, whilst his mother—probably with other family members—continued to live in Constantinople.⁵⁹ Some members of the Constantinopolitan elite also made their way to Epiros. Demetrios Chomatenos, archbishop of Achrida (1215–1235), was even of the opinion that half of the refugees from Constantinople, including members of the imperial aristocracy, ended up in Epirote territory.⁶⁰ A problem here is that Chomatenos wrote some two decades after 1204 and that about that time the Epirots had already captured some considerable Latin territories in Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace. Consequently, the question is the extent to which these people had perhaps settled initially in regions within the Latin Empire. Moreover, Chomatenos often had propagandist intentions in his correspondence: the legitimacy of the Epirote rulers—who were to take on the Byzantine imperial title

⁵⁶ Villehardouin, §403.

⁵⁷ Akropolites, §16.

⁵⁸ Mesarites, *Der Epitaphios*, §48.

⁵⁹ Heisenberg, *Neue Quellen I*, p. 5, p. 14. Hoeck & Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otrante*, pp. 35–52.

⁶⁰ Nicol, *Refugees, mixed population and local patriotism*, p. 11.

after the taking of Latin Thessalonike in 1224—with respect to their rivals in Nicaea.⁶¹

We can state that in the years 1204–1207 some members of the former imperial elite were prepared to settle under Latin rule. This was particularly the case after the new masters as a result of the, for them, disastrous Bulgarian-Byzantine alliance in Thrace in the years 1205–1206, had demonstrated their preparedness to allot the Byzantine aristocracy a substantial political role. This component of the Byzantine elite stayed either in Constantinople in the direct service of the Latin emperor, or settled in principalities that were under the suzerainty of the Latin emperor. Families from both the military and civil aristocracy chose collaboration or coexistence with the Latins. Another part of the Byzantine imperial aristocracy opted not to remain under Latin rule. In this context, a number of Byzantine magnates with direct links with the Byzantine imperial lineages established independent Byzantine states, inter alia in Nicaea and in Epiros. These states attracted some of the Constantinopolitan aristocracy, but for figures such as Niketas Choniates and Nicolas Mesarites this option appears to have been only a second choice, after their ambitions in Latin Constantinople had come to naught.

Whilst in themselves interesting, the results of our re-examination of the familiar sources are far from satisfactory. It is difficult to conclude from the narrative sources discussed what proportion of the Byzantine aristocracy adopted which attitude to the Latin rulers. We would like to remedy this by means of a way of working that is inspired by the prosopographical method. On the basis of Kazhdan's work about the Byzantine aristocracy in the eleventh and twelfth century we define the group that formed the Byzantine imperial elite immediately prior to 1204: some 161 families.⁶²

The question now is as to the fate of these families after 1204. As we have seen, a number of them are to be found easily shortly after 1204 in the source material available to us. For a large number of other families, the construction of a hypothesis about their situation in the years after 1204 will appear to be the only possibility. We shall use the

⁶¹ Karpozilos, *The ecclesiastical controversy*, p. 40, p. 61. Ook: Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, n° 94.

⁶² Kazhdan & Ronchey, *L'aristocrazia bizantina*, pp. 248–255.

Table 1: The 161 families constituting the Byzantine imperial elite prior to 1204.

1. Aboudimos	Doukas	Klaudiopolites	Pegonites
Akropolites	Drimys	Komites	Pepagomenos
Alyates	Eirenikos	Komnenos	Petaliphas
Amaseianos	Eleodorites	Kontostephanos	Philokales
Angelos	Exazenos-Galeas	Kopsenos	Phrangopoulos
Antiochos	Gabalas	Kostomyres	Pikrides
Anzas	Gabrades	Kourtikios	Pothos
Aoinos	Gabrielakites	Krateros	Probatas
Apimpithioun	Galaton	Kritopoulos	Prosouch
Aplesphares	Galenos	Lapardas	Psellos
Aplucheiros	Gerardi	Lascaris	Pyrros
Apokaukos	Gidos	Lebounes	Radenos
Apotiradi	Glabas	Lepentrenos	Raoul
Aristenos	Hagiochristophorites	Makrembolites	Rogeros
Armenopoulos	Hagioeuphemites	Makrocheir	Romanakes
Aspietes	Hagiostephanites	Mandales	Sarakenopoulos
Attichos	Hagiotheodorites	Maniakes	Schoinas
Autoreianos	Hagiozacharites	Mankaphas	Senachereim
Axouchos	Ionopolites	Manuelites	Sergopoulos
Balanites	Kabasilas	Maroules	Sgouros
Balsamon	Kalamanos	Matzukes	Skoutariotes
Belissariotes	Kaloethes	Maurommates	Smyrnaioi
Beriboes	Kalouphe	Mauropous	Spanopoulos
Blachernites	Kamateros	Maurozomes	Splenarios
Boioannes	Kampanarios	Melissenos	Stethatos
Botaneiates	Kamytzes	Mesarites	Strobelos
Branas	Kanabos	Mesopotamites	Synadenos
Bryennios	Kantakouzenos	Monasteriotes	Syropoulos
Chalkoutzes	Kapandrites	Monomachos	Taronites
Chamaretos	Kappadokes	Moschos	Tatikios
Charsianites	Karantenos	Mourtzouphlos	Tessarakontapechos
Chites	Karatzas	Mouzalou	Tornikes
Choniates	Karikes	Opsikianos	Trichas
Choumnos	Kasiteras	Padiates	Tripsychos
Chrysoberges	Kaspax	Pakourianos	Tzitas
Chrysos	Kastamonites	Paleologos	Tzykandeleis
Chysanthos	Katakallontes	Panagiotes	Vatatzes
Dalassenos	Kataphloron	Panaretos	161. Xiphilinos
Dermokaites	Kazanos	Pantechnes	
Dishypathos	Kephalas	Paxenos	
Dokeianos	Kinnamos	Pediadites	

following basic assumptions in order to make closer study of the fate of these families after 1204.

Firstly, families that are attested to have been in regions falling under the suzerainty of the Latin emperor in the period 1204–1261, are assumed to have opted, shortly after 1204, for a life under the new Latin masters. After all, it would seem highly unlikely that families in the decades following 1204—and in particular after 1224, when the geopolitical strength of the empire in the Byzantine space considerably weakened—having first sought sanctuary in Nicaea or Epiros, for example, would then have settled under Latin rule. Secondly, we use the year 1224 as the chronological cut-off point in the sense that the attestation of families only after 1224 in, for example, the Nicaean empire and the Epirote state, is to be considered as being of only little significance as regards the situation of these families in the intervening period of 1204–1224. Their presence in Nicaea or Epiros after 1224 can very well be the result of the severe military setbacks of the Latin Empire in 1224. The year 1217 can even be seen as being the *terminus ante quem* for the region of Epiros, in view of the fact that, after that time, Theodore Doukas, ruler of Epiros, had already conquered considerable Latin territories in Thessaly and Macedonia.

Of the aforementioned one hundred and sixty-one families that formed the Byzantine imperial elite shortly before 1204, we can with relative certainty retrace twenty-one within the boundaries of the Latin Empire: Akropolites⁶³, Angelos⁶⁴, Blachernites⁶⁵, Branas⁶⁶, Choniates,⁶⁷

⁶³ The father of historiographer Georgios Akropolites (Akropolites, §29).

⁶⁴ Shortly after the Latin taking of Constantinople, Margaret of Hungary, widow of Emperor Isaac II Angelos (1185–1195 and 1203), in 1204 married Boniface of Montferrat. She took her sons from her first marriage—John and Manuel Angelos—to Latin Thessaloniki (Niketas Choniates, pp. 598–600). For a member of the Angelos family in Constantinople circa 1228: cf. Chapter III, note 216.

⁶⁵ Cf. Chapter VI, p. 320.

⁶⁶ Cf. Chapter IV, pp. 158–159.

⁶⁷ As has been seen, Niketas Choniates stayed in Salymbria and Constantinople in the years 1204–1206, subsequently leaving for Nicaea (Kazhdan, *Niketas Choniates*, p. 428; various recent contributions on Choniates' work as a historian and as a writer in: Simpson & Eftymiadis, *Niketas Choniates*, passim). His brother Michael Choniates, metropolitan of Athens, in 1205 went into exile on the isle of Kea, on the Attican coast, and in 1217 entered the *Joannes Prodromos* monastery at Bodonitza, which was under Latin rule. His nephews Niketas and Michael lived in the same region (Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, n° 116, 132).

Charsianites,⁶⁸ Doukas,⁶⁹ Kamytzes,⁷⁰ Klaudiopolites,⁷¹ Komnenos,⁷² Kostomyres,⁷³ Laskaris,⁷⁴ Makrembolites,⁷⁵ Matzukes,⁷⁶ Mesarites,⁷⁷ Petraliphas,⁷⁸ Philokales,⁷⁹ Phrangopoulos,⁸⁰ Pyrros,⁸¹ Synadenos,⁸² Tornikes.⁸³ It is probable that the families Radenos⁸⁴ and Galaton⁸⁵ also resided in the Latin Empire. Eleven of these families we find in or nearby Constantinople (Akropolites, Angelos, Blachernites, Galaton, Laskaris, Matzukes, Mesarites, Philokales, Pyrros, Radenos, Tornikes), two in the principality of Adrianople (Branas, Kostomyres), two in the principality of Paphlagonia (Komnenos, Synadenos), four in the Kingdom of Thessalonike (Angelos, Charsianites, Petraliphas, Phrangopoulos), several in Epiros (inter alia the Doukas family—see also *infra*), one on Euboea (Tornikes), two in Attica-Beotia (Choniates, Makrembolites) and

⁶⁸ Simon, *Witwe Sachlinkina gegen Witwe Horaia*, p. 329, p. 335.

⁶⁹ Cf. Chapter IV, p. 164.

⁷⁰ Deacon John Kamytzes is mentioned in 1216 as *chartophylax* of Metropolitan of Melnik Paul Klaudiopolites (cf. note 71).

⁷¹ In 1216 Paul Klaudiopolites is mentioned as Metropolitan of Melnik, a town lying within the principality of the Rhodopes mountains under Alexios Sthlabos, who had recognized the Latin imperial suzerainty in 1208. Before 1216 Klaudiopolites had been archimandrite of the nearby *Spelaiotissa* monastery, which was founded by Sthlabos (Lefort, *Actes de Vatopédi*, I, n° 12–13; Popovic, *Zur Topographie des spätbyzantinischen Melnik*, p. 115; Pavlikianov, *Byzantine and early Post-Byzantine Documentary Evidence for the City of Melenikon*, pp. 496–497).

⁷² Cf. Chapter IV, p. 158.

⁷³ Michael Kostomyres belonged to the political elite of the feudal principality round Adrianople and Didymoteichon under Theodore Branas. Cf. Chapter IV, p. 159n11.

⁷⁴ In 1222, the brothers of Emperor Theodore I Laskaris of Nicaea fled to Latin Constantinople (Akropolites, §22).

⁷⁵ Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, n° 122–123, 145, 150. Rhoby, *Miscellanea*, n° 9.

⁷⁶ Janin, *Les églises et les monastères*, p. 60. Grünbart, *Nachrichten aus dem Hinterland Konstantinopels*, p. 65. Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, n° 2. Rhoby, *Miscellanea*, n° 2.

⁷⁷ Nicolas Mesarites, his brother John (†1206) and their mother († before 1214) stayed in Constantinople after 1204; Nicolas was later to move to Nicaea (Mesarites, *Der Epitaphios*, §48).

⁷⁸ The Petraliphas family resided in the Latin Kingdom of Thessalonike (cf. Miklosich & Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi*, t. 4, pp. 345–349; Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros*, p. 155).

⁷⁹ Cf. Chapter III, note 32.

⁸⁰ George Phrangopoulos was *doux* of Thessalonike under Latin rule (Chomatenos, *Ponemata Diaphora*, n° 106).

⁸¹ Cf. Chapter III, note 88.

⁸² One Synadenos was the military commanding officer of David Komnenos, ruler of Paphlagonia and liegeman of the Latin emperor (Niketas Choniates, p. 626).

⁸³ Constantine Tornikes in Constantinople: cf. Chapter III, p. 127n89. Euthymios Tornikes in Euboea: Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, n° 97–98, 102–103, 108, 112–113.

⁸⁴ Cf. Chapter III, pp. 114n36, 131n16.

⁸⁵ Cf. Chapter III, p. 116.

two at Melnik in the Rhodopes mountains (Kamytzes, Klaudiopolites). Whilst of course it would not be very worthwhile to carry out statistical calculations on these very small numbers, it is nonetheless striking that the most prominent Byzantine families can be retraced in the autonomous feudal principalities under Latin suzerainty, for example the families Doukas, Komnenos, and Branas. It would appear that in the capital Constantinople it was in particular the families of the civil aristocracy that stayed, for example the Akropolites and Pyrros families. Lastly, families from both the civil and from the military aristocracy that were not related to the imperial families settled in the feudal principalities under Latin rule, inter alia the families Phrangopoulos and Tornikes.

We can trace twenty-one families from the one hundred and sixty-one families mentioned in the Empire of Nicaea in the period 1204–1224: Angelos, Autoreianos, Branas, Choniates, Dermokaites, Gabras, Kamateros, Kamytzes, Komnenos, Kontostephanos, Krateros, Laskaris, Mankaphas, Maurozomes, Mesarites, Paleologos, Phokas, Strategopoulos, Tornikes, Tzykandeles, and Vatatzes.⁸⁶ We find thirteen families in the same period 1204–1217/1224 in Epiros: Apokaukos, Chamaretos, Chomatenos, Dokeianos, Doukas, Kataphloron, Komnenos, Makrembolites, Melissenos, Mesopotamites, Padiadites, Pegonites, and Senachereim.⁸⁷ In Nicaea and Epiros settled families that belonged to the major military landowning aristocracy, whether related to the imperial lineages or not (for example the Angelos, Komnenos, Doukas, Laskaris, Vatatzes, Branas, and Paleologos families), and families that were part of the civil aristocracy (for example the families Choniates, Mesarites, Makrembolites, Padiadites and Pegonites).

⁸⁶ Ahrweiler, *L'histoire et la géographie de la région de Smyrne*, p. 6 (Mankaphas, Maurozomes), p. 132 (Angelos), p. 140 (Krateros), p. 141 (Phokas), p. 149 (Tornikes), p. 171 (Komnenos). Laurent, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat*, p. 1 (Autoreianos), p. 2 (Mesarites), pp. 8–10 (Tzykandeles), p. 20 (Branas). Kazhdan, *Niketas Choniates*, p. 428. Akropolites, §15 (Paleologos, Vatatzes), §16 (Dermokaites), §24 (Kamytzes). Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, p. 1 (Laskaris), p. 7 (Kamateros), pp. 9–10 (Strategopoulos), pp. 10–11 (Gabras, Kontostephanos).

⁸⁷ Nicol, *The despotate of Epiros*, p. 11 (Senachereim), p. 54 (Apokaukos). Magdalino, *A neglected authority*, pp. 316–323 (Chomatenos, Chamaretos). Laurent, *Les regestes des actes du patriarcat*, pp. 32–33. Prinzing, *Studien zur Provinz- und Zentralverwaltung II*, p. 55 (Pegonites), p. 72 (Komnenos), p. 78 (Kataphloron), p. 80 (Padiadites), p. 100 (Melissenos). Nicol, *Refugees*, p. 13 (Makrembolites). Gonis, *Ioannes Kostamoires—Mesopotamites, metropolites Neon Patron*, pp. 723–801.

When we calculate the total number of different families that we find in the Latin Empire, Nicaea and Epiros in the period 1204–1224, we then arrive at forty-six. Of these we find twenty-one in Nicaea, thirteen in Epiros and probably twenty-three in the Latin Empire, bearing in mind that in 1209–1217 Epiros was a feudal principality under Latin imperial suzerainty. This means that for the large majority of the one hundred and sixty-one Byzantine families that prior to 1204 formed the central aristocracy, nothing is known about their reaction to the Latin conquest of 1204. Doubtless, a number of these families settled in Nicaea and Epiros, without however appearing in the sources, and doubtless some travelled to Bulgaria and to the Seljuk Sultanate of Konya, as Nicolas Mesarites indicates. A number of other families must have lost their prominent societal position either prior to 1204 or as the result of the upheaval of 1204, which explains their absence from the sources. An analysis of the provenance of the available source material that provides information about the ruling elite of the different political entities in the Byzantine space for the period 1204–1224 perhaps makes it possible to create a hypothesis about the fate of a considerable number of these approximately one hundred and fifteen families that, after 1204, are ‘invisible’.

The situation with respect to the sources concerning the empire of Nicaea for the period under discussion is relatively favourable. Both narrative and diplomatic sources provide quite a large amount of information about the administrative organization and political elite of the Nicaean empire. The most important are: the chronicles of Niketas Choniates and George Akropolites, the writings of Nicolas Mesarites, a series of imperial and patriarchal charters, and a number of monastic cartularies.⁸⁸ The state of Epiros produced no comparable chronicles, but the voluminous correspondence of three metropolitans from the region—John Apokaukos of Naupaktos, Demetrios Chomatenos of Achrida, George Bardanes of Corfu—contain a wealth of information about the administrative structure and local aristocracy of Epiros.⁸⁹ In comparison with Nicaea and Epiros, the situation with respect to the sources for the reconstruction of the political elite of the Latin Empire can be described as unfavourable. The three important chroniclers of

⁸⁸ Cf. Karayannopoulos & Weiss, *Quellenkunde zur Geschichte von Byzanz*, n° 441–442, n° 444, n° 482–483. Ahrweiler, *L’histoire et la géographie de la région de Smyrne*, p. 13.

⁸⁹ Karayannopoulos & Weiss, *Quellenkunde zur Geschichte von Byzanz*, n° 478–n° 479, n° 484.

the Latin Empire in this period—Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Robert of Clari and Henry of Valenciennes—tell us in only general terms about the administrative organization. Writing for a Western public, they provide hardly any information about the Byzantine elite in the Latin Empire. Moreover, these chronicles cover chronologically only the early years of the empire, the years 1204–1209.⁹⁰ Furthermore, there remains virtually no diplomatic material concerning the internal administration of the Latin Empire.⁹¹ It is possible that this miserable situation as regards the sources concerning the internal administration of the Latin Empire is connected with the absence in the sources after 1204 of circa one hundred and fifteen families from the former Byzantine imperial elite. The already cited passage by George Akropolites that states that the Latin Emperor Henry (1206–1216) had numerous Byzantine aristocrats from Constantinople in his service supports this interpretation.⁹²

In summary, we conclude that after 1204 quite a considerable number of the Byzantine imperial aristocracy residing in Constantinople initially showed their preparedness to continue to function within the political framework of the feudally organised Latin empire. Approximately twenty-three families are attested in the sources, but the actual number of families must have been much greater. In the two most important independent Byzantine states after 1204, Nicaea and Epiros, in the period 1204–1224 we encounter in total thirty-three families from the Byzantine imperial elite, a relatively small number, considering the situation as regards the sources for both these regions is markedly more favourable than that for the Latin Empire. This suggests that the post-1204 emigration of members of the Byzantine central elite to territories that did not fall under Latin control was by no means as overwhelming as until now had been assumed.⁹³

As an explanation for the willingness of some of the Byzantine imperial elite to coexist with the Latins, we can firstly mention the earlier discussed limited loyalty of this group to the prevalent imperial dynasty, to the Byzantine imperial ideology and to the existing governmental system in general in the decades prior to 1204 (particu-

⁹⁰ Ibidem, n° 446–448.

⁹¹ Hendrickx, *Regestes*, pp. 13–105. Santifaller, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des lateinischen Patriarchats*, pp. 67–71, pp. 100–101.

⁹² Akropolites, §16.

⁹³ Cf. Jacoby, *The Greeks of Constantinople*, p. 59.

larly post-1180).⁹⁴ Secondly, and this is a matter that we shall discuss further at a later stage, after the Bulgarian-supported Byzantine uprising in Thrace in the years 1205–1206, the Latin rulers were in general prepared on one hand to give the Byzantine aristocracy a substantial share in the new administrative structures which, inter alia, at a local level remained to a not unimportant extent Byzantine in character, and on the other hand to respect to a certain extent the Byzantine culture and religion. Consequently, the Byzantine aristocracy did not have to feel completely alienated or abandoned within the Latin reconstruction of Byzantium. Oversimplifying in a way for this group it may have seemed like just another change of regime, the coming to power of a new—now Latin—imperial dynasty. A foreign dynasty obtaining the emperorship through conquest was of course quite a novelty, but in the past there had already been emperors who had acquired the throne by relying on foreign military force, the most recent example being Alexios IV Angelos, and in the middle of the twelfth century Emperor Manuel I Komnenos for a while considered the foreign prince Bela (III) of Hungary—renaming him Alexios, betrothing him to his daughter Maria and granting him the court title of *despotes*—to be his successor. Up to a point the Latin takeover could thus still be viewed within a Byzantine frame of reference.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ See also: Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations*, pp. 110–145.

⁹⁵ Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 79–81. Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, p. 186. Earlier Byzantine emperors (re)gaining the throne by relying on foreign troops were for example Justinian II, who in 705 was supported by Bulgar forces, or Alexios I Komnenos who in 1081 for his military coup predominantly relied on foreign troops present in the capital (Lilie, *Byzanz*, p. 114; Chalandon, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis Ier Comnène*, pp. 49–53).

CHAPTER ONE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATIES OF 1204–1205: THE LATIN RESTRUCTURING OF BYZANTIUM

In March 1204, approximately one month prior to the taking of Constantinople, the leaders of the Fourth Crusade reached a mutual agreement that delineated the lines of force of the governmental concept with regard to the planned take-over of the Byzantine Empire. In the period up to October 1205 this initial pact was supplemented by a number of attendant treaties that, with regard to a number of points, completed and made concrete the original agreement. Together, these texts formed the preconceived, rough constitutional framework within which, in principle, the Latin take-over of the Byzantine Empire was intended to be realized.

THE PACT OF MARCH 1204

The intention of the agreement reached between the leaders of the crusade—Marquis Boniface of Montferrat, the Counts Baldwin of Flanders and Hainaut, Louis of Blois and Hugh of Saint-Pol, and the Venetian Doge Enrico Dandolo—was, with an eye to the impending attack on Constantinople, to maintain the unity of the leaders and the entire army before, during and after the planned attack. The treaty formed the conceptual framework, the blueprint for the future Latin administration in Byzantium.¹

An initial basic principle thereof was the continuation of the Byzantine Empire as a single, undivided political whole.² The agreement provided for the election of an emperor from the ranks of the crusading army, who would exercise certain powers over the entire

¹ Longnon, *L'empire latin*, p. 44. Carile, *Partitio terrarum imperii Romaniae*, pp. 125–130. Idem, *Per una storia dell'impero latino di Constantinopoli (Seconda edizione)*, pp. 148–159. Wolff, *The Latin Empire of Constantinople*, p. 190. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, p. 73. Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean*, pp. 40–43. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, p. 141.

² Carile, *Per una storia dell'impero latino*, p. 157.

territory of the empire. The election was to be carried out by a jointly composed commission of Venetian and non-Venetian crusaders.³ All those who decided to reside permanently in the empire after March 1205 were vis-à-vis the emperor bound both to an oath of allegiance (*iuramentum*) and to a certain service (*servitium*) for fiefs obtained.⁴

The feudalization of the Byzantine Empire formed a second basic principle, as the result of which a fundamental break was made with the administrative structure that, until then, had been in place in the empire. Before 1204, the Byzantine governmental organization had always been characterized by a centralized administrative system under the direct authority of the emperor. This system was typified by a central level with judicial, fiscal, financial and other departments which operated from the capital and which supervised the provincial administrative organization. In both the central and provincial administrations, the emperor personally appointed the paid officials, whose positions were untenured and whose job descriptions were laid down in relatively detailed form.⁵ However, as regards the twelfth century we should add a degree of nuance to the image of a centralized imperial administration under the direct control of imperial authority, since in the course of this century there was a development that weakened the imperial control of the provincial administration.⁶ Above this, and in the same century, the administrative organization at the central level evolved increasingly towards a form of household government.⁷ The twelfth century also saw the implementation at a larger scale of administrative mechanisms that could be typified as feudal, such as the *pronoia* system, in which public rights were exercised by private individuals and as the result of which the imperial powers lost part of

³ The parity between the non-Venetian and the Venetian components of the crusading army that we find in the agreement of March 1204 and the succeeding treaties, was a consequence of the original agreement about transport that the leaders of the crusade had made with the city-state of Venice in early 1201. In this agreement it was stipulated that Venice had the right to one-half of everything captured during the expedition (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 92, p. 367).

⁴ Prevenier, *De oorkonden van de graven van Vlaanderen (1191—aanvang 1206)*, II, n° 267, p. 556.

⁵ Brehier, *Les Institutions de l'Empire Byzantin*, p. 116. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire 1025–1204*, p. 151. Herrin, *Realities of Byzantine provincial government*, pp. 252–284.

⁶ Lilie, *Die Zentralbürokratie und die Provinzen*, pp. 65–75.

⁷ Cf. Angold, *A Byzantine Government*, p. 147. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, p. 180, p. 228.

their authority.⁸ Finally, in the last quarter-century preceding 1204 the empire was plagued in numerous territories by fairly substantial and difficult to control regionalist and separatist tendencies, in which either magnates related to the imperial lineage or local potentates attempted to build up for themselves autonomous principalities in defiance of imperial authority.⁹

In concreto, the theoretical Latin feudalization of the Byzantine Empire meant that one-quarter of the imperial territories, including the imperial palaces of Boukoleon—the typical Western designation for the Great Palace (of which the Boukoleon was in fact only a part)—and Blacherna in Constantinople, belonged to the emperor. The other three-quarters were to be divided between the non-Venetian and the Venetian components of the crusading army.¹⁰ The empire—without doubt only understood as being the remaining three-quarters—was under the form of *feuda et honorificentiae* to be divided *inter homines*, again by a jointly composed commission of Venetian and non-Venetian crusaders, who were at the same time supposed to establish the *servitia* to which *ipsi homines* were bound vis-à-vis the emperor and the empire. Everyone's possession of a *feudum* was designated as being *libere et absolute*, hereditary both through the male and female line, and each had the *plena potestas* to do what he wished with his fief *salvo iure et servitio imperatoris et imperii*.¹¹ From these stipulations it is clear that, with the exception of the imperial quarter, the rights of possession and other rights in the other three-quarters of the Byzantine territory were to be divided among the crusading army under the form of fiefs. However, neither the material content of those benefices—for example the right to economic exploitation, fiscal rights, judicial rights, nor the imperial rights to them, were described specifically in the agreement. Nonetheless, the use of the term *honorificentiae* indicates that public governmental rights were distinguished

⁸ Ostrogorsky, *Pour l'Histoire de la Féodalité byzantine*, pp. 35–40. Idem, *Pour l'Histoire de l'Immunité à Byzance*, pp. 165–254. Idem, *Die pronoia unter den Komnenen*, pp. 41–54. Patlagean, “Economie paysanne” et “Féodalité byzantine”, pp. 1371–1396. Carile, *Signoria Rurale e Feudalesimo nell'Impero Latino*, pp. 667–678. Ahrweiler, *La «pronoia» à Byzance*, pp. 681–689. Oikonomides, *Title and Income at the Byzantine Court*, pp. 210–213.

⁹ Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations*, p. 427. Hoffman, *Rudimente von Territorialstaaten*, pp. 77–140. Angold, *The Road to 1204*, pp. 257–278.

¹⁰ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267, p. 557.

¹¹ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267, p. 558.

from other types of fiefs.¹² The notable absence from the March pact of the concept *homagium*—inter alia an essential element in the feudal relationships between liege and vassal in France and Germany—can be explained by the presence in the crusading army of an important contingent from Northern Italy, of which, for example, Boniface or Montferrat was a representative. In this region only the oath of allegiance sealed the feudal contract.¹³

The drastic decentralization of the empire's administrative organization brought about by this feudalization is also apparent at the level of the ecclesiastical structures. The patriarchate of Constantinople was to be the right of the party from which the emperor would not be chosen, which in casu would turn out to be the Venetian component of the crusading army. Moreover, the clerics of each party were given the right to appoint the bishops in the territories awarded to their party. In this, the authors of the agreement—all of them laymen—showed themselves to have a particularly insouciant regard for the rules of canonical law.¹⁴ What is more, they took the remarkable decision to assign to the clergy only part of the—until then—existing ecclesiastical possessions in the empire: sufficient to be able to live *honorifice*. According to the method of distribution mentioned above, the remaining ecclesiastical possessions were to be granted to the emperor and to the Venetian and non-Venetian components of the crusading army in the form of fiefs.¹⁵

In conclusion, the agreement contained a number of specific clauses with regard to the position of the city-state Venice within the empire. Firstly, the city retained all the secular and ecclesiastical possessions and rights that it had in the Byzantine Empire prior to 1204. Secondly, individuals belonging to a nation with which Venice was at war were not allowed to enter the empire. Thirdly, the doge was not obliged to swear an oath either to the emperor or the empire regarding the *servitia* to which he was bound by reason of the Venetian possessions in

¹² Cf. Ganshof, *Qu'est-ce que la Féodalité?* (cinquième édition), pp. 187–188.

¹³ Ibidem, pp. 128–130. However, in practice the feudal contract would be sealed not only with the oath of allegiance, but also with the homage and the kiss (cf. Chapter IV, note 103).

¹⁴ Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople*, p. 227.

¹⁵ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267, p. 557.

the empire. However, his representatives in the empire certainly were obliged to do so.¹⁶

Any supplements to this basic covenant were to be decided upon by a council, consisting of on one hand the Venetian Doge Enrico Dandolo and six of his councillors and on the other hand by Marquis Boniface of Montferrat and six of his councillors.¹⁷ Clearly, this council was only intended to be a temporary body, in view of its composition being linked to specific persons. However, in the supplementary basic covenant of October 1205 we shall see the appearance of a similar body of a more permanent nature, of which when looked at in retrospect, the council described in the agreement of March 1204 was the prefiguration.

The empire's basic covenant of March 1204 displays a number of remarkable lacunas. A few of them are easily explained. The choice of the emperor, and as a consequence also the award of the patriarchate, the assignation of territories to the emperor and to the respective Venetian and non-Venetian component of the crusading army, and the more detailed laying down of the respective rights and duties of the vassals and the emperor, were assigned to specific commissions. It is possible that in March 1204 there was no consensus among the crusade leaders about these questions and they were postponed to a later date. The superficial character of the description of the relationship between the emperor and his vassals, for example, indicates that this question was something of a bone of contention. Indeed, the emperorship itself was still to be assigned, which certainly must have contributed to the fact that not all the parties involved had yet developed a definitive perspective as to the position of the imperial powers within the empire as a whole. In this respect, the basic pact of March 1204 already foreshadows the contrast between centripetal and centrifugal forces that were to characterize the Latin Empire.

¹⁶ *Sciendum est, quod vos, prefate domine dux, non debetis imperatori qui fuerit electus, vel imperio, ad aliqua servitia facienda, iuramentum prestare, propter aliquod datum vel feudum, sive honorificentiam, que vobis debeat assignari, tamen illi, vel ille, quem vel quos loco vestro statueritis super hiis que vobis fuerint assignata, debeant iuramento teneri ad omne servitium imperatori et imperio faciendum, iuxta omnem ordinem superius declaratum.* (Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267, pp. 556–559). Cf. Wolff, *The Oath of the Venetian Podestà*, p. 541. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, p. 141.

¹⁷ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267, p. 558.

There is one important issue in particular that the March pact does not mention at all, notably the question as to how the Latin rulers would deal with the existing Byzantine administrative organization and with the position of the Byzantine political elite and population. However, we do not have to interpret this as their having been completely ignored. After all, the *raison d'être* for the agreement was in the first instance the maintenance of the internal harmony between the leaders and within the crusading army. In this light, the recording of the relations between the different components of the crusading army must have appeared to be of much more importance than discussing the relationship with the existing administrative organization and with the Byzantine elite and population. It is possible that in March 1204 the issue was relegated to the future without being looked at more closely at that stage. It should be mentioned here that not one of the provisions of the agreement excluded in principle the participation of the Byzantine elite in the administration.

After the Latin seizure of Constantinople in April 1204, in the course of the years 1204–1205 several points in the original treaty of March 1204 were crystallized by the activities of the commissions brought into being by virtue of this agreement. In succession, the election of the emperor took place (May 1204), the so-called *Partitio terrarum imperii Romaniae* was laid down (in the course of 1204), and the relationship between emperor and vassals was described in more detail (October 1205).

THE ELECTION OF THE EMPEROR (MAY 1204)

The election of the emperor—this was decided by six Venetians and six non-Venetian prelates from the crusading army—revolved around two likely candidates, the two most important non-Venetian leaders of the crusading army, Marquis Boniface of Montferrat and Count Baldwin of Flanders and Hainaut.¹⁸ The opinions of the non-Venetian prelates were divided, and consequently the Venetian representatives—and thus Doge Dandolo—had the last word. On 9 May 1204 the choice fell on Baldwin IX (VI), Count of Flanders and Hainaut. In his favour was the fact that he had at his disposal the greatest contingent of

¹⁸ Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, p. 75. Jacoby, *The Venetian Presence in the Latin Empire*, p. 143.

troops. In addition, both in his own region and during the crusade, he had proved himself to be a capable ruler and leader.¹⁹ In Venetian eyes, against Boniface of Montferrat was his connection with the competing trading power Genoa, on the Ligurian coast and close to Boniface's domain. In the case of Baldwin IX on the other hand, an Italian connection of that nature was not a concern.²⁰ The verdict in the choice of emperor ensured that the patriarchate of Constantinople fell to La Serenissima.²¹

THE *PARTITIO TERRARUM IMPERII ROMANIE*
(MAY–SEPTEMBER 1204)

The distribution of the Byzantine territories among the different components of the crusading army was a second important point on the agenda of the Latin conquerors. The *Partitio terrarum imperii Romanie* provides extensive information about this. A good understanding of this diplomatic document is essential for the further study of the administrative organization of the Latin Empire. The *Partitio* enumerates the territories that were allotted to the emperor, the *peregrini* and the Venetians.²² However, the document does present us with two major problems. Firstly, numerous Byzantine territories are missing from the enumeration, this being without any clear explanation. Secondly, the document does not give any appearance of being of an official nature. For example, it contains no *intitulatio*, *corroboratio* or *datatio*. Two authors that have made an in-depth study of the document, Carile and Oikonomides, are in agreement that the *Partitio* in the form in which we know it cannot have been the definitive agreement as to the distribution of the territories.²³

Carile opines that the lacunas in the *Partitio* are a reflection of the political situation in the Latin Empire in the period May–September 1204, and more specifically of the conflict at that time between Emperor Baldwin and Boniface of Montferrat about Thessalonike, which Boniface as losing candidate in the election of the emperor was given

¹⁹ Wolff, *Baldwin of Flanders and Hainaut*, pp. 281–288.

²⁰ Longnon, *L'empire latin*, p. 50. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, p. 75.

²¹ Cf. Marin, *The Venetian "Empire" in the East*, pp. 185–214.

²² Carile, *Partitio*, pp. 217–222.

²³ Ibidem, p. 165. Oikonomides, *La décomposition de l'empire byzantin*, p. 8.

as consolation prize.²⁴ Carile propounds that the *Partitio* could have been drawn up shortly after the reconciliation between Baldwin and Boniface—which took place in early September 1204—and he explains implicitly the absence of the names of a number of territories as a conscious choice not to include in the agreement the areas that had recently been the object of the dispute between Baldwin and Boniface. In this sense, the unmentioned localities can be understood to be the extent

²⁴ Longnon, *L'empire latin*, pp. 58–61. Initially, shortly before the imperial election it had been decided that Asia Minor would be awarded to the losing candidate. After Baldwin's coronation however Boniface asked Emperor Baldwin if it would be possible to obtain—instead of Asia Minor—a principality round Thessalonike, firstly because it was closer to the kingdom of his brother-in-law Andrew II of Hungary, and secondly because he thought he had a rightful claim to this region on account of his brother Renier, to whom emperor Manuel at the time of his wedding to his daughter Maria Komnena (1180) had given certain rights regarding Thessalonike (Haberstumpf, *Dinastie*, pp. 56–61). Both Villehardouin and De clari agree that the matter was intensively discussed, but that in the end Boniface's request was granted (Villehardouin, §264; De Clari, §§99–100). De Clari specifies the problem with Boniface's request: Thessalonike was not really Baldwin's to give, since no partition of the empire had as yet been drawn up by the competent commission of *partitores* (cf. basis pact of March 1204) and that thus in principle only one quarter of Thessalonike belonged to the emperor, 3/8 to Venice and 3/8 to the crusader army. Baldwin and the crusade leaders nevertheless decided to give the city to Boniface and Villhardouin adds that Boniface did homage for it to the emperor.

Madden has recently argued on the basis of De Clari's text that Thessalonike was not given to Boniface at all in May 1204 and that consequently Villehardouin's account of the matter is to be discarded. The author prefers De Clari's version of events because it would be more in line with the March Pact, that stipulated that the partition of the empire was to be drawn up by the *partitores* already mentioned. If Thessalonike had been given to Boniface by Emperor Baldwin, by mutual agreement with the other crusade leaders, this would have gone against the terms of this pact (Madden, *The Latin Empire's Fractured Foundation*, pp. 45–46). However, in awarding Asia Minor to the losing candidate of the imperial election, the crusade leaders in early May 1204 anyhow ignored the treaty's provisions. In our view there is no insurmountable contradiction between the accounts of Villehardouin and De Clari. While discussing the conflict that arose between Baldwin and Boniface over Thessalonike at Mosynopolis in the summer of 1204, De Clari explicitly states that Boniface was of the opinion that Thessalonike had effectively been given to him. That Emperor Baldwin and his entourage, according to the same chronicler, answered this claim with the statement that the land was not Boniface's, should be viewed in connection with information provided by Villehardouin. The latter chronicler relates that while encamped at Mosynopolis, where Baldwin had awaited him, Boniface had requested the emperor to let him take possession of Thessalonike on his own, without any imperial involvement (Villehardouin, §§272–279). This was no doubt unacceptable for Baldwin, who must have reasoned that as Boniface's suzerain he was without question entitled to enter his land, at least together with him. It's in this context that the imperial answer to Boniface at Mosynopolis as recorded by De Clari has to be read: if the Marquis chose to from the start infringe upon his suzerain's rights, Baldwin and his entourage no longer felt obliged to consider Boniface's rights to Thessalonike.

of the Principality of Thessalonike claimed by Boniface.²⁵ However, we believe that Carile's views and argumentation are untenable. Sizeable territories and major cities of Asia Minor—such as Nicaea, Prusa, Lopadion, Magnesia, Smyrna, Philadelphia and Trebizond, and most of the Cyclade Islands—including Naxos and Paros, are also unmentioned in the *Partitio*, but played no role in the conflict between Baldwin and Boniface. Conversely, other localities—inter alia Larissa, Berroia and Platamon—that Carile himself does look upon as belonging to the Principality of Thessalonike, certainly do appear in the text. As a consequence, the absence of certain territories from the *Partitio* does not say anything about the conflict between Baldwin and Boniface, or about the size of the territories that had or had not been promised to Boniface. Consequently, Carile's hypothesis about the nature and dating of the document in question is untenable.²⁶

Oikonomides states that the *Partitio* was an interim agreement, drawn up prior to, and presumably in preparation to, the election of the emperor (9 May 1204). On the basis of a number of chronicles, the author states that a territorial distribution was already in existence shortly before the election, at the time of the allocation of a principality as a consolation prize to the losing candidate, and he equates this to the *Partitio* that is familiar to us.²⁷ The author argues plausibly that the basis for this territorial distribution were the Byzantine fiscal registers of September 1203, which contained only the territories that recognized Alexios IV as emperor.²⁸ However, we believe that Oikonomides too was mistaken as regards the dating. A number of passages in the chronicles used by Oikonomides preclude the territorial distribution mentioned therein from being equated with the *Partitio* text known to us.

Firstly, in his account of the preparation for the imperial election, Geoffrey of Villehardouin records that the winner of the election should give Byzantine Asia Minor to the loser as consolation for not winning the emperorship.²⁹ In the *Partitio*, Byzantine Asia Minor now falls under the imperial quarter, and from this Oikonomides deduces

²⁵ Carile, *Partitio*, pp. 158–159. Cf. also: Pokorny, *Der territoriale Umfang des lateinischen Königreichs Thessaloniki*, pp. 543–544.

²⁶ Oikonomides, *La décomposition*, p. 5.

²⁷ Ibidem, pp. 5–11.

²⁸ Ibidem, pp. 14–22.

²⁹ Villehardouin, §258.

firstly that the *Partitio* was already in existence prior to the imperial election, and secondly concludes that Emperor Baldwin would have had to relinquish part of his quarter of the empire to Marquis Boniface. However, it is unthinkable that Baldwin would have agreed to part with a territory, and in particular Byzantine Asia Minor, which contained more than three-quarters of the territory allocated to him in the *Partitio*. After all, with the exception of Asia Minor, the emperor was allotted in the *Partitio* only a relatively limited territory in Thrace. Furthermore, as Carile rightly states, Boniface's principality should not have been formed from the imperial quarter, but from the territorial share of the non-Venetian *peregrini*.³⁰ As against that which is asserted by Oikonomides, Byzantine Asia Minor was not allotted to Emperor Baldwin in early May 1204. Secondly, Robert de Clari's chronicle shows us clearly that at the time of the imperial coronation Thessalonike was already the subject of a distribution agreement, in which Venice in particular had gained a number of rights of possession.³¹ However, the *Partitio* does not mention Thessalonike. These two examples indicate that there is no reason to assume that the known text of the *Partitio* was already in existence shortly before the imperial coronation. Indeed, the later basic treaty of October 1205 states that the *partitores*, the distribution commission, were appointed by Emperor Baldwin, Doge Enrico Dandolo, Boniface of Montferrat and the rest of the crusading army, therefore after the coronation (16 May 1204) or certainly after the imperial election (9 May 1204).³²

In summary, the information about the nature of the text of the *Partitio*: Despite the ingenious endeavours of Carile and Oikonomides, precise dating appears to be impossible. The drawing up of the document can be placed somewhere in the period May–September 1204. From the overview above it also appears that the *Partitio* was no more than a provisional working document.³³ No mention is made of a number of regions (for example Thessalonike), whilst from other sources it appears that there certainly were agreements about its allocation (in this case Clari's chronicle). The basis for the document in question

³⁰ Carile, *Partitio*, p. 142.

³¹ De Clari, §99.

³² Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 160, pp. 571–572. This same agreement in a reference to the covenant of March 1204 names Baldwin as '*dominum imperatorem tunc comitem Flandrensem*'.

³³ Zie ook: Zakythenos, *La conquête de Constantinople en 1204*, p. 145.

was, as Oikonomides propounds, probably the Byzantine fiscal registers of the previous year, from September 1203. In all probability, the *Partitio* text was just one of a number of working documents that were drawn up in order ultimately to achieve a definitive distribution agreement towards mid-September 1204.³⁴ We shall endeavour to discover what this unsaved definitive distribution agreement—whether to be understood as a single, all-encompassing agreement or a combination of different partial agreements—stipulated.

Firstly, it established the territories that were allocated to the emperor, to the non-Venetian crusaders—including Boniface's kingdom in the area of Thessalonike—and to La Serenissima. As is apparent from the actual taking possession of the Byzantine territories later, this distribution occurred to a great extent according to the stipulations found in the *Partitio* that has been handed down to us. Separate, supplementary agreements must have existed for, inter alia, the capital Constantinople and the region around Thessalonike.³⁵ Secondly, the agreement also referred to some extent to individual fiefs. There is absolutely no mention of these in the *Partitio*, but the chronicler Clari offers us information about them. He recounts that one fief was worth 300 Angevin pounds, which is sure to have meant the annual income from the fief.³⁶ The fiefdoms were divided among the *contes et puis après as autres haus hommes*, according to the status of each and according to the numerical strength of each one's retinue. These *haus hommes* were to divide further the fiefdoms granted them—from six to two hundred fiefdoms—among the members of their own retinue. Clari refers to the fiefs mentioned as *chités, teres, seigneuries*, and a number also as *roiaume*. The fiefdoms granted were part of both the imperial quarter and of the share of the crusading army and that of Venice.³⁷ Villehardouin indicates only that the *terres* were divided, both by the emperor in his quarter, and in the non-Venetian and the

³⁴ Jacoby, *The Venetian presence*, p. 149. Idem, *The Venetian Quarter*, p. 160. Carile, *Partitio*, p. 165.

³⁵ Jacoby has argued convincingly that at least a sketchy partitioning of Constantinople must have been decided upon before the actual capture of the city (Jacoby, *The Venetian Government*, pp. 39–40).

³⁶ In a 1219 document, the settlement on ecclesiastical property between regent Cono I of Béthune and papal legate Giovanni Colonna, a *feodum* worth 300 hyperpera seems to have been considered as a sort of standard fief: Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, n° IV, p. 299. Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 95.

³⁷ De Clari, §§107–112.

Venetian territories.³⁸ Gunther of Pairis confirms that, after the division of the empire into these three large areas (imperial, Venetian, non-Venetian), the concrete *castella*, *ville* and *municipia* were divided up.³⁹

We may deduce from the terms used by Clari and Pairis that the fiefdoms of the great barons of the crusading army did not just contain rights to the exploitation of land, for example. On the contrary, these men acquired—both in the crusaders' part, with Boniface or Montferrat at the head, and in the imperial quarter—extensive territories, including the considerable administrative, fiscal and jurisdictional prerogatives that went with them.⁴⁰ Indeed, the agreement of March 1204 had already indicated something of this nature by describing the fiefs to be distributed *inter alia* with the term *honorificentiae*. In the Venetian territory, the presence of Doge Enrico Dandolo and the existing Venetian administrative tradition was to lead to a more centralized approach. Generally however the exercise of the public rights by the Byzantine emperor and his subordinate bureaucracy was consequently abandoned in favour of a decentralized administrative organization according to a Western feudal model, as had already been stipulated in the basis agreement of March 1204.

Pairis' *Hystoria Constantinopolitana* nevertheless states in an interesting but little noticed passage that there was an agreement among the Latin leaders to maintain the Byzantine administrative and judicial institutions for the greater part at regional and local levels, despite this decentralization: '*Leges autem et iura et cetere instituciones, que ab antiquo tam in urbe quam in provincia laudabiles habebantur, ita, ut prius fuerant, consistere permisse sunt, que vero reprobabiles videbantur, vel correcte in melius vel penitus inmutate.*'⁴¹ This measure was probably a matter of pragmatic practicality and at the same time intended to win over the broad strata of the Byzantine population. The amendments mentioned by Pairis probably referred principally to the giving of independence to the existing Byzantine administrative

³⁸ Villehardouin, §§303–304.

³⁹ Gunther of Pairis, p. 163.

⁴⁰ A papal letter of 1210 indicates that a number of local barons in the principedom of Achaea were exercising high justice (Haluscynskyj, *Acta Innocentii Papae III*, n° 171, pp. 400–401).

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 163–164. An echo of this agreement can for example be found in Ravano dalle Carceri's settlement with Venice concerning Euboea (1209): *Grecos autem tenebo in eo statu quo domini Emanuelis Imperatoris tempore tenebantur* (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 205).

institutions vis-à-vis the imperial authority by means of the implementation of a feudal superstructure.

From the information about the agreement that has been handed down to us, the extent to which by virtue of the distribution agreement the Latin emperor was able to reserve certain rights for himself outside his own quarter remains unclear. However, it does sound likely that, for example, an embryonic specification of the military service to be provided to the emperor, which as far as we know was only specified in writing in the supplementary agreement of October 1205, had already been decided upon in 1204 within the framework of the distribution agreement. Indeed, shortly after the allocation of the individual fiefdoms at the end of September 1204, the new Latin vassals departed Constantinople in order to take possession of their newly acquired goods and rights. It is unlikely that prior to this massive exodus no verbal agreements, however provisional, existed with regard to the duty of military service to the emperor.

THE PACT OF OCTOBER 1205

In the distribution agreement of the end of September 1204, the description of the relationship between the emperor and his vassals remained only vague. It could be assumed quite plausibly that the more exact description of these mutual rights was a thorny issue—as is indeed indicated by the conflict between Emperor Baldwin and Boniface of Montferrat—and that towards the end of September 1204 there was still no agreement among the crusade leaders about this matter. It is possible that the great non-Venetian barons and the Venetian doge endeavoured to postpone the issue indefinitely in the hope that there would be no tangible result. Perhaps Emperor Baldwin assumed that he would be able to exercise greater influence on the *partitores* after the departure of his great vassals from Constantinople. Even in the period leading up to the disastrous Latin defeat at Adrianopel on 14 April 1205, which led to Emperor Baldwin landing in Bulgarian imprisonment, no agreement was reached. Again, this can be interpreted as an indication of internal dissension among the *partitores* and among the various parties involved: the emperor, the leading non-Venetian barons and the Venetian doge. The protracted imprisonment of Emperor Baldwin and the death of doge Enrico Dandolo (circa 1 June 1205) probably caused additional delays.

It was only towards October 1205 that an agreement was drawn up in which the relations between emperor and vassals were laid down. Regent Henry of Flanders/Hainaut, Baldwin's brother, and the Venetian representative podestà Marino Zeno acted as issuers. In this, they confirmed the stipulations that had been agreed upon by Emperor Baldwin, Enrico Dandolo, Boniface of Montferrat and the *partitores* that had been appointed by the crusading army.⁴² The agreement also ratified the basic treaty of March 1204 and repeated and further specified some stipulations from this basic agreement with regard to the position of the Venetians in the empire, which indicates that problems had already arisen about this.⁴³ With respect to the new provisions negotiated by the *partitores*, the treaty of October 1205 stipulated in the first place the existence of a central *consilium* of the empire, which was in fact the continuation of the temporary council that had been described in the basic pact of March 1204. Serving on this *consilium*, which we shall refer to further by the term 'mixed council', were on one side the Venetian podestà and his council (also referred to by the term *consilium*), and on the other side the *magnates Francigenarum*.⁴⁴ The composition of the Venetian component of the mixed council is self-evident: the podestà and his permanent councillors or *consiliarii*. Meant by the *magnates Francigenarum* are without doubt a selection of prominent barons from the non-Venetian component of the original crusading army. However, this selection is not described in further detail, for example either in numbers or according to their geographic origins.

An initial competence of the mixed council relates to the military service provided by the vassals to the emperor. The council and the emperor decided jointly when both the non-Venetian and Venetian *milites* that were in possession of a *feudum* or *possessio* should provide the emperor with military service as part of an imperial venture *ad expeditionem, ad acquisitionem et defensionem imperii*. A second competence was that the council could give the emperor compelling advice relating to operations *ad defendum et manutenendum imperium* that he was to undertake with use of the means of his own quarter of the empire's territory. As a consequence, the empire's defence

⁴² Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 160, pp. 571–574.

⁴³ Ibidem, I, n° 160, p. 573.

⁴⁴ Jacoby, *The Venetian Presence*, p. 147.

policy, and thus in effect foreign policy, fell within the sphere of action of the mixed council. A third competence related to possible conflicts between the emperor and his *milites*. Such conflicts could concern the military service to be provided to the emperor, or duties that had to be fulfilled by the emperor. In the event of such a conflict, the council were to appoint both Venetian and non-Venetian judges (*iudices*), who then pronounced judgment on the matter at hand. An analogously appointed court of law was also to judge the emperor himself if he were to act against someone *contra iusticia*. Apart from the establishment of the mixed council, the agreement of October 1205 also described more fully the relationship between the emperor and his individual vassals, these being from both the Venetian and non-Venetian territories of the empire. These vassals were obliged to provide the emperor with military service from 1 June to 29 September, whenever these were requested by the emperor and the mixed council. In the event of an enemy attack aimed at the destruction of the empire, the council was empowered to extend the length of the period of this service. Vassals whose possessions were situated in the close vicinity of a hostile power were obliged to provide only half of the prescribed military service. In regions that were attacked by an enemy power, no one was obliged to fulfil this duty. All those who had a *possessio* or *feodum* in the empire were obliged to confirm these stipulations concerning military service by swearing an oath. It was not made explicit to whom the oath should be sworn. However, the treaty of March 1204 had in any event already determined that everyone in the empire was obliged to swear an oath of allegiance to the emperor.⁴⁵

As has been seen, the emperor was to carry out whatever the mixed council ordered him to do, using means from his own quarter of the empire, but the agreement also carried the following clause: '*Dominus vero imperator omnes alias necessarias res et expensas ad defendendum en manutenendum imperium statim omni tempore facere debet.*'⁴⁶ The emperor was at all times to guarantee the defence and maintenance of the empire, and to this end could himself take relevant initiatives,

⁴⁵ Hendrickx's theory that in the Latin Empire there existed absolutely no connection between the oath of allegiance to the emperor, the fief granted and the obligation to provide military service to the emperor does not, in our opinion, stand up to scrutiny (cf. our quotation from the basic treaty of March 1204 in note 16). Cf. Hendrickx, *Le contrat féodal*, p. 226.

⁴⁶ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 160, p. 572.

without referring to the mixed council. The phrase *defendendum et manutenendum imperium* describes such imperial initiatives in a manner so vague that the entire passage can be interpreted as a sort of 'back door', by means of which powerful imperial authority could still be achieved despite the theoretical guardianship of the mixed council. In a way, this granted the emperor *carte blanche* as regards competencies, or in any case the passage could be understood in this sense. However, in the event of a conflict with a vassal the emperor himself was not empowered to pronounce judgment, for example by withdrawing the fiefdom from his vassal. He was to subject himself to the authority of the judges indicated by the mixed council. In addition, it was stated in general terms that the emperor was not permitted to act against anyone *contra iusticia*. This last stipulation can be seen as a counterbalance vis-à-vis the passage just discussed. Then again, the concept *contra iusticia* was not defined precisely.

The agreement of October 1205 makes one point very clear. There existed little unanimity in the empire about the position and competencies of the emperor in respect of his vassals. The bonds between the central, imperial level and the feudally dependent regional and local levels continued to be described only in vague and in part contradictory terms, examples of which we illustrate here. Imperial authority was supposed to be limited greatly by the mixed council, but particularly as regards the group of the non-Venetian magnates, the membership of this important institution was not described more specifically. In the one clause the emperor was in some way given *carte blanche* in the matter of the state government, while in another was stipulated that the emperor was allowed to undertake nothing *contra iusticia*. In addition, the distribution agreement provided for the establishment of a number of administratively autonomous feudal principalities and baronies, but at the same time all feudatories in the empire were in principle bound directly to the emperor through an oath of allegiance.

Besides this, even after the agreement of October 1205 there remained a number of important lacunas with regard to the broad outlines of the administrative organization of the empire. For example, which body was qualified to deal with conflicts, either concerning feudal matters or not, between vassals situated outside the imperial quarter who were directly and exclusively dependent on the emperor? Or in conflicts in which just one party was directly and exclusively dependent on the

emperor? The treaties also do not mention anything about imperial succession, and consequently neither do they touch on the sources of authority of future emperors, a not unimportant blind spot with regard to the emperorship. By virtue of the agreement of March 1204, Baldwin I, the first Latin emperor, had his position thanks to his election by a mixed commission of non-Venetian and Venetian representatives of the crusading army, but there is no evidence that it was the intention that this commission was to gain a permanent nature.⁴⁷ Was there an agreement about the points mentioned, either verbal or otherwise? Should the emperor and/or the mixed council indicate the competent body? Were the parties involved given the freedom to act on their own discretion? Taking this a step further, we can ask ourselves whether the emperor retained certain *regalia* vis-à-vis his vassals, for example rights of mintage. The emperor appears to have been the only one within the territories of the empire that had coins minted, with the possible exception of the ruler (later king) of Thessalonike, who occupied an exceptional position in the empire.⁴⁸ Did the emperor perhaps also possess other prerogatives, that were likewise not recorded in the agreements, with regard to the empire as a whole, the origins of these prerogatives being either Western or Byzantine? The sources offer us no answer as to what, at the time of the planning of the administrative organization of the Latin take-over of the empire, the Latin masters' conceptions were in relation to the issues mentioned. Further in this study we can only attempt to discover what the practice was as regards these matters.

CONCLUSION

On the subject of the theoretical restructuring of the Byzantine Empire we can formulate three conclusions. Firstly, the leaders of the crusade instituted a drastic feudalization of the Byzantine Empire. This feudalization represented an important fault line with the period prior to 1204, when the empire had a centralized form of administration with a relatively strongly developed bureaucracy at central and provincial

⁴⁷ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267, p. 556. Cf. Hendrickx, *Le pouvoir impérial*, p. 93.

⁴⁸ Hendy, *Coinage and Money in the Byzantine empire*, pp. 209–210. Morrison, *The Emperor, the Saint, and the City*, p. 177.

levels. The crusaders planned to turn the empire into a conglomerate of autonomous principalities, whereby the former public rights of the state would become fragmented and whereby in essence only the suzerainty of the emperor over the regional princes and barons would guarantee the political unity of the empire.

This option on the part of the crusade leaders can of course be explained by their Western background. It was unthinkable for prominent territorial princes or important barons that they would function in a state bureaucracy that was modelled on Byzantine lines and that was under imperial control, or that they would have to be content with the limited fiscal and judicial prerogatives that some Byzantine magnates possessed in their estates and domains. With this the crusade leaders, on the basis of their own political concepts, transformed Byzantium following the model of a typically Western state, although the integration of the Venetian territories in Romania within the empire's fabric was a novel feature. Although the Latin feudalization of the Byzantine Empire meant an absolute break with the preceding period, this should nevertheless be nuanced in the sense that on the one hand in Byzantium in the 12th century there were growing tendencies towards feudalization, whilst on the other hand, and in particular at the end of the same century, increasingly strong regionalist and separatist movements manifested themselves in the empire.

A second, more original conclusion is that the idea of the empire as a political unit was retained. The Latin crusade leaders did not wish to do away with the Byzantine Empire, but rather to continue it. Never at any time does there appear to have been the idea of abolishing the Byzantine Empire and in its place, for example, establishing a number of independent kingdoms or princedoms. The explanation for this is that the centuries-old Byzantine Empire, which could claim to be the only legitimate heir to the Roman Empire, enjoyed enormous prestige as a state in the eyes of the crusaders. It was thus for them virtually unthinkable to consider abolishing the empire. We have already established that an agreement was made to take over the Byzantine administrative organization to the greatest possible extent. It is probable that such a position was inspired principally by political pragmatism. The measure provided the best guarantee to administer successfully the territories that were to be conquered, to exploit efficiently the fiefs that were to be acquired, and to the greatest possible extent win over the Byzantine aristocracy and population for the Latin newcomers.

Finally, the successive agreements of the years 1204–1205 display a continuing area of tension with regard to the relationship between the emperor and his vassals. The prominent vassals must have been concerned about gaining for themselves the greatest possible degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the imperial authority. In that sense, the basic agreements granted the emperor as suzerain only very few concrete competencies, and quite some clauses in these agreements evidence a concern that imperial power had to be limited. At the same time, several other phrases, and in particular in the agreement of October 1205, did grant the emperor a certain right of initiative that was anything but precisely worded and therefore could, if need be, be interpreted very broadly. Such passages are evidence of the input of the Latin Emperor and his entourage, who must have had the natural inclination to obtain via the constitutional agreements a certain juridical foundation, on the basis of which to found and make good a real political influence of imperial authority in the empire in its entirety. This antithesis in perspective in the basic pacts concerning the relationship between the emperor and his vassals already raised the suspicion that the interplay between centripetal and centrifugal political forces would become one of the chief characteristics of the empire.

CHAPTER TWO

THE IMPERIAL IDEOLOGY

The constitutional treaties of the years 1204–1205 describe the emperor's position within the empire in anything but precise terms. In essence, these agreements marked out the respective powers of the emperor and his vassals, but conflicting principles were applied and intentional ambiguities and numerous lacunas remained. Furthermore, a number of passages in these conventions formulated more abstract ideas about the identity and mission of the Latin emperorship and of the empire taken by the crusaders. For example, the basic pacts defined the emperorship as a contractual undertaking with—albeit vaguely—delineated rights and duties for the suzerain and his vassals. This perception of the emperorship fits entirely within Western political thinking, which is hardly surprising since all the crusade leaders were Western regional princes.¹ To a great extent, such a contractual view of the imperial office was alien to Byzantine political thinking, although we should note that in Byzantium too the emperor, despite the theoretically universal and absolute nature of his emperorship, had to observe certain responsibilities and duties towards his subjects.²

The identity of the empire for which, by virtue of the pact of March 1204 an emperor must be chosen, was not described further anywhere in this agreement, which suggests that this related to the Byzantine Empire prior to 1204. The later agreement of October 1205 refers explicitly to the empire as the *imperium Constantinopolitanum*, a traditional appellation for the Byzantine Empire in twelfth-century Western sources used, inter alia, by the papal chancery.³ As a consequence, in the eyes of the Latin leaders of the crusade the Byzantine Empire in 1204 was not irrevocably overthrown or destroyed, but simply taken over and continued, although for its administration a number of new principles were formulated. As is evident from the term *imperium Constantinopolitanum*, the crusade leaders hereby departed

¹ Ganshof, *Qu'est ce que la Féodalité*, pp. 132–133.

² Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations*, pp. 177–190.

³ Wolff, *Romania*, pp. 1–2.

from a typical Western perception of Byzantium. The Roman character of the Byzantine Empire, an essential element in the Byzantine imperial ideology, is not apparent in the treaties of March 1204 and October 1205. The Holy Roman Empire, in the eyes of the crusade leaders must, in the framework of the two-emperors-problem, have been regarded as being the legitimate *imperium Romanum*.

In the agreement of March 1204 there had also been an allusion as to what either the mission or the ideological *raison d'être* of the Latin empire was to form. The convention stipulated that the empire should be governed *ad honorem Dei et sancte Romane Ecclesie et imperii*. Consequently, the empire was explicitly in the service of the Christian faith and the Roman Catholic Church.⁴ Without doubt, this view can be explained from the specific context in which the Latin take-over of Byzantium occurred, namely the Fourth Crusade. The leaders of the crusade will have had to put forward the results of this undertaking as being in the interests of Christianity and the Church of Rome in order to claim any form of legitimacy.

We now examine whether, and if so how, the political frames of reference—the Western ideas, the Byzantine heritage, and the specific Christian mission of the empire—that were present in embryo in the agreements of 1204–1205, were employed or elaborated upon by the Latin emperors in the ideological founding and legitimizing of their authority.

THE IMPERIAL TITLE

The title adopted by a ruler in documents, on seals and on coins, ranks as one of the instruments that expressed his perception of the authority he exercised.⁵ Prevenier has indicated that under the first Latin emperor the following intitulation was used in the chancery: *Balduinus Dei gratia fidelissimus in Christo imperator a Deo coronatus Romanorum moderator et semper augustus*.⁶ As noted by this author, in two letters to Pope Innocent III, known only from copies in the registers of the papal chancery, there were instances of deviation from this intitulation, which in the first letter underwent fundamental abbreviation and

⁴ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267.

⁵ Schramm, *Kaiser, Könige und Päpste*, pp. 30–32, p. 35.

⁶ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, I, p. 515.

alteration to *Balduinus eadem gratia Constantinopolitanus imperator et semper augustus*, and which varies only slightly in the second letter as *Balduinus eadem gratia fidelissimus in Christo Constantinopolitanus imperator a Deo coronatus Roman[orum] moderator, et semper augustus*.⁷

The question arises as to whether these altered titles are the work of the imperial chancery, where a number of substantially different intitulation formulas could possibly have been used at the same time, or of the transcriber in the papal chancery. The first letter is also known from three other, virtually identical engrossments sent to three other recipients. The classic intitulation formula appears in each of these three other engrossments.⁸ This implies that in all probability the imperial title was manipulated during transcription in the chancery registers. This probable manipulation suggests that the second papal letter in question was also manipulated and that the term *Constantinopolitanus* is an interpolation. Suffice it to say at this stage that the explanation for these manipulations is the constatation that in the papal chancery the description *Constantinopolitanus imperator* was the customary title for the Byzantine emperors.⁹

Baldwin I's seals are a second medium that represents an official imperial title. In each case the obverse displays the Greek formula 'ΒΑΛΔΟΒΙΝΟΣ . ΔΕΣΠΟΤΗΣ.' The reverse displays a Latin formula, the abbreviations of which were suggested by Prevenier and Hendrickx as meaning the following: 'BALD'(uinus) D(e)I GRA(tia) IMP(e)R'(ator) ROM(anie) FLAND(rie) HAIN(onie). COM(es)'.¹⁰ The question arises as to whether in the light of Baldwin's intitulation in documents it is not more plausible to suggest that 'Rom' stands for *Romanorum*.

Various authors have stated that in composing his imperial title, Emperor Baldwin I and his entourage, in particular the personnel of his chancery, based their ideas on the existing Byzantine imperial title.¹¹ Baldwin's title is indeed a well-nigh perfect copy of the title used by Emperor Alexios IV Angelos (1203–1204) (who was placed on the throne by the leaders of the crusading army) in a letter—only

⁷ Ibidem, II, n° 271, 278.

⁸ Ibidem, II, n° 272, 273, 274.

⁹ Bijvoorbeeld: Migne, *PL*, CCXIV, col. 769 (II, 211).

¹⁰ Hendrickx, *Le pouvoir impérial*, p. 131.

¹¹ Longnon, *Notes sur la diplomatie de l'empire latin*, pp. 4–5. Prevenier, *De oor-konden*, I, p. 516. Carile, *La cancellaria sovrana dell'impero latino*, pp. 51–55. Hendrickx, *Le pouvoir impérial*, pp. 135–137.

known in a Latin version—to Pope Innocentius III of 1203: *fidelis in Christo imperator a Deo coronatus Romanorum moderator et semper augustus*.¹² This title is in turn almost identical to that of Emperor Alexios III Angelos (1195–1203), also in a letter to Innocentius III of 1199, and again in a version only known about in Latin: *in Christo Deo fidelis imperator divinitus coronatus sublimis potens excelsus semper augustus moderator Romanorum*.¹³ This Latin formulation is the almost literal translation of the traditional Greek title of the Byzantine emperors in the twelfth century in documents intended for foreign rulers: *en Christoi toi theoi pistos basileus theostephes anax krataios hupselos augoustos kai autokrator Romaion*.¹⁴ It is notable that the Latin titles of Alexios III and IV vis-à-vis the original Greek version display a slight nuance that earlier authors failed to notice, notably the absence or transposition of the conjunction *et* (as equivalent of *kai*). In this way, the impression is created that Alexios III and IV did not call themselves *basileus kai autokrator ton Romaion* (or *imperator et moderator Romanorum*) in their Latin titles, but simply *imperator*, and beside this *moderator Romanorum*.

This nuance is significant in the context of the so-called two-emperors problem.¹⁵ In the late twelfth century the long-standing conflict between the Holy Roman emperor and the Byzantine emperor about one another's conflicting claims to an exclusive and universal emperorship came to something of a head. The Hohenstaufen Emperor Henry VI (1190–1197) in particular pursued a policy that was aimed at making the Byzantine emperor recognize the superiority of his emperorship, which caused some consternation in the policy-making circles in Constantinople.¹⁶ From this point of view it may have appeared opportune for Alexios III to make a slight adjustment to the Latin translation of his imperial title, so that this was no longer in direct competition with that of his rival and, as regards the Holy Roman emperor—but also that other Western universal power, the papacy—to some extent lost its 'provocative' nature. Emperor Alexios IV followed

¹² Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, III, n° 1667. Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 236 (VI, 210).

¹³ Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, III, n° 1648. Migne, *PL*, CCXIV, col. 765 (II, 210).

¹⁴ Dölger, *Byzantinische Diplomatie*, pp. 142–143.

¹⁵ Ohnsorge, *Das Zweikaiserproblem im früheren Mittelalter*, Hildesheim, 1947. Brehier, *Les Institutions de l'Empire byzantin*, pp. 10–13.

¹⁶ Brand, *Byzantium confronts the West*, pp. 191–194.

his predecessor's rationale and made the nuance even more evident by inversion of the words *moderator Romanorum* to *Romanorum moderator*, perhaps under the influence of his protectors from the crusading army. As a consequence, in his imperial intitulation Baldwin followed the compromise that had been worked out by Alexios III and Alexios IV in relation to correspondence in Latin with the West.

The question arises as to the extent to which Emperor Baldwin, as his Byzantine predecessors, in documents intended for internal use may have used a title that was more closely in keeping with Byzantine customs. Sigillography may offer us an answer to this. As is apparent from Baldwin's title on seals as mentioned above, the Latin title avoids the two-emperors-problem by means of the convenient abbreviation 'IMPR' ROM'. However, the Greek side bears the title that the Byzantine emperors also had on their seals, that of 'ΔΕΣΠΙΟΤΗΣ'.¹⁷ This shows that Baldwin and his entourage were also familiar with the Greek titles of the Byzantine emperors. It is known of Baldwin's brother and successor Henry (1206–1216) that he adopted even more typically Byzantine elements in his title. For example the legend on one of Henry's seals incorporates the title *autokrator*. A seal of the much later titular Latin Emperor Philip of Courtenay (1273–1281) bears as its Greek legend 'ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ Κ(αί) ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡ ΡΟΜΕΩΝ', a formulation that was customary in Byzantine imperial documents as subscription and which the titular emperor doubtless adopted from his predecessors.¹⁸ In any event, under Emperor Henry the Latin equivalent of this formula is known as a type of intitulation in documents. The data mentioned strongly suggests that under Emperor Baldwin the customary Greek imperial titles were, at least to some extent, already in use. Whether this was in particular the case with regard to the internal administration of the empire and pertained to the relations with neighbouring rulers is not clear. The data we have available to us about the imperial title of Baldwin (1204–1205) can be summarized as follows:

¹⁷ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, I, Types X–XIII, pp. 476–480. Dölger, *Byzantinische Diplomatik*, p. 136.

¹⁸ Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, n° 31.

Table 2: The imperial titles of Emperor Baldwin I (1204–1205).

1. Standard intitulation in documents
Balduinus Dei gratia fidelissimus in Christo imperator a Deo coronatus Romanorum moderator et semper augustus
2. Differing types of intitulation in documents only known from copies
type 1: Balduinus eadem gratia Constantinopolitanus imperator et semper augustus
type 2: Balduinus eadem gratia fidelissimus in Christo Constantinopolitanus imperator a Deo coronatus Roman[orum] moderator et semper augustus
3. Legends on seals
obverse: ΒΑΛΔΟΥΙΝΟΣ. ΔΕΣΠΟΤΗΣ.
reverse: BALD'(uinus) D(e)I GRA(tia) IMP(e)R'(ator) ROM(anorum) FLAND(rie) HAIN(onie). COM(es).

Study of the imperial titles in the intitulation in the documents of Baldwin's brother and successor Henry of Flanders/Hainaut (1206–1216), virtually all sent to Western rulers and ecclesiastical institutions, creates a number of problems. In the only known document preserved in its original form, the gift of a relic to an imperial cleric in 1207, the intitulation reads: *Henricus Dei gratia fidelissimus in Christo imperator a Deo coronatus Romanorum moderator et semper augustus*.¹⁹ This formulation is identical to the intitulation in Baldwin's documents. However, in the copies that we have of Henry's other documents are three notably different formulations.

Firstly, a transcript of a document of 1208 that accompanied the gift of a relic to the Abbey of Liessies in Hainaut contains the abbreviated formulation *Henricus Dei gratia imperator et moderator Romanorum*.²⁰ Apart from the typically Western *Dei gratia* formulation, this fits in direct with the above-mentioned subscription in charters of the Byzantine emperors (*basileus kai autokrator Romaion*). Apparently, Henry's chancery made use of a second imperial intitulation formula, also after Byzantine model. The difference in the use of these two formulas is unclear in view of the fact that there is only one known example of the abbreviated intitulation.

¹⁹ Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 27. Mussely & Molitor, *Cartulaire de l'Ancienne Eglise Collégiale de Notre Dame à Courtrai*, n° 29. This formula also appears in another document from Henry that is only known via a copy, a letter of 1206 to his bastard brother Godfrey, provost of Saint-Amé in Douai (Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XVIII, p. 527).

²⁰ Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 33. Hendrickx, *Regestes*, n° 87.

Secondly, a 1208 letter to Innocent III as preserved in the papal registers gives as intitulation: *Henricus eadem gratia fidelissimus in Christo imperator a Deo coronatus Romanie moderator et semper augustus*.²¹ This formulation also appears in the gift of a relic to Renaud of Forez, Archbishop of Lyons, dated 1208.²² A third document, which has been preserved in a number of copies, provides us with a solution here. Two copies (B and C) of Henry's 1213 encyclical to his Western friends show the formula mentioned, but the title in a third copy (D) is virtually identical to this in Henry's only known original.²³ Consequently, we can assume that Henry's intitulation contained the concept *Romanorum*, but that this term—as in Baldwin's documents—was sometimes abbreviated (*Rom*).²⁴ This led to different interpretations by the transcribers: *Romanie* or *Romanorum*. The same transcribers also could possibly manipulate the term *Romanorum* as written in full to the formulation *Romanie*, which was more familiar to them in the context of the Byzantine Empire.²⁵ Consequently, there is no reason to assume as do, inter alia, Longnon, Hendrickx and Brezeanu, that since Henry's reign a title came into being that, by omitting the term *Romanorum*, would have been a concession to the views of the pope and to those of the Holy Roman Emperor regarding the two-emperors-problem.²⁶

Thirdly, a copy of a letter of circa 1213 to Western prelates has as its intitulation: *Henricus Dei et Romane ecclesie beneplacito imperator Constantinopolitanus et fidelis in Christo Rom[anorum] moderator*.²⁷ Again this seems to be a case of an interpolation. It is indeed difficult to explain why the imperial chancery would have selected a more Western-oriented, more modest title (*Dei et Romane ecclesie beneplacito*) for the recipients in question, when in letters to the pope himself the formulation *a Deo coronatus* was used. Concerning Henry's reign, there is furthermore a document relating to the internal administration of Romania which contains an imperial intitulation, the so-called *Forma iustitiae inter Venetos et Francigenas* of 1207. The imperial intitulation, together with the subscription contained in the document, reads simply

²¹ Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XIX, p. 514.

²² Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 30, p. 81.

²³ 'Henricus Dei gratia fidelissimus in Christo imperator a Deo coronatus Romanorum *et* moderator et semper augustus' (Prinzing, *Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs*, p. 411).

²⁴ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 275, 282, 285–288.

²⁵ Wolff, *Romania*, pp. 32–33.

²⁶ Longnon, *Notes sur la diplomatie*, p. 4. Hendrickx, *Le pouvoir impérial*, p. 136. Brezeanu, *Das Zweikaiserproblem*, pp. 256–257. Van Tricht, 'La gloire de l'empire', pp. 213–214.

²⁷ Lauer, *Une lettre inédite d'Henri I d'Ange*, p. 201.

dominus imperator.²⁸ In an administrative document drawn up on one side by Henry's representatives and on the other side by representatives of the Venetian podestà in 1206, the emperor was referred to as *Constantinopolitanus imperator*.²⁹ These few documents that have been preserved demonstrate that—at least sometimes—a simplified title was used in documents relating to the internal administration of the empire. We should remark here that before 1204 too there was no elaborate intitulation in a number of imperial documents relating to the internal administration of the empire.³⁰

Henry's six known but undated seals display a number of interesting differences vis-à-vis those of his predecessor. Three types can be distinguished. A first type carries in full as its Latin legend 'HENRIC(us) D(e)I GRATIA INP(er)ATOR RO(ma)N(ia)E', as Greek legend 'ΕΠΠΙΚΟΣ ΔΕΣΠΟΤΗΣ'.³¹ A second type, probably dating from post-1212, bears as its Latin legend 'HENRICUS D(e)I GRA(tia) I(m)P(e)RAT(or) ROMAN(orum)', while the Greek remains unchanged.³² The third type, which can probably be dated as being later than the second type, carries the legends, respectively: '[.] [HENRICI] DEI : GR[ATIA] [IMPERATOR]IS : CONSTAN(tinopolitani)' and '+ EP[ΙΚΟΣ][ΑΥ]ΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡ ΚΑΙ [ΔΕΣΠΟ]ΤΗΣ ΚΩ(νσταντινου)ΠΟ(λου)'.³³

Chronologically, we could suggest a shift from *imperator Romanie*, a formula that departs from Baldwin's seals, through *imperator Roman(orum?)*, formula that again matches Baldwin's seals, to *imperator Constantinopolitanus* and its Greek equivalent, a new departure that was introduced in Henry's reign and for which there is no Byzantine model. However, the question arises as to whether the different types

²⁸ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 180, pp. 49–52.

²⁹ Longnon, *Recherches sur la vie de Geoffroy de Villehardouin*, n° 83.

³⁰ Dölger & Karayannopoulos, *Byzantinische Urkundenlehre. I: Die Kaiserurkunden*, pp. 109–115.

³¹ Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, n° 6–7. Zacos & Vegler, *Byzantine Lead Seals*, I/1, n° 112a–d.

³² Tzotchev, *Molybdobulle de l'empereur latin de Constantinople Henri*, pp. 24–25. Dating from after 1212: This seal was found close to Tzarevetz Castle at Tirnovo, the residence of the Bulgarian tsars from the end of the 12th century. It was only after circa 1212 that the Emperor Henry maintained diplomatic relations with the Bulgarian tsars; previously, the contacts had been limited to military confrontations.

³³ Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, n° 7b. For the dating thereof after type 2: type 2 bears as its imperial escutcheon the lion of Flanders, which was certainly the imperial blazon in the early years of Henry's reign (as also under Baldwin I) (Valenciennes, §659). However, type 3 displays a totally different escutcheon, and this suggests that the seal can be dated to post-type 2.

were not instead destined for different recipients. As far as is known, the first types of seals were only found in Western Europe. The second and third types of seals, of which to be sure in each case only one example is known, were found in Romania itself or in a neighbouring region—in this case in Bulgaria. On the strength of this interpretation the *imperator Romanie* formula might have been used only in documents intended for Western rulers and institutions in connection with the sensitivity relating to the two-emperors-problem, perhaps by way of compensation for the *Romanorum* formula in the intitulation of the documents themselves. The data available on the imperial entitlement enables us to summarize this for Henry's reign (1206–1216) as follows:

Table 3: The imperial titles of Emperor Henry (1206–1216).

A. Types of intitulation in documents
1. Standard intitulation in documents Henricus Dei gratia fidelissimus in Christo imperator a Deo coronatus Romanorum moderator et semper augustus
2. Abbreviated intitulation according to the model of the Byzantine imperial subscriptio (a single known example) Henricus Dei gratia imperator et moderator Romanorum
3. Abbreviated intitulation in document with respect to the empire's internal administration (a single known example) Dominus imperator
4. Different types of intitulation in documents only known from copies type 1: Henricus eadem gratia fidelissimus in Christo imperator a Deo coronatus Romanie moderator et semper augustus' type 2: Henricus Dei et Romane ecclesie beneplacito imperator Constantinopolitanus et fidelis in Christo Romanorum moderator
B. Legends on seals
type 1: face: ΕΡΡΙΚΟΣ ΔΕΣΠΟΤΗΣ reverse: HENRIC(us) D(e)I GRATIA INP(er)ATOR RO(ma)N(ia)E
type 2: face: ΕΡΡΙΚΟΣ ΔΕΣΠΟΤΗΣ reverse: HENRICUS D(e)I GRA(tia) I(m)P(e)RAT(or) ROMAN(orum)
type 3: face: [.] [HENRIC](us) DEI : GR[ATIA] [IMPERATOR]IS : CONSTAN(tinopolitani) reverse: + ΕΡ[ΡΙΚΟΣ] [ΑΥ]ΤΟΚΡ[ΑΤΟΡ] [ΚΑΙ] [ΔΕΣΠΟ]ΤΗΣ Κω(νσταντινου) ΠΟ(λου)

The source material for Henry's successors is very limited. Only one document is known about with respect to the imperial pair Peter of Courtenay (1217–1218) and Yolande of Flanders/Hainaut (1217–1219), which is the imperial oath sworn to the Venetian doge to respect the conventions of 1204–1205. The intitulation reads in three interdependent copies: *Petrus Dei gratia fidelissimus in Christo Constantinopolitanus imperator a Deo coronatus R[omanorum] moderator et semper augustus et [...] Yolens eius uxor eadem gratia imperatrix*. Another version reads: *Petrus Dei gratia fidelissimus in Christo Constantinopolitanus imperator Roman[orum] moderator a Deo coronatus et semper augustus et [...] Yolens eius uxor eadem ka[ritate] imperatrix*. The inversion of the phrases *moderator* and *a Deo coronatus* in this last copy vis-à-vis the classical intitulation formulation appears to be carelessness on the part of the transcriber.³⁴ For the rest, it would seem that the abbreviation *R* or *Roman* stands for *Romanorum*, analogous to the documents of the emperors Baldwin and Henry.

The addition of the word *Constantinopolitanus* is a new departure in the intitulation of imperial documents, although we have already come across the term in one of the types of Henry's seals and in a document concerning the internal administration of the empire. However, in so far as it does not relate to an interpolation, the addition appears to be connected principally with the circumstance that the document was drawn up outside the imperial chancery in Constantinople. A Venetian notary was indeed responsible for the issuing of the document that took place in Rome on the occasion of the papal imperial coronation there. Owing to the lack of source material, the extent to which the Empress Yolande used the complete imperial title in documents drawn up in her name, whether before or after the death of her husband (circa 1217–1218), continues to be an open question. However, there is absolutely no reason to assume that she would not have done so. As the sister of the Emperors Baldwin and Henry, Yolande of Flanders/Hainaut was after all empress in her own right and not via her husband. In comparison with the preceding emperors and on the basis of this one example, we establish the continuity as regards entitlement under the reign of Peter and Yolande, even though care is taken with the concept *Romanorum*.

³⁴ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 240, p. 194.

With respect to Robert of Courtenay (1221–1228), son and successor to Yolande of Flanders/Hainaut and Peter of Courtenay, the problem arises once again that there are no known original documents, only copies in the papal and Venetian registers. Robert's four known documents from the years 1221–1224—which have as their subjects the ecclesiastical possessions in the empire, certain Venetian ownership rights, and Robert's confirmation of the agreements of 1204–1205—state invariably as intitulation *Robertus Dei gratia fidelissimus in Christo imperator a Deo coronatus Romanie moderator et semper augustus*.³⁵ Without doubt the term *Romanie* is again an incorrect interpretation of the abbreviation *Rom*, or a conscious interpolation of the term *Romanorum*, as we assumed earlier in the case of a copy of a letter of the Emperor Henry preserved in the papal registers. Such a rationale is indeed also plausible for the copies in the Venetian registers. The title used by the doge of Venice after 1204 contains the formula: *quarte partis et dimidie totius Romanie imperii dominator*, whereby the term *Romanie* may have been chosen in preference to *Romanorum* in light of the two-emperors-problem.³⁶ It is quite possible that transcribers changed the term *Romanorum* in the original documents, perhaps abbreviated to *Rom* or *Roman*, to *Romanie*, in order to conform the imperial title with the official title of the doge.

The interpretation of Robert of Courtenay's two known seals is also problematic. The Greek legend does not create a problem and can be read as 'POBEPTOS ΔΕΣΠΙΟΤΗΣ', a formula that we have already encountered with the emperors Baldwin and Henry. However, the Latin legend on the first seal reads: '[+] ROB'(er)TI D(e)I . GRA(tia) . IM[P](er)ATOR(is) ROMANI [...]'.³⁷ On the second seal stands: '+ ROB'(er)TI D(e)I GRA(tia) IMP(er)ATOR(is) [ROM]ANI α'.³⁸ This last character—which appears to be a Greek α, which the publisher mistakenly reproduces as an A, and which probably appeared on the damaged first seal—is striking. It seems unlikely that this character would belong to the preceding word and would complete the word *Romania*, as the publishers assume. Firstly, the grammar would require a genitive, which would produce *Romaniae* or *Romanie*. Secondly,

³⁵ Wolff, *Politics in the Latin patriarchate*, pp. 298–301. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 260, 267, 269. Carile, *Partitio*, pp. 171–172, 175–176, 179.

³⁶ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 279.

³⁷ Zacos & Vegliery, *Byzantine Lead Seals*, I/1, n° 113a.

³⁸ Ibidem, n° 113b.

it is unclear why a Greek alpha was used instead of a Latin character. Thirdly, the alpha stands physically apart from the whole word *Romani*. A more meaningful interpretation in this light may be that the alpha is an abbreviation for *augusti*, a term that was part of the title of the Latin emperors.³⁹ The Greek letter alpha can be used in order to indicate unambiguously that a new word is intended. It is possible that the legend is again an example of the earlier witnessed consciously ambiguous treatment of the concepts *Romanie/Romaniae* and *Romani/Romanorum*.

The preceding analysis shows that, in essence, the Latin emperors in the years 1204–1228 adopted the existing late twelfth-century Byzantine imperial titles. As far as is possible to ascertain, this adoption related both to the original Greek titles and to the Latin translations of them that were used by the Byzantine emperors. One difference is that the Latin titles did not now have the character of the ‘authenticated translations,’ but were on an equal footing with the Greek titles. The seals we have discussed illustrate this: the Latin and Greek titles each take up one side.

Some other innovations, not following the Byzantine model are, with respect to the imperial ideology, more meaningful. In the first place we can consider in this regard the title *imperator Romanie* (cf. Henry’s seals, type 2, used for Western recipients), which was the expression of the contemporary Western perception of the two-emperors-problem. Innovative too was the title *imperator Constantinopolitanus* and its Greek equivalent *autokrator kai despotes Konstantinou polou* (cf. Henry’s seal, type 3), which emphasized the possession of the city of Constantinople as a legitimizing element against the claims on the Byzantine emperorship on the part of, inter alia, the rival emperor in Nicaea. The introduction of the formulation *Dei gratia*, an element originating from Western princely titles, and the abandonment of several imperial epithets (*anax krataios hupselos* or the Latin equivalent *sublimis potens excelsus*), as already attested under Emperor Alexios IV Angelos, are of rather secondary importance.⁴⁰

³⁹ Cf. Cappelletti, *Dizionario di Abbreviature latine ed italiane*, p. 429. On the interplay between Greek and Latin in documents and inscriptions during a much earlier phase of Byzantine history: Millar, *Linguistic co-existence in Constantinople*, p. 102.

⁴⁰ Dabbs, *Dei Gratia in Royal Titles*, pp. 159–194.

In what way was this form of title now the expression of the political ideology of the Latin emperors in the period 1204–1228? Three closely connected central concepts of the Byzantine imperial ideology were externalized in the title. Firstly, the idea of the emperor as God's appointed ruler, His viceroy on earth (cf. the formula *a Deo coronatus*). Secondly, the idea of the Roman nature of the Byzantine Empire, and the idea automatically coupled with this of a universal and exclusive emperorship, the *basileus ton Romaion* as the highest worldly authority (cf. the concept *Romanorum*). Thirdly, the depiction of the emperor as the absolute ruler who, in exercising his power, is dependent on no one (cf. the term *autokrator*, or in Latin translation *moderator*). In contrast to authors such as Hendrickx, Carile and Lock, we shall substantiate that the Latin emperors, from Baldwin to Robert of Courtenay certainly were aware of the way in which their titles referred to the Byzantine imperial ideology.⁴¹ The slight variations displayed in the seals of successive emperors indicate that careful thought had been given to these titles. The circumspect use of the term *Romanorum*, so sensitive in the context of the relations with the West, points in the same direction. It need not be the cause of surprise that the Latin emperors would have been acquainted with the Byzantine ideology. During the Fourth Crusade, the first Latin emperors Baldwin and Henry had in the years 1202–1203 been able to acquaint themselves with the Byzantine political system via contacts with Alexios (IV), pretender to the Byzantine throne.⁴² Testimony from both Byzantine and Western sources indicates explicitly the Latin interest in Byzantine culture. For example, Niketas Choniates relates how in 1204, shortly after Constantinople was taken, the Latin crusaders enquired of the Byzantine population extensively about the symbolic significance of all manner of sculptures and effigies in the city.⁴³ A passage by chronicler Henry of Valenciennes illustrates how the Latins acquainted themselves with local prophecies about the Byzantine emperorship.⁴⁴ Also Robert of Clari, of whom Macrides states that 'he absorbed "Greek" attitudes and ideas', Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Gunther of Pairis

⁴¹ Hendrickx, *Le pouvoir impérial*, p. 135. Carile, *La cancellaria sovrana*, p. 52. Idem, *Per una storia dell'impero latino*, p. 37. 1978. Lock, *The Latin emperors as heirs to Byzantium*, pp. 295–304.

⁴² Hendrickx, *Baudouin IX de Flandre et les empereurs byzantins*, pp. 482–489.

⁴³ Niketas Choniates, pp. 643–644.

⁴⁴ Valenciennes, §567. Cf. Chapter VIII, note 146.

show interest in Byzantine culture.⁴⁵ And finally, in the immediate vicinity of the Latin emperors there were prominent Byzantines who occupied high administrative positions with whom they and their Western entourage must have been in continual interaction.

The basic principle of Byzantine political theory was rather new for westerners. The idea of an emperor who was chosen and appointed by God himself, with which the two other central ideas of universality and autocracy were connected, meant that the power of the emperor as God's representative was, in principle, unlimited. The *basileus* was the absolute sovereign, who was adorned with an aureole of holiness and who was accountable to no one other than God himself. This also implied, for example, that the emperor was not subordinate to the Church. The relations between the Empire and the Church, between emperor and patriarch, were, in theory, arranged in Byzantium by the principle of solidarity. In this manner, the emperor had considerable powers at his disposal with respect to a variety of aspects of the administration of the Church, but at the same time it was his duty to be its loyal protector. The Byzantine imperial ideology was in fact a Christianized version of the original Roman emperorship, which was also of a universal and absolutist nature.⁴⁶

The Latin emperors and their entourage must have realized that this Byzantine body of thought could form an ideological basis for the development of a strong imperial authority, a counterbalance to the constitutional agreements of 1204–1205. Via the idea of an emperor chosen directly by God, Baldwin I and his successors were no longer compelled to let their throne and their authority be dependent on election by the leading barons. The actual adoption of this concept is witnessed by a passage in Henry's oath ratifying the agreements of 1204–1205 prior to his coronation: *ut deberemus coronari a domino patriarcha secundum Dei providentiam*.⁴⁷ Consequently, from the imperial standpoint the source of imperial power was God himself, whose choice needed only to be confirmed or explicited by a college

⁴⁵ De Clari, §66, 81, 86–88, 92. Villehardouin, §307–308. Gunther Van Pairis, p. 166. Macrides, *Constantinople: the crusader's gaze*, pp. 197–212.

⁴⁶ Treitinger, *Die Oströmische Kaiser- und Reichsidee*, p. 34, pp. 43–45. Brehier, *Les Institutions de l'Empire byzantin*, pp. 49–54, pp. 345–353. Runciman, *The Byzantine Theocracy*, pp. 22–25.

⁴⁷ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 174, p. 34. Cf. Hendrickx, *Le pouvoir impérial*, p. 92.

of leading barons. In this way the Latin emperor to a certain extent appropriated the sacred character of the Byzantine emperorship.

Of course, the idea of the Byzantine emperor as *autokrator* was, in the light of the constitutional agreements that defined the imperial powers, a sensitive matter for the Latin emperors. However, the manner in which Emperor Robert of Courtenay in circa 1223, by way of an imperial favour via a *privilegium* (the Latin equivalent of a *chrysoboullos logos*), promised the Venetian doge a number of rights of possession to which Venice in any case was entitled *de iure* by virtue of the 1204 distribution agreement, is in this context notable.⁴⁸ Robert, probably after the example of his predecessors, clearly attempted to formally keep in existence the fiction of the autocracy of the absolute ruler, just as the Byzantine emperors had done before the Latin conquest. Indeed, the appearance of the significant term *autokrator* in one of the types of imperial seals from Henry's reign indicates that the Latin emperors saw in the Byzantine concept of autocracy an instrument with which to increase his authority and prestige.

That the Latin emperors supported the idea of universal emperorship is clear in the light of their retention of the Roman nature of their emperorship, made concrete in their conscious adoption of the term *Romanorum*.⁴⁹ Hereby they interpreted the concept *Romani* as solely referring to a political identity, the conglomerate of all the subjects of the Roman emperor, and not also to an ethnic identity, as had been the case before 1204 for the cultured, Greek-speaking Constantinopolitan

⁴⁸ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 269, p. 255. Hendrickx, *L'attribution de "privilegia"*, pp. 144–145.

⁴⁹ Henry also expressed his awareness of the elevated Roman character of the empire in a letter to his bastard brother Godfrey, provost of Saint-Amé in Douai: 'Quantum honorem quantamve gloriam terra Flandriae et Hainoniae totaque progenies nostra in aeternum in captione Constantinopolitani imperii sit adepta non solum in terram nostram verum etiam per quatuor mundi climata divina potentia credimus esse delatum [...]. Nullis etiam praedecessoribus nostris tantam contulit gloriam et honorem quantam domino et fratri nostro B. imperatori et nobis tradidit et donavit; de quo tanto ipsi Domino a quo omnis virtus et victoria venit immensas tenemur grates referre quanto nullis meritis nostris praecedentibus de tam magno et excellentissimo imperio ex insperato victoriam dedit. Et quia non minor est virtus quam quaerere parta tueri, licet Deus miraculose nobis tradiderit imperium Romanum non tamen illud possumus absque consilio et auxilio amicorum nostrorum conservare, praesertim cum eis prae omnibus aliis totius christianitatis incumbat manutenere et defendere praefatum imperium ad honorem Dei et nostrae progenis exaltationem et gloriam [...]' (Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XVIII, p. 527).

elite, who considered themselves as the only true *Romaioi*.⁵⁰ The Latin emperors considered themselves as rulers of a multinational state composed of subjects with different ethnic identities, inter alia Latins (subdivided in Frenchmen, Germans, Venetians, Lombards, etc.), Greeks (*Graeci* or *Grieci* in the Western sources, which could be interpreted as the equivalent of the Greek *Hellenoi*, a term increasingly attested in twelfth-century Byzantine sources),⁵¹ Armenians and Bulgarians. The adoption of the Roman nature of their emperorship naturally brought them into conflict with the prevalent Western views of emperorship in which, under the influence of the papal *translatio imperii* theory, the Holy Roman emperor was considered to be the only legitimate and universal emperor.⁵² The Latin emperors and their entourage were aware of this area of tension and, as has been mentioned, treated the matter with some circumspection. Despite this caution, they nonetheless did not renounce the title that expressed this universalism. From their Byzantine predecessors the emperors also inherited the appearance of having a unique authority vis-à-vis their Western counterparts because of the fact that they were the most important possessors and distributors of the most precious Christian relics, including the True Cross and many Passion relics.⁵³

It is difficult to determine how they exactly viewed the conflicting claims of universality between the Holy Roman emperor and their own dignity. Without doubt the Latin emperors recognized the legitimacy of the Holy Roman emperorship, as is apparent, inter alia, from the difficult manner with which the term *Romanorum* had to be dealt. However, this did not alter the fact that the Latin emperor as *a Deo coronatus*—a privilege that his Holy Roman colleague could not claim—possibly aspired to a position of precedence in the imperial hierarchy.⁵⁴ In any event the Latin emperor claimed a position that was at least equal to that of the Holy Roman emperor. This is apparent from the proposed marriage that Emperor Henry put forward in circa 1207–1208 to *rex Romanorum* Philip of Swabia, who had not been officially crowned Holy Roman emperor because of his struggle

⁵⁰ On these two versions of Byzantine Roman identity: Page, *Being Byzantine*, pp. 47–50, 69–70.

⁵¹ Page, *Being Byzantine*, pp. 65–67, 88–89.

⁵² Brezeanu, 'Translatio Imperii', pp. 607–608.

⁵³ Mergiali-Sahas, *Byzantine Emperors and Holy Relics*, p. 48. Kalavrezou, *Helping Hands for the Empire*, pp. 54–48. Cf. also Chapter VII, note 244.

⁵⁴ Cf. Brezeanu, 'Translatio Imperii', p. 612.

for the imperial dignity with rival claimant Otto (IV) of Brunswick. When Philip answered Henry's envoys that their sovereign was an *advena* and *solo nomine imperator*, and furthermore stated that he would only give his daughter in marriage if Henry were to recognize him as *imperator Romanorum* and *suus dominus*, the envoys replied diplomatically that they did not know what their lord's answer to this would be.⁵⁵ In the light of the fact that we have been able to learn nothing further about this planned marriage, we may conclude that for Henry—in concordance with his Byzantine predecessors—the subordination of his emperorship to that of the Holy Roman Emperor was not considered to be an option.

In concreto, the Latin emperors restricted their theoretical claim of universality to what we can indicate as the Eastern half of Christendom, in accordance with the *divisio imperii* concept, which as a result of the events of 1204 also found acceptance with Innocent III in place of the concept of *translatio imperii*.⁵⁶ Thus the Latin emperors did not at any moment attempt to gain political influence in the West. However, they certainly did try to acquire a hegemonic position within the Byzantine space and with regard to the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine, whereby when they had the opportunity they also opposed local claims of the Holy Roman emperors in those regions.⁵⁷ As a concluding observation in this context we would like to note that in the past the Byzantine state had already been prepared to compromise concerning its universalist claims with regard to the Persian and Muslim empires, when this was deemed to be politically advantageous.⁵⁸ The Latin emperors took this willingness to compromise one step further.

In the area of religion too, the Latin emperors claimed a number of notable prerogatives that had little resemblance to Western customs, which again illustrates the fact that their ideological frame of reference was to some extent based on Byzantine political thinking. A striking example of this is how in 1204 Baldwin invited Pope Innocent III to organize a general council in Constantinople about the unification

⁵⁵ *Chronicon Universale Anonymi Laudunensis*, p. 453. Van Tricht, "La gloire de l'empire", pp. 227–228.

⁵⁶ Brezeanu, "Translatio Imperii", pp. 609–610.

⁵⁷ Cf. Chapter VIII, pp. 471–472.

⁵⁸ Kalogeras, *The Emperor, The Embassy, The Letter and the Recipient: the Byzantine Letter of 615 to Khusrau II and its History*, pp. 284–285 (with references to further reading). Nicholas I Patriarch of Constantinople, *Letters*, p. 2, n° I, v. 16–22.

of the Roman and Byzantine Church.⁵⁹ Although the ultimate decision on this was the prerogative of the pope himself, this initiative is nonetheless reminiscent of the right of Byzantine emperors to convoke oecumenical councils.⁶⁰ In the same vein Emperor Henry at the end of 1206 advised the Byzantine metropolitan clergy to address a request to Innocent III asking to appoint a provisional patriarch of their own and to convoke a council in Constantinople to restore ecclesiastical unity.⁶¹ For Emperor Henry we also know that at times he preached to his barons and vassals, quoting the Scriptures. This is reminiscent of the didascalical aspirations of earlier Byzantine emperors like Leo VI (886–912) and Manuel I (1143–1180), who delivered sermons at various occasions.⁶² Furthermore, Henry was repeatedly to take important initiatives with regard to ecclesiastical institutions, without taking into account the relevant papal or patriarchal viewpoints, and systematically expanded his influence in the area of religion at the expense of the Latin patriarch. In this area, the Byzantine traditions were quite frequently a direct source of inspiration. Henry also set himself up as the protector of the Byzantine clergy, whose interests he defended on repeated occasions against Latin ecclesiastical and secular leaders.⁶³ Lastly, Baldwin, Henry and their successors claimed the right to issue decrees concerning the property rights and fiscal obligations of the Church.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271, pp. 575–576.

⁶⁰ Runciman, *The Byzantine Theocracy*, p. 24.

⁶¹ The original request of the Byzantine clergy asking Henry, whose imperial rule they explicitly recognized, to allow them to elect a patriarch of their own fell through because of the condition the emperor had stipulated: the recognition of papal primacy (Mesarites, *Der Epitaphios*, pp. 51–63; Migne, PG, CXL, col. 293–298; Haluscynskyj, *Acta Innocentii Papae III*, n° 22; Longnon, *L'empire latin*, pp. 95–96).

⁶² Valenciennes summarizes an improvised, parenthetic imperial sermon, delivered by Emperor Henry during his campaign against the Bulgarians in late 1208: “*Et quant li empereres l’oï, si se fist maintenant armer, et fist maintenant armer ses homes; et puis lor dist qu’il pensassent endroit soi cascuns dou bien faire, et ne quidassent pas que chil sire ki les avoit fait a sa propre samblance et a s’ymage [Gen 9:6], les evust entroubliés por cele chienaille. ‘Se vous, fait-il dont, metés vostre fiance del tout en lui [Psalm 4:5] et votre esperance [Psalm 130:7], n’aïés ja paour ne doutance que il contre vous puissent eure durer.’ Que vous diroie-jou? Tant lor a li empereres preechié de Nostre Segnor, et mis avant de boines paroles et amonestés de bieles proeces, ke il n’i a si couart ki maintenant ne soit garnis de hardement, et desirrans de proeece faire s’il venir puent en point. Ensi preeche li empereres ses homes et amonieste de bien faire, tant que tous les a resvigourés.*” (Valenciennes, §516–517). Dagron, *Empereur et prêtre*, pp. 259, 272–273.

⁶³ Van Tricht, “*La gloire de l’empire*”, pp. 223, 237–239. Cf. Chapter IV, pp. 214, 233, and VI, p. 314.

⁶⁴ Cf. Chapter IV, pp. 194–196.

We can see two explanations for the partial adoption of the central concepts of the Byzantine imperial ideology, to some extent adapted to a Western frame of reference. Firstly, emulating the Byzantine predecessors was without doubt intended to create legitimacy in the eyes of the local Byzantine elite and population in order to gain their support, and to avoid there being a feeling of alienation between Latin monarch and Byzantine subject. The new style titles *Constantinopolitanus imperator* and *autokrator kai despotes Konstantinou polou*, for example, also fit in within this way of thinking. Being in possession of Constantinople was traditionally an essential element in the imperial legitimacy, and it was the wish of the Latin emperors to emphasize this vis-à-vis their own subjects *and* their rivals, in the first place the Emperors of Nicaea and later Thessalonike too.⁶⁵ We point out here, obiter dictum, a typically Western element in the way in which the first emperors legitimized their possession of the throne of Constantinople. They referred to the myth in common currency in twelfth-century Western Europe that the Franks were descendants of the Homeric King Priam of Troy. In this way, the Latin emperors—and by the same token the other crusaders—were the heirs of an ancient, autochthonous dynasty. On the strength of this perspective, the Latin emperors therefore did nothing more than claim the ancient heritage of their forefathers.⁶⁶ A second explanation for the adoption of the Byzantine imperial ideology is, as has already been mentioned briefly, that this provided a basis upon which a powerful imperial authority could be developed—this in particular vis-à-vis the Byzantine elite and population in general, who were only acquainted with this Byzantine tradition, and who could only see the Latin emperor from a Byzantine point of view. This relatively firm imperial authority vis-à-vis the Byzantine subjects could also serve as the basis for increasing the imperial influence and prestige in the eyes of the Latin vassals.⁶⁷

In addition to the adoption of the central concepts of the Byzantine imperial ideology, with respect to Emperor Henry, for whose reign

⁶⁵ Gounarides, *Formes de légimitation de l'Etat de Nicée*, pp. 157–158. Vasiljevskij, *Epirotica saeculi XIII*, n° 26. With regard to the Empire of Trebizond it is to be noted that the imperial title is only first attested in contemporary sources during the reign of Manuel I Komnenos (1238–1263) (Prinzing, *Das byzantinischen Kaisertum in Umbruch*, pp. 171–173).

⁶⁶ De Clari, §106. Shawcross, *Re-Inventing the homeland in the historiography of Frankish Greece: the Fourth Crusade and the Legend of the Trojan War*, pp. 120–152. Jacoby, *Knightly values*, pp. 170–173.

⁶⁷ Van Tricht, “La gloire de l’empire”, p. 219.

the most sources are available, we can substantiate that he consciously attempted to fulfil the Byzantine ideal that the ruler arrogated the virtues of philanthropy, justice, mercy and solicitude for the general good, and that again this was to legitimize his position vis-à-vis the local elite and population.⁶⁸ However, at the same time Henry did not disregard his own cultural background. For example, texts that emanate from his entourage, and in particular imperial letters and Valenciennes' chronicle, characterize him as the incarnation of the Western ideal of chivalry, with the emphasis on fidelity, courage, magnanimity, courtesy and honour.⁶⁹ The adoption of Byzantine ideas concerning emperorship appears to have achieved its aim in the sense that part of the Byzantine population and elite certainly recognized the Latin emperor, in this instance Henry, as their legitimate sovereign, as is witnessed by various Latin and Byzantine sources.⁷⁰ This recognition need be no cause for surprise in the sense that, to a certain extent, the Latin emperor, and for example no less than the emperor of Nicaea, satisfied the three traditional requirements for legitimization: the possession of Constantinople, the acknowledgement and protection of the Orthodox faith, and the maintenance of the Byzantine laws and institutions.⁷¹ We have already seen how the Latin emperor emphasized the possession of the city of Constantinople in his title. The phrase *fidelissimus in Christo* in the imperial intitutatio shows his dedication to the second requirement. That the emperors belonged to the Church of Rome and not to that of Byzantium did not have to be an insurmountable problem. What the Orthodox faith signified precisely was in the early decades of the thirteenth century the object of negotiations between the two Churches (1204–1206, 1214, 1232–1234).⁷² In fact in earlier and later Byzantine history sometimes there were also divergent perceptions of the definition of the Orthodox faith.⁷³ Besides that, it is known of Emperor Henry for example that he took Byzantine

⁶⁸ Ibidem, pp. 221–226. Cheynet, *Pouvoir et contestations*, p. 184. Angelov, *Imperial ideology and political thought in Byzantium*, p. 79.

⁶⁹ Valenciennes, §508–513, 516, 520, 527, 536, 546–549, 568, 641, 660–661. Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XVIII, pp. 527–529.

⁷⁰ Villehardouin, §490. Valenciennes, §663, 672, 683. Akropolites, §16–17. Cotelierius, *Ecclesiae Graecae monumenta*, III, p. 516. Van Tricht, "La gloire de l'empire", pp. 223–224.

⁷¹ Karpov, *The Black Sea region, before and after the fourth crusade*, p. 287 (+ references in note 19).

⁷² Cf. Chapter VI, pp. 314–315.

⁷³ Cf. Chapter VI, note 181.

monastic institutions and clerics under his protection.⁷⁴ As regards the third requirement for legitimization, it will be apparent that the Latin emperors retained the Byzantine institutions to a large extent.⁷⁵

A last manner of strengthening the legitimization of the emperorship was to enter into a relationship with one of the earlier imperial lineages. Although there were no formal rules in Byzantium about imperial succession, the concept of familial and dynastic continuity was fairly strong. Dagron has pointed out that the legitimacy of someone who acquired the imperial throne in an unorthodox way, for instance by means of violence (cf. the conquest of Constantinople in 1204) (*légitimité de rupture*), did not have to be problematic, as long as he allied himself with the former imperial family (*légitimité de durée*).⁷⁶ This consideration must have played a role when, as mentioned earlier, Emperor Henry suggested marriage to the daughter of the Roman king Philip of Swabia, who was married to Irene, daughter of Isaac II Angelos and sister of Alexios IV.⁷⁷ To some extent, Emperor Robert's negotiations with Theodore Laskaris in 1221 with regard to a marriage to his daughter Eudokia, via her mother Anna, a grandchild of Alexios III Angelos, can also be viewed in this light.⁷⁸ However, neither of the proposed marriages came to fruition, as the result of which the Latin emperors could not claim continuity with the Byzantine imperial families.⁷⁹ In 1217 Empress Yolande was able to address the legitimacy question in an alternative manner by giving birth to her youngest son, who after the first Latin emperor was named Baldwin, in the *Porphyra* palace, the traditional birthplace for the children of the Byzantine emperor. Apart from the already mentioned Byzantine concepts concerning the imperial succession there indeed also existed the notion

⁷⁴ Cf. Chapter IV, pp. 214, 233.

⁷⁵ Cf. Chapter III, p. 155.

⁷⁶ Dagron, *Empereur et prêtre*, pp. 44–55. Angelov, *Imperial ideology and political thought in Byzantium*, pp. 116–117.

⁷⁷ Cf. references in note 55.

⁷⁸ Cf. Chapter VII, p. 365.

⁷⁹ Through his marriage to Marquis Boniface's daughter Agnes of Montferrat, Henry did marry into a family that itself was related to several Byzantine imperial lineages. In 1180 Boniface's brother Renier had married Mary Komnena, daughter of Emperor Manuel. In 1187 his other brother Konrad had married Theodora Angelina, daughter of Emperor Isaac II, and in 1190 Isabelle of Anjou (whose mother Mary Komnena was a grandniece of Emperor Manuel), with whom he had a daughter Mary, who was the heiress of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and a cousin of Henry's wife Agnes (Haberstumpf, *Dinastie*, pp. 51, 54, 77).

that when God allowed a child and heir to be born to the reigning emperor, this legitimized the incumbent emperor and his lineage.⁸⁰ As emperor *porphyrogennetos* Baldwin II (1240–1273) propagated his own lineage, via a reference to it on his seal (*Phlandras*), as the legitimate imperial *genos*, possibly following the example of his predecessors.⁸¹

IMPERIAL CEREMONIES, RITUALS AND TRADITIONS

The Latin emperors also adopted a number of Byzantine imperial ceremonies, rituals and traditions, in so far as these could be reconciled with a Western frame of reference. The intention was the same as the adoption of the Byzantine title: to legitimize themselves and to increase imperial prestige.

A first example is that of the coronation ceremony.⁸² Baldwin I's imperial coronation on 16 May 1204 was clearly partially modelled on the Byzantine example.⁸³ He had already been honoured at his election with the *divinis laudibus* by both clergy and the laity, acclamations that emphasized the religious and sacred nature of the emperorship. On the day of his coronation the emperor-elect was led by the prelates and barons from the Great Palace to the Church of Saint Sophia, the church of coronation of Byzantine emperors since the seventh century. The city was decorated with banners, streamers and precious tapestries. In an annex of the church the emperor-elect was dressed in the imperial robes: the *divetesion*, the *loros*, the *chlamys* and purple shoes.⁸⁴ Baldwin was then led by two prelates to the altar, with one

⁸⁰ Dagron, *Empereur et prêtre*, pp. 61–62.

⁸¹ Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, n° 11–15, pp. 170–171. In an early thirteenth-century Serbian *vita* Emperor Henry is called 'the Greek emperor Filandar' (Maksimovic, *La Serbie et les contrées voisines*, p. 280). In a cycle of Greek folksongs—known in a sixteenth-century version, but which probably came into being shortly after Henry's death in 1216—he is referred to as 'Henry of Flanders' (Manousakas, *To elleniko demotiko tragoudi gia to basilia Erriko tes Phlantras*, pp. 1–52. Idem, *Kai pali to tragoudi gia to basilia Erriko tes Phlantras*, pp. 336–370). The Flemish counts and Flemish mercenaries were not completely unknown in twelfth-century Byzantium: Ciggaar, *Flemish mercenaries in Byzantium*, pp. 44–75.

⁸² The pontificalia from this period were unusable: Andrieu, *Le Pontifical Romain de la Curie Romaine*, pp. 52–53, 219, 382–385. Cf. Schramm, *Das lateinische Kaisertum in Konstantinopel*, p. 844.

⁸³ Cf. Treitinger, *Die Oströmische Kaiser- und Reichsidee*, pp. 14–15. Dagron, *Empereur et prêtre*, pp. 74–76.

⁸⁴ On the imperial robes: Hendy, *Coinage and money in the Byzantine Empire*, pp. 65–68. Piltz, *Middle Byzantine Court Costume*, pp. 42–43.

of the crusade leaders, Hugh of Saint-Pol bearing the imperial standard and another, Louis of Blois, the imperial sword, and Boniface of Montferrat, assisted by two prelates, the imperial crown, the *stemma*. The emperor-elect then knelt before the altar, was disrobed and anointed. When he was once more enrobed, the *stemma* was put upon his head by the attendant prelates, whilst he was again honoured with both Byzantine and Latin acclamations. A jewel that had belonged to Emperor Manuel Komnenos (1143–1180) was then suspended from his neck. Baldwin then sat on the imperial throne, after which he together with all those present celebrated the Eucharist, bearing in one hand the cross-bearing globe, and in the other the sceptre. After the religious ceremony Emperor Baldwin I left in procession to return to the Great Palace, where he took seat on the throne of Emperor Constantine the Great. The Byzantines present then honoured the emperor by performing the *proskynesis* and recognized him as their *saint empereur*.⁸⁵

Although clearly inspired by the Byzantine coronation ceremony, also with notable references to the Emperors Constantine and Manuel, we must mention briefly that a number of Byzantine elements had their equivalent in the contemporary Western coronation rituals. Ritual robes, the coronation itself, acclamations of a religious nature, the sceptre and orb were, for example, also elements in the Holy Roman emperor's coronation ceremony.⁸⁶ The anointment most likely was an element of Western origin, since there is no conclusive evidence that before 1204 Byzantine emperors received a material unction, although they were considered to be God's anointed one.⁸⁷ In addition, neither should we forget several typically non-Byzantine elements in the coronation ceremony. The substantial participation of the lay lords in the ceremony, and the presence of the imperial sword are obviously non-Byzantine elements, although lower echelon courtiers were not entirely absent in the Byzantine coronation ritual. The great barons

⁸⁵ De Clari, §96–97. Villehardouin, §261–263. Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271. Anonymus Suessionensis, p. 7. Albericus Trium Fontium, p. 884.

⁸⁶ Schramm, *Kaiser, Könige und Päpste*, I, pp. 38–42.

⁸⁷ Dagron, *Empereur et prêtre*, pp. 281–283. Angold, *Church and Society in Byzantium*, pp. 542–545. Nicol, *Kaisersalbung*, pp. 37–52. Macrides, *Bad Historian or Good Lawyer*, pp. 194–196. The available sources do not tell us whether chrism or oil was used in Baldwin's anointment. Around 1200 Holy Roman Emperors were anointed with oil, while the French and English kings were still anointed with chrism. The crusader army counted both bishops from the French crown domain and from Germany (Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, pp. 320–321; Eichmann, *Die Kaiserkrönung im Abendland*, pp. 86, 147, 205–206).

clearly wished to express symbolically their prominent position in the empire, this in analogy with the Western coronation ceremonies, in which officials of the court and important vassals played a major role.⁸⁸ Only the Byzantines carried out the *proskynesis*; not as was customary in the religious service, but during an additional secular ceremony in the Great Palace. With their Western feudal background, the barons will not have been willing to carry out the *proskynesis*, a symbol of subjection to the emperor. This ritual will also not have seemed appropriate to the Latin prelates as containing a subjection of the religious authority to that of the emperor.

Furthermore the emperor did not swear an oath of allegiance to the Orthodox faith, as the Byzantine emperors were in the habit of doing. The Latin secular equivalent was an imperial oath in confirmation of the constitutional agreements of 1204–1205, prescribed in the convention of March 1204.⁸⁹ However, one of the clauses of the constitutional pact of March 1204 stipulated that the emperor should rule *ad honorem Dei et sancte Romane Ecclesie*, by which the fundamental principle of the original Byzantine oath was nevertheless incorporated to some extent in the Latin custom. Lastly, Baldwin was not crowned by the patriarch of Constantinople. In view of the fact that the emperorship was granted to a non-Venetian, by virtue of the March convention the patriarchate was the entitlement of Venice. However, at the time of Baldwin's coronation no one had been appointed. After Constantinople had been taken, the Byzantine Patriarch John X Kamateros had fled the city and was to play no further active political role.⁹⁰

Known only about Henry's coronation is that he swore the imperial oath shortly before the ceremony, and that he was crowned by patriarch Thomas Morosini in the Church of Saint Sophia on 20 August 1206.⁹¹ With regard to the coronation ceremony of Emperor Robert, crowned on 25 March 1221 in the Church of Saint Sophia by Patriarch Mattheus, one source refers to the golden crown and the typical imperial robes.⁹² The imperial coronation of Peter of Courtenay

⁸⁸ Schramm, *Der König von Frankreich*, p. 193. Eichmann, *Die Kaiserkrönung im Abendland*, pp. 254–255. On the limited role of courtiers in the Byzantine coronation ritual: Majeska, *The Emperor in His Church*, p. 2.

⁸⁹ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 174.

⁹⁰ Wirth, *Zur Frage eines politischen Engagements Patriarch Joannes X. Kamateros*, pp. 247–251.

⁹¹ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 174.

⁹² Philippe Mouskes, p. 405.

and Yolande of Flanders/Hainaut is an unusual case. It took place on 9 April 1217 in the basilica of San Lorenzo in Rome, and was carried out by Pope Honorius III. The initiative for coronation by the pope was that of Peter and Yolande. Honorius acceded only hesitantly, for fear of prejudicing the rights of King of the Romans Frederick II and Patriarch Gervasius of Constantinople. In the light of the two-emperors problem and possibly under pressure from a section of the Roman population, the coronation did not take place in the Saint Peters basilica—the traditional location for the coronation of the Holy Roman emperor—but in a church outside the city walls of Rome.⁹³ Nothing however is known about the actual coronation ritual.⁹⁴ It is probable that this followed mainly Western imperial ceremonial.⁹⁵ The ambition of the imperial pair to greater the prestige of their emperorship explains the choice of coronation by the pope, and in that sense the initiative was successful. The imperial coronation was on the lips of all Western Europe, as is apparent from the numerous chronicles that report it.⁹⁶ At the same time it was a notable departure from the Byzantine traditions.

In addition to the coronation ritual, there were also numerous other religious and other rites in which the Byzantine emperor participated and which were part of the complex court ceremonial.⁹⁷ However, as regards the Latin emperors there is only little known in this respect. Furthermore, the examples that are known about can all be dated to the reign of Emperor Henry, the richest period when it comes to source material. Only one imperial procession of a religious nature is known about for the period 1204–1228. On 2 February 1206 Henry of Flanders/Hainaut, then still regent for his brother Emperor Baldwin I, went in procession to the *Theotokos ton Blachernon* church, where previously the Byzantine imperial court traditionally celebrated the festival of the

⁹³ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 497.

⁹⁴ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 249.

⁹⁵ Cf. the references in notes 82, 86–88.

⁹⁶ Richardus De San Germano, *Chronica*, p. 338. Annales Ceccanenses, p. 301. Albericus Trium Fontium, *Chronica*, p. 906. Robertus Autissiodorensis, *Chronologia*, p. 284. Vincentius Bellovacensis, *Speculum historiale*, lib. 30, cap. 78. Ptolomaïos de Lucca, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, col. 1128–1129.

⁹⁷ Treitinger, *Die Oströmische Kaiser- und Reichsidee*, pp. 112, 124, 151.

Purificatio on this day.⁹⁸ As against the opinion of Hendrickx, this is serious evidence to support the hypothesis that the Latin emperors could well have adopted many imperial religious traditions. In 1209 the local Byzantine population of Négrepont lead Emperor Henry in procession to the local *Theotokos*-church in order to pray there.⁹⁹ In his 1213 letter Henry relates that in the previous year returning from his campaign in Epiros, he had been welcomed back in Constantinople ‘*cum gaudio et sollemnitate maxima, velut qui longo tempore a populo expectati cum desiderio fueramus*’.¹⁰⁰ This may, albeit in a vague way, refer to the Byzantine ceremony of the imperial *adventus* in the capital, suggesting that also more secular imperial ceremonies were at least partly adopted by the Latin emperors.¹⁰¹

There is nothing known about two other typically imperial religious traditions, the *Peripatos* and the *Prokypsis*. The *Prokypsis* ceremony—an imperial epiphany, in which the emperor appeared to the assembled court, the priesthood and the population, as a symbol of the rising sun, mostly on a very brightly lit podium—took place on Christmas Eve, on the feast of the Epiphany, and sometimes also at coronations and imperial weddings. The origins of this ceremony lay in heathen sun worship, which played an important role in the classical Roman imperial cult.¹⁰² The *Peripatos* procession commemorated Jesus’ entry into Jerusalem on Palm Sunday; in the procession the emperor himself assumed the role of Christ, being his earthly substitute.¹⁰³ Just as the ‘heathen’ *prokypsis*, the direct association of the emperor with the figure of Christ scarcely fitted in within the Western frame of reference.¹⁰⁴ It is interesting to note here that in the Byzantine *Purificatio* procession, which as has been seen has been attested under Latin rule, there was no question of any form of identification with the figure of Christ

⁹⁸ Villehardouin, §411. JANIN, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, p. 170. Hendrickx, *Le pouvoir impérial*, p. 135.

⁹⁹ Valenciennes, §683.

¹⁰⁰ Prinzing, *Der Brief*, p. 412.

¹⁰¹ On the *adventus* ceremony: Mango, *The Triumphal Way of Constantinople*, p. 174. A passage in De Clari’s chronicle shows that the Latin crusaders were acquainted with the tradition (De Clari, §89).

¹⁰² Kantorowicz, *Oriens Augusti—Lever du Roi*, pp. 159–161. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 13, 240, 246–247. Jeffreys, *The Comnenian Prokypsis*, pp. 38–52.

¹⁰³ Treitinger, *Die Oströmische Kaiser- und Reichsidee*, pp. 125–126.

¹⁰⁴ Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies*, p. 60. Niketas Choniates, pp. 476–477. Brand, *Byzantium confronts the West*, pp. 191–192.

or of elements that could be described as 'heathen'.¹⁰⁵ This may explain why this religious ceremony was indeed continued and why the other two ceremonies discussed here are not attested in the sources.

Another ceremony that indicates the adoption of Byzantine traditions is the coronation by Emperor Henry of the young Demetrios of Montferrat as King of Thessalonike on 6 January 1209.¹⁰⁶ The coronation took place on the initiative of Demetrios's mother and guardian, the Byzantinized Margaret of Hungary, widow of Isaac II Angelos and of Boniface of Montferrat. This ceremony is reminiscent of the Byzantine custom in which the principal emperor crowns his co-emperor, although there were also typically Western elements present in the ceremony: during the coronation Emperor Henry bestowed a knighthood upon Demetrios.¹⁰⁷ Henry apparently attempted to reformulate the Western feudal structure of his empire within a Byzantine framework: the kingship of the ruler of Thessalonike was made dependent on coronation by the emperor.

One last ceremony about which we have information available to us is the imperial marriage ceremony. On 4 February 1207 Emperor Henry married Agnes of Montferrat.¹⁰⁸ The only known—but nonetheless interesting—detail is that during the religious ceremony in the Church of Saint Sophia both the emperor and the empress wore crowns, which indicates that, just as the Byzantine empresses, Agnes had been crowned. Whether according to Byzantine custom Henry had crowned her himself is, however, unknown. In any case Emperor Robert of Courtenay did crown his wife empress after their marriage had been consecrated.¹⁰⁹

We have already seen the *proskynesis* (or *adoratio*), prostration or kneeling, as a mark of honour and as the sign of subjection to the emperor, as part of the coronation ritual carried out by the Byzantine

¹⁰⁵ Constantin VII Porphyrogenete, *Le Livre des Cérémonies*, §27.

¹⁰⁶ Valenciennes, §605.

¹⁰⁷ Treitinger, *Die Oströmische Kaiser- und Reichsidee*, p. 14.

¹⁰⁸ Villehardouin, §458.

¹⁰⁹ *Chronicon Turonense*, p. 311: 'imperator [...] eam [...] desponsavit et ad imperium coronavit.' Treitinger, *Die Oströmische Kaiser- und Reichsidee*, p. 15. Yolande of Flanders/Hainaut, who was empress in her own right (cf. Chapter V, p. 290), was crowned by Pope Honorius III together with her husband Peter of Courtenay according to various semi-contemporaneous Western chroniclers (Richardus de San Germano, *Chronica*, p. 338; Annales Ceccanenses, p. 301; Robertus Autissiodorensis, *Chronologia*, p. 284; Vincentius Bellovacensis, *Speculum historiale*, lib. 30, cap. 78).

participants.¹¹⁰ For Henry's reign we also have at our disposal several additional examples. In 1208 Alexios Sthlabos, lord of the Rhodopes region and related to the Bulgarian royal family, displayed via the *proskynesis*, here in the form of a genuflection and kiss upon the feet and hand of the emperor, his acceptance of the authority of Emperor Henry.¹¹¹ In this way, the Bulgarian lord, who belonged in the Byzantine cultural circles, paid the customary honour to the emperor. In 1209 during Henry's campaign in southern Thessaly the local Byzantine population performed the *proskynesis* to the emperor. In 1212 during his successful campaign in Asia Minor against Emperor Theodore Laskaris of Nicaea the local population in great numbers honoured Henry in the same manner: '*omnes usque ad marchiam Turkie nostro venerunt inclinare imperio*'.¹¹² With regard to Peter of Courtenay's short reign *L'Estoire d'Eracles* describes a meeting in 1217 between the emperor, who was traversing Epiros on his way to Constantinople, and the local prince Theodore Doukas, who shortly before at Dyrrachion had performed homage to Peter for the lands he held, as follows: '*Ensi come il [= Doukas] aprocha de la herberge, li empereres Pierre monta a cheval et ala encontre lui a grant conpaaignie des chevaliers. Moult se firent grant feste de saluer et d'encliner et d'enbracer, et descendirent ou tref l'empereor Pierre*'.¹¹³ This passage may be interpreted in the sense that Doukas and his accompanying *arcondes* performed the *proskynesis* to Emperor Peter.

Another example is much less unambiguous. Valenciennes reports that during Emperor Henry's mentioned expedition to Thessaly in 1209, the intention of which was to gain the recognition of his imperial authority from a number of vassals, the until then rebel constable Amé Pofey came and kneeled before the emperor at the parliament in Ravennika. Henry bade him stand, and then embraced him.¹¹⁴ In this, Hendrickx sees no *proskynesis*, and in the ritual described one can

¹¹⁰ Brehier, *Les Institutions de l'Empire byzantin*, pp. 61–62. Hendrickx, *Die "Proskynesis" van die Bisantynse Keiser*, pp. 147–148.

¹¹¹ Valenciennes, §546: '*Esclas [...] se laist chair as piés l'empereor et li baise, et puis la main.*'

¹¹² 1209: Ibidem, §671: '*Dont passent la Closure, et Griphon vinrent encliner.*' 1212: Prinzing, *Der Brief*, p. 417.

¹¹³ *L'Estoire d'Eracles*, p. 292. On the relation between Emperor Peter and Theodore Doukas: cf. Chapter IV, p. 242.

¹¹⁴ Ibidem, §669: '*Li connestables vint a l'empereor, et mist pié a terre si tost comme il le vit; et quant il vint devant lui, il s'agenouille. Et li empereres l'en lieve et le baise, et li pardonne son mautalent et canques il avoit meffait enviers lui.*'

certainly see a connection with Western traditions, such as the genuflection when homage is paid, genuflection at the sight of the king, and the kiss of peace.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless, the ritual is clearly reminiscent of the *proskynesis*. The central point here is that the physical act of the *proskynesis* and of the Western genuflection before the king could be identical, and that their interpretation depended on the one hand on the identity of the actor, and on the other hand on the identity of the observer.¹¹⁶ In essence this relates to an analogous symbolic act with a similar symbolic meaning, although the Byzantine *proskynesis* laid more emphasis on the sacred and absolute nature of the emperorship.

Another form of *proskynesis* was that vis-à-vis the image of the emperor, comparable with the worship of the icons of saints, and emphasizing the religious nature of the emperorship.¹¹⁷ One important piece of information is known about this with regard to the Latin emperors: in the important monastery of the Great Lavra on Mount Athos there was a portrait of Emperor Henry.¹¹⁸ In view of the clerical environment in which this portrait was located, it sounds credible that this was an imperial icon, to which the monastic community paid tribute by means of *proskynesis*. Henry's role as protector of the Byzantine monasteries on Mount Athos supports this hypothesis.

We have already seen imperial acclamations by both the Byzantine and the Latijnse populations in the coronation ceremony, where they represented the symbolic recognition of the emperor. Such acclamations belonged to both the Western and Byzantine traditions.¹¹⁹ In Byzantium they accompanied numerous imperial ceremonies. In particular, the *polychronon* is attested under Latin rule. As early as the taking of Constantinople in 1204, the city's population, assuming that the marquis would be elected as emperor, greeted Boniface of

¹¹⁵ Hendrickx, *Die "Proskunesis" van die Bisantynse Keiser*, p. 152, n. 34. Schmitt, *Le raison des gestes dans l'Occident médiéval*, 1990, pp. 296–299.

¹¹⁶ Valenciennes uses the same verb '*encliner*' in the context of the respect shown to Emperor Henry by the Greek population (cf. reference in note 112) and in the context of the rebellious Albertino of Canossa's encounter with Henry (Valenciennes, § 572: '*Dont encontra il [= Emperor Henry] Aubertin, qui tout cel mauvais plait avoit basti. Et lors que li empereres le vit, si le salua; et Aubertins lui, et puis l'enclina, et non mie de cuer.*').

¹¹⁷ Hendrickx, *Die "Proskunesis" van die Bisantynse Keiser*, pp. 154–156.

¹¹⁸ Lemerle, *Actes de Lavra. IV: Etudes historiques—actes serbes—compléments et index*, p. 6.

¹¹⁹ Kantorowicz, *Laudes Regiae*, Berkeley, 1958.

Montferrat with the acclamation *Ayos phasileos marchio*.¹²⁰ In imperial visits to various cities throughout the entirety of the empire, the local populations—including the *papas* and the *archontes*—continued to meet Emperor Henry in procession and with acclamations.¹²¹ The letter by the Byzantine clergy of the metropolitan region to Innocent III from 1206 alludes to the fact that the Latin emperor was honoured with the *polychronon* at the end of the Eucharist.¹²²

Other ceremonial customs and traditions were also continued under Latin rule. For example, in military campaigns—and on other occasions—the Latin emperors had carried before them a cross that can without doubt be identified as a *staurotheke*, a cruciform reliquary that contained a relic of the Holy Cross. This custom is attested for the reigns of Emperors Baldwin, Henry and their successors.¹²³ The symbol of the cross once more emphasized the sacred nature of the emperorship and at the same time symbolized imperial invincibility.¹²⁴ In the neighbouring Kingdom of Jerusalem there was an analogous tradition, in which the relic of the Holy Cross accompanied the army in military campaigns.¹²⁵ The traditional use of the *Porphyra* situated within the Great Palace as the birthplace for the imperial princes was also maintained.¹²⁶ Emperor Baldwin II of Courtenay (1240–1273), born in 1217 as son of the imperial couple Peter and Yolande, alluded to himself explicitly as *porphyrogennetos*, which demonstrates that the tradition was in fashion during the rule of Empress Yolande.¹²⁷ Lastly, the Latin emperors continued the tradition of the Byzantine emperors to identify themselves with their renowned predecessor Constantine the Great (306–337), a custom that is also attributed to a number

¹²⁰ Gunther van Pairis, pp. 156–157.

¹²¹ Villehardouin, §432, 490. Valenciennes, §663, 672 (*'polucrone'*). The following passage in Henry's letter from January 1213 may also refer in a general way to imperial acclamations: *'Tunc vero Constantinopoli revertentes ibi cum gaudio et sollemnitate maxima recepti sumus, velut qui longo tempore a populo expectati cum desiderio fueramus'* (Prinzing, *Der Brief*, p. 414).

¹²² Migne, PG, CXL, col. 297–298. Treitinger, *Die Oströmische Kaiser- und Reichsidee*, pp. 73–74.

¹²³ Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon Anglicanum*, pp. 201–202. Prinzing, *Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs*, p. 416. Henri De Valenciennes, §524. *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, p. 838. On this tradition: Mergiali-Sahas, *Byzantine Emperors and Holy Relics*, pp. 50–51.

¹²⁴ Treitinger, *Die Oströmische Kaiser- und Reichsidee*, pp. 149, 180.

¹²⁵ Murray, *'Mighty Against the Enemies of Christ'*, p. 231.

¹²⁶ Janin, *Constantinople byzantine*, pp. 121–122.

¹²⁷ Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, p. 170.

of Western emperors. In this way, during his coronation ceremony Baldwin I solemnly took his place on Constantine's throne in the Great Palace, a ritual that his successors probably continued.¹²⁸

THE IMPERIAL INSIGNIA, SYMBOLS AND IMAGE

We have already encountered a number of imperial insignia at the coronation: the sceptre, the cross-bearing globe, the crown (*stemma*), the imperial standard and the imperial robes (inter alia the *loros* and the *chlamys*). We also encounter a number of other insignia on coins: the *labaron* (standard with christogram), the *anexikakia* (symbol of mortality), and the sceptre with cross (the symbol of imperial victory).¹²⁹ It is virtually impossible to ascertain the extent to which the Latin emperors actually used these insignia at ceremonies other than at their coronation. As has been indicated, the crown was worn during the imperial wedding ceremony. The imperial standard was taken along during military campaigns. In the only known instance, this standard bore a design of golden crosses on a red background, a reference to the imperial coat of arms which itself referred to Byzantine imperial iconography. The specific extent to which this standard tied in iconographically with the traditions of prior to 1204 cannot be determined.¹³⁰

A Western chronicle tells us that the Latin emperors wore purple, the traditional imperial colour, as the colour of their ceremonial clothing.¹³¹ However, from seals of the period 1204–1228 we can see that emperors did not only wear garments that can be described as being typically Byzantine (cf. the coronation ceremony), but indeed also Western style attire.¹³² In Valenciennes' chronicle we find the Emperor Henry during a military campaign clad in a red cloak decorated with golden crosses, again a reference to the imperial coat of arms.¹³³ The Latin emperors also wore the *kampagia*, purple-coloured sandals that were the sole

¹²⁸ De Clari, §97.

¹²⁹ Malloy, *Coins of the crusader states 1098–1291*, pp. 322–324.

¹³⁰ Valenciennes, §541. Grabar, *L'Empereur dans l'Art byzantin*, p. 53.

¹³¹ *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, p. 838.

¹³² However the seals of the later Emperor Baldwin II of Courtenay (1240–1273) did represent him in traditional Byzantine imperial garments (*loros* and *sakkos*). Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, pp. 165–172. Schramm, *Das lateinische Kaisertum in Konstantinopel*, pp. 847–848. Prevenier, *La chancellerie de l'Empire latin*, p. 70.

¹³³ Valenciennes, §541.

preserve of the emperor.¹³⁴ Furthermore, they continued the wearing of ceremonial attire for imperial dignitaries. In the fifteenth-century *Catalogus et cronica principum et comitum Flandrie et forestariorum*, an anonymous compilation that is based on, inter alia, older chronicles that are nowadays no longer known to us, it is reported that the Emperor Baldwin bestowed upon a number of his *nobiles* the honour of being allowed to wear footwear which, as regards colour and markings, referred to the coat of arms of Baldwin as Count of Flanders.¹³⁵ Although this chronicle contains numerous flagrant inaccuracies in its account of the Fourth Crusade and Baldwin's reign as Latin Emperor, it would nevertheless seem to us that the source of information used by the anonymous author for this information is reliable. It is worth noting that footwear of specific colouring and motif appropriate to the esteem in which the dignitary was held, was indeed one of the customs of Byzantine court ceremonial.¹³⁶

The Latin emperors likewise adopted the imperial eagle of their Byzantine predecessors as the symbol of the *imperium*. For example, during his coronation Baldwin I wore, inter alia, a cloak adorned with eagles. Moreover, the imperial coat of arms first witnessed in Henry's reign relates closely with the Byzantine imperial symbol of the cross, quartered either with smaller crosses, bezants, orbs, or four times the letter B.¹³⁷ The Latin imperial coat of arms, portrayed on one of Henry's seals, displays a field of gules with a golden cross bearing five golden bezants, quartered with golden bezants, each of which bearing a small cross.¹³⁸ Whilst this coat of arms clearly refers back to the above-mentioned Byzantine symbol, we share the assumption made by Prinnet that the cross-bearing bezants referred to the cross-bearing globe as the symbol of universal sovereignty. The suggestion by the same author that the bezants at the same time represent the name Byzantium, which at the beginning of the thirteenth century was still a Greek designation of the imperial capital, also sounds plausible.¹³⁹ The

¹³⁴ *Venetiarum Historia Vulgo Petro Iustiniano Filio Adiudicata*, p. 145. Jacoby, *The Venetian presence*, p. 149, n. 24.

¹³⁵ *Catalogus et Cronica Principum et Comitum Flandrie et Forestariorum*, p. 136. Kelders, *Kronieken van Vlaanderen*, pp. 6–8, 353. Lambert, *De Kronieken van Vlaanderen 1164–1520*, pp. 80–86.

¹³⁶ Akropolites, §82.

¹³⁷ Cernovodeanu, *Contributions à l'étude de l'héraldique byzantine*, pp. 412–415. Pastoureau, *Les Armoiries*, pp. 24–27.

¹³⁸ Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, n° 7bis.

¹³⁹ Prinnet, *Les armoiries des empereurs latins*, pp. 250–256. Cf. Hendrickx, *Le pouvoir impérial*, p. 124.

symbol of the cross in itself points to the sacred nature of the emperorship, and also to the Christian mission of the Latin emperorship.

The pose in which the Latin emperors were portrayed on their seals indicates a major Western influence. The obverse, which well-nigh invariably depicts a Greek legend, shows the emperor seated upon a throne, with several Byzantine imperial insignia (the *stemma*, the sceptre and the orb). Earlier authors such as Longnon have opined that this side formed the so-called Byzantine side of the imperial seal.¹⁴⁰ However, Byzantine imperial seals from prior to 1204 display a clearly different sort of iconography: the obverse shows a standing monarch clad in the traditional imperial robes, whilst the reverse bears an image of Christ.¹⁴¹ As regards the pose, apparel and throne, the obverse of the Latin seals can rather be compared with contemporary majestic seals of Western monarchs. Only the crown refers unequivocally to the Byzantine *stemma*.¹⁴² The reverse of the imperial seal, on which the Latin legend is generally figured, is commonly looked upon as being the Western side. The emperor is always portrayed on horseback, comparable with numerous contemporary seals of Western sovereigns and lords, including the Counts of Flanders and Hainaut, the lineage to which the imperial family belonged.¹⁴³ However, in Byzantium too, the portrayal of the emperor on horseback was to be found (also in military attire), albeit not on imperial seals and different as regards concrete iconography.¹⁴⁴

The types of coin issued by the Latin emperors did follow the traditional Byzantine imperial iconography.¹⁴⁵ These coins were imitations of the Byzantine coins, which on their obverse portrayed Christ, the

¹⁴⁰ Longnon, *L'empire latin*, p. 129.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Dölger & Karayannopoulos, *Byzantinische Urkundenlehre*, p. 42.

¹⁴² Cf. Dalas, *Corpus des sceaux français du Moyen Âge. II: Les sceaux des rois et de régence*, pp. 146–150. One element of Byzantine origin was also the material of which the seals were made, gold or lead (Zacos & Vegler, *Byzantine Lead Seals*, I/1, pp. 3–5). The later Emperor Baldwin II of Courtenay (1240–1273) was represented on the obverse of his seals in a more Byzantine fashion: sitting on a throne of Byzantine design with *stemma*, cross-bearing sceptre or *labaron* in his right hand, and cross-bearing orb in his left hand (Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, pp. 170–172).

¹⁴³ Cf. Laurent, *Les Sceaux des Princes Territoriaux belges du X^e siècle à 1482*, II, pp. 20–24, 169–174.

¹⁴⁴ Grabar, *L'Empereur dans l'Art byzantin*, pp. 45–54, 129–131.

¹⁴⁵ Hendy, *Coinage and Money in the Byzantine Empire*, pp. 199–217. Stahl, *Coinage and Money in the Latin Empire of Constantinople*, p. 205. We cannot agree with Leonard who excludes that any Latin emperor could have been responsible for gold coinage, because of the supposed continually sorry financial situation they found themselves in (Leonard, *The Effects of the Fourth Crusade on European Gold Coinage*, p. 82). On the imperial mint and finances: see Chapter III, pp. 131–138.

Theotokos or a saint, and on their reverse the emperor with the imperial insignia and robes, in some instances in the presence of Christ, the Theotokos or a saint. They were however not identical imitations: elements of former types were combined into new hybrid types. The most remarkable characteristic of the Latin imitations is that they also bore the names of earlier Byzantine emperors. As far as can be ascertained, the choice in the period 1204–1228 was notably for that of Emperor Manuel Komnenos (1143–1180).¹⁴⁶ The question may be raised as to whether this can be seen as a manifesto on the part of the Latin emperors: regain for the empire the splendour it had known under Manuel, an emperor whose reign was generally looked upon favourably both in Byzantium and in the West, and who had been open to the adoption of Western ideas in his policy. He certainly appears to have been a source of admiration and inspiration for the Latin crusaders, as is evident from De Clari's portrayal of Manuel in the most glowing terms, particularly highlighting *qu'il amoit si durement les Franchois*. In this context it should also be remembered that during the ceremony of his coronation, Baldwin in any event identified himself with the Emperor Manuel—whose victories by the way were the subject of several lavish mosaics in both the Great Palace (more specifically in the *Triklinos* of Manuel) and the Blacherna palace where they could be admired—via a jewel that had belonged to the latter.¹⁴⁷

Nonetheless, as a result of this imitative coinage, an opportunity of promoting the Latin emperorship unequivocally was missed, and the reference to the Emperor Manuel—if indeed it was intentional—comes across as a compromise. An economic explanation is that it was convenient to continue a coinage familiar to the majority of the population.¹⁴⁸ An ideological explanation can possibly be found in the iconographically strong religious character of the Byzantine coins. Just

¹⁴⁶ Malloy, *Coins of the Crusader States*, pp. 316–324. Of the coinage attributed to the period 1204–1228, the types A, B, D, E, F and G bear Manuels name; only the rare types C, H and I bear another emperor's name (Alexios and Andronikos).

¹⁴⁷ De Clari, §16–21. Magdalino, *Manuel Komnenos and the Great Palace*, pp. 101, 107. Kazhdan, *Latins and Franks in Byzantium*, p. 95. Kolbaba, *Byzantine Perceptions of Latin Religious "Errors"*, p. 137. For another example of the new Latin rulers harking back to Manuel's reign: cf. Chapter I, note 41.

¹⁴⁸ Malloy, *Coins of the Crusader States*, p. 316. Stahl's suggestion that the Byzantine monetary system was simply too complex to be adopted by the new Latin rulers in our opinion is to be disregarded, since they had for example no trouble in taking over the intricate fiscal machinery (Stahl, *Coinage and Money in the Latin Empire of Constantinople*, p. 205).

as with the *Peripatos* ceremony, the strong association of the emperor with Christ—or with the Theotokos or another saint—was probably difficult to accept for the Latin vassals and populace.¹⁴⁹ The Latin emperor's assumed identification with model Emperor Manuel offered a solution by using Manuel's name to promote the Latin emperorship indirectly in the empire within a Byzantine frame of reference. An additional explanation for the imperial imitative coinage is that the leading barons of the crusading army, who were to be the major feudal rulers in the empire, next to the Latin emperor himself—including Boniface of Montferrat and the doge of Venice—were probably not very enthusiastic about an imperial coinage that promoted the person of the Latin emperor within the empire as a whole, and in particular within the feudal principalities that they themselves had acquired within the empire. On the basis of Hendy's thorough study on the coinage in Latin Romania it is even conceivable that the coinage in Constantinople was the result of imperial-Venetian collaboration. The choice of an immobilized coinage, upon which the names of earlier Byzantine emperors figured, certainly fits in with this perspective. Hendy points out that, at that time, such types of immobilized coinage or coins not bearing the name of the monarch were to be found throughout Western Europe, including the county of Flanders.¹⁵⁰

THE IMPERIAL MISSION IN THE SERVICE OF CHRISTIANITY AND THE CHURCH OF ROME

As has already been indicated above, it is apparent that the Latin emperors partially adopted the religious, sacred nature of the Byzantine emperorship, in so far as this did not conflict too greatly with the Western frame of reference. However, the Latin emperorship also had an entirely individual religious character. The Latin emperors propagated in particular the idea that their empire had a special and even

¹⁴⁹ Of course the phrase *a Deo coronatus* in the imperial title did closely associate the emperor with Christ, but this was not quite as direct as the actual portrayal of the emperor being crowned by Christ or the Theotokos. It is probably no coincidence that the coin types (A, B, C and D) that can be attributed to the earliest period 1204–1219 do not represent the emperor side by side with Christ, the Theotokos or a saint on the reverse. This step was only taken in the following period 1220–1230 (types F, G, H and I) (Malloy, *Op. cit.*, pp. 322–324), which might indicate increasing Byzantine influence in the Constantinopolitan mint during these years.

¹⁵⁰ Hendy, *Coinage and money in the Byzantine Empire*, pp. 207–208, 325.

unique role to fulfil within Christendom in its entirety and within the Church of Rome.

The Emperor Baldwin I crystallized the main points of this religious mission in his first letter to Pope Innocent III. Firstly, thanks to the Latin take-over of Romania, religious unity between the Church of Rome and the Byzantine Church would be restored.¹⁵¹ Secondly, the empire would be the decisive support needed for the distressed Latin states in the Holy Land.¹⁵² During his period as regent, Henry summarized the imperial standpoint in a letter of 1205 to Innocent III: *ob ecclesie tantum unitatem reformandam et terrae sanctae subventionem laboremus*.¹⁵³ As emperor, Henry also repeated these two ideas regularly in various letters to other recipients.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, in about 1213 he declared himself prepared to participate in the new crusade to the Holy Land that had been announced by Pope Innocent III. The symbol of the cross, which was a regularly recurring element in imperial representations, may also be interpreted as pointing to the special responsibility of the Latin emperor vis-à-vis the Holy Land. It is worth observing here that in this way a symbol that traditionally belonged to Byzantine imperial symbolism was allotted a new significance under the Latin emperors.¹⁵⁵

To the two fundamental conceptions mentioned above, Henry added a third, related idea. Under the pressure of the circumstances, he put forward that in his own region too, the Latin emperor had to defend by force of arms the Christian faith and the Church of Rome against local enemies. About his conflicts with the Vlachs and Cumans, who were part of the armies of the Bulgarian tsar, he wrote in 1206 to his brother Geoffrey: *centum millibus hominum [...] Blacorum et Commanorum qui cum omni lege careant Sarracenis deteriores sunt*.¹⁵⁶ In the same letter he said of the Bulgarian tsar himself: *Johannicius crucis inimicus* and *crucis et sanctae Romanae ecclesiae inimicus*.¹⁵⁷ In 1208 he writes to Innocent III in similar terms once more about the Bulgarian tsar

¹⁵¹ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271.

¹⁵² Ibidem, n° 271.

¹⁵³ Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XVIII, p. 526.

¹⁵⁴ Ibidem, p. 529.

¹⁵⁵ Treitinger, *Die Oströmische Kaiser- und Reichsidee*, p. 149. On Henry's crusading commitment: cf. Chapter VIII, p. 461.

¹⁵⁶ Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XVIII, p. 528.

¹⁵⁷ Ibidem, p. 528.

as an *iniquissimum persecutorem ecclesie Dei*.¹⁵⁸ In 1208 the imperial army joined battle with the Bulgarian tsar Boril with the battle cry *Saint Sepulcre* and was granted the crusade indulgence by imperial chaplain Philip.¹⁵⁹ In 1213 he described his conquests to the Western prelates as: [...] *terre quam non sine multa Latini sanguinis expensa ad honorem Dei et Sancte Romane [ecclesie] [...]*.¹⁶⁰ With the thought of the Latin Empire as bastion at the borders of Roman Christendom, Henry once more reinforced the idea that the existence of his empire was linked to the destiny of Western Christendom as a whole.

During their short reign, Peter of Courtenay and Yolande of Flanders/Hainaut continued to pursue the policies developed by their predecessors. For example, Emperor Peter, and possibly Empress Yolande too, adopted Henry's commitment to participate in the Fifth Crusade.¹⁶¹ During Peter's ultimately fatal journey from Rome *en route* for Constantinople through the territory of his vassal Theodore Doukas, ruler of Epiros, further plans were made for a joint military campaign that on the one hand was to be waged against the neighbouring Seljuk Sultanate of Konya—a local enemy of the Christian faith—and on the other hand was intended to lend support to the Holy Land.¹⁶² Lastly, accompanying Peter was the papal legate Giovanni Colonna, who had, *inter alia*, a papal assignment concerning the furtherance of religious unity between the Latin and Byzantine Church, a project to which the imperial couple would certainly have wanted to lend their support.¹⁶³

With respect to the reign of Emperor Robert of Courtenay, nothing is known about the promotion of the concept of the Latin Empire as an essential pillar of the Latin Orient or as a protagonist in the religious unification. The meagre sources of information available for these years certainly play a role in this, but the empire's difficult political situation in Robert's reign—with the unfavourable course of the campaign against Theodore Doukas of Epiros and against John III

¹⁵⁸ Ibidem, XIX, p. 514.

¹⁵⁹ Valenciennes, §538–539. As Longnon has already shown Valenciennes' original intent was only to write a narrative of Henry's expedition against the Bulgarians (Ibidem, p. 11). The chronicler presented this, either on his own initiative or in consultation with the emperor himself or with other members of his entourage, propagandistically as a true crusade to the Western audiences for whom he, *inter alia*, wrote.

¹⁶⁰ Lauer, *Une lettre inédite d'Henri Ier d'Ange*, p. 201.

¹⁶¹ In 1220 Pope Honorius III speaks of the late Emperor Peter of Courtenay as *crucesignatus* (Brial, *Recueil des historiens des Gaules*, XIX, p. 704).

¹⁶² *L'estoire d'Eracles*, pp. 291–293.

¹⁶³ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 39.

Vatatzes of Nicaea doubtlessly contributed to both these aspects of the empire's Christian mission being pushed into the background. On the other hand, the concept of the defence of the true Christian faith and of the Church of Rome in Robert's region certainly is certified, albeit only in echoes thereof in papal correspondence. Pope Honorius III saw the Latin emperor's fight against Theodore Doukas in particular in the years 1222–1225 as a religiously motivated campaign, in which the crusade indulgence was granted to the participants.¹⁶⁴ It is highly likely that the court in Constantinople, pursuing the theory developed under the Emperor Henry of the Latin Empire as the Roman Christian bastion in its own region, followed the train of thought conveyed in the papal letters. It is even rather probable that the imperial court itself was the inspiration thereof.

In the period 1204–1228 the Latin emperors propagated the idea that their empire played an important role in the destiny of (Roman) Christendom in three ways. The origins of this line of thought are obvious. The Latin emperors in Constantinople was the direct result of a crusading mission, the actual objective of which was to provide support to the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine, a matter that was close to the heart of its initiator, Pope Innocent III. Consequently, the first Latin emperor, Baldwin I, felt it necessary to justify in a serious way to the papacy and the Western world as a whole the expedition's diversion to Constantinople on religious grounds. The Latin take-over of Byzantium had to be put forward as being as worthwhile to Roman Christendom as a crusading expedition to the Holy Land itself.

We remark lastly that, as regards the empire's Christian mission, it was not the intention of the Latin emperors that they should subordinate their authority to that of the highest religious power or, in concreto, to that of the pope. The Latin emperor was, as were the Byzantine and Holy Roman emperors, defender of both the Christian faith and of the Church. Witnessing this, *inter alia*, are the adjective *fidelissimus* in the imperial title and the idea of governing the empire *ad honorem Dei et sancte Romane Ecclesie et imperii*. However, at the same time the Latin ruler also considered himself to be empowered to act in all manner of religious matters, where necessary going against the religious authorities and even against the papacy itself. In this respect, an occasional pronouncement such as *volumus ut ecclesia Romana nos*

¹⁶⁴ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 4353.

habeat mandatorum executores suorum qui nos non sumus eius domini sed ministri in Henry's letter to Innocentius III of 1208 should not be interpreted literally as an imperial token of subjection, but in our opinion refers to the role played by the Byzantine emperor vis-à-vis the church as *epistemonarch* or guardian of the canonical and disciplinary rules.¹⁶⁵ The Christian mission that the Latin emperors elaborated for their empires, their desire to accord the empire of Constantinople a unique role within (Roman) Christendom as a whole, indeed tied in with the universal nature that they ascribed to their empire.

CONCLUSION

To a great extent, the Latin emperors drew their inspiration as regards both form and substance from the Byzantine imperial ideology. They were conscious of that Byzantine heritage and they looked upon themselves as the direct successors to the Byzantine emperors of prior to 1204, as is for example indicated by their identification with Manuel Komnenos and Constantine the Great. They adopted the fundamental principles of the Byzantine imperial ideology, and despite how the actual political situation was currently, or might develop, they propagated them symbolically: the emperor as God's direct representative on earth and the derived ideas of autocracy, universalism and the defence of the Christian faith and the Church. The adoption of the Byzantine body of thought reflected their concern to legitimize the Latin emperorship vis-à-vis the Byzantine elite and population. In addition, the Byzantine political philosophy could form the ideological basis for the development of powerful imperial authority.

Although the Latin emperors initially derived their ideological way of thinking and the representation thereof from their Byzantine predecessors, their own Western background was also a major influence. Most of the Byzantine forms of representation that have been discussed underwent the introduction of Western elements. The Latin emperors neither desired to—nor indeed were able to—discard their own culture. Furthermore, they had to take care not to alienate themselves from their

¹⁶⁵ Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XIX, p. 514. Dagron, *Empereur et prêtre*, pp. 260–261. In a 1204 letter Emperor Baldwin had already described himself to Innocent III as being *miles suus*, which no doubt is to be related to his unfulfilled crusading vow (Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271).

Latin entourage and vassals. Parallels as regards the body of thought, as regards rituals and as regards symbols between the Byzantine and the Holy Roman emperorship, which itself was inspired by the Roman and Byzantine emperorship, simplified and furthered the synthesis of Byzantine and Western influences.

From a chronological point of view, no major developments appear to have come about in the years 1204–1228. Baldwin and Henry developed the hybrid Byzantine-Latin imperial ideology, and their successors adopted this synthesis. Yolande of Flanders/Hainaut sought to comply with the Byzantine imperial traditions, for example by giving birth to her son Baldwin II in the Porphyra Palace. As has been mentioned, Robert of Courtenay's familiarity with the Byzantine way of thinking is apparent, for example, from the granting of a *privilegium* to the doge of Venice.¹⁶⁶ Only Emperor Peter of Courtenay, who indeed during his short reign never reached Constantinople, appears to have maintained a more predominantly Western perceptive of the emperorship. The papal coronation ceremony in Rome is illustrative of this.

The Latin imperial ideology did differ substantially from the Byzantine ideology in one point in particular. The concept of the emperor as God's direct representative on earth was considerably less prominently present in Latin state symbolism. The idea itself was indeed adopted, as is apparent, *inter alia*, from the *a Deo coronatus* formula in the imperial title, but it was propagated to only a limited extent. Among other examples, this is evident from the imperial seals, on which the traditional Byzantine association of the image of the emperor with that of Christ was not followed. The circumspect manner of dealing with the imperial coinage suggests similar concern. The fact that—as far as is known—*Prokypsis* and *Peripatos* were not adopted can also be seen in this light. After all, in the West there was a completely different relationship between secular and religious authority from that in Byzantium. With his Western background, the Latin emperor could not claim the position that the Byzantine emperor held vis-à-vis the church by virtue of the theory that he was God's direct representative on earth. Too great an emphasis on this theory, or attempting to implement its consequences, would be unacceptable in the eyes of the

¹⁶⁶ In this context we also would like to draw attention to a remarkable change in the iconography of the coin types in the years 1220–1230 (cf. note 149).

local Latin clergy and vassals and in the eyes of the pope, who always was an important ally of the emperorship. Because the association between God and emperor in the Latin emperorship was weakened in this way, the derived concepts of autocracy and universality were toned down at the same time. In this sense, the Latin imperial ideology represented a diminished reflection of the three central concepts of the former Byzantine emperorship.

This last observation requires some degree of nuance. The relative Latinization of the imperial ideology was a phenomenon that in the first place occurred with respect to the Latin elite and subjects. The Byzantine elite and populace saw the Latin emperor within the Byzantine ideological frame of reference, as is shown by the two following examples: in their eyes, the emperor retained the traditional epithet of *hagios*, which expressed the sacred nature of the emperorship and its direct link with God, and the Latin emperor submitted willingly to this (cf. the coronation ceremony). We have also seen that the Byzantine elite took it for granted that the Latin ruler retained the traditional imperial prerogatives vis-à-vis the church. Here we can refer to the request by the Byzantine clergy of Constantinople to the Emperor Henry to allow them to elect a Byzantine patriarch after the death of John X Kamateros in 1206. The emperor reacted by making his assent dependent on the recognition by the Byzantine clergy of the papal primacy. However, Henry accepted in principle the instrumental role of the emperor with respect to the appointment of a new patriarch.¹⁶⁷ As is evident from these examples, we may conclude that in propagating their imperial ideology the Latin emperors according to the concrete section of the population in question probably laid the emphasis on the Byzantine or Western elements therein.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. note 61.

CHAPTER THREE

THE IMPERIAL QUARTER

To a major extent, the Latin emperors modelled their emperorship ideologically on the Byzantine example, while at the same time significant Western influences were also present. But how did they actually develop the concrete administrative organization of their empire? The constitutional pact of March 1204 established the contours within which this imperial administration was to be constructed. The starting point of the convention meant a drastic change with regard to Byzantine administrative principles. A fundamental aspect was the feudalization and the theoretical division of the Byzantine Empire into three large regions. One-quarter of the territory was allotted directly to the Latin Emperor. Three-eighths were allotted to the non-Venetian and three-eighths to the Venetian component of the crusading army. Both regions were to be feudally dependent upon the emperor. In this chapter we examine administrative practice in the imperial quarter.

THE LOCATION OF THE IMPERIAL QUARTER

The imperial domain encompassed five-eighths of the capital Constantinople: the imperial quarter plus the non-Venetian crusaders' section. It is true that the March 1204 agreement allotted only the Great Palace—designated as the Boukoleon palace—and the Blacherna palace to the emperor, which implied that the rest of the city should have been divided up according to the established distribution formula, but in practice there is not a single indication to be found that part of the city (three-eighths) was to be allotted to the non-Venetian crusaders in the form of a separate enclave with administrative autonomy from the imperial quarter.¹ Apparently, the definitive distribution agreement stipulated that five-eighths of Constantinople was to fall to the emperor or, *de facto*, this was the situation there.²

¹ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267.

² Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 110. Jacoby, *The Venetian Quarter*, pp. 160–167.

In Thrace, by virtue of the already discussed *Partitio* document of 1204, the imperial quarter encompassed the region stretching from Constantinople in the East, to Medeia and Agathopolis in the North, with Vizye and Tzouroulon in the West and Salymbria and Athyra in the South.³ Carile erroneously assumes that the region of Philippopolis was also part of the imperial quarter.⁴ In 1219 Venice claimed her share of the region from Regent Cono of Béthune, from which it would appear that this territory was not part of the imperial quarter.⁵ During the greater part of the period 1204–1228 the imperial territory in Thrace was effectively under Latin rule. Only in the years 1205–1206 and 1225–1228 was control over it problematic to non-existent as the result of first the Bulgarian and then Epirote offensives in the region.

In Asia Minor, the *Partitio* allotted to the emperor virtually all the territories which, prior to 1204, had belonged to the Byzantine Empire: Paphlagonia, Optimaton, Bithynia, Opsikion, Neokastra, Thrakesion, Mylasa and Melanoudion.⁶ In the period 1204–1228 only a limited number of these belonged effectively to the Latin Empire: 1. The region Optimaton, with Nicomedia as its most important city for virtually the entire period; 2. A number of coastal towns in the Bithynia region, such as Kibotos, during the entire period; 3. The Opsikion region with, inter alia, the towns of Adramyttion, Achyraeus, Poimanenon, Lentiana, Lopadion and Daskylion in 1204–1205 and 1212–1224/25; in the period 1206–1211 only a few places such as Pegai remained in Latin hands; 4. The Paphlagonia region, with the towns of Herakleia Pontika and Amastris in the years 1206–ca. 1214/1222. The confrontation with the Nicaean Empire explains the changes in the control over these territories.

Finally, the text of the *Partitio* allocated to the emperor the island of Prokonnesos in the Sea of Marmara, and in the Aegean Sea the islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Lesbos (Mytilene), Skyros, Chios, Tinos, Samos and Kos. The extent to which other, unmentioned islands, such as the central Cycladean island of Naxos belonged to the imperial quarter on the basis of the definitive distribution agreement, is unclear. In the case of the Cyclades for example, some islands fell under the authority

³ Carile, *Partitio*, p. 217. Niketas Choniates, p. 646. On Agathopolis: see Chapter VI, pp. 327, 346.

⁴ Carile, *Alle origini dell'Impero latino d'Oriente*, tavola IV.

⁵ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 257.

⁶ Carile, *Partitio*, pp. 217–218. Cf. Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile*, p. 243.

of the Latin Emperor (e.g. Tinos), others under Venice (e.g. Andros).⁷ With the exception of Samos and Kos, in the period studied the islands mentioned effectively came under Latin control. Lesbos, Chios and the neighbouring islands were re-conquered by the Nicaean emperor in circa 1225.

A geopolitical advantage of the location of the imperial quarter was that this consisted largely of an unbroken whole that was in principle easier to control than fragmented territories. However, a major disadvantage was that in large areas of the empire the Latin emperor did not have at his disposal territories that he could rule directly. This situation meant that it could not have been a simple matter for the emperor to establish effective imperial authority over the entire territory of the empire.

THE PARTIAL FEUDALIZATION OF THE IMPERIAL QUARTER

When the geographical contours of the imperial quarter were established in 1204, the major part of these territories was not in Latin hands. The development of the administrative organization of the imperial quarter was, for example, closely linked with the manner in which this area was brought under Latin control. For this, as a matter of necessity the Latin emperor was dependent on the co-leaders, barons and knights of the crusading army. For these assertive barons, who originated from a Western feudalized society, a possible position as an untenured governor or salaried functionary in a Latinized Byzantine bureaucracy under absolute imperial authority was not an attractive proposition. This brought about the partial feudalization of the imperial quarter according to the Western model.

Two questions arise in the assignment of a part of the imperial quarter in the form of fiefs: which part of the imperial quarter was assigned and what was the nature of these fiefs? In answering each of these questions we assume that there were two phases in the feudalization of the imperial quarter: an initial phase in the years 1204–1205 and a reorganization in the years thereafter. The rebellion supported by the Bulgarian tsar that took place in Thrace in early 1205 functions in this as a cut-off point.

⁷ Carile, *Partitio*, pp. 217–219.

In the years 1204–1205, Emperor Baldwin reserved for himself the areas allotted to the emperor in Thrace and the region from Constantinople to Nicomedia in Asia Minor, although it is reasonable to assume that he might have allotted fiefdoms of a limited size to the troops that took and controlled these areas on his behalf.⁸ In addition to this region, which fell under his direct authority and which we shall further refer to as the ‘imperial core quarter’, Baldwin also granted sizeable fiefdoms in the rest of the imperial quarter to a number of prominent barons. Count Louis of Blois acquired a *duché* near Nicaea and sent troops from Constantinople to conquer this territory. The towns of Pegai, Kyzikos, Poimanenon, Appolonia and Lopadion were effectively taken.⁹ Baldwin gave the region Abydos to Adramyttion to his brother and later successor Henry, who effectively captured the territory in the winter of 1204–1205.¹⁰ The emperor gave the *duché* of Philadelphia to Stephen of Perche,¹¹ one-quarter of the *ducatus* Neokastra to the Knights Hospitaller,¹² and the city of Antalya to the Knights Templar.¹³ However, none of the last-mentioned territories, nor the rest of Byzantine Asia Minor that Baldwin seems to have tentatively reserved for himself, ever came into Latin hands. With regard to the islands that belonged to the imperial quarter, in the years 1204–1205 we know of no initiatives concerning the allotment or the taking possession of these.¹⁴

The question arises, applicable both to the feudal principalities in the imperial quarter and to the modest fiefs within the core quarter, as to what status these fiefs possessed, in particular as compared with those lying outside the imperial quarter, which in principle were only obliged to provide the emperor with military service, and were apart from that administratively, judicially, fiscally and otherwise autonomous with respect to Constantinople. However, vis-à-vis the fiefdoms within the core quarter, virtually no information is available about the

⁸ Villehardouin, §337, 342, 387.

⁹ Ibidem, §305, 319, 320.

¹⁰ Ibidem, §310, 321.

¹¹ Ibidem, §316.

¹² Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 285. Markl, *Ortsnamen Griechenlands in “fränkischer” Zeit*, p. 53.

¹³ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1019–1020 (IX, 180).

¹⁴ Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, p. 82.

nature of the fiefs or about the identity of the vassals.¹⁵ However, the Western background of the Latin emperors and their vassals suggests that familiar feudal traditions were maintained to a certain extent. In general, in the Western feudal system the nature of a fiefdom could be very diverse: a seigneurial domain with a certain degree of judicial powers; a money fief through which specific imperial incomes were allocated in the form of a fiefdom; a position, with the income that accompanied it.¹⁶ The emperors Baldwin and Henry had also given in fief certain *abbatias vel bona ipsarum*.¹⁷ There is no way of telling

¹⁵ A document that in this context deserves special mentioning is the 1221 papal confirmation of the possessions of the Constantinopolitan *Sancta Maria de Percheio* or Saint Mary of Le Perchay monastery (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 3123; Pitra, *Analecta novissima Spicilegii Soesmensis altera continuatio*, n° XIX, pp. 577–578; Martin, *Un acte de Baudouin II*, pp. 213–215). In the list of properties are mentioned first the numerous possessions that the monastery had acquired from its current abbess Beatrix (inter alia a *grangium* near Panormos on the Bithynian coast). Next are mentioned eight property gifts by members of the Latin aristocracy, which as far as they are identifiable all relate to the imperial core quarter: 1. the *casalia* Lefky and Troloty in the Servochoria district (near Nicomedia, cf. Carile, *Partitio*, p. 236; Martins—*Op. cit.*, p. 214—identification of Lefky with present-day Lefke/Osmaneli makes no sense since this last locality is situated southeast of Nicaea/Iznik) donated by Geoffrey of Merry and his wife M. (cf. Chapter V, note 82); 2. a yearly revenue of thirty measures of wheat *de redditibus casalis de Laphiella* near Charax (Gulf of Nicomedia, Bithynia) donated by *nobilis vir* de Clermont (probably Macaire, cf. Chapter V, note 73); 3. a yearly revenue of thirty *magarice* of wine donated by *nobilis mulier* Isabelle (probably de Clermont—cf. Chapter V, note 73—or perhaps de Bracheux, cf. note 184); 4. a yearly revenue of one hundred measures of salt and a yearly rent of twenty hyperpera on the *casale* of *Closyas* on the island of Prokonnesos (Sea of Marmara) donated by Beuve (II) of Saint-Sépulchre (cf. note 195); 5. a yearly revenue of ten hyperpera on the saltpans of Salymbria donated by *nobilis vir Ph. de Percheio* (a relative of William of Le Perchay, cf. note 187); 6. a yearly revenue of five hyperpera on the *scala* of Panormos (Sea of Marmara coast, Bithynia) donated by *J. de Corneliis* (possibly he is to be identified with *Johannes de Cormella* who in 1172 held a fief near Rozay-en-Brie in the County of Champagne and whose surname actually may have been *Cornella*, since around 1253–1270 we find *Jehans, fils de monseigneur Hugue de Cornilon*—whose surname refers to Cornilon near Meaux—who possessed the fortress of Le Plessis-feu-Assoux, which is situated only 8 km from Rozay, and a smaller fief in Coulommiers, cf. Longnon, *Documents relatifs au comté de Champagne et de Brie*, I, n° 879, 5717); 7. a yearly revenue of ten hyperpera and ten measures of wheat on the *casale* of *Zelpia* donated by Cono II of Béthune (cf. Chapter V, note 66); 8. certain rights on the *casale* of *Pynates* (also donated by Cono II or by an unnamed benefactor?, text unclear). This survey gives us some idea of the kind of possessions that Latin nobles possessed within the imperial core quarter.

¹⁶ Ganshof, *Qu'est-ce que la Féodalité*, pp. 180–186.

¹⁷ This information is contained in the 1221 confirmation by Emperor Robert of the 1219 agreement concerning the ecclesiastical possessions in the empire concluded by regent Cono of Béthune and papal legate Giovanni Colonna (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 3863; Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, n° IV, p. 299). The document

whether a feudal pyramid with the accompanying practice of subinfeudation was brought into being within the core quarter. Similarly, very little is known about the obligations of the vassals within the core quarter with respect to their suzerain. Apart from the military service that was an obligation of all vassals in the empire, it is probable that they were also responsible for fulfilling garrison duties, providing advice and carrying out various administrative and diplomatic tasks.¹⁸

The opportunities that Byzantine institutions—especially the *pronoia*, *exkoussieia* and *despoteia* that were to a certain extent comparable with Western fiefdoms—offered to maintain a greater control of their own quarter vis-à-vis the aristocratic class, make it likely that the Latin emperors also tried to connect with the Byzantine feudal model.¹⁹ Carile has made it plausible that the introduction of the Western feudal system in the Peloponnese took place partly on the basis of existing Byzantine feudal institutions.²⁰ An analogous phenomenon could have occurred in the imperial core quarter. An element in the previously mentioned gift of one-quarter of the *ducatus* Neokastra by Emperor Baldwin to the Knights Hospitaller supports this last hypothesis. In this, the Knights Hospitaller were promised both the fiefdoms (*foedi*) and the non-feudal possessions (*dominici*) in the region in question.²¹ In view of the fact that, as far as is known, the unconquered region of Neokastra was never subdivided into individual fiefs by the Latins, it

mentions that the imperial *assignationes* of abbeys or abbatial properties specified what the holders were allowed to impose on the monastic communities or possessions in question. Maybe these *assignationes* should be related to the Byzantine *charistike* system, by which monasteries were held in quasi-possession by private individuals (Charanis, *The Monastic Properties*, pp. 72–81; Ahrweiler, *Charisticariat et autres formes d'attribution de fondations pieuses*, pp. 1–27; Bartusis, *Charistikion*, p. 412).

¹⁸ Cf. Boutruche, *Seigneurie et féodalité, II: L'apogée (XI^e–XIII^e siècles)*, pp. 179–204.

¹⁹ Ostrogorsky, *Pour l'Histoire de la Féodalité byzantine*, pp. 35–40. Idem, *Pour l'Histoire de l'Immunité à Byzance*, pp. 165–254. Idem, *Die pronoia unter den Komnenen*, pp. 41–54. Patlagean, “*Economie paysanne*” et “*Féodalité byzantine*”, pp. 1371–1396. Carile, *Signoria Rurale e Feudalesimo nell'Impero Latino*, pp. 667–678. Ahrweiler, *La “pronoia” à Byzance*, pp. 681–689. Bartusis, *The late Byzantine army*, p. 162.

²⁰ Carile, *Rapporti fra Signoria Rurale e Despoteia*, pp. 548–570. Cf. Jacoby, *Les Archontes grecs et la Féodalité en Morée franque*, pp. 422–445. Carile, *Sulla pronoia nel Peloponneso Bizantino anteriormente alla conquista Latina*, pp. 327–335. Ostrogorsky, *Die Pronoia unter den Komnenen*, pp. 52–53.

²¹ Preuenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 285: ‘*Notum facimus universis quod dedimus en concessimus pro salute anime nostre dilectis nobis magistro Hospitalis sancti Iohannis Iherosolimitani et fratribus eiusdem domus quartam partem ducatus Neocastri qui noster dominicus est et proprius cum omnibus pertinentiis eiusdem quarte partis in terra et in mari in montibus in plano in vallibus forestis et vivariis in foedis et dominicis libere et absolute in perpetuum possidendam.*’

is possible that the term *foedi* meant 'fiefs' from the Byzantine time, in particular the *pronoiai*, *despoteiai* and *exkoussai* in existence in this area prior to 1204. These institutions must certainly have been known to the Latins, and they will doubtless have noticed the similarity to the Western fief and seigneurial system.

The principalities that were created from the imperial territories in Asia Minor were undoubtedly of an entirely different nature from the above-mentioned fiefdoms. The description of them in both diplomatic and narrative sources with the terms *duché* and *ducatus*—or even as *royaulme* by Robert of Clari—indicates that these were entities that were administratively autonomous from Constantinople. The above-mentioned gift of one-quarter of the *ducatus* Neokastra to the Knights Hospitaller specifies that all administrative rights over the territory in question were transferred to the order. We may assume that the principalities around Nicaea and Philadelphia for example enjoyed a similar status. The position occupied by the holders of these principalities in the feudal hierarchy in their home region does not allow any other conclusion. Figures such as Louis of Blois and Stephen of Perche would not have accepted anything less, a fact of which Emperor Baldwin will have been fully aware. These prominent vassals further distributed fiefdoms within their regional princedoms among the members of their own following, analogously to the situation in the imperial core quarter.²²

The devastating Byzantine uprising that, with Bulgarian support, took place in Thrace in 1205–1206, and the following Bulgarian and Nicaean offensives of 1206–1207, resulted in the territories in Asia Minor being relinquished entirely, with the exception of the town of Pegai and the region to Nicomedia. This situation, and the departure of large numbers of vassals after the severe defeat near Adrianople in April 1205 in which numerous prominent barons such as Counts Louis of Blois and Stephen of Perche lost their lives and Emperor Baldwin fell captive to the Bulgarians, provided the opportunity for the reconsideration of the feudalization of the imperial quarter.

Initially, Regent Henry of Flanders/Hainaut opted for the continuation of the liberal enfeoffment policy embarked upon by his brother Baldwin. The relatively small number of Latin barons and knights from

²² Villehardouin, §453–454.

the area around Constantinople who after the defeat near Adrianople chose to remain in the empire, made generosity imperative. In this way, the towns of Nicomedia in Asia Minor and Athyra in Thrace, which until then had belonged to the imperial domain, were now awarded to barons who had lost their former fiefdoms in Asia Minor.²³ Other barons, such as Peter of Bracheux with Pegai and Kyzikos, retained the remainders of their fiefdoms in Asia Minor.²⁴ The region of Paphlagonia, which had not previously been allocated, was in 1206 granted as a principality to David Komnenos, a magnate who belonged to the pre-1204 Byzantine imperial lineage. He had taken possession of the region in circa 1204–1205 and showed himself prepared to recognize the Latin emperor as suzerain in order to guarantee the autonomy of his principality against his direct rival in Nicaea, Theodore Laskaris.²⁵ So for the time being in Asia Minor it was only Optimaton, the region across from Constantinople with, inter alia, the forts of Charax and Kibotos, that remained under direct imperial rule.²⁶ Conversely, as far as it is known, Thrace continued to fall to a great extent under imperial control.

The Latin re-conquest of North-Western Asia Minor in 1212–1213 meant the end of the large-scale feudalization of the imperial quarter. Not one of the re-conquered larger towns—such as Adramyttion, Achyraous, Abydos, Lentiana, Poimanenon and Lopadion—is known to have been given as a fiefdom. It is probable that Nicomedia had fallen once more under the imperial domain even before that time.²⁷ Fiefdoms certainly were granted to the Latin barons and knights in the newly conquered region, but they no longer had the character of autonomous principalities. One example is the small coastal city of Lampsakos, which in circa 1214 was granted by Emperor Henry as a

²³ Thierry of Loos: Nicomedia; Payen of Orléans: Athyra (Ibidem, §420, 455).

²⁴ Ibidem, §453–454, 487–489. Peter was persuaded by Emperor Henry to deliver Kyzikos in 1207 in the context of a truce that was being concluded with Theodore Laskaris of Nicaea. The truce stipulated that Laskaris was allowed to dismantle the fortress of Kyzikos and the fortified church of Nicomedia, but this did not seem to have implied that both places were surrendered to the Nicaean emperor: Nicomedia in any case appears to have remained in Latin hands (cf. Chapter VI, note 73). After Laskaris' demolition work Peter thus may have regained Kyzikos.

²⁵ Niketas Choniates, pp. 639–640. Booth, *Theodore Laskaris and Paphlagonia*, p. 155.

²⁶ Villehardouin, §460, 463–464.

²⁷ Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 246. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 273. Cf. also note 15.

fiefdom to the Venetian podestà, who in turn had allotted it to three Venetian nobles. In addition to patrimonial rights, this fiefdom also included administrative, judicial and fiscal prerogatives.²⁸ It is probable that Peter of Bracheux possessed analogous rights in the already-mentioned town of Pegai and Kyzikos. Geoffrey of Merry, the only Constantinopolitan baron about whom we have somewhat more information as regards his possessions, obtained the *castrum* Daskylion (near Poimanenon) some time before 1229 and held (at least part of) Servochoria near Nicomedia (mentioned in 1221). In Thrace, outside the imperial quarter, he furthermore possessed the town of Ainos (mentioned in 1219).²⁹ Assuming that Geoffrey acquired these properties mainly through imperial munificence (and not through marriage or inheritance), we might hypothesize that the emperors chose to enfeoff their vassals with possessions that were geographically scattered in order to prevent that large baronies would come into being within the core quarter and surrounding Thrace. In Asia Minor also other smaller towns, villages and domains with more or less extensive administrative, fiscal and judicial prerogatives were assigned to the Latin barons and knights. A document of 1229 mentions the *teneuta hominum Latinorum* in the territory of Asia Minor.³⁰ Indeed, the specification *Latinorum* suggests that there were also *teneuta hominum Grecorum*. Owing to the absence of sources, the extent to which this refers to former or new Byzantine *pronoiai*, *despoteiai* or *exkousseiai*—or to fiefdoms according to the Western model, must remain an open question.

The feudal reorganization in the years after 1205, and in particular after 1212, meant that the imperial quarter, with the exception of relatively limited and scattered fiefdoms, to a great extent came to fall under direct imperial administration. The only exception to this was the principality of Paphlagonia. The explanation for this evolution is twofold. A first point has already been touched upon: the social status of the Latin vassals after 1205 was considerably lower than that of figures with comital status such as Louis of Blois, Stephen of Perche and Henry of Flanders/Hainaut himself. The material compensations for

²⁸ Cf. Jacoby, *The Venetian Presence*, pp. 177–178. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, p. 175. In 1219 the annual income of the fief amounted to 1671 hyperpera.

²⁹ Auvray, *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, n° 6089. This 1241 letter mentioning Geoffrey's possession of Daskylion states that he had not enjoyed any revenues from his property during the last twelve years (cf. also note 15).

³⁰ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 257, 273.

these vassals could thus have been of a lesser nature. A second point is that—certainly from 1212 and differently from the years 1205–1207—relative stability prevailed in the wide environs of Constantinople. Consequently there were outside the imperial quarter, and in particular in non-imperial Thrace, sufficient territories and sources of income that could be enfeoffed to barons, knights and sergeants.

The islands in the Aegean Sea that in principle were part of the imperial quarter are a special case. Inter alia two papal letters of 1222 tell us that the islands of Lesbos and Chios at that time fell effectively under Latin control. They were in all probability incorporated into the imperial core quarter during the imperial campaign of 1212–1213.³¹ Lemnos, on the other hand, was in circa 1206 given in fief to the Byzantine aristocrat Philokales, who was related to the Venetian family Navigaioso.³² The imperial island of Skyros and the Northern Sporades were possibly conquered as early as 1207 by Geremia Ghisi (later on joined by

³¹ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 92–92a. Riant, *Exuviae*, II, p. 195. Cf. also Chapter VI, note 80. There is no reason to assume that Lesbos was conquered a first time in 1205 as does Saint-Guillain, who misinterprets a passage in Aubry de Trois-Fontaines' chronicle (Saint-Guillain, *Les conquérants de l'Archipel*, p. 181; Albericus Trium Fontium, *Chronicon*, p. 855).

³² Andreas Dandolo, *Chronica per extensum descripta*, p. 282 (*Philocalus etiam Navigaioso, Stalimenem optinens, imperiali privilegio, imperii megaduca est effectus*). For our identification of the lord of Lemnos as a member of the Byzantine family Philokales, compare the following documents: Morozzo Della Rocca, *Documenti*, I, n° 519 (a 1210 Venetian contract mentioning *Filocarus Navigaioso megaduca de Constantinopoli*); Laurent, *Les registres des actes du patriarcat*, I/4, n° 1219 (a 1214 letter by the Nicaean patriarch Theodore II Eirenikos mentioning a letter sent to him by one *Philokales*, who is given the title of *megalos doukos*, concerning the religious repression of Byzantine faithful in Constantinople); Saint-Guillain, *Deux îles grecques au temps de l'empire latin. Andros et Lemnos au XIII^e siècle*, pp. 603–609 (a seal with on the obverse a Byzantine style Saint Nicolas with Greek legend (a reference to his forename?), and on the reverse a western style coat of arms with a mixed Greek (*ho megas doux*) and Latin (*Sigillum Filocari Megaducis*) legend). Since he was also called Navigaioso (but only in the 1210 Venetian document), he may have been of mixed Byzantine-Venetian descent. If so, the fact that he chose the family name Philokales to figure on his seal might suggest that his father was Byzantine (and his mother Venetian). That he cared about the (religious) fate of the Byzantine population (cf. his letter to the Nicaean patriarch) indicates that he saw himself first and foremost as Byzantine. Saint-Guillain does not accept the hypothesis of Philokales' Byzantine descent, but can offer no plausible explanation for his contacts with the Nicaean patriarchal court. The author further states that the genitive *Philokalou* appearing in the 1214 patriarchal letter derives from *Philokalos* (which he interprets as a forename) and that the person in question can thus not be linked to the Byzantine *Philokales* family. However, *Philokalou* can of course very well be read as the genitive of *Philokales* (Saint-Guillain, *Les conquérants de l'Archipel*, pp. 223–224).

his younger brother Andrea), as it is stated in the sixteenth-century and somewhat unreliable chronicle of Daniele Barbaro. The islands of Tinos and Mykonos appear to have been acquired some years later, perhaps in the context of Marco Sanudo's conquest the Cyclades or later still. As far as is known nothing was determined by the distribution agreement of 1204 concerning Mykonos and the Northern Sporades. Barbaro mentions that the Ghisi's campaign would have taken place with the assent of Emperor Henry, but no contemporary source confirms this information. In any case, apart from the recognition of the imperial suzerainty, the islands were administratively autonomous.³³ The isolated location of these islands vis-à-vis the other imperial territories and the absence of an extensive imperial fleet provide sufficient explanation for this development. The Latin Emperor had to be satisfied with a nominal recognition of his suzerainty.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CAPITAL CONSTANTINOPLE

Within the Latin Empire, the city of Constantinople fulfilled a three-fold administrative function. Firstly, the city formed an administrative entity in itself. In a sense, it even consisted of two administrative units: the imperial and the Venetian quarters. Secondly, Constantinople was the capital of the imperial core quarter and its provincial subdivisions. Thirdly, the New Rome was also the capital of the entire empire. In this paragraph we should like to speak only of the administrative structure of the capital as a governmental entity in its own right, and in particular of the administration of the imperial quarter.³⁴

A passage by Gunther of Pairis tells us in general terms that the administration of the city of Constantinople—designated by the chronicler as *urbs*—remained fundamentally unchanged in relation to the period prior to 1204: *Leges et iura et cetere instituciones, que ab antiquo tam in urbe quam in provincia laudabiles habebantur, ita, ut prius fuerant, consistere permisse sunt, que vero reprobabiles videbantur, vel*

³³ Andreas Dandolo, *Chronica per extensum descripta*, p. 282. Loenertz, *Les Ghisi, dynastes Vénitiens dans l'archipel 1207-1390*, pp. 27-28. Koumanoudi, *The Latins in the Aegean after 1204*, p. 249. On a possibly later date for the Ghisi's conquests and on the reliability of the Barbaro chronicle: Saint-Guillain, *Les conquérants de l'Archipel*, pp. 179, 182. Cf. also Chapter IV, p. 165.

³⁴ About the administration in the Venetian quarter: Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, pp. 23-64.

correcte in melius vel penitus inmutate.³⁵ Sigillographic sources appear to confirm Pairis' description. However, the material in question is problematic in that firstly it is difficult to date precisely, and secondly it is even more difficult to locate geographically. The working method we employ is founded on two principles. Firstly, unambiguous as thirteenth-century dated seals of functionaries of the metropolitan administration that have been attested neither in the Nicaean Empire, nor in the Principality of Epiros (later the Empire of Thessalonike), are possibly to be attributed to the Latin imperial administration. Secondly, the aforementioned principle prevails even more when the family of the functionary in question is equally unknown in each of the principalities named.

A seal of Constantine Radenos, which bears the title *eparchos* of Constantinople, the Byzantine official who was in charge of the capital's administration, can possibly be dated as early thirteenth century. As a consequence, it is conceivable that Radenos' term of office as *eparchos* can be dated as having been post-1204.³⁶ It is also probable that two seals that belonged to *eparchos* Dominikos Manios can be attributed to the early thirteenth century. Although editor Laurent himself opts for dating these as being late twelfth century, he does concede that vis-à-vis style and finish certainly one of the two seals can be regarded as being from the early thirteenth century.³⁷ Laurent identified Manios as an Italian on the basis of his name, and believed that he was introduced into the Byzantine administration either under Emperor Manuel (†1180), or still later in the twelfth century.³⁸ That Manios' seal was entirely Byzantine in style and design suggests that Manios, or his family, had been in Constantinople for some time and had undergone a relatively thorough Byzantification. Nonetheless, it

³⁵ Gunther of Pairis, pp. 163–164.

³⁶ Cf. Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, II, n° 1048. Stavrakos, *Die byzantinischen Bleisiegel mit Familiennamen aus der Sammlung des Numismatischen Museums Athen*, p. 328. To our knowledge the title of *eparchos* nor a member of the Radenos family have been attested in either Nicaea or Epiros.

³⁷ Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, II, n° 1043–44. The seal about which Laurent states that, as regards style and workmanship it is more likely to be from the beginning of the 13th century, is even the earliest of Manios' two known seals, as the editor rightly indicates. On this seal, Manios used only the title *eparchos*, whilst the second seal also displays the titles *koiastor* and *ephoros*, which suggests that the seal can be dated at a later moment in his career. To our knowledge no Manios has been attested in Nicaea or Epiros.

³⁸ Laurent, *Les Sceaux byzantins du Médaillier Vatican*, n° 88.

would appear unlikely that an Italian that had only relatively recently arrived in Constantinople would have occupied the high position of *eparchos* in the Byzantine imperial administration.³⁹ It is therefore in our opinion preferable to place Manios' seals in the beginning of the thirteenth century, under Latin administration. As a Byzantinized Italian who had settled in Constantinople some time prior to 1204 and who perhaps had already been employed in the imperial bureaucracy, he had in any event the right profile to occupy a senior position with quite some responsibility in the capital's administration, acceptable to both the Latin and the Byzantine elite. If indeed the office of *eparchos* was continued under Latin rule, it is probable that the administrative structure subordinate to this office was also continued.⁴⁰

A 1221 document emanating from Emperor Robert of Courtenay provides material for the hypothesis that the *eparchos* is denoted in Latin translation as *castellanus*. In this charter one *Manetus*, indicated as *castellanus* (of Constantinople), acts as witness.⁴¹ In our opinion, this Manetus can be identified as the above-mentioned *eparchos* Manios, whose name clearly sounds similar. In drawing this conclusion we need to bear in mind that it was common in the diplomatic documents involved, and even more so in copies made thereof, that names were severely corrupted, sometimes to the point of being unrecognizable. Equally, a statement by Dominican Petrus of Sézanne circa 1233–1234 suggests the equation of the *eparchos* with the *castellanus* of Constantinople. It can be inferred from this source that, the *castellanus* of Constantinople just as the *eparchos*, was head of the capital's administration and fulfilled, inter alia, judicial and policing capacities.⁴² In the description of the powers of the *eparchos*, the Latin emperors must have recognized a function such as that of the Western *castellani* or viscounts, which we also encounter in the County of Flanders, the home territory of the Latin emperors.⁴³

It can also be argued that a number of the capital's other offices, with specific responsibilities and an autonomous position in respect of the *eparchos*, remained valid under Latin administration. One of

³⁹ Kazhdan, *Latins and Franks in Byzantium*, pp. 95–100.

⁴⁰ Brehier, *Les Institutions de l'Empire byzantin*, pp. 154–157.

⁴¹ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 260.

⁴² Golubovich, *Biblioteca Bio-Bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell'Oriente Franciscano*, pp. 302–303.

⁴³ Blommaert, *Les châtelains de Flandre*, pp. 219–222, 241–248. Warlop, *The Flemish Nobility before 1300*, I, p. 106.

the two seals of Dominikos Manios shows that he combined the office of *eparchos* with that of *koiaistor*, the head of a court with powers to deal with issues concerning inheritance and other civil matters, being at the same time responsible for people who were sojourning in Constantinople.⁴⁴ *Koiaistor* Stephanos Galaton, whose family is attested neither in Nicaea nor in Epiros after 1204, could possibly also be placed during the early part of Latin administration.⁴⁵ In the event that the office of *koiaistor* did indeed continue to exist, it might also be possible to infer that other, specialized courts in the capital also remained—besides the court of the *eparchos* that of, inter alia, the *katholikos* for fiscal matters. In any event, Byzantine private law continued to be valid in Latin Constantinople, as is apparent from a document of Pope Gregorius IX from 1232, which referred to a regime of common marital possessions with the term *loci consuetudinem*, meaning the Byzantine legal practices.⁴⁶ In addition to *eparchos* and *koiaistor* Dominikos Manios was also *ephoros* of Constantinople, once again according to the above-mentioned seal. The *ephoros* was the head of a separate financial administration that in principle did not fall under the authority of the *eparchos*.⁴⁷ Perhaps the exercise of various important administrative offices by Manios indicates a certain degree of centralization of the capital's administration under Latin rule.

A number of non-sigillographic elements also indicate institutional continuity. Prior to 1204, Constantinople had its own militia, the organization of which was allied to the capital's guilds.⁴⁸ In 1235, on the siege of Constantinople by Emperor John III Vatatzes of Nicaea, the Latin government decided to disarm systematically the Byzantines in the

⁴⁴ Guiland, *Le questeur*, pp. 81–82. Macrides, *The Competent Court*, pp. 120–122.

⁴⁵ Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, II, n° 1122. In our opinion the editor, who with certitude dates the seal as being post-1196, is incorrect in excluding in principle a date post-1204. A possible later, Latinized relative may have been Milo of Galata (*Milo de Galathas*) (†1283), who was a *familiaris* and *vexilliferus* of the Latin Emperor Baldwin II (1228–1273) (Mazzoleni, *Gli atti perduti della cancellaria angioina*, I, n° 418, p. 85; Filangieri Di Candida, *I registri ella cancellaria angioina*, X, n° 112, p. 236). An argument in favour of a connection between these two men, in addition to the similarity in names, may be that Milo's coat of arms depicted an eagle, a conspicuous symbol that in the second half of the twelfth century was well known at the Byzantine court (Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, p. 204; Cernovodeanu, *Contributions à l'étude de l'héraldique byzantine et post-byzantine*, pp. 409–22).

⁴⁶ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 182.

⁴⁷ Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, II, p. 631.

⁴⁸ Cameron, *Circus Factions. Blues and Greens at Rome and Byzantium*, pp. 112–113. Vryonis, *Byzantine Demokratia and the Guilds*, pp. 295, 302–314.

city.⁴⁹ This suggests that the Byzantine population of Constantinople under Latin administration still had some form of military organization. It is reasonable to suppose that any post-1204 urban militia was not a new structure introduced by the Latin authorities, but on the contrary stemmed from the system existing prior to 1204.

There are also indications of the continued existence of the metropolitan socio-economic institutions after the state-controlled guilds had fallen into decline at the end of the 12th century.⁵⁰ In a 1207 document of Emperor Henry and podestà Marino Zeno referring to the legal procedures to be followed in matters concerning conflicts over possessions between *Francigenae* and Venetians the *sylogos* (association) of the *tabularioi*, that fell under the authority of the *eparchos*, is mentioned: '*Item, si Venetus emerit bestias vel res laboratas a duabus ypperperis et supra, debent esse scripte ab illis, qui fuerint constituti in Constantinopoli ad hec perficienda, a quo homine emit eas, et quantum precium dedit.*'⁵¹ The group in question, denoted further as *scribani*, can neither be identified with the earlier-mentioned *notarii* or *tabelliones* who were appointed by the Venetian authorities or by the Latin Emperor. Furthermore, a seal datable to the mid-thirteenth century—possibly from Latin Constantinople—of a certain Nikephoros mentions the title of *vestoprotos* (as Laurent has argued an alternative form of the title of *vestioprates*). This was carried by members of the association of traders of domestically produced silken textiles. Jacoby has proposed that the Constantinopolitan silk industry did not survive the Latin capture of the city. His argumentation is based on a series of assumptions and a passage in Metochites' Nicene Oration. Firstly he argues that the retailers of foreign silk textiles (*prandiopratai*) were located in a quarter of the city that was destroyed by the 1203–1204 fires, from which he then deduces that the metropolitan silk workshops must have suffered heavy damages as well, although it remains unclear whether these were situated close to the *prandiopratai*'s quarter or not. Secondly he conjectures that the silk industry must

⁴⁹ Philippe Mouskes, p. 614: '*Les armes de tous lor Grios prisent / Et leurs gens bien armer en fisent*'.

⁵⁰ Cf. Maniatis, *The domain of private guilds in the Byzantine economy*, pp. 339–369. On the economic resurgence of the capital from 1205 onward and on the economic situation in Latin Constantinople in general: Jacoby, *The Economy of Latin Constantinople*, pp. 198–199.

⁵¹ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 180. About the guild of notaries: Vryonis, *Byzantine Demokratia and the Guilds*, p. 297.

have subsequently left Constantinople for Nicaea, since under Latin rule there would have no longer remained a sufficiently wealthy clientele present in the city. Thirdly he claims to find confirmation for his hypothesis in Metochites' ode to Nicaea (probably composed circa 1290), which mentions that after 1261 the art of silk weaving was not sent to Constantinople from Nicaea and that Nicaean silk deliveries continued to be made to the imperial court.

Against Jacoby's first two arguments we would like to point out that there are no compelling reasons to assume the virtually total destruction of all branches of the metropolitan silk industry because of the 1203–1204 fires and that certainly during the first two decades of Latin rule there still was a numerous Latin-Byzantine elite present in the capital who could afford to buy luxury goods. In addition panegyrist Metochites only states that after 1261 the Nicaean silk industry—which already existed before 1204, but no doubt expanded after Nicaea had become the capital of the Lascarid emperors and because of the probable influx of Constantinopolitan silk workers, as Jacoby has argued—was not transplanted to the capital and that finer silk textiles were nowhere to be found. It cannot be deduced from this passage that after 1204 there was no silk industry at all in Constantinople. To us it seems on the contrary possible that under Latin rule the metropolitan silk industry at first remained partly in place, although presumably on a reduced scale and producing primarily lower quality textiles. These last two nuances may have been particularly true after 1224, when the empire was in decline. In our view it would rather have been the political decline of Latin Constantinople—and the related contraction of the metropolitan elite and its resources—which may have caused the demise of the silk industry, since after the Paleologean restoration of 1261 it is no longer attested in the capital. Two concrete elements may be interpreted as substantiating our view of the Constantinopolitan silk industry surviving the 1204 conquest for some time. Firstly, a 1231 Venetian notarial document drafted in Constantinople records the purchase of silk textiles by the bishop of Rhaidestos, though it is not clear when or where these had been produced. Secondly, a contemporary Persian source mentions Constantinopolitan silk, though this geographical term may perhaps not necessarily need to be understood narrowly as exclusively referring to the Queen of Cities.⁵²

⁵² Nikiphoros' seal as *vestoprotos*: Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, II, n° 659–660; Lichacev, *Istoričeskoe značenie italo-italo-grečeskoj ikonopisi*, app. p. 23. On the dif-

In the area of higher education, which traditionally fell partly under imperial supervision and partly under patriarchal supervision, we also find elements that indicate continuity. In this respect in the 1206 negotiations on religious unity we encounter in the Byzantine camp the *maistor* of the 'first grammar school' Joannes Kontotheodoros.⁵³ This description refers without doubt to the school that was located in the *Orphanotropheion*, an orphanage that was part of a charitable complex restored and extended by Emperor Alexios I Komnenos and his successors; the school was well known as being the most important grammar school in twelfth-century Constantinople.⁵⁴ The extent to which the *Orphanotropheion* and the school remained affiliated with the imperial court is difficult to discover. The church that was attached to the complex and which was devoted to Saint Peter and Saint Paul, generally known as Saint Paul Church, was in any event one of the conventual churches, the right of presentation of which was in the possession of the Latin Emperor, as the result of which the complex can have remained within the sphere of imperial influence.⁵⁵

The extent to which the eleven other *maistores* and *didaskoloi*, who connected to different churches had been in charge of the capital's higher education in the *artes liberales* and in theology, whether or not continued to occupy their positions under Latin rule, is completely unknown.⁵⁶ In a number of those churches, for example as in Saint Paul Church, Latin chapters were established, and in particular in the Church of Saint Sophia, the Church of the Forty Martyrs, the Church of the Holy Apostles, the *Theotokos Chalkoprateia* Church, and the

ferent branches of the Constantinopolitan silk industry (with further references): Muthesius, *Silk in the Medieval World*, pp. 328–329. Vryonis, *Byzantine Demokratia and the Guilds*, p. 297. On the socio-economic position of the Constantinopolitan elite under Latin rule: see note 136 and Chapter V. Jacoby, *The Jews and the Silk Industry of Constantinople*, pp. 18–19. Theodore Metochites, *Nicene Oration*, ch. 18, v. 12–17, pp. 190–192. Morozzo Della Rocca, *Documenti*, II, n° 658. Thanks to prof. David Jacoby for informing me about the Persian source mentioning Constantinopolitan silk (cf. email de dato 11 June 2010).

⁵³ Mesarites, *Die Disputation*, p. 15.

⁵⁴ Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, pp. 567–568. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, p. 330.

⁵⁵ Cf. Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, pp. 393–394, 399–401. Another charitable complex, the Saint Samson hospital, certainly retained a bond with imperial authority. The hospital became the headquarters of the religious order of the Knights of Saint Samson, of which the Latin emperors were the founders and patrons (cf. Chapter VI, p. 342).

⁵⁶ Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 325–328.

Theotokos Church of the imperial Blacherna Palace.⁵⁷ Our hypothesis about the *Orphanotropheion* suggests that this didn't have to mean the end of the schools connected with those churches. In any event, George Akropolites, who as a scion of a prominent family followed grammar schooling in Constantinople until he was sixteen, does not mention any decline or drastic restructuring of education under Latin rule.⁵⁸ If this educational system did indeed continue to exist to a greater or lesser extent, it is certain that at least some of its imperial patronage was lost. A number of the above-mentioned churches were situated in the part of the city that was under Venetian control, in particular the Church of the Holy Apostles.

Despite the great degree of continuity, Latin administration must also have brought innovations with it, although these are difficult to discover. The arrangements concerning relations between the Latin and Byzantine populations was without doubt one of the most important stimuli for innovation in the administrative organization. For example, it is highly unlikely that members of the Latin populace will have had to stand before the existing Byzantine courts that were presided over by autochthonous judges. Even prior to 1204, Western trading colonies enjoyed a privilege that allowed them to fall under the special jurisdiction of Byzantine senior functionaries.⁵⁹ It is probable that under Latin rule a similar system of special jurisdiction functioned in mixed Byzantine-Latin matters. There was in any event a special tribunal in existence for certain types of court cases between non-Venetian Latins and Venetians. It is possible that for cases involving only Latins there were Latin departments within the existing Byzantine judicial structure, or that separately from this, new types of courts were established.⁶⁰

The division of Constantinople into an imperial quarter and a Venetian quarter was a clear innovation that regularly gave rise to conflicts about the exact delineation of one another's respective possessions and rights.⁶¹ It is difficult to discover the extent to which the administration of the two quarters was completely separate. Wolff and Jacoby have demonstrated that the Venetian quarter had its own

⁵⁷ Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, p. 579.

⁵⁸ Akropolites, §29.

⁵⁹ Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, p. 59, n. 2.

⁶⁰ Cf. Prawer, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem*, I, pp. 498–500, 521–522.

⁶¹ Jacoby, *The Venetian Quarter*, pp. 160–167.

financial, judicial, fiscal and military organization.⁶² With regard to certain fiscal incomes, such as a number of taxes on merchandise (including the *kommerkion*), it is however not unlikely that these were collected centrally, subsequently being divided between the two parties according to the formula 5/8–3/8.⁶³ As an extension to this it is possible that other aspects of Constantinople's administration, for example certain tribunals, also retained a centralized structure, supervised by a mixed committee of Venetians and non-Venetian Latins. In this respect we would point out the existence in the capital's neighbourhood of a system of joint imperial-Venetian exploitation: the *casalia monetae*, domains from the Byzantine period that were considered to be indivisible and were therefore exploited jointly, the yields from which were then shared out according to the well-known formula (3/8–5/8).⁶⁴ In addition, the activities of someone such as *iudex*, *notarius* and *scriptor* Vivianus, who no doubt was at the same time in imperial and Venetian service, suggest that the two administrations did not function completely separately from one another.⁶⁵ In this context we also

⁶² Wolff, *The Oath of the Venetian Podestà*, pp. 555–556. Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, pp. 25–38.

⁶³ In circa 1258–1259, a delegation despatched by Emperor Baldwin II and the Latins in Constantinople were in negotiations at the Nicaean court about a peace treaty. As one of the conditions, Michael VIII Paleologos stated that he should receive half the government's income from the trade in the capital, which might be interpreted in the sense that this was collected centrally (Akropolites, §78). In our opinion Jacoby's postulation that, with respect to fiscal matters, there were completely separate imperial and Venetian administrations is not sufficiently well founded. The passages in the ecclesiastical possessions arrangement of March 1206 and in the 1207 *forma iustitiae* that he cites do not convincingly support his point of view (Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, pp. 55–56).

⁶⁴ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 277. Jacoby, *The Venetian Presence*, p. 152.

⁶⁵ Vivianus is known to us through a number of copies of documents that he executed, all of which somehow relate to the Latin empire and mostly to Constantinople (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I–II, n° 93, 144–145, 154, 157, 174, 184, 199, 204–205, 243–247). In all of these copied charters Venice invariably was one of the parties involved. This should not surprise us since Vivianus' copies are known to us only via well-known Venetian charter collections such as the *Liber Albus* and the *Liber Pactorum*. The fact that many of the copies specifically relate to Venetian Constantinople, strongly suggests that Vivianus was active in the Venetian podestà's chancery and was of Venetian descent. At the same time however Vivianus must have been in the service of the Latin emperors. In several of the copies mentioned, which are contemporary with the original charters (cf. n° 154—executed in 1209; n° 204–205—executed in 1211), he styled himself '*scriptor notarius et iudex domini Henrici (Romanorum) imperatoris*'. The fact that he also refers to himself in this way in his copy of Emperor Henry's oath to podestà Marino Zeno to uphold the basic treaties of 1204–1205, in our view implies that the '*imperator Henricus*' in his title cannot have been anyone

would like to recall that the imperial mintage possibly took place in consultation with the Venetian partner.⁶⁶

THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE IMPERIAL CORE QUARTER

The terminology used in the sources for administrative entities within the core quarter (for example the *ducatus Nicomedie* in 1229), together with the use of similar names for the original feudal principalities in Asia Minor (*duché* and *ducatus*), shows that the Latin emperors based the organization of the provincial administration on the pre-1204 Byzantine administrative structure, on which the already-mentioned *Partitio* text was also based. The term *duché* or *ducatus* is the Latin translation of the Greek *thema*, derived from the customary title for the governor of such a *thema*, the *doux*. Thus, prior to 1204, Nicomedia, Philadelphia, Neokastra and Antalya were indeed Byzantine *themata* or provinces.⁶⁷ However, in a number of instances the Latins certainly adapted these larger administrative entities to meet their own requirements. In this way, in the distribution agreement of 1204 the *thema* Thrace was divided into a number of regions assigned to the emperor, Venice and the non-Venetian crusaders.⁶⁸

We know of only one provincial circumscription in the imperial core quarter with certainty: the *ducatus* or *thema* Nicomedia.⁶⁹ However, it is probable that the rest of the core quarter in Asia Minor was subdivided into similar entities. We can suppose that the smaller imperial territory in Thrace formed a single administrative entity. Within these larger circumscriptions—the *ducatus* or *themata*—the earlier local Byzantine administrative entities were certainly continued in part. For example, Lampsakos, which in circa 1214 was given in fief by Emperor

but Henry of Flanders/Hainaut. Holy Roman Emperor Henry VI—the only other near-contemporary ‘*imperator Romanorum*’ by the name of Henry—had deceased in 1197 and it is hard to see why the Venetian Vivianus around 1209–1211 would have referred to a ruler who had been dead for over a decade, especially in the aforementioned copie of Latin Emperor Henry’s oath.

⁶⁶ Cf. Chapter II, p. 95.

⁶⁷ Carile, *Partitio*, p. 227.

⁶⁸ Cf. Carile, *Partitio*, pp. 217–218; Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 85.

⁶⁹ Emperor-elect Jean of Brienne’s 1229 agreement with the Constantinopolitan barons states this ‘*ducatus Nichomedie*’ as being part of the core quarter (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 273).

Henry to the Venetian podestà, was in all probability already an administrative entity prior to 1204.⁷⁰ Indeed, vis-à-vis terminology, the 1204 *Partitio* text already made use of Byzantine administrative substructures, and circa 1206–1216 in a dispute concerning the demarcation of the territories (outside the core quarter) allotted to the non-Venetian crusaders and Venice, the imperial and Venetian arbitrators scrupulously followed the borders in existence prior to 1204.⁷¹

The provincial administrative machinery was also retained to a great extent, as is indicated in the passage by Gunther of Pairis already cited above.⁷² The chronicles of Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Henry of Valenciennes and George Akropolites support this view. None of these authors reports the installation of a Latin civil administrative system in a single city within the imperial core quarter. In the incorporation of the Thracian cities into the imperial domain in 1204–1206, the inhabitants, including the local administrators, only had to swear the traditional oath of allegiance to the emperor.⁷³ An explicit example of the imperial policy to continue the existing machinery, albeit outside his own quarter, is Baldwin's confirmation of the administrative privileges of Thessalonike in the summer of 1204.⁷⁴ In general, the official Latin presence in the cities of the core quarter was limited to the—not always permanent—establishment of garrisons in a small number of centres. In imperial Thrace we know of garrisons in Salymbria, Tzouroulon and Vizye; in Asia Minor in Poimanenon, Lentiana, Charioros, Berbeniakon, Charax and Kibotos.⁷⁵

Other elements also indicate continuity. In a 1208 charter of Emperor Henry we encounter '*primus inter pretores nostros*' Gerard of Walcourt.⁷⁶ In Western Europe this title was known for some time as a synonym for the viscount (*castellanus*) or bailiff (*ballivus*) of a lord or prince, but in the late twelfth century it does not seem to appear either in the principalities of the Southern Low Countries, nor in the

⁷⁰ Jacoby, *The Venetian Presence*, p. 173.

⁷¹ Longnon, *Recherches sur la vie de Geoffroy de Villehardouin*, Paris, n° 83, pp. 201–202. Carile, *Partitio*, pp. 219, 221, 225–231.

⁷² Gunther of Pairis, pp. 163–164. Angold also supports the thesis of administrative continuity on a provincial level in Latin Asia Minor (Angold, *A Byzantine Empire in Exile*, p. 241).

⁷³ Sovronos, *Le serment de fidélité à l'empereur byzantin*, pp. 110, 135–136.

⁷⁴ Villehardouin, §280. Niketas Choniates, p. 599.

⁷⁵ Villehardouin, §337, 387, 411, 460. Valenciennes, §561. Akropolites, §22.

⁷⁶ Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 33.

French crown domains—the region of origin of the Latin emperors and many of their vassals.⁷⁷ In contrast, the title *praitor* became prevalent in Byzantium in the twelfth century as appellation for a high-ranking provincial functionary who had competencies in the fiscal and judicial aspects of the administration of a *thema*. However, he was not the uppermost governor of a *thema*. That position was held by the *doux*, who was endowed with, inter alia, military jurisdictions. This having been said, it did occur on a regular basis that one and the same person exercised both the offices of *doux* and *praitor* at the same time.⁷⁸

On the basis of this we are in a position to formulate the hypothesis that under Latin rule the *pretor* was a provincial governor, who probably combined the competencies of the *praitor* and the *doux*—as in the Byzantine model. From an imperial point of view, the title *praitor* was preferable to that of *doux*, because the latter was evidently reminiscent of the vis-à-vis imperial or royal authority quasi-independent dukes (*duces*) in Western Europe.⁷⁹ With regard to the judicial competencies of the provincial governor vis-à-vis the Byzantine population a situation similar to the one in Thessalonike may have existed: there the local *doux* George Phrangopoulos acted as judge together with the Byzantine bishops of the surrounding region.⁸⁰ In this respect it should be noted that the imperial court in Constantinople in any case was made up of Latins and Byzantines working together. We would also like to point out that although the only *praitor* known under Latin rule was a westerner, other provincial governors may well have been Byzantines. An important office as the supreme military command of Latin Asia Minor in any event was entrusted to the Byzantine George Theophilopoulos.⁸¹

The extent to which the function of *praitor*—whether it was in a Western sense a hereditary office with possible income in the form of

⁷⁷ Niermeyer, *Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minus*, p. 845. Lot & Fawtier, *Histoire des institutions françaises au Moyen Âge. II: Institutions royales*, pp. 140–150. In the County of Flanders the term *pretor* was used as a synonym for *castellanus* until the eleventh century (Blommaert, *Les châtelains de Flandre*, p. 211).

⁷⁸ Banescu, *La signification des titres de Praitor et de Pronoetes*, p. 391. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, pp. 431–432.

⁷⁹ Kienast, *Der Herzogstitel in Frankreich und Deutschland*, pp. 450–451.

⁸⁰ Demetrios Chomatenos, *Ponemata Diaphora*, n° 106. On the presence of Byzantine bishops in the imperial core quarter: cf. Chapter VI, p. 329.

⁸¹ Cf. note 172. How Theophilopoulos' supreme command related to the assumed military competences of the provincial governors is not clear. We would think the *praitor*'s competences to have been of more local nature.

fief from the province under his governance, or a non-hereditary function that was paid in another way following the Byzantine model, cannot be determined. At this point we should not forget that for example in the Latin emperors' home territory of the County of Flanders, with the introduction of the office of bailiff in the course of the twelfth century, an administrative system of paid, untenured functionaries was already in existence.⁸²

We find yet another form of continuity in the previously mentioned coastal city of Lampsakos. A Venetian *praktikon* of 1219 shows us that the Byzantine fiscal and judicial system was retained at a local level. The document mentions a whole series of taxes from the period prior to 1204, whilst at the same time it appears that the local administration of justice remained unchanged.⁸³ It is also probable that there was administrative continuity in the city of Pegai, Peter of Bracheux's fiefdom within the core quarter. This is indicated by the circumstance that at the end of 1206 or beginning of 1207 Peter retook the city with the help of the local Byzantine magnate Varinos Sthablos, after it had been surrendered temporarily in early 1205 against the background of the Byzantine rebellion in Thrace.⁸⁴ The Byzantine-Latin collaboration suggests that in 1204–1205 Peter had respected the existing local institutions.

Just as in the capital, at provincial level too there must certainly have been adjustments made to the existing system that were aimed at steering the coexistence of Byzantines and Latins in the right direction. Because of the meagre situation vis-à-vis sources we are unable to determine what these innovations were, but it is certain that they were in nature analogous to those relating to the capital's administration. One appurtenant innovation was perhaps the establishment of provincial feudal courts that were intended to deal with conflicts and other issues relating to the Latin—and possibly also Byzantine—fiefs within the imperial core quarter.⁸⁵

⁸² Nowe, *Les baillis comtaux de Flandre*, pp. 366–369. De Gryse, *The reform of Flemish judicial and fiscal administration in the reign of Philip of Alsace*, Ann Arbor, 1980.

⁸³ Jacoby, *The Venetian Presence*, pp. 199–200. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, p. 175.

⁸⁴ Niketas Choniates, p. 641.

⁸⁵ See also p. 139.

THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE IMPERIAL CORE QUARTER

As a point of reference for the discussion of this administrative level we take the Byzantine central administration under Manuel Komnenos (1143–1180), as described by Magdalino.⁸⁶ In doing so we base ourselves on the principle that offices of Byzantine origin that we encounter in the core quarter in the later period of the Latin Empire (1229–1261), were also in existence in the preceding period.

The Imperial Chancery

A first department of the Byzantine central administration was the chancery. Under Latin rule the two functionaries at its head are attested: the *epi tou kanikleiou*,⁸⁷ who was responsible for the red ink with which the emperors signed charters, and the *epi ton deeseon*,⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Cf. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 228–231.

⁸⁷ In 1277 cleric and *magister* Robertus of Buccaleone was *caniclius* of the titular Latin Emperor Philip of Courtenay. Cf. Mazzoleni, *Gli atti perduti della cancellaria angioina*, n° 204, p. 27 & n° 501, p. 622. Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, II, p. 101.

⁸⁸ Deacon Demetrios Pyrros is attested in this office in 1240, when he is involved in the drawing up of a charter of Matthaïos Perdikares concerning the Hagia Trias-monastery in Constantinople (Lauriot, *Athoitis Stoa*, p. 132; Janin, *La Géographie Ecclésiastique*, p. 488; Kidonopoulos, *Bauten in Konstantinopel 1204–1328*, pp. 95–96; Guiland, *Le maître des requêtes*, pp. 97–100). Supporting our hypothesis that Pyrros was the imperial *epi ton deeseon*, and not the eponymous patriarchal functionary, is the fact that in the Latin patriarchal administration no Byzantines occupying higher offices are known (Darrouzes, *Recherches sur les Ophikia de l'Eglise byzantine*, pp. 378–379). That the charter in question would concern a monastery in Thessalonike and would have been drawn up in Thessalonike, as some authors argue, seems implausible to us (Lemerle, *Actes de Lavra*, II, pp. 1–2; Jacoby, *The Greeks of Constantinople*, p. 60). A number of witnesses mentioned in the document are clerics attached to the Great Church (*megalonaites*), which in our view refers to the patriarchal church of Saint-Sophia in the capital, and not to the church of Saint-Demetrios or some other church in Thessalonike, as Lemerle suggests; nowhere in his edition of the charters of the Great Lavra monastery the term *megalonaites* is used to refer to clerics attached to a Thessalonican church. Furthermore none of the family names of the witnesses mentioned in the document can be linked with certainty and/or exclusively with mid-thirteenth-century Thessalonike. The Blachernites family belonged at the beginning of the thirteenth century to the metropolitan imperial elite, just as the Pyrros family (cf. Prologue, pp. 34–35), although this last name is attested also in Berroia around 1220–1225, in Thessalonike in 1265 and in Constantinople in 1357 (Chomatenos, *Ponemata*, n° 45; *PLP*, n° 23933, 23934); the name Zombatos is attested in Thessalonike only at the end of the thirteenth century (Lemerle e.a., *Op. cit.*, p. 6) and in Serres in 1360 (*PLP*, n° 16632); the family name Manikaïtes is attested in Constantinople in 1357 and in Thessalonike in 1374 (*PLP*, n° 16637); the name Kapelabes is attested

who dealt with supplications to the emperor. Also to be found under Latin rule was the function of *logothetes tou dromou*—responsible for official imperial communications and, whilst it is true that this office did not fall directly under the chancery, it was nonetheless linked to it.⁸⁹ It is also possible that the executive office of *protonotarios* continued to exist in the Latin chancery.⁹⁰ It is notable that the title *protonotarius* first appears shortly after 1204 in the administration of the County of Flanders, the home territory of the first Latin Emperor Baldwin I. In a 1210 charter from Baldwin's brother Philip of Namur, then regent of the County of Flanders, mentions Petrus, provost of the Saint Peter's chapter in Cassel, who had previously been *protonotarius*.⁹¹ It is possible that the title was introduced in Flanders by Walter of Courtrai (†1227), who was himself to carry the title of comital *protonotarius* in the years 1220–1226. Walter had been active in the comital chancery prior to 1204 and together with Baldwin had taken part in the Fourth Crusade. It is certain that he remained in Constantinople until 1206, where he held the chancellorship for some time, and he is once again encountered in the County of Flanders in 1211.⁹²

in Chalchidike only in 1327; (*PLP*, n° 11028); the family name Amarianos only in 1300 in Hierissos and in 1324 in Thessalonike (*PLP*, n° 755, 756); the family name Lampoudes is attested in Chalchidike in 1320 and in the Peloponnese in 1354 (*PLP*, n° 14435, 14441); the family name Manganes is known in Constantinople in 1342 (*PLP*, n° 16010). The toponyms mentioned in the charter likewise cannot be linked exclusively to Thessalonike, on the contrary. In our opinion the term *Hebraïis* does not refer to the Jewish quarter in that city, but to the Jewish Gate or the Jewish quarter in Constantinople (Janin, *Constantinople byzantine*, pp. 40, 292; Jacoby, *The Jewish community of Constantinople*, pp. 37–39). Furthermore a church dedicated to Saint-Elias is attested in Thessalonike only in 1316, while at the end of the twelfth century there existed several such churches in Constantinople (Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, pp. 136–138; Idem, *Les églises et les monastères des grands centres byzantins*, p. 373). To conclude, the early nineteenth-century monk-copier Theoderet, whom Lemerle himself deems to be well-informed and who possibly had at his disposal documents no longer in existence today, states explicitly that the monastery in question was situated in Constantinople (Lemerle e.a., *Op. cit.*, p. 1).

⁸⁹ Constantine Tornikes, who held the position of *logothetes tou dromou* prior to 1204, joined the service of Emperor Baldwin after 1204. On the basis of Choniates' account he appears not to have changed his position. Cf. Niketas Choniates, p. 643. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, p. 233. Guiland, *Les logothètes*, pp. 66–67.

⁹⁰ Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, II, p. 77. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 229, 257.

⁹¹ Mussely & Molitor, *Cartulaire de l'Ancienne Eglise Collégiale de Notre Dame à Courtrai*, n° 38.

⁹² Strubbe, *Egidius van Breedene (11.–1270), grafelijk ambtenaar en stichter van de abdij Spermalie*, pp. 38, 43–45. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 191. At the end of the 12th century the title of *protonotarius* was also to be found in a number of West

Furthermore a *chancelier* or *cancellarius* has been attested in the imperial chancery, which shows evidence of Western influence. The first chancellor, John Faicete of Noyon (†1204), and after him Walter of Courtrai effectively headed the chancery.⁹³ The third person known to us that bore the title *cancellarius* (certainly from 1216) unlike his predecessors did not stand effectively at the head of the chancery. Chancellor Warin (†1240) was in the first instance archbishop of Thessalonike, where he also resided.⁹⁴ Consequently, in the second half of the period 1204–1228 there was no leading functionary with the title of chancellor present in the imperial chancery. It is probable that the holder of one of the above-mentioned chancery offices with Byzantine origins fulfilled this role in that period.

Known to us in the subordinate chancery offices circa 1209–1211 is *notarius* and *scriptor* Vivianus.⁹⁵ Public servants with the homonymous title of *notarios* had functioned in the earlier Byzantine imperial chancery, just as *notarii* were active in West European chancelleries.⁹⁶ Additionally, in a charter of 1207 Hugh, former abbot of Saint Ghislain, exercised the function of keeper of the seal (*sigillarius*), without explicitly using the title.⁹⁷ It is possible that a number of *clerici* or *capellani* from the imperial entourage also worked as chancery clerks, as was the case in the Flemish comital chancery, for example.⁹⁸ Finally, prior to 1261 a certain Aloubardes and Nikephoritzes held the function of *hypogrammateus* or undersecretary under Baldwin II.⁹⁹ This indicates that Byzantine chancery offices with Byzantine titulars also continued to exist in the lower echelons, as had already been suggested by the continuation of the leading office of *epi ton deeseon* that was held by a Byzantine.¹⁰⁰

European chancelleries. As a consequence, it is not impossible that the Flemish chancery was influenced by those neighbouring chancelleries and not by this one in Constantinople. Cf. Renardy, *Le monde des maîtres universitaires du diocèse de Liège*, pp. 113, 120.

⁹³ Villehardouin, §290. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 165. *Lectiones Sancti Petri Insulensis*, p. 9. Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, I, pp. 504–505. Cf. also Chapter V, p. 256.

⁹⁴ Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 33. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 187–188. As chancellor Warin received a yearly income which in 1233 and in the preceding years amounted to 400 hyperpera (Auvray, *Les registres de Grégoire IX*, n° 1175).

⁹⁵ Cf. note 65.

⁹⁶ Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, II, p. 77. Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, I, p. 313.

⁹⁷ Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 27.

⁹⁸ Cf. Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, I, pp. 315–317.

⁹⁹ Pachymeres, II, §36. Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, III, n° 1901a.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, I, p. 507. Carile, *La cancellaria sovrana*, pp. 47–48.

As against what authors such as Prevenier, Longnon and Carile have thought until now, the preceding overview of the chancery personnel demonstrates that this institution after 1204 was not at all in essence modelled on the West European example.¹⁰¹ These authors, to whom the above-mentioned information was to a greater part unknown, based their views on the known documents from the imperial chancery, which, apart from a number of Byzantine characteristics of form, do indeed display essentially Western hallmarks.¹⁰² This need not be surprising, as without exception the documents were addressed to Western rulers, prelates and institutions. However, concerning the internal administration we may assume that Byzantine chancery practices were pursued. For example, in circa 1212 Emperor Henry granted a *privilegium aurea bulla munitum* to the orthodox abbey of Chortaiton near Thessalonike.¹⁰³ This document is only known about through a mention in a papal letter, but the terminology used, makes clear that the charter in question must have been a *chrysoboullos logos*, the most solemn type of imperial privileges, or a *chrysoboullon sigillion*, a somewhat less solemn type of document, probably in the Greek language, as addressed to an Byzantine monastic community.¹⁰⁴ In any event, Hendrickx has already demonstrated that several other imperial *privilegia* and documents also refer to the Byzantine imperial *chrysoboulloi*.¹⁰⁵ The author inter alia argues plausibly that Baldwin I's confirmation of the privileges of Thessalonike took on the form of an imperial *logos* (or possibly a *sigillion*), probably written in Greek.¹⁰⁶ Hendrickx in our view however underestimates the Byzantine character of Emperor Henry's *imperialis privilegium*—which has not been preserved, but is mentioned by the 14th-century Venetian chronicler

¹⁰¹ Prevenier, *La chancellerie de l'empire latin*, pp. 63–69. Longnon, *Notes sur la diplomatie de l'empire latin*, p. 3. Carile, *La cancellaria sovrana*, p. 55.

¹⁰² We encounter this Byzantine influence regarding characteristics in form: in the *intitulatio*, in which the Byzantine imperial titles were adopted; in the *datatio*, in which the indiction was stated; in the *subscriptio*, in which use was made of the *menelogema*, a subscription that was written in red ink by the emperor himself and which showed the month and indiction; in the application of an imperial seal that to some extent owed its inspiration to the Byzantine model. Cf. Prevenier, *La chancellerie de l'empire latin*, pp. 64–69. Dölger & Karayannopulos, *Byzantinische Urkundenlehre*, pp. 48–56.

¹⁰³ Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, CCXVI, col. 951 (XVI, 152). This document is not mentioned in Hendrickx, *L'attribution de "privilegia" par les empereurs latins*, pp. 141–148.

¹⁰⁴ Dölger & Karayannopulos, *Byzantinische Urkundenlehre*, pp. 117–127.

¹⁰⁵ Hendricks, *L'attribution de "privilegia" par les empereurs latins*, p. 148.

¹⁰⁶ Niketas Choniates, p. 599.

Andreas Dandolo—that made the Byzantine lord of Lemnos Philokales *megas doux* of the Latin Empire. The author places this lost document in a western, feudal context, supposing that Philokales was a Venetian belonging to the Navigaioso family, as Dandolo states. As has been seen there is however good reason to assume that the *megas doux* was first and foremost a member of the Byzantine Philokales family.¹⁰⁷ In this context there is no reason to think that Henry's *privilegium* would have differed much from the *chrysoboulloi logoi* with which *megai doukai* were normally appointed.¹⁰⁸

However what certainly is an element of Western origin is that these chancery functionaries were to a great extent clerics. As opposed to the eleventh century, in twelfth-century Byzantium the inclusion of clerics in the imperial bureaucracy was no longer customary, although this was not entirely unheard of.¹⁰⁹ In the West however, the installation of clerics in princely chanceries was the general rule, inter alia in the Flemish comital chancery.¹¹⁰ In short, the Latin imperial chancery was an institution that possessed both Byzantine and Western characteristics. However, the extent to which they were divided formally into a Byzantine and a Latin department is impossible to discover. It is possible that in the reorganization of the chancery under the Latin administration a not unimportant role was played by the quite large number of Western interpreters who were working in the Latin translation department at the end of the twelfth century and who would have been ideally placed for this.¹¹¹ Interpreters, present in large numbers

¹⁰⁷ Cf. note 32.

¹⁰⁸ Brehier, *Les Institutions de l'Empire byzantin*, p. 105. Raybaud, *Le gouvernement et l'administration centrale de l'empire byzantin sous les premiers Paléologues*, p. 172. The bilingual nature of the imperial chancery recalls the co-existence of Latin and Greek in the Constantinopolitan administration during a much earlier phase of Byzantine history (Millar, *Linguistic co-existence in Constantinople*, p. 102). The Flemish Counts were familiar with multilingualism (Prevenier & De Hemptinne, *La Flandre au Moyen Âge. Un pays de trilinguisme administratif*, passim).

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Angold, *The Imperial Administration and the Patriarchal Clergy in the Twelfth Century*, pp. 17–18, p. 24. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 347–348.

¹¹⁰ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, I, pp. 311–319.

¹¹¹ Gastgeber, *Die lateinische Übersetzungsabteilung der byzantinischen Kaiserkanzlei*, pp. 105–122. De Clari mentions the use of an interpreter in the context of the crusader barons' visit to Agnes, daughter of the French King Louis VII and widow of Emperor Andronikos I Komnenos, and in the context of the barons' conversation with *li rois de Nubie* (possibly the Ethiopian *negus* Lalibela) in the presence of Isaac II and Alexios IV (July 1203) (De Clari, §53–54). Cf. Hendrickx, *Un roi africain à Constantinople en 1203*, pp. 893–898.

in Constantinople, must have played an important role in all other administrative departments—and at every level.¹¹²

The Central Financial Administration

A second department within the central administrative machine was the financial administration. Two Byzantine offices from the period prior to 1204 have been attested with certainty. Firstly, the function of *phylax*, head of the similarly named department or *sekreton* that was responsible for, inter alia, ceremonial objects, state robes and the imperial art collection.¹¹³ The second office is that of *vestiarios*, the functionary who was responsible for the *vestiarion*, in origin a place of storage for valuable objects and stocks of minted and unminted metals and at the same time an arsenal in which the materials for major military campaigns was stored. In the twelfth century the *vestiarion* became the principal state treasury.¹¹⁴ The *vestiarios* fell under the supervision of the person with ultimate responsibility for public financial administration and the imperial treasury, the *megas logariastes*.¹¹⁵ It is possible that this function also existed under Latin administration: a case can be made that the seal of John Radenos, which can be dated to circa 1250, stems from Latin Constantinople.¹¹⁶ A fourth

¹¹² In service of the court of the Kingdom of Thessalonike was a certain Manuel, interpreter to the former Emperor Manuel Komnenos, whose services the Emperor Henry also knew to appreciate (Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 227 (XIII, 35)). During a festive meal Emperor Peter of Courtenay and Theodore Doukas, ruler of Epiros, conversed with each other by means of an interpreter (*L'estoire D'eracles*, p. 292). Certainly a number of Latin barons from the second-generation in Constantinople had a firm grasp of Greek (*Chronique De Moree*, §357). See also: Ciggaar, *Bilingual word lists and phrase lists*, p. 166. Jacoby, *Multilingualism and institutional patterns of communication*, pp. 30–38.

¹¹³ In 1261 the Byzantine John held this office under Baldwin II (Pachymeres, I, pp. 200–201). On the *phylax*: Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, II, p. 346; Oikonomides, *The Role of the Byzantine State in the Economy*, pp. 993–994.

¹¹⁴ A certain Bertranus carried on his (undated) seal the title of 'bestiarius' (in Latin script) (Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, n° 100). On the *vestiarion*: Oikonomides, *The Role of the Byzantine State in the Economy*, pp. 993–994. On the continued existence of the imperial mint in the Great Palace: Akropolites, §78; Morrison, *Byzantine Money: its production and circulation*, p. 916. On the Latin emperors' coinage, cf. Chapter II, pp. 93–95.

¹¹⁵ Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, II, p. 353. Guiland, *Le logariaste; le grand logariaste*, pp. 108–113.

¹¹⁶ Stavrakos, *Die byzantinischen Bleisiegel mit Familiennamen*, n° 219. The family Radenos is not known about either in Nicaea, or in Epiros; cf. also our hypothesis about Constantine Radenos as *eparchos* of Latin Constantinople in the early 13th century.

function that was to some extent linked with the financial administration was that of *clavicularius*, keeper of the imperial treasury of relics. Hugh, former abbot of Saint Ghislain, whom we encountered deputizing in a function in the chancery, held this office prior to 1215.¹¹⁷ This position corresponds with that of the Byzantine imperial *skeuophylax*, who was responsible for the relics and the religious treasures of the Great Palace.¹¹⁸ In addition the Constantinopolitan imperial mint also continued to function, as is for example evident from a passage in Akropolites' chronicle relating to emperor Baldwin II of Courtenay's reign (1259).¹¹⁹ Emperor Baldwin, who must have inherited a virtually empty treasury from his Byzantine predecessors (although this was no doubt in part compensated by his share in the 1204 booty), shortly after his coronation resorted to melting down works of art—statues from the Hippodrome—in order to mint coins, an emergency measure not unheard of in earlier Byzantine history and last resorted to by Alexios III.¹²⁰ It cannot be ascertained whether the emperors further confined themselves to restriking older coins or whether they also resorted to newly extracted or imported bullion.¹²¹ The coin types issued in the period 1204–1228 included mostly billon aspron trachea, but probably also electrum aspron trachea and golden hyperpera.¹²² Taken as a whole, all this information suggests that to an important extent the Byzantine central financial administration was continued in the imperial core quarter. There is no trace of the implementation of a new sort of Latin financial administration.¹²³

¹¹⁷ Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 40, p. 100.

¹¹⁸ Seibt, *Die Byzantinischen Bleisiegel in Österreich. I: Kaiserhof*, p. 200.

¹¹⁹ Akropolites, §78. Morrison, *Byzantine Money: its production and circulation*, p. 916. On the Latin emperors' coinage, cf. also Chapter II, pp. 93–95.

¹²⁰ Niketas Choniates, pp. 648–650. Alexios III had fled Constantinople with part of the treasury (worth 18,000 marks of silver) in 1203 and Alexios IV had depleted the treasury further with his payments (worth 110,000 marks of silver) to the crusader army (Brand, *Byzantium confronts the West*, pp. 241–252; Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, pp. 168–169). On the melting down of works of art by previous Byzantine emperors: Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, pp. 229–230.

¹²¹ In general throughout Byzantine history new metal seems to have played but a very limited role in renewing the money supply: Morrison, *Byzantine Money: its production and circulation*, pp. 941–942.

¹²² Hendy, *Coinage and Money in the Byzantine Empire*, pp. 199–217. Malloy, *Coins of the Crusader States*, pp. 322–324. Stahl, *Coinage and Money in the Latin Empire of Constantinople*, pp. 197, 199–200, 203.

¹²³ Jacoby has pointed out that the Latin conquerors in 1204 did not have an adequate knowledge of Byzantine fiscal terminology, registration techniques and practices. The

When it comes to the matter of the Latin imperial income and expenditure, we can only sketch an approximate image. Firstly, the income on one hand consisted of the revenues from the exploitation of the imperial domains, and on the other hand of fiscal incomes according to Byzantine model.¹²⁴ The previously mentioned instance of Lampsakos illustrates how the Byzantine fiscal system was continued in the core quarter.¹²⁵ Also mentioned earlier are the *casalia monetae*, which demonstrate that Byzantine imperial domanian forms of exploitation were also continued. Secondly, it is unclear as to the extent to which the vassals in the imperial quarter had financial obligations, by analogy with Western feudal customs, with respect to the emperor. The *Assises de Romanie*, the fourteenth-century feudal legal code for the Principality of Achaëa, which was partially based on earlier feudal provisions applicable to the entire empire, provided for relief (an inheritance tax) and for financial contributions by the vassals on the event of the prince's daughter's marriage and for ransom in the event of the prince being captured. Treasure trove was also automatically the property of the prince.¹²⁶ It is possible that analogous legal rules were customary in the early thirteenth century in the imperial core quarter. A last source of income was the spoils of war.¹²⁷

The most important item of expenditure was of course the cost of the numerous defensive and offensive wars.¹²⁸ Additionally, much money was spent on infrastructural work, usually necessary as the result of the circumstances of war. For example, Niketas Choniates and Henry of Valenciennes report on restoration works carried out on various cities and fortifications in Thrace as the result of the devastating Bulgarian attacks in 1205–1208.¹²⁹ The financing of the bureaucracy and of

assistance of former imperial officials was imperative to keep the fiscal administration running (Jacoby, *Multilingualism and institutional patterns of communication*, p. 31).

¹²⁴ Cf. Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean*, pp. 177–178.

¹²⁵ Jacoby, *The Venetian Presence*, pp. 173–180.

¹²⁶ Recoura, *Les Assises de Romanie*, §23, §34, §155. Cf. Lot & Fawtier, *Histoire des institutions françaises au moyen âge*, II, p. 169.

¹²⁷ Niketas Choniates, pp. 645–646. Villehardouin, §446, §492. Valenciennes, §544.

¹²⁸ In the years 1205–1207, 1208–1209, 1210–1212, 1212–1213, 1214–1215, 1223–1225 there were numerous military expeditions against the princes of Epiros, Thessalonike, Bulgaria, Servia and Nicaea. On imperial expenditure before 1204 and after 1261: Oikonomides, *The Role of the Byzantine State in the Economy*, p. 1010. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, pp. 161–164.

¹²⁹ Niketas Choniates, p. 642. Valenciennes, §550.

the court must also have taken a considerable bite from the budget. Diplomatic missions and gifts formed another item of expenditure. Falling into this category, to some extent following the example of the Byzantine emperors, were gifts of relics and other precious objects to neighbouring and West European rulers and to persons from the imperial entourage or to prominent vassals.¹³⁰ Finally, there was room in the budget for cultural-religious projects. Included among these are the metropolitan Cistercian monastery *Sancta Maria Sancti Angeli* and the Saint Thorlac's Church, intended for the Scandinavian population of Constantinople, both founded by Emperor Henry. Concerning the *Sancta Maria Sancti Angeli* monastery we further know that it also enjoyed the patronage of Emperor Robert of Courtenay and that it included barons of the imperial entourage among its benefactors.¹³¹

There exists in the historiography the image of the Latin emperors being in constant financial difficulties.¹³² This does apply to some extent to the years 1205–1212, the period in which parts of the imperial core quarter in Thrace (1205–1208) and Asia Minor (1205–1212) were destabilized by wars. In this context, the emperor felt it necessary in circa 1207 to borrow fairly substantial sums from the patriarch, and in 1210 Innocent III urged Emperor Henry to pay his troops better, in order that the Latin soldiery would cease deserting to the enemy camp.¹³³ Also in

¹³⁰ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 291. Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 4, 7, 14, 27, 30, 40. Mergiali-Sahas, *Byzantine emperors and holy relics*, pp. 46–48. Klein, *Eastern Objects and Western Desires*, pp. 290–292.

¹³¹ Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, p. 580. Van Arkel & Ciggaar, *St. Thorlac's in Constantinople, built by a Flemish emperor*, pp. 428–446. Clair, *Les filles d'Hautecombe dans l'empire latin*, p. 274. These examples show that in these years the Latin emperors did have the resources to engage in the maintenance, repair or construction of public buildings in Constantinople, contrary to what Jacoby believes, and that in this respect they thus did not disregard the symbolic and ideological dimension of the capital (Jacoby, *The Urban Evolution of Latin Constantinople*, pp. 290, 297). In this context we may add that even emperor Baldwin II of Courtenay shortly before the Byzantine reconquest of Constantinople in 1261, although he was in dire financial straits, still had the means to build a (small) church dedicated to Saint-George, which the anonymous 14th-century Byzantine author who reports the fact considered to be very beautiful (*He Alosis Tes Konstantinoupoleos*, pp. 351–354, v. 367–428; Charanis, *Les Βραχυνά Χρονικά comme source historique*, pp. 335–337).

¹³² See for example: Wolff, *The Latin empire, 1204–1261*, p. 211. Jacoby, *The Urban Evolution of Latin Constantinople*, pp. 289–290.

¹³³ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1391 (XI, 76); col. 1395 (XI, 78). The need to contract loans may partly be explained by liquidity problems. Tax collection took place twice a year, in September and March. When in the previous years no surpluses had been set aside, as was no doubt the case in 1207, exceptional (war) expenses caused cash flow problems, which earlier Byzantine emperors had sometimes also tried to solve by

the later years 1224–1228, which saw the loss of major parts of Latin Asia Minor to the Nicaean Empire and the disruption of Thrace by the Byzantines of Epiros, the financial problems must have been great. However, for the intervening period the sources testify to financial prosperity. For example, the English chronicler Ralph of Coggeshall, writing during the opening decades of the thirteenth century on the basis of information from persons who had visited Constantinople, states that the daily imperial income amounted to 30.000 hyperpera.¹³⁴ Annually this would amount to 10.950.000 hyperpera, clearly an exaggeration. Circa 1150 the income of this as yet unfeudalized and significantly larger empire would have amounted to 5.600.000 hyperpera.¹³⁵ Nonetheless, Coggeshall's testimony indicates that the Latin emperor's income appeared to be very considerable in the eyes of Western visitors.¹³⁶

In order to calculate the actual income, the size of the population of the imperial core quarter, which can be assessed hypothetically at some 990.625 to 1.240.125 people, will perhaps give us a more suitable point of departure.¹³⁷ If we base our calculations on Treadgold's

resorting to (on occasion forced) ecclesiastical loans (cf. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, pp. 160, 231; on the fiscal system in general: Oikonomides, *The Role of the Byzantine State in the Economy*, pp. 995–1004). For the geopolitical background in the years 1204–1210: cf. Chapter VII, p. 351.

¹³⁴ Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicum Anglicanum*, p. 149. On comparable exaggerated imperial revenue figures provided by the mid twelfth century Jewish traveller Benjamin of Tudela: Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, p. 173).

¹³⁵ Treadgold, *A History of the Byzantine State*, p. 705. In the period in question, the value of the hyperperon remained almost stable. Cf. Spufford, *Handbook of medieval exchange*, pp. 286–288.

¹³⁶ Mouskès too refers to the wealth of the Latin emperors when he relates that Emperor Robert of Courtenay had his brother Baldwin (II) brought up 'ricement' (Philippe Mouskes, p. 408). Goldsmith Gerard, a master of the Mosan school, executed a splendid golden reliquary of the True Cross for Emperor Henry (Gaborit-Chopin, *The Treasury of San Marco*, pp. 244–251; Jacoby, *The Urban Evolution of Latin Constantinople*, p. 289). Another magnificent work of art, a silver plate depicting the Ascension of Alexander the Great, is also attributed to the Latin imperial court (Evan & Wixom, *The Glory of Byzantium*, p. 399, n° 267).

¹³⁷ In 1282 the Byzantine Empire in Asia Minor will have had a population of some 3.000.000 (Treadgold, *A History of the Byzantine State*, p. 700, n. 22). As regards surface area, Latin Asia Minor will have encompassed approximately 1/3 to 1/4 of this region, which if converted into a population figure results in 750.000 to 1.000.000 inhabitants. The populous imperial Thrace possibly had a population of 100.000, taking into account the numerous cities and towns in the region. We believe that in the first three decades following 1204, Latin Constantinople had circa 225.000 inhabitants, of which circa 140.125 (5/8) lived under imperial jurisdiction. Jacoby estimates the city's population shortly before 1204 at 250.000 (Jacoby, *La population de Constanti-*

estimation formula for the annual income of the central administration at 56 hyperpera per 100 head of population (mid-twelfth century),¹³⁸ we come out at 554.750 to 694.470 hyperpera, bearing in mind however that a limited part of the core quarter had been distributed as fiefs. Andronikos II Paleologos' income in the early 14th century provides us with a workable point of comparison. The chronicler Gregoras, *chartophylax* at the emperor's court, states that in 1321 this amounted to about 1.000.000 hyperpera.¹³⁹ The population under the direct control of Andronikos has been estimated at circa 2.000.000. In view of the relative stability of the fiscal system—if anything the tax rate may have been lighter in the later period—some 500.000 to 700.000 hyperpera per annum may then be a realistic figure for the Latin emperors' income circa 1212–1224, especially in view of the fact that by the time of Andronikos the efficiency of the financial machinery would have been somewhat reduced in spite of his efforts to address this problem.¹⁴⁰ Converted, this sum represents approximately 251.208 to 314.477 livres parisis.¹⁴¹ By way of comparison, in 1180 the King of France received 228.000 livres parisis from his crown property, and in 1223—after the annexation of inter alia Vermandois and Normandy—438.000.¹⁴² Consequently, vis-à-vis the Latin emperors there is no reason to speak

nople à l'époque byzantine, p. 107; cf. Kislinger, *Pane e demografia*, p. 289). An exodus shortly after 1204 of more than 10% of the total population, of which the aristocracy only made up a small part, seems unlikely to us (cf. Prologue, pp. 24–39). The already mentioned Ralph of Coggeshall writing during the opening decades of the thirteenth century on the basis of eyewitness reports considered the city to be very populous (Ralph Of Coggeshall, *Chronicum Anglicanum*, p. 149). In later years, for instance in the late 1230's, new migrational waves away from the capital would follow (Gualterius Cornutus, *Historia Susceptionis Corone Spinee*, p. 50). The Latin population in Constantinople shortly before 1261 would have numbered around 3000, most of which were probably Venetians (Jacoby, *Houses and Urban Layout in the Venetian Quarter of Constantinople*, pp. 281–282).

¹³⁸ Treadgold, *Op. cit.*, pp. 704–705 (5,6 million hyperpera for a population of ten million people around 1150). On the relativity of Treadgold's (and thus our own) calculations: Oikonomides, *The Role of the Byzantine State in the Economy*, p. 1016.

¹³⁹ Nikephoros Gregoras, lib. VIII, §6. Treadgold, *Op. cit.*, pp. 842–843. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, p. 161.

¹⁴⁰ Treadgold, *Op. cit.*, pp. 841–842. Hendy, *Op. cit.*, pp. 161, 237–238, 526–530. Oikonomides, *The Role of the Byzantine State in the Economy*, pp. 1030–1034. In this context it should be noted that between the early thirteenth and early fourteenth century the hyperperon was severely debased.

¹⁴¹ Hendy, *Coinage and Money in the Byzantine Empire*, p. 14, n. 1. Spufford, *Handbook of Medieval Exchange*, p. 172, p. 209. Cf. Wolff, *Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's son*, p. 53, n. 15.

¹⁴² Sivery, *Les Capétiens et l'argent au siècle de Saint-Louis*, p. 160.

of a chronic shortage of money, at least in respect of the period of the empire's burgeoning in circa 1208/1212–1224. However, this does not alter the fact that for example Emperor Henry's ambitious foreign policy certainly could put the available budget under considerable pressure, as is witnessed by a letter from Innocent III January 1216 to Emperor Henry which alludes to this.¹⁴³

The loss of major portions of the well-populated Latin Asia Minor in 1224–25 must have at least halved the imperial budget, as the result of which the Latin Emperor felt it necessary to resort to exceptional measures. Firstly, Emperor Robert implemented an increase in taxation.¹⁴⁴ Secondly, he obtained financial support from religious sources, as had Emperor Henry already done around 1207 after the example of earlier Byzantine emperors. Thus Emperor Robert of Courtenay managed to arrange that in November 1224 Pope Honorius III apportioned to him one tenth of the church's income in his quarter of the empire and in the rest of Thrace for a period of one year, as compensation for the lost income from Asia Minor.¹⁴⁵ In January 1225 Honorius took an even more drastic financial measure and placed one quarter of the church's income from this region at the disposal of the secular authority.¹⁴⁶ Early in 1227 Emperor Robert, after the failed crusade to re-conquer the Kingdom of Thessalonike in 1225, was able to obtain that Gregorius IX granted him extra income on behalf of the Greek rural priests for a period of three years, after Patriarch Mattheus had already temporarily granted him the same income.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, in the same year Robert himself travelled to Rome, where he managed to obtain additional financial support from the pope.¹⁴⁸ Despite this support from the religious quarter, which is redolent of analogous solutions during the crisis situation under Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118) after the disastrous Byzantine defeat at Manzikert (1071), from

¹⁴³ Hampe, *Aus verlorene Registerbänden der Päpste Innozenz III. und IV.*, pp. 561–562. On Henry's ambitious, but unsuccessful campaigns against Serbia in the years 1214–1215: cf. Chapter VII, p. 397.

¹⁴⁴ *Chronicon Turonense*, p. 310. On the raising of taxes as an emergency measure: Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, pp. 237–238.

¹⁴⁵ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 128. Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 5186, 5189. Wellas, *Das westliche Kaiserreich und das lateinische Königreich Thessalonike*, pp. 42–43.

¹⁴⁶ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 5270.

¹⁴⁷ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 157.

¹⁴⁸ Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, pp. 394–395.

1224–1225 the imperial administration found itself in very straitened circumstances.¹⁴⁹

Central Judicial Organization

In the twelfth century the Byzantine imperial court of justice was the competent authority for those belonging to the senatorial class. Among other things it also formed a court of appeal for certain civil cases that had in the first instance been dealt with by provincial and metropolitan courts.¹⁵⁰ The information we have at our disposal on the working of an imperial court of justice under Latin administration is only sporadic. We know of only one person that was judged by the imperial court: the former emperor Alexios V Mourtzouphlos, who having been captured in November 1204—probably somewhere between Abydos and Adramyttion in the imperial quarter—was judged by Emperor Baldwin and his barons and counsellors, *inter alia* the Venetian doge and the Counts Louis of Blois and Hugh of Saint-Pol.¹⁵¹ Mourtzouphlos was accused and found guilty of having murdered his sovereign, Alexios IV Angelos, and was sentenced to death.¹⁵² Although this is an isolated and somewhat exceptional case, it nevertheless seems to suggest that men of senatorial or aristocratic rank retained the privilege to be judged by the emperor's court.

Concerning the court's composition we furthermore know of the already mentioned Vivianus, who was active around 1209–1211 and who bore the title of *iudex imperatoris*.¹⁵³ In our view this title should be interpreted in the sense that the person in question functioned as a judge in the imperial court of justice. Apart from the involvement of the emperor and his barons, this court thus seems to have been made up partially of a number of professional *iudices*, to whom certain

¹⁴⁹ Lilie, *Byzanz. Das zweite Rom*, p. 327.

¹⁵⁰ Brehier, *Les Institutions de l'Empire byzantin*, pp. 185–190. Macrides, *The Competent Court*, p. 122.

¹⁵¹ Cf. Chapter V, p. 254. The presence of Dandolo and Hugh of Saint-Pol, who as far as is known held no fiefs in the imperial quarter, on the imperial council dealing with Mourtzouphlos strictly speaking implies that his case was not treated by the imperial court specifically competent for the imperial quarter. Maybe such a court did not yet formally exist in November 1204, or maybe Baldwin deemed it wise or natural to include on his council the important barons present in Constantinople for this exceptional case (and possibly also in other cases), whether they held fiefs inside or outside the imperial quarter.

¹⁵² Villehardouin, §306–308. De Clari, §108–109.

¹⁵³ Cf. note 65.

types of cases must have been delegated and who at the same time could perform a function in the imperial chancery. The mentioned Vivianus was as has been seen indeed also active in the imperial chancery as *scriptor* and *notarius*. The competencies of the imperial court or the judicial procedures employed largely remain unknown.¹⁵⁴ Did the competencies remain the same as in the Byzantine period? Did the judicial procedures for Byzantines stay the same, whilst procedures based on Western customary law were introduced for Latins? Were the personnel mixed Byzantine and Latin just as in the chancery and the financial administration? The partial continuity combined with Latin innovations in departments that have already been discussed make an affirmative answer to these questions not improbable.

The imperial court indicated innovation in at least one respect. There is no doubt that this court, in view of the partial feudalization of the imperial quarter, must have functioned as the supreme feudal court in the region. Once again, little is known about its working, but in 1229 there is mention of a *corpus juris* under the appellation *approbatas consuetudines imperii*.¹⁵⁵ It has been correctly assumed by earlier authors that this must have concerned an entirety of feudal provisions.¹⁵⁶ We are of the opinion that these *consuetudines* were brought into being on the initiative of the Latin emperors and that they were not only applicable in the imperial core quarter, but in the whole of the Latin Empire.¹⁵⁷ Consequently, Western feudal law joined the already complex existing judicial pluralism in the Byzantine space where, among others, official imperial law, regional customary laws, canonical law, jurisprudence from secular and religious courts, together with judicial customs of religious minorities and overseas trading colonies were applied alongside one another.¹⁵⁸ Nothing further is known on the workings of the imperial court as the supreme feudal court in the region. None of the available sources alludes to feudal conflicts or situations within the core quarter that normally would have been judged by the imperial feudal court (or for that matter by the presumed provincial feudal courts).

¹⁵⁴ On the functioning of the imperial court in cases not relating to the imperial core quarter: cf. Chapter IV, p. 210.

¹⁵⁵ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 273.

¹⁵⁶ Recoura, *Les Assises de Romanie*, p. 32.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Chapter IV, p. 207.

¹⁵⁸ Michaelides-Nouaros, *Quelques remarques sur le pluralisme juridique en Byzance*, pp. 424–425, 446.

As the already cited Gunther of Pairis states, the Byzantine *leges* were generally maintained under Latin administration. The fifteenth-century compilatory *Catalogus et cronica principum et comitum Flandrie et forestariorum* provides analogous—and therefore in essence presumably reliable—information, albeit somewhat romanticized. During his short reign, Baldwin I was to ratify the *justi leges, privilegia ac consuetudines Atheniensium et Graecorum* and to prescribe them for his vassals.¹⁵⁹ In the discussion of the capital's administration we also encountered elements that indicated the continuation of the Byzantine legislation. A passage in a papal answer dated 1218 to a number of questions from legate Giovanni Colonna about problems concerning the Latin and Byzantine episcopate, capricious divorce and remarriage by Byzantine men, the Byzantine population's working on Sundays and holy days, and the running of monasteries by both Latin and Byzantine lay magnates, contains interesting information along the same lines. Honorius III instructed his legate to solve these problems in accordance with the *iura canonica et civilia edita super omnibus fere articulis praenotatis*.¹⁶⁰ The term *iura civilia* can maybe be interpreted as a reference to the imperial civil law code—the *corpus juris civilis*—which had been compiled by Justinian I and which had not only always remained valid in Byzantium but had been further supplemented, as witnessed by later revisions such as the *Ecloga*, the *Procheiron* and the *Basilika*.¹⁶¹ The early fourteenth-century Byzantine chronicler Ephraem Aenius also confirms that the Byzantine judicial system was maintained to a major extent under Latin administration when he describes Emperor Baldwin I as the defender of the laws and justice.¹⁶² Surveying the available source material it seems not improbable to us that the first Latin emperor, in accordance with the 1204 distribution agreement as we have reconstructed it, may have issued

¹⁵⁹ *Catalogus et Cronica Principum et Comitum Flandrie et Forestariorum*, p. 137. Outside of the imperial quarter Baldwin in any case confirmed the administrative privileges of Thessalonike in the summer of 1204 (Niketas Choniates, p. 599; Villehardouin, §280).

¹⁶⁰ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 39.

¹⁶¹ Karayannopoulos & Weiss, *Quellenkunde zur Geschichte von Byzanz*, I, pp. 128–129. Michaelides-Nouaros, *Quelques remarques sur le pluralisme juridique en Byzance*, pp. 425–427.

¹⁶² Ephraem Aenius, *Historia Chronica*, p. 256, v. 7222.

a decree for the empire in its entirety confirming to a large extent the Byzantine law and justice system.¹⁶³

Apart from their legislative activity in the sphere of feudal law and their confirmation of existing Byzantine law, it should be noted that the Latin emperors also enacted several laws regarding the property rights of ecclesiastical institutions and the fiscal obligations of clerics, some of which were applicable only in the imperial core quarter, while others were meant to be applicable in the empire in its entirety. We will treat this aspect of the emperors' legislative activity more fully in the next chapter.¹⁶⁴ Two of our findings however may already be pointed out here briefly. Firstly, as is evident from these laws the Latin emperors ascribed to themselves the—from a western viewpoint rather remarkable—right to promulgate decrees concerning the property rights and fiscal obligations of the Church. Secondly, in doing so they seemingly were partially following the example set by their Byzantine predecessors, who in the period before 1204 had issued similar edicts.

The Military Organization of the Imperial Core Quarter

The military effectives at the disposal of the Latin Emperor were quite diverse in nature. Some of the troops were supplied to the emperor through the military service to which the Latin barons, knights and sergeants were obliged on account of the fief that he had granted them or that had been assigned to them. In addition, the Latin emperors also made use of autochthonous Byzantine troops. As we have already seen above, Byzantines had also been granted fiefs, and whilst the precise nature of these is unknown, just as the Latin vassals they must have been required to provide troops. One exceptional corps were the *varangoi* or Varangians, elite troops principally of Scandinavian or Anglo-Saxon origin who had for centuries made up part of the Byzantine army. The *varangoi* were based in Constantinople, often served only temporarily, and were known for their loyalty to the emperor.¹⁶⁵ There was also a unit of Scandinavian troops active under the Latin

¹⁶³ On this distribution agreement: cf. Chapter I, p. 46. On legislative initiatives by the Latin emperors relating to the empire in its entirety: cf. Chapter IV, p. 194.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Chapter IV, p. 194.

¹⁶⁵ Blöndal & Benediktz, *The Varangians of Byzantium*, pp. 120, 162–163, 181–182, 188–189.

administration.¹⁶⁶ However, little more is known about the exact status of these *varangoi* under Latin rule. A papal letter of 1208 mentions the presence of the Danish and English *nationes* in Constantinople.¹⁶⁷ The only Varangian in Latin Constantinople to be known by name is the Norwegian Reidar. As a Varangian under Alexios III (1195–1203) he was despatched as an imperial envoy to the Norwegian King Sverri to ask for troops. In 1210 he travelled to the Holy Land after a long stay in Norway, and on the return journey (circa 1210–11) he joined the service of Emperor Henry in Constantinople, where he died in 1214.¹⁶⁸ A mid-thirteenth-century seal of Michael, *megalos diermeneutos ton Baraggon* (Grand Interpreter of the *varangoi*), was until now attributed to the Empire of Nicaea, but now that it has been shown that the Latin emperors too had a corps of *varangoi* in their service it is just as easily possible that its origin can be attributed to the Latin Empire.¹⁶⁹ Lastly the emperors had mercenaries of unspecified Western origin at their disposal, whose loyalty however depended on how well they were paid.¹⁷⁰

The military services took on two forms: firstly garrison duties in a number of fortified cities and secondly participation in defensive or offensive field expeditions. Known to us for the period 1204–1207 is that in the imperial quarter in Thrace there were temporary or permanent Latin garrisons in Salymbria, Tzouroulon and Vizye.¹⁷¹ In Asia Minor the fortified cities of Poimanenon, Lentiana, Charioros and

¹⁶⁶ Van Arkel & Ciggaar, *St. Thorlac's in Constantinople*, pp. 428–446. Blöndal, *The Varangians of Byzantium*, pp. 167–170.

¹⁶⁷ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1353 (XI, 23). Van Arkel & Ciggaar, *St. Thorlac's in Constantinople*, p. 434.

¹⁶⁸ Ibidem, pp. 434–436. Another Norwegian who around 1218–1220 appears to have travelled to Jerusalem by way of Constantinople was Ogmund of Sponheim (The Saga of Hacon, p. 73; Riant, *Expéditions et pèlerinages des Scandinaves en Terre Sainte au temps des croisades*, p. 331).

¹⁶⁹ Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, II, n° 471. In 1253 a certain Theophylaktos bore this title in Nicaea (Guilland, *Le grand interprète*, p. 23).

¹⁷⁰ During his campaign in the Kingdom of Thessalonike and southern Thessaly in 1208–1209 Emperor Henry made good use of *'saudoyer'*, whom he paid well (Valenciennes, §641, 666). In 1210 Innocent III however advised Henry to pay his Latin mercenaries better, in order to stop them from serving his rivals, Michael Doukas and Theodore Laskaris (Migne, *PL*, CCXI, col. 354 (XIII, 184)). Latin mercenaries serving whoever that asked and paid for their services nevertheless continued to be available in the region. In 1212 Theodore Laskaris still had a sizeable Latin contingent in his army (Prinzinger, *Der Brief*, p. 416).

¹⁷¹ Villehardouin, §337, 387, 411, 460. Valenciennes, §561. On the performance of garrison duties in the Kingdom of Thessalonike: Ibidem, §573.

Berbeniakon housed garrisons, although the nationalities thereof are unclear. It is possible that there were mixed or purely Byzantine garrisons established there. In any event, the defence of the territories of Asia Minor in circa 1212–13 was entrusted to the Byzantine George Theophilopoulos.¹⁷² This assignment is consistent with the Byzantine function of *domestikos ton scholon tes Anatoles*, the supreme commander of the armed forces in the Eastern section of the empire, and it is not implausible that Theophilopoulos did indeed bear this title.¹⁷³ Some of the troops under his command were prisoners of war that Emperor Henry had taken into his service in the context of the military confrontation with the Nicaean Empire in 1212–13. They were assigned to purely Byzantine contingents, with their own Byzantine commanders.¹⁷⁴ In the years following 1204 it was principally Latin troops that were engaged in military campaign, with the inclusion of the *varangoi*, although there were also some Byzantine troops.¹⁷⁵ The division into *corps de bataille* and *acies* and the appointment of their leaders took place mainly on an ad hoc basis, which was different from the situation for the mentioned Byzantine corps in Asia Minor.¹⁷⁶ In the later years, Byzantine contingents took a more prominent role in military expeditions. Correspondingly, among the leaders of the army that marched on the Nicaean Empire in 1224 were the brothers Alexios and Isaak Laskaris, who had fled Nicaea for Constantinople after the death of their brother Emperor Theodore Laskaris in 1222.¹⁷⁷

It is difficult to determine whether the Latin emperors had a fleet at their disposal. As the result of the government's maladministration and lack of interest there was no Byzantine navy worth mentioning during the Latin seizure of Constantinople.¹⁷⁸ In naval rescue operations

¹⁷² Akropolites, §16, 22. A seal dating from the first half of the thirteenth century (circa 1225) probably belonged to this person (or to a relative of his). The obverse portrays Saint George, while the reverse displays the formula 'Σφράγισμα γραφῶν τοῦ Θεοφιλοπούλου' (Jordanov, *Corpus of Byzantine Seals from Bulgaria*, II, pp. 156–157—the author also publishes a second seal belonging to a Theophilopoulos, dating from the same period and this time displaying Saint Nikephore on the obverse). The Theophilopouloi are not known in Byzantium prior to 1204, but the family is attested in the fourteenth century (PLP, n° 7627).

¹⁷³ Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, II, pp. 499–500.

¹⁷⁴ Akropolites, §16. Booth, *Theodore Laskaris and Paphlagonia*, p. 204.

¹⁷⁵ Villehardouin, §403.

¹⁷⁶ Ibidem, §430. Prinzing, *Der Brief*, p. 416.

¹⁷⁷ Akropolites, §22.

¹⁷⁸ Ahrweiler, *Byzance et la mer*, pp. 291–292. Lilie, *Byzanz. Das zweite Rom*, p. 373.

in 1207 from Constantinople to Kibotos and Kyzikos on the coast of Asia minor, Pisan and Venetian ships that were present at the capital were used.¹⁷⁹ However, in his expedition to the Kingdom of Thessalonike in 1209, Emperor Henry certainly did have at his disposal a number of ships for transport and provisioning.¹⁸⁰ In view of the fact that nowhere is there any allusion to Venetian or other intervention, it is reasonable to assume that they were part of an imperial fleet. The bestowal of the title *megas doux* (prior to 1210), the customary title for the supreme commander of the fleet, on Philokales, lord of the island of Lemnos, does suggest the existence of an imperial fleet. It is possible that Philokales was, as *megas doux*, responsible for the maintenance of the imperial fleet that was attested in 1209, and that perhaps on occasion he also fulfilled military assignments.¹⁸¹ The capacity of the imperial fleet could always be supplemented by the naval strength of the Northern Italian trading powers, as shown in the previously described occurrences of 1207. Vis-à-vis the mighty Venetian fleet, this can be seen as being within the framework of the feudal service due to the emperor. The Pisan colony in Constantinople was committed to naval support in exchange for the trading privileges granted by the Latin emperors, just as had been the case prior to 1204.¹⁸²

THE POLITICAL ELITE OF THE IMPERIAL CORE QUARTER AND OF SURROUNDING THRACE

We consider as the political elite of the imperial core quarter the group of people who occupied clearly defined positions in the administration of the region, or to whom responsibilities were allocated while partaking in an imperial expedition outside the core quarter, or who possessed a considerable fiefdom in the region. Two components can be distinguished within this group: firstly the group that only played a significant role within the imperial quarter, and secondly the group that also participated in the administration of the empire as a whole. This

¹⁷⁹ Villehardouin, §466, 468.

¹⁸⁰ Valenciennes, §642, 664–665.

¹⁸¹ Philokales is attested in 1210 and 1214 in Constantinople. Cf. Morozzo Della Rocca, *Documenti*, I, n° 519. Laurent, *Les registres des actes du patriarcat*, I/4, n° 1219. See also note 32.

¹⁸² Müller, *Documenti sulle Relazioni delle Città Toscane coll' Oriente*, n° 55, pp. 86–87. Schaube, *Eine bisher unbekannte Regentin des lateinischen Kaiserreiches*, pp. 587–594.

second group—the central political elite—will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter. At this point, we devote our attention specifically to the first group, in which we can distinguish a Latin component and a Byzantine component.

The Latin Component

The composition of the Latin component was in the first instance determined by the composition of the crusading army.¹⁸³ The leading figures that in 1204 obtained fiefdoms within the imperial quarter from Emperor Baldwin originated from the counties of Blois, Clermont, Perche and Flanders in the Kingdom of France, from the County of Hainaut in the Holy Roman Empire, and from the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The Latin defeat at Adrianople in 1205 and the feudal reshuffle in Thrace that followed it, made the vassals in the core quarter and surrounding Thrace even more diverse as regards their geographical origins. It was in this way that after the death of Hugh IV of Saint-Pol, the city of Didymoteichon came into the hands of the Byzantine magnate Theodore Branas.

A first group outside the central elite that we can identify as belonging to the Latin elite in the imperial core quarter are those who held an important fief in the area. Of this group only Henry of Grand Gerin is known to us by name.¹⁸⁴ A second group are the individuals who fulfilled an administrative or military function within the core quarter. This criterion provides us with three more names: William of Bloville,¹⁸⁵

¹⁸³ Carile, *Movimenti di popolazione e colonizzazione occidentale in Romania*, p. 10.

¹⁸⁴ Henry of Grand Gerin originated in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. He was the son of the Lord of Grand Gerin and of Hodierna, daughter of Manasses of Hierges, Constable of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. After the death of Peter of Bracheux (between 1213 and 1224) he was Lord of Pegai. He gave his daughter Philippa in marriage to the Cypriot Lord Raymond of Aguilers (*Les Lignages D'outremer*, §38). It is probable that Henry of Grand Gerin obtained the town via a marriage with Peter's heiress Isabelle of Bracheux, mentioned in the martyrology of the *Sancta Maria Sancti Angeli* monastery in Constantinople (cf. Clair, *Les filles d'Hautecombe dans l'empire latin*, p. 273; Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 92, 97—in this context it is interesting to note that Peter had a Cypriot squire in his entourage: John of Cyprus, cf. *Ibidem*, p. 97).

¹⁸⁵ William of *Blanvel*, as Villehardouin calls him, probably belonged to the Bloville family, of the County of Flanders (Van Lokeren, *Chartes et documents de l'abbaye de Saint-Pierre*, n° 349, p. 192). William of Bloville is in 1205 attested as being military commander of the imperial town of Tzouroulon. In 1208 it is probably he who was in possession of a fiefdom near Vigneri (Macedonia) in the Kingdom of Thessalonike. If both Williams are indeed one and the same, it cannot be determined whether he at the same time retained his position in the imperial core quarter. For instance

Gerard of Walcourt¹⁸⁶ and William of Le Perchay.¹⁸⁷ Probably they too possessed fiefdoms in the core quarter or possibly in the part of not-Venetian Thrace that lay outside the neighbouring principalities of Adrianople and Philippopolis.

Then there is a third group of individuals of which we know that they fulfilled responsibilities in imperial service during expeditions outside the core quarter, and of whom it seems likely that they remained for a longer period in the empire. Arguments in favour of this are: 1. A long number of years attested in the sources; 2. The presence in later years of relatives from their homelands. Although these persons clearly were based in the large region around Constantinople, it is impossible to state the extent to which they possessed fiefdoms either within the imperial core quarter itself or otherwise in non-Venetian Thrace: Hugh

imperial marshal Geoffrey of Villehardouin held possessions both from the prince/king of Thessalonike (Mosynopolis) and directly from the Latin emperor (inter alia Ainos)(Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 168). Cf. also Chapter IV, note 186.

¹⁸⁶ Originating from the County of Namen, in 1208 he was designated *primi inter pretores* by Emperor Henry. In the same year his brother Thomas, cleric, returned homewards with a series of imperial relics. The fact that in 1221 we encounter his relative Thierry II of Walcourt in Constantinople in an important function suggests that Gérard remained in the core quarter for a long period, if not permanently. Cf. Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 33. Philippe Mouskes, pp. 407–409.

¹⁸⁷ Originating from Le Perchay in the French crown domain, William was the leader of one of the galleys during the relief expedition near Kyzikos in 1207 and conducted the defense of Nicomedia together with Thierry of Looz later that year. In 1208 he participated in the campaign against Bulgaria; he is last mentioned in a 1210 charter (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 130). A relative of his *Ph. de Percheio* (= Le Perchay in Latin) (Brown, *The Cistercians in the Latin Empire*, p. 92, note 153) is mentioned in a papal letter from 1221 as one of the benefactors of the Cistercian *Sancta Maria de Percheio* or Saint Mary of Le Perchay abbey in Constantinople (Presutti, *Regesta*, n° 3123; Martin, *Un acte de Baudouin II*, p. 215). Given the name of the monastery we would like to put forward the hypothesis that it was founded by the Le Perchay family and named after it. Abbess Beatrix, named in the document from 1221, may have founded the abbey since she was by far its biggest benefactor (donating numerous properties). If this is correct she must have been related to the Le Perchay family (she may have been William's wife or widow). Up until recently no satisfactory explanation had been found for the designation *de Percheio*, which most authors have interpreted as a topographical element (a survey of the various hypotheses: Ibidem, p. 217). Lately Saint-Guillain has proposed a similar hypothesis identifying *Percheio* as Le Perchay and convincingly identifying *Ph. de Percheio* as William's brother Philip. The author further suggests William himself may have been the founder of the abbey. This however seems unlikely to us in view of the fact that he is not mentioned in the 1221 papal confirmation of the abbey's properties, which appears to enumerate all of the abbey's possessions without referring to any previous papal confirmation (Saint-Guillain, *Sainte-Marie du Perchay*, pp. 593–603).

and William of Beaumetz,¹⁸⁸ Matthew and Hugh Bliaud,¹⁸⁹ Robert II of Boves,¹⁹⁰ Bègues, Raoul and Hugh of Fransures,¹⁹¹ Baldwin I and Baldwin II of Neuville,¹⁹² Peter of Radinghem,¹⁹³ Walter of Schorisse,¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁸ Hugh of Beaumetz was the brother of Gilles, Lord of Beaumetz and Viscount of Bapaume, situated in the border territories between the County of Flanders and the French crown domain. In 1206 he commanded an army corps during an imperial expedition near Didymoteichon. Because of a conflict with Regent Henry of Flanders/Hainaut he left the expedition and then the empire. In 1208–1209 during Henry's campaign near Thessalonike we encounter William of Beaumetz, charged with responsibilities and probably a relative of Hugues (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 157, 186).

¹⁸⁹ During Emperor Henry's campaign in the Kingdom of Thessalonike we encounter Matthew, Hugh and Jacques Bliaud, originating from the County of Hainaut. Matthew and Hugh were entrusted with responsible assignments. They are undoubtedly relatives of Jean Bliaud, who belonged to the imperial *familia* and who in circa 1205–1206 fulfilled a mission in Western Europe (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 173, 185).

¹⁹⁰ Robert I of Boves (+ 1226–28), Lord of Fouencamps near Boves in the French crown domain, took part in the Fourth Crusade, but had already returned shortly after 1204—after a detour via Syria—to his home territory, where he is attested in 1210, 1219, 1222 and 1226. It is therefore probably his son Robert II who in 1208–1209 took part in Henry's expedition to Thessalonike and in 1217 in Rome acted as witness to the affirmation of the constitutional treaties of 1204–1205 issued by the imperial couple Peter and Yolande. It is only in 1239 that Robert II is attested in his home region (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 124; Valenciennes, §652–653; Nieuw, *Le comté de Saint-Pol. II: Annexes*, n° 13, p. 165; Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 249; Newman, *Les Seigneurs de Nesle*, I, pp. 98–99).

¹⁹¹ Bègues of Fransures originated from the area of Amiens. In 1206 he was commander of a Latin garrison in Apros, where he died defending this city. Both his sons found themselves in Constantinople in 1208 (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 108).

¹⁹² Baldwin I belonged to the line of the Lords of Neuville in the County of Artois. He perished in the battle of Adrianople on 14 April 1205 (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 171). In circa 1226–1227 Emperor Robert of Courtenay married the daughter of one Baldwin of Neuville—who is difficult to identify with the former, but who was doubtless from the same family and whom we thus call Baldwin II—and a Byzantine mother. (cf. Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 394; *Chronicon Turonense*, p. 311). Cf. Chapter V, p. 301.

¹⁹³ Peter of Radinghem came from the area of Lille in the County of Flanders, and in 1206–1207 was commander of an imperial garrison in Adrianople (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 177).

¹⁹⁴ Walter of Schorisse was originally from the area of Oudenaarde in the County of Flanders. In 1206–1207 he carried out military duties during successive imperial campaigns. He possessed a fiefdom *Caligrant* which we could not further identify (Ibidem, p. 174).

Beuve II of Saint S  p  lchre,¹⁹⁵ Roger and Gobaus of Marke,¹⁹⁶ and Bouriaus of Fressain.¹⁹⁷

Lastly there are those who, as far as it is known, carried only temporary administrative responsibilities in the service of the empire, and who had no successors from their home region.¹⁹⁸ Here too it is impossible to say precisely where they might have held fiefdoms: Robert of Rozoy (or Ronsoy);¹⁹⁹ Renier of Mons;²⁰⁰ John of Choisy and Andrew Dureboise;²⁰¹ Guy of Henrue  l and Herv   of Gare  t;²⁰² William of Gommegnies and

¹⁹⁵ The lordship of Saint S  p  lchre was located in the County of Champagne (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 74). In 1210 Beuve acted as a witness in the *resignatio Ravenic  * (Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n   48, p. 75; cf. also Chapter IV, pp. 164, 210). In a papal letter from 1221 he is mentioned as one of the benefactors of the Saint Mary of Le Perchay abbey in Constantinople (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n   3123; Martin, *Un acte de Baudouin II*, p. 215). See also note 15.

¹⁹⁶ Roger of Marke was from the area of Courtrai in the County of Flanders. He acted as a witness to an imperial charter in February 1205 (*Ibidem*, p. 160). Gobaus of Marke, doubtless a relative of Roger, met his end in 1224 during the siege of the city of Serres in Macedonia (Philippe Mouskes, p. 408).

¹⁹⁷ Fressain lies in the County of Flanders, between the towns of Douai and Valenciennes. Bouriaus also died in the siege of Serres in 1224 (*Ibidem*, p. 408).

¹⁹⁸ There certainly are more individuals attested in the region around Constantinople in the early period, but they did not fulfil assignments of any responsibility in imperial service (Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n   280–283; Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 192).

¹⁹⁹ Robert of Rozoy/Ronsoy came from Rozoy in the Laonnais region, or Ronsoy in Vermandois, both of these situated in the French crown domain. Robert was one of the commanders of the imperial troops near Nicomedia in 1204–1205. He died on 14 April 1205 at Adrianople (*Ibidem*, pp. 118–119).

²⁰⁰ Renier of Mons originated in the County of Hainaut. In 1204 he was appointed by Baldwin I as commander of an imperial garrison in Thessalonike (*Ibidem*, p. 162).

²⁰¹ John of Choisy and Andrew Dureboise came from the French crown domain and were part of the entourage of Bishop Nivelon of Soissons. In 1206 each of them was in command of a corps in the defence of the town of Rhousion in Thrace under the leadership of Captain Thierry of Tenremonde. Both died whilst carrying out this mission (*Ibidem*, p. 129).

²⁰² Guy of Henrue  l originated in the County of Champagne; the geographical origin of Herv   of Gare  t is unknown to us. Both fulfilled important missions during the emperor's Thessalonican expedition in 1208–1209 (*Ibidem*, p. 68; Valenciennes,   611, 624).

Dreux of Beaurain;²⁰³ Eustace of Salperwick;²⁰⁴ Robesote of Wavrin;²⁰⁵ Baldwin of Beauvoir;²⁰⁶ Matthew of Walincourt.²⁰⁷

The local Latin elite of the core quarter displayed a clear cohesion vis-à-vis their geographical origins and social status in their home region. In respect of geographical origin the emphasis lay mainly on the Counties of Flanders and Hainaut, and on the French crown domain, and in the second instance on the contiguous Counties of Namur and Champagne. Consequently, we can say that the majority of the administrative elite originated in the home regions of the Latin emperors (Flanders, Hainaut, Namur). The considerable numbers from the French crown domain can be explained by the fact that parts thereof, and in particular Vermandois, were closely associated with the County of Flanders until the end of the twelfth century. There were also close family ties between the imperial family of Constantinople and the royal house of Capet.²⁰⁸ The presence of the Champenois is connected to the presence in the central elite of a number of persons from the same

²⁰³ They came respectively from the area of Valenciennes in the County of Hainaut and from the area of Cambrai respectively in the eponymous princebishopric. They took part in the imperial expedition in Thrace in 1206, but left the army together with, inter alia, Hugh of Beaumetz and Baldwin of Beauvoir after a conflict with Regent Henry (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 159–160).

²⁰⁴ Eustace of Salperwick came from the area of Saint-Omer in the County of Flanders. He was for a while commander of an imperial garrison at Adrianople in 1204. In February 1205 he acted as a witness to an imperial charter (Ibidem, p. 161).

²⁰⁵ Robesote of Wavrin witnessed an imperial charter of February 1205. He was a member of one of the most prominent families of the County of Flanders (Ibidem, p. 192; De Hemptinne, *Peter van de Elzas, leven en loopbaan*, p. 159).

²⁰⁶ Baldwin of Beauvoir originated either in Vermandois or in the County of Flanders. In 1206 he was commander of an army corps in an expedition for Regent Henry at Didymoteichon. He belonged to the group that came into conflict with Henry and the army during the campaign, and left the empire (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 154–156).

²⁰⁷ Matthew's home region was located in the County of Henegouwen, near to Cambrai. In 1204–1205 he was one of the leading figures in the imperial troops near Nicomedia. He too fell in April 1205 at Adrianople (Ibidem, p. 152).

²⁰⁸ Elisabeth of Hainaut (+ 1190), sister of the Emperors Baldwin and Henry and of Empress Yolande, was married to Philip II Augustus (1180–1223) and was the mother of the later King Louis VIII (1223–1226). Philip, Count of Namen Namur (+ 1212) and brother of Baldwin, Henry and Yolande, in 1210 married Mary, daughter of Philip II Augustus. Finally, Emperor Peter of Courtenay was a grandson of the French King Louis VI (1108–1137) (Von Isenburg, *Stammtafeln zur Geschichte der Europäischen Staaten*, II, Tafel 10 & 14).

area and the fact that the wife of Emperor Baldwin was a daughter of the count of Champagne. The Holy Land was represented by Henry of Grand Gerin, which was also the case in the mentioned central elite.

As regards social status, the majority of these figures belonged to the lower echelons of the feudal hierarchy in their home regions. The overwhelming majority of these were to be classified beneath the level of the prominent families, the peers, the hereditary court dignitaries, the viscounts and other important barons in the principalities from which they came. Rather, they were feudatories and local lords of modest rank. Here one can draw a parallel with the early years in the Holy Land, where at the end of the eleventh century the members of the Latin elite were also of relatively humble origin.²⁰⁹ The most important lineages were the Walcourt family, which belonged among the prominent lineages of the small County of Namur,²¹⁰ the Beaumetz family, which held the viscountcy of Bapaume; the Grand Gerin family, which prior to Saladin's conquests at the end of the twelfth century formed part of the elite of the Kingdom of Jerusalem,²¹¹ the Boves family, which was allied with the counts of Saint-Pol,²¹² and the Wavrin family, which held the seneschal office of Flanders and was allied with the comital lineage.

It is difficult to determine the extent to which this local political elite actively endorsed the imperial policy of Latin-Byzantine integration that we have established above. The marriage of Baldwin II of Neuville with a Byzantine shows that certainly some of them were positive in this respect. However, other elements indicate opposition to this policy. Villehardouin recounts how in June 1206 Regent Henry undertook a rescue operation of Didymoteichon, which was under siege by the Bulgarian tsar Kalojan. This took place at the request of the local Byzantine population, who shortly before had fought against Latin rule with the support of the tsar. The regent succeeded in relieving Didymoteichon and pursued Kalojan into Bulgarian territory. However, at the stronghold of Ephraim part of the army left the expedition owing to a conflict with the regent. Mentioned by name are Baldwin of Beauvoir, Hugh of Beaumetz, William of Gommegnies and

²⁰⁹ Runciman, *The Families of Outremer*, pp. 6–7.

²¹⁰ Lahaye, *Cartulaire de la commune de Walcourt*, pp. xiv–xxx.

²¹¹ *Les Lignages D'outremer*, p. 470.

²¹² Nieuw, *Le comté de Saint-Pol*, I/1, p. 123, n° 23; p. 127, n° 9.

Dreux of Beaurain; in total there were some 50 knights out of a total of 400.²¹³

Villehardouin does not examine the cause of the conflict, but from his report it appears that from the outset the expedition in support of the Byzantines in Thrace could scarcely count on the undivided enthusiasm of the leadership of the Latin army. It is easy to assume that Baldwin of Beauvoir and his companions were part of the group that held a rather sceptical opinion of the rescue operation in support of Byzantine Didymoteichon. What they looked upon as a risky expansion of the campaign deep into Bulgarian territory must have seemed a step too far.²¹⁴ We can consider their scant preparedness to go to the aid of the Byzantines of Thrace against the Bulgarian tsar as a lack of sympathy with the imperial policy of bringing about Latin-Byzantine harmony. Taking the expedition further—which would increase the safety of Didymoteichon and neighbouring Adrianople, cities that were under the administration of Byzantines who accepted Latin dominion—was an element that actually could contribute to the growth of Latin-Byzantine mutual trust.

The Byzantine Component

In addition to *megas doux* Philokales, *kaisar* Theodore Branas and the Laskaris brothers, whom we consider as belonging to the central elite, we know by name the following persons, already mentioned above, in imperial service in the core quarter: Constantine Tornikes, in the service of Emperor Baldwin I, probably as *logothetes tou dromou*; George Theophilopoulos, charged with the defence of the core quarter in Asia Minor from circa 1212–1213; perhaps also John Kontotheodoros, *maistor* of the school attached to the *Orphanotropheion*, which prior to 1204 was under imperial patronage; at the beginning of the thirteenth century possibly the *eparchoi* of Constantinople Constantine Radenos and Dominikos Manios, and *koiaistor* Stephanos Galaton. In addition to them there were in and around Latin Constantinople a number of Byzantine families that prior to 1204 had belonged to the administrative elite, but of whom no descendants are attested explicitly in the Latin administration. Nonetheless, it is not unlikely that members of these families held positions in that Latin bureaucracy: the father of

²¹³ Villehardouin, §426, 429.

²¹⁴ Ibidem, §435–440.

chronicler George Akropolites,²¹⁵ a descendant of the imperial Angelos family;²¹⁶ members of the Choniates, Matzukes and Naziraios families.²¹⁷ A member of the Pyrros family is not encountered in the Latin administration until 1240, but it seems likely that members of this family had served in the Latin administration prior to this date.²¹⁸

In addition to these Byzantine individuals and families who are known by name, we must not forget the presence in Asia Minor of the Byzantine vassals mentioned earlier. We can also assume an Armenian presence in the Latin administration. During his conquering expedition on Adramyttion in Asia Minor, Henry of Flanders/Hainault entered into an alliance with the local Armenian population. In his return from the region in early 1205 resulting from the Byzantine rebellion in Thrace, he brought with him a large number of Armenian families with the intention of letting them settle in and around Constantinople. Although ultimately the majority of these Armenians were to be killed by the Greek and Bulgarian troops in Thrace, a limited number of them managed to escape to the capital.²¹⁹ It is likely that some of them served in the administration, on account of their familiarity with the Byzantine administrative machinery on one hand and on the other hand of their loyal alliance with the Latins from the outset of Latin rule.

²¹⁵ Akropolites, §29.

²¹⁶ In circa 1228, under pressure from Regent Narjot of Toucy, Isabelle of Clermont married a certain *Angelus*, although she was already married to Milo III le Bréban, at that time apparently absent from Constantinople. Without doubt, this *Angelus* belonged to the Byzantine Angeloi. The named Latins themselves were part of the highest elite of the capital and the empire. In this sense it sounds logical that the *Angelus* involved will have had a similar social status, and who other than a member of the Angelos family could unequivocally be referred to simply as *Angelus*? (cf. Auvray, *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, I, n° 1138; Wolff, *Politics in the Latin patriarchate*, p. 287—the author wrongly ascribed to *Angelus* the expression *de facto* as family name).

²¹⁷ Choniates: in the winter of 1235–1236 George Bardanes, metropolitan of Corfu, sent a letter to his acquaintance Choniates, who was born in Constantinople and who, on the basis of Bardanes' letter, can be supposed still to be residing in Constantinople at the time of the correspondence in question (cf. Hoeck & Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otrante*, n° 18; Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessalonike*, p. 228, n. 796). Matzukes: Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, n° 2; Rhoby, *Miscellanea*, n° 2; Janin, *Les églises et les monastères*, p. 60; Grünbart, *Nachrichten aus dem Hinterland Konstantinopels*, p. 65. Naziraios: cf. *infra*.

²¹⁸ Cf. note 88.

²¹⁹ Villehardouin, §380–381, 385. Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, pp. 386–387.

Within the Byzantine component of the administrative elite in the core quarter we encounter families that prior to 1204 belonged to the military, major land-owning aristocracy who were related to the imperial family (Angelos), families that were part of the civil aristocracy (Akropolites, Choniates, Pyrros, Tornikes), and families that can be placed somewhere between them (Radenos).²²⁰ In addition, under the Latin rule there was also the opportunity for new families—i.e. families that were not known prior to 1204—to work their way up to gain important positions in the administration (Theophilopoulos, Naziraios, the Byzantinized family Manios of Italian origins). This explains to some extent the preparedness of the Byzantine elite and population to accept Latin rule: the Latin emperors were prepared to give responsibilities in their administrative machinery to both the old aristocracy and to *novi homines*. The old-established elite had no cause to fear for their achievements, whilst opportunities were nonetheless made available to newcomers.

This initially materialistic, pragmatic motivation to accept Latin rule was in the longer run no obstacle to an attitude of loyalty towards a Latin-Byzantine model of collaboration. This is witnessed by the problems experienced by Nicolas Mesarites in 1207 in Constantinople—during a secret mission in the service of Nicaean Emperor Theodore Laskaris—on account of his former friend Jacob Naziraios. As the result of an ineptitude on the part of one of Mesarites' contact persons, news of Mesarites' mission quickly reached the ears of the Latin—in this case Venetian—authorities. It is in this context that Naziraios then compelled Mesarites to leave Constantinople under duress.²²¹ A section of the Byzantine populace was also prepared to accept rapprochement vis-à-vis religion. This is evidenced by a case in 1232 that was recorded in the papal registers. Theodora, a *pauper mulier Constantinopolitana* and, in view of her name, doubtless of Byzantine origin, had left her husband B., a *civis Constantinopolitanus*, because the latter supported heresy and had for years forbidden her to practise her own religion. She brought her case to the papal court with the request that she be awarded part of the matrimonial possessions. Gregorius IX accepted that she was divorcing her husband on the grounds of *fornicatio spiritualis* and

²²⁰ Kazhdan & Ronchey, *L'aristocrazia bizantina*, pp. 210, 260–266, 276. Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations*, p. 141.

²²¹ Mesarites, *Reisebericht*, pp. 43–44.

ordered a number of Latin metropolitan prelates to comply with her request.²²² This case demonstrates how Byzantine citizens turned to the Latin ecclesiastical hierarchy. The fact that the woman in question was able to bring her case before the papal court suggests that she belonged to the moneyed classes, although it seems that at the time of her divorce she found herself in difficult financial circumstances.

This case puts into perspective a number of encyclicals of 1214–1215 and 1223 respectively from the patriarchs of Nicaea to the Byzantine populace and clergy of Constantinople. In them, Theodore II Eirenikos and Germanos II displayed their pleasure concerning the loyalty of the Byzantine populace and clergy in the capital vis-à-vis the Byzantine Church despite all manner of Latin pressure.²²³ The case cited nuances this impression, and shows how some of the population was nevertheless prepared to make religious accommodations with the Latins. Indeed the patriarchal letters mentioned unwillingly bear witness to the same tendency in the concern they express with regard to the Byzantine population vis-à-vis their perseverance in maintaining their orthodox faith. This patriarchal solicitude suggests that some of the Byzantine believers were in danger of drifting off too much towards the Latin side. We should mention here that there is no reason to assume that the preparedness for religious accommodation in some of the Byzantine faithful could not at the same time go hand in hand with a lasting loyal attitude to their own Byzantine religion or with contacts with the Nicaean patriarchate. However, the existence of this group of religious moderates does not alter the fact that at the same time there existed a faction that was not prepared for such accommodation and advocated a hard line. We shall return to the problems surrounding the Latin-Byzantine coexistence at a later stage.²²⁴

CONCLUSION

To a great extent, the Latin emperors retained control over the quarter allotted them by virtue of the distribution agreement of 1204, or at least insofar as this came to fall under Latin rule. Only the region

²²² Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 182.

²²³ Laurent, *Les registres des actes du patriarcat*, I/4, n° 1219, 1233–1234.

²²⁴ See Chapter IV, pp. 239–248, Chapter V, pp. 276–280, 296–304, Chapter VI, pp. 312–334.

of Paphlagonia and a number of peripheral islands in the Aegean Sea escaped this. In comparison with the regional princes, the Latin Emperor's effective control over the imperial core quarter placed at his disposal considerable financial and military means to bring the imperial authority into reality in the empire as a whole. The most important centrifugal factor in respect of the imperial quarter was its location, which can hardly be described as central in relation to the totality of the empire's territories.

The administrative organization of the core quarter was to a great extent inspired by the pre-1204 Byzantine institutional machine, although the source material that supports this postulation is rather fragmentary. Nonetheless we have at our disposal both testimony that in general terms indicates institutional continuity (Gunther of Pairis, for example), and concrete elements that support this generalized evidence (cf. the sigillographic material and the Byzantine administrative titles). We established administrative continuity at metropolitan, provincial and central levels. In addition, there were innovations bearing a clear Western tint, such as the partial feudalization of the core quarter. However, one should not forget that under Byzantine rule in the twelfth century and earlier, experiments were also carried out with institutions comparable with Western fiefs and with seignorial domains. Nevertheless, the relatively limited feudalization of the core quarter and the consequences of the Latin-Byzantine coexistence gave occasion to adjustments in the administration. With this we can posit the installation of, for example, feudal courts and a system of mixed Latin-Byzantine jurisprudence.

The retention of the existing structures has an explanation that is twofold. Firstly, by means of this policy, the Latin take-over of the emperorship and Latin rule in the core quarter could be legitimized in Byzantine eyes. The Byzantine population was not alienated from the new Latin emperor by over-drastic administrative innovations. This was even more so as the local elite remained involved at all echelons of the administration beside the Latin newcomers. Secondly, the Latin emperors doubtless recognized that the centralist Byzantine administrative system could form a sound basis for strong imperial authority within the core quarter, a rationale we had already ascribed to the emperors with regard to their partial adoption of the Byzantine imperial ideology.

CHAPTER FOUR

IMPERIAL AUTHORITY WITHIN THE EMPIRE IN ITS ENTIRETY

The constitutional treaties of 1204–1205 describe rather vaguely the emperor's prerogatives vis-à-vis his vassals outside the imperial quarter. In any case, all the feudatories were obliged to swear an oath of fealty to the emperor and were also obliged to provide a certain measure of military service, which the emperor determined in consultation with the mixed council. In the event of a conflict with one of his vassals the emperor was not entitled to make judgment on the basis of his own authority, this being the prerogative of ad hoc *iudices* who were appointed by the mixed council. Other clauses in the treaties left quite a large amount of licence for imperial initiatives. In this context it was to be the concrete balances of power rather than the basic pacts that were to determine the extent to which effective imperial control or influence could be extended with respect to the feudally dependent territories.¹

THE PARTIAL REORIENTATION OF THE FEUDAL SUPERSTRUCTURE OF THE EMPIRE

By virtue of the distribution treaty or *Partitio* of 1204, the empire beyond the imperial quarter was divided into two large blocks: the Venetian and the non-Venetian territories, which in principle both encompassed 3/8 of the empire's territory. However, the effective conquest and annexation of these territories brought into being a reality that de facto varied profoundly from the provisions stipulated in the distribution treaty. The Latin emperors played a not unimportant role in this. They intervened in the regional or local feudal organization, often flagrantly in contradiction of the original distribution treaty, as is apparent from the following overview of the geopolitical division of the empire.

¹ Cf. Hendrickx, *Le Pouvoir impérial*, p. 111.

We have already mentioned in our discussion of the administration in Constantinople that 3/8 thereof was to belong to the city of Venice, which effectively came to control a quarter of about that size along the Golden Horn.²

By virtue of the *Partitio*, Paphlagonia in Asia Minor, with Herakleia Pontika and Amastris as its most important cities, was part of the imperial quarter. However, as has already been mentioned, the region never fell under direct imperial rule. In 1206 David Komnenos, who had held the region under his control between circa 1204–1205, recognized the imperial suzerainty.³

Venetian Thrace was situated around Arkadioupolis, Mesene, Boulgarophygon, Herakleia, Chalkis, Rhaidestos, Panion, Ganos, Peristasis, Myriophyton, Brachiolon, Hexamilion and Kallipolis. The region fell under the authority of the Venetian podestà in Constantinople.⁴

To the non-Venetian crusaders was granted the region in Thrace around Vrysis, Genna, Pamphylon, Garella, Apros, Kypsella, Rhousion, Bera, Makri, Trajanopolis, Ainos, Sestos and Madytos.⁵ Makri, Trajanapolis and Bera were awarded as fiefdoms in 1204 to Geoffrey of Villehardouin.⁶ In 1219 *baro* Geoffrey of Merry held the city of Ainos as fiefdom.⁷ In a document of 1266, in addition to the baronies of Ainos and Makri, is attested the barony of Madytos.⁸ In this part of Thrace the Latin emperor retained the right to make amendments to the original distribution treaty. It was in this way that in 1205 Regent Henry awarded the city of Apros to the Byzantine magnate Theodore Branais, and as emperor he gave the *castellum* of Garella to the recently founded Order of St Samson shortly before 1210.⁹ A number of localities were even annexed *de facto* in the core quarter. The town of Vrysis, as far as is known not granted as a fief, was such an instance: in 1208 Henry quartered one of his own garrisons there,

² Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration in Latin Constantinople*, pp. 19–79.

³ Niketas Choniates, pp. 639–640. Valenciennes, §551–552.

⁴ Jacoby, *The Venetian Presence*, p. 154, pp. 158–163.

⁵ Carile, *Partitio*, pp. 220–221. Longnon, *Recherches sur la vie de Villehardouin*, n° 83, pp. 201–202.

⁶ Villehardouin, §382.

⁷ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 256, p. 215.

⁸ Buchon, *Recherches et matériaux pour servir à une histoire de la domination française aux XIII^e, XIV^e, XV^e siècles*, I, pp. 28–29.

⁹ Villehardouin, §403. Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 217 (XIII, 17).

and Villehardouin designated the place as *ses castiaus*, together with Salymbria and Vizye, which were part of the core quarter.¹⁰

As is evident from these examples, the emperor to a certain extent claimed a right to have at his command territories that lay outside the imperial quarter. This action could relate either to the allocation of them as fiefdoms or as bringing them under direct imperial control. The explanation for this is twofold. Firstly, the Bulgarian-supported Byzantine uprising in Thrace in 1205–1206, which drastically disrupted the original award of fiefdoms, provided room for initiatives. Secondly, the central elite who together with the emperor mapped out imperial policy, consisted to an important extent of persons, including Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Geoffrey of Merry, whose possessions were situated in non-Venetian Thrace.

Still in Thrace, by virtue of the *Partitio* the city of Adrianople was part of the Venetian part of Thrace and in 1204–1205 was effectively brought under Venetian control. The city of Didymoteichon belonged in principle to the non-Venetian crusaders' section, and in 1204 was granted to Count Hugh IV of Saint-Pol (+ 1205), who took possession of the city. After the Byzantine uprising in 1205–1206, that was centred around these two cities, and the break-up of the Byzantine-Bulgarian alliance, in 1206 Emperor Henry granted the two cities and the surrounding territory to Theodore Branas as a feudal principality under imperial suzerainty, the model for which certainly being the twelfth-century *thema* Adrianople-Didymoteichon. This took place in consultation with the Venetian podestà, but the imperial initiative was decisive and the bond between Branas and the emperor was to eclipse that between Branas and Venice.¹¹ The granting of Didymoteichon took place in a manner analogous to the imperial interference in the rest of non-Venetian Thrace.

Finally, a *ducatus* Philippopolis was created in Thrace, this being based on the similarly named Byzantine *thema*. As far as is known, the region did not figure in the original distribution agreement. In this context, Emperor Baldwin I was able to take the initiative of granting

¹⁰ Valenciennes, §561. Prior to 1204, Vrysis and its surrounding area formed a separate *thema* (Sesan, *Les thèmes byzantins à l'époque des Comnènes et des Anges*, p. 47).

¹¹ Villehardouin, §404–423, 441, 452, 496. Niketas Choniates, pp. 618–633. Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 381. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 169, p. 18.

the region to Renier of Trith, one of his feudatories from the County of Hainaut.¹² The City of Venice was to claim its rights to 3/8 of the territory for a long period without success, only seeing these confirmed circa 1223–1224, when Gerard of Estreux, Lord of Philippopolis, declared himself prepared to recognize the Venetian suzerainty over part of his territory, perhaps in the context of ruler of Epiros Theodore Doukas' succesful advance in Thessaly and Macedonia.¹³

After the fall of Constantinople in 1204 and up to the death of the Bulgarian Tsar Kalojan in 1207, the Rhodopes Mountains in Macedonia, which were not mentioned in the *Partitio* and which had as their most important cities Tzepaina and Melnik, were part of the Bulgarian empire. In the context of the difficult succession in Bulgaria in 1207, Alexios Sthlabos, cousin of the new Bulgarian Tsar Boril, was able to expand this area into an autonomous principality. After Emperor Henry's victory over Boril in 1208 in the area of neighbouring Philoppopolis, Sthlabos recognized his suzerainty. Henry formally granted the Bulgarian prince the Rhodopes region as a dowry in the context of Sthlabos' marriage with the former's natural daughter.¹⁴

By virtue of the *Partitio*, the region around the town of Prosek in Macedonia belonged in part to Venice and in part to the non-Venetian crusaders, but until 1209 escaped Latin control and was to a large extent in the hands of the Bulgarian Prince Strez, brother of Boril, who had taken command of the region after the death of Kalojan in 1207.¹⁵ During an expedition in the Kingdom of Thessalonike in 1208–1209, Emperor Henry was able to bring Strez to recognizing his suzerainty, the imperial initiative thus incorporating this region too into the empire.¹⁶

The Kingdom of Thessalonike was established in 1204 as consolation prize for the losing candidate of the imperial election, Boniface of Montferrat. The kingdom's territorial proportions, as established in 1204 by the distribution commission, are difficult to retrieve, as

¹² Villehardouin, §311. Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens und Serbiens*, p. 27.

¹³ Cessi, *Deliberazioni*, I, n° 69, p. 66. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 257, p. 219.

¹⁴ Valenciennes, §545–549, §555–557. Akropolites, §24. Cf. Adziewski, *Der Despot Aleksj Slav*, pp. 79–92.

¹⁵ Carile, *Partitio*, pp. 217–222. Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens und Serbiens*, pp. 100–106.

¹⁶ Prinzing, *Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs*, p. 411. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, p. 122.

they do not appear in the *Partitio* text that is known to us.¹⁷ In 1204–1205 Marquis Boniface succeeded in bringing southern Macedonia, Thessaly, Beotia, Attica and Euboea under Latin control. However, not all these territories—and in particular the southernmost part of Thessaly and the territories to the south thereof—belonged to the Kingdom of Thessalonike, although the marquis did manage to make them feudally dependent on him.¹⁸

That the southernmost part of Thessaly was not part of the kingdom is apparent from the imperial expedition there in 1209 and from the simultaneous imperial gift of Besaina, Demetrias and the two eponymous cities of Halmyros in southern Thessaly to Boniface's widow Margaret of Hungary, guardian of her son Demetrios of Montferrat, King of Thessalonike, and her children.¹⁹ Zetounion and Ravennika in southern Thessaly fell under the authority of a local imperial

¹⁷ The hypothesis—recently supported by Hendrickx and Pokorny—that the territorial dimensions of the kingdom can be equated with the towns and localities (in southern Macedonia and northern Thessaly) that are missing from the *Partitio*, does not stand up to scrutiny (cf. Hendrickx, *The incorporation of Pieria*, pp. 244–246; Pokorny, *Der territoriale Umfang des lateinischen Königreichs Thessaloniki*, pp. 543–544). For example Berroia, a town near Thessalonike that definitely belonged to the kingdom (Demetrios Chomatenos, *Ponemata Diaphora*, n° 106), is mentioned in the *Partitio*. In addition, in 1213 the Emperor Henry called Berthold of Katzenelnbogen, who was Lord of Velestino in southern Thessaly (Miklosich & Müller, *Acta et Diplomata*, IV, pp. 345–349; Laurent, *Les registres des actes du patriarcat*, I/4, n° 1333), one of his barons in the *regnum Thessalonicense*, implying that Velestino—which probably was a part of the *Provincia Velechative* mentioned in the *Partitio* (cf. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, p. 488; Koder & Hild, *Hellas und Thessalia*, p. 133)—was a part of the kingdom (Prinzing, *Der Brief*, p. 417).

¹⁸ For example Otho of La Roche, Lord of Athens, clearly acted as Boniface's vassal when he served as his messenger announcing the arrival of Boniface's daughter Agnes in Thessalonike to Emperor Henry, who was to marry her (Villehardouin, §450; cf. also: Valenciennes, §681). Also on this matter: Longnon, *Problèmes de l'histoire de la principauté de Morée*, p. 79. Bon, *La Morée Franque*, pp. 53–54. Hendrickx, *Quelques problèmes à la conquête de la Morée*, pp. 385–388. Pokorny, *Der territoriale Umfang des lateinischen Königreichs Thessaloniki*, p. 572.

¹⁹ Valenciennes, §667–670, 678–679. Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 227 (XIII, 34). This imperial gift can be more or less equated with half of the *pertinentia imperatricis* (the other half included Ravennika, Domokos and Pharsalos) mentioned in the *Partitio* from 1204, which as has been seen was probably based on Byzantine fiscal records from September 1203. The empress referred to then must be Margaret of Hungary, who in 1203 was still the wife of emperor Isaac II Angelos (Magdalino, *Thessaly and Epiros in the later middle ages*, p. 97). Most likely these possessions were first regranted to her by her new husband Boniface of Montferrat. After Boniface's death (1207) Margaret probably thought it wise to have these possessions regranted to her by the Latin emperor himself.

representative.²⁰ That the emperor had on his own authority the disposition of fiefdoms in the southernmost part of Thessaly indicates that, from the imperial perspective, this region was not part of the Kingdom of Thessalonike. Kallindos, Domokos, Pharsalos and Velestino seem to have been the southernmost fiefdoms belonging to the kingdom.²¹

However, the choice of Guido Pelavicino, Lord of Bodonitza in Beotia, as regent circa 1218–1221 indicates that the dream of a ‘great Kingdom of Thessalonike’ after Boniface’s death in 1207 was not entirely extinguished. Of course the choice of Pelavicino as regent in itself created no feudal bond between Bodonitza and Thessalonike, but it could be perceived as a first step in that direction.²² Nonetheless, the imperial authorities seem not to have protested. Circa 1219–1221 the imperial court and Emperor Robert worked without problem with the regent on the confirmation of an arrangement concerning the ecclesiastical properties in the kingdom.²³ The successful invasion of the kingdom by Theodore Doukas, which at that time was gradually taking on dramatic proportions, possibly pushed imperial concern about the exact situation concerning feudal relationships in the region into the background. With respect to the more southerly territories—the rest of Beotia, Attica and Euboia—there are indeed no indications that they still maintained feudal links with Thessalonike after 1209, which demonstrates that here the imperial vision certainly did remain intact.

As has been seen, Attica and Beotia stood initially in a feudally unclear relationship vis-à-vis Thessalonike. However, the above-mentioned imperial expedition of 1209 broke the feudal bonds with Thessalonike. The region was later divided into a series of autonomous lordships. By about 1228 three large baronies had grown from this fragmentation: the previously-mentioned marquisate of Bodonitza, the principality

²⁰ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 323–324 (XIII, 136–137).

²¹ Velestino belonged to Berthold of Katzenelnbogen (cf. note 17). Kallindos, Domokos and Pharsalos were in the hands of Amé Pofey, constable of the kingdom and at the same time imperial constable (cf. references in note 83).

²² There is no source material available that supports Haberstumpf’s hypothesis that Bodonitza (or for that matter Corinth) formally was a part of the kingdom (Haberstumpf, *Su alcuni problemi istituzionali*, p. 18). William VI of Monferrat, who had been co-invested with the rights to the kingdom by Emperor Peter of Courtenay in 1217, probably played an instrumental role in appointing the Lombard Pelavicino as regent.

²³ Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, n° 4, p. 300. Cf. Haberstumpf, *Su alcuni problemi riguardanti il marchesato di Bodonitza*, pp. 20–22.

of Athens, which encompassed by far the largest part of the region including the city of Thebes, and the lordship of Salona.²⁴ There is no attestation of any imperial influence in this process of crystallization, but it cannot be ruled out. It is a fact that the Latin emperor did involve himself actively in feudal matters in the region. For example, shortly before 1212, Emperor Henry gave in fief the local, further unidentified *Sanctus Angelus de Saga* monastery to the brothers Albertino and Rolandino of Canossa, at that time Lords of Thebes.²⁵ It seems likely to us that Nicolas of Saint-Omer, scion of one of the viscomital families in the emperor's homeland of Flanders, in the same way circa 1209 acquired possessions in fief near Thebes that had previously belonged to the Knights Templar.²⁶

The island of Euboia was granted to Venice in the *Partitio*. However, as we have seen already, circa 1204–1205 Boniface of Montferrat managed to bring the island under his personal suzerainty, where he installed barons of his choice. Emperor Henry's expedition in the region in 1209 put an end to the feudal bond with the court of Thessalonike. In a treaty negotiated in the years 1209–1210 the then local lord, Ravano dalle Carceri, recognized both imperial and Venetian suzerainty, which was then no longer to be called into question among Ravano's successors.²⁷

By virtue of the distribution agreement, the Peloponnese belonged to Venice. However, in 1204–1205 the entire region—with the exception of a few bastions of Byzantine resistance—was taken possession of by the Champenois Geoffrey I of Villehardouin and William of

²⁴ Cf. Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 4758, 5202, 5304. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, p. 164. Idem, *Les Autremencourt, seigneurs de Salona en Grèce*, pp. 25–26.

²⁵ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 612 (XV, 99).

²⁶ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 331 (XIII, 154). Nicolas, a younger son of William IV, viscount of Saint-Omer, and Ida of Avesnes and attested in his home region until 1208, may have come to Romania following in the wake of his maternal uncle James of Avesnes (on Nicolas: see also Chapter VII, note 112). James, having participated in the Fourth Crusade, had obtained an unspecified fief on Euboia; by August 1205 however he had already deceased (Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 329 (XIII, 146) & col. 331 (XIII, 153); Stefano Magno, *Annali Veneti*, p. 179). There is no source material available that allows one to assume that James acquired the whole of Euboia or the town of Négrepont: Koder, *Negroponte*, p. 45; Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 154). On the confiscation of Templar property in southern Greece by Emperor Henry: cf. Chapter VI, p. 342.

²⁷ Valenciennes, §604, 664, 667–668, 678, 682–686. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 204–205, pp. 89–96. Loenertz, *Les seigneurs tiers de Négrepont*, pp. 235–44. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 239.

Champlitte. Only the two coastal towns of Modon and Koron fell circa 1206–1207 under the administration of governors appointed directly by La Serenissima.²⁸ In early 1209, during his campaign in Thessaly, Emperor Henry at the Parliament of Ravennika recognized Geoffrey I of Villehardouin as the rightful Prince of Achaea. Only afterwards, in June 1209, did Geoffrey also recognize Venetian suzerainty, in an agreement that came into being under imperial supervision, *protoves-tiarios* Cono I of Béthune being present.²⁹

Epiros, which stretched from the town of Naupaktos over Arta to Dyrrachion, was also allocated to Venice in the distribution agreement, but initiatives to take possession of the region were limited to the occupation of the port of Dyrrachion and the neighbouring island of Corfu. The rest of the region came into the hands of the Byzantine magnate Michael I Doukas in the years 1204–1208. In 1209, during Emperor Henry's campaign in the Kingdom of Thessalonike and southern Greece, he decided to recognize the suzerainty of the Latin emperor. Just as Villehardouin in Achaea, Doukas only after that, in 1210, also recognized the Venetian suzerainty.³⁰

In 1217, after Michael's successor Theodore Doukas had captured Dyrrachion from the Venetians, it once again became apparent that the Latin emperor had taken upon himself the right to grant territories outside the imperial quarter in the form of fiefdoms.³¹ The new emperor, Peter of Courtenay had originally agreed with the Venetians that during his journey from Italy to Constantinople, after having been crowned in Rome together with his wife Yolande of Flanders/Hainaut, he would besiege the city of Dyrrachion and return it into their hands. However, at Dyrrachion he entered into an agreement with Theodore

²⁸ Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, p. 86. Gasparis, *The period of Venetian rule on Crete*, p. 239.

²⁹ Valenciennes, §599. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 207, pp. 97–98. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, pp. 72–75, pp. 115–116. BON, *La Morée franque*, pp. 58–71. Ilieva, *Frankish Morea*, pp. 125–141.

³⁰ Valenciennes, §688–694. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 223–224, pp. 119–123. Carile, *Partitio*, pp. 219–220. Stiernon, *Les origines du despotat d'Epire*, pp. 121–122. Loenertz, *Aux origines du despotat d'Epire*, pp. 363–364, p. 377. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros*, pp. 12–13, pp. 29–30.

³¹ On the conquest of Dyrrachion by Theodore Doukas (and not by Michael): Van Tricht, *La politique étrangère de l'empire de Constantinople (1re partie)*, p. 237.

Doukas that left the latter in possession of the city, without further heed to the rights of the Venetians.³²

The island of Crete, which prior to 1204 formed a separate *thema*, does not figure in the text of the *Partitio*. As early as the time of the Fourth Crusade, Emperor Alexios IV Angelos had given the island to the leader of the expedition, Boniface of Montferrat. It is probable that this gift was considered valid after the conquest of Constantinople. After all, in August 1204 Boniface of Montferrat sold his rights to the island of Crete to the city of Venice. None of the documents relating to this transaction indicates that Crete, either via Alexios IV's gift, or via Boniface's sale, would no longer have remained part of the empire.³³ As a consequence, and contrary to the beliefs of a number of earlier authors, the island continued to be part of the empire, and it is not unlikely that the definitive distribution pact of 1204 confirmed the allocation of Crete to Venice.³⁴ In 1207–1212 the city of Venice was able to take effective possession of the island after a successful struggle to drive out her Genoese rival.³⁵ Crete, so distant from Constantinople, was the only region in the empire in which the Latin emperor exerted absolutely no influence on the feudal organization.

Of the Cyclades in the Aegean Sea, only Andros (Venetian) and Tinos (imperial quarter) figure in the *Partitio* text. Saint-Guillain has recently and up to a point convincingly proposed a new chronology for the Latin conquest of this group of islands.³⁶ Previously the widespread view was that the Cyclades were conquered around 1205–1207 under the leadership of the Venetian aristocrat Marco Sanudo on the basis of a passage in the fourteenth-century *Chronica per extensum descripta* by Andreas Dandolo (which was adopted in many later Venetian chronicles), the earliest available source dating the conquest.³⁷

³² Cf. *L'Estoire D'Eracles*, pp. 290–293. Ernoul & Bernard le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 393. *Annales Ceccanenses*, p. 301. Robertus Autissiodorensis, *Chronologia*, pp. 284–285.

³³ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 123, pp. 513–515. Cervellini, *Como i Veneziani acquistarono Creta*, pp. 274–275.

³⁴ Cf. Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean*, p. 152. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, p. 123. Borsari, *Il dominio veneziano a Creta nel XIII secolo*, p. 13.

³⁵ Jacoby, *La colonisation militaire vénitienne de la Crète*, pp. 298–299.

³⁶ Saint-Guillain, *Les conquérants de l'Archipel*, pp. 204–226.

³⁷ Dandolo discusses the conquest under the first year in office of doge Pietro Ziani (August 1205–July 1206) (Andreas Dandolo, *Chronica per extensum descripta*, p. 282).

Saint-Guillain has shown however on the basis of a letter by Michael Choniates that by 1208 the island of Naxos was certainly not in Latin hands, since the former metropolitan of Athens was offered the see of Naxos by the Nicean patriarch Michael IV Autoreianos at that time.³⁸ In addition the author cites a poem by Choniates, entitled *Theano* and datable to the end of 1211 or early 1212, which indicates that seven years before (thus in late 1204 or in 1205) the Latins had tried to subject the Cyclades to their rule. The archipelago however had withstood this attempt and the islands had since then enjoyed a period of relative peace.³⁹ On this basis Saint-Guillain has proposed to situate Marco Sanudo's conquest of the Cyclades around 1213–1214, after his adventure on Crete in 1212.⁴⁰ His hypothesis however does not take into account the fact that Choniates in his poem also states that after the first Latin attempt (1204/1205) had been ward off, the Cyclades in the following years '*did not listen to the haughty Italian obstinacy*'. This suggests that repeated Latin attempts were undertaken to subdue the Cyclades. On the basis of Choniates' testimony we would have to conclude that these were largely unsuccessful, but it is not excluded that a foothold was acquired. It seems indeed rather unlikely to us that Choniates, while writing his poem on the relatively isolated island of Kea, would have been aware of all the latest military developments in the entire Cycladic region. In this way the data provided by Choniates may be reconciled with Dandolo's version of the conquest of the archipelago: attempts at conquest were started from around 1204/1205 onward, but it was only achieved until some years later. Sanudo then was probably involved in these early attempts and by 1212 seems to have had a base of operations in the Cyclades: in that year at the request of the local Venetian duke Jacopo Tiepolo he helped to suppress a Byzantine revolt on Crete, which suggests that by that time he had built himself a power base.⁴¹ Sometime after—or

³⁸ Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, n° 95.

³⁹ Michael Choniates, *Theano*, pp. 386–387, 389. The author states that at the time that he wrote the poem, he had been on the island of Kea for six years. Choniates probably arrived there in the second half of 1205 or in early 1206: in the summer or autumn of 1205 he was in Thessalonike, after which he retired on Kea (Hoeck-Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otrante*, pp. 34–35).

⁴⁰ Saint-Guillain, *Les conquérants de l'Archipel*, pp. 224–225 (see however also note 262 in which the author admits that part of the archipel may have been conquered before 1212).

⁴¹ Andreas Dandolo, *Chronica per extensum descripta*, p. 282. It is hard to understand why Tiepolo would have asked Sanudo to come to his aid, when the latter would

maybe during—the conquest Sanudo chose to seek the recognition of the Latin emperor. Emperor Henry then enfeoffed Sanudo with the *ducatus* of Naxos, to which the major part of the Aegean Cyclades belonged, as the other (later) name for the principality *Agyepelagi*—from *Aigaion Pelagos*—indicates.⁴² Andros, allocated to Venice in the *Partitio*, belonged to the *ducatus*. It was only decades later that the city of Venice was to endeavour to make good its rights to the island.⁴³

The overview presented above shows that the Latin emperors carried out an active policy of intervening in the feudal structures and relationships within the entirety of the empire. In doing so they appropriated the prerogative not only to confer individual fiefdoms in the various regions, but also to adapt the feudal superstructure of the empire at their own discretion, frequently making use of external opportunities

not have had a power base of his own in the surrounding region. Saint-Guillain doubts if Tiepolo ever appealed to Sanudo (attributing this element to Andreas Dandolo's creative reworking of earlier materials) and suggests that Sanudo may have been on Crete from around 1208 onward, basing himself on a passage in the unpublished fourteenth-century chronicle attributed to Enrico Dandolo (Saint-Guillain, *Op. cit.*, pp. 149–150, 202–203). The relevant fragment is however chronologically confused, contains grave factual errors, omits major events—as the author admits—and thus its overall reliability is very questionable. Saint-Guillain also states that Enrico Dandolo situates Sanudo's conquest of the Cyclades after his intervention on Crete (1212), but this seems to be a misinterpretation. Enrico Dandolo mentions Sanudo in the context of his account of the Venetian acquisition of Crete. After having narrated his (in our opinion incorrect) view on Sanudo's part therein, the chronicler seizes the opportunity to add some biographical information on Sanudo, which clearly is not chronologically linked to the Cretan episode. He introduces these biographical facts with the phrase *Di quello mes. Marco Sanudo infinite cose dir se poria* and then mentions that he: 1. was related to doge Enrico Dandolo; 2. participated in the Fourth Crusade; 3. conquered the Cyclades; 4. undertook an expedition against Smyrna; 5. married a sister of the emperor (of Nicaea, it is implied)—this last piece of information seems not very credible in view of the fact on the one hand that the Byzantine court had always been particular about marrying female members of the imperial family to foreign rulers and on the other hand that Sanudo's status was relatively modest; whether the chronicler may have confused the Nicaean emperor with the Latin emperor, cannot be ascertained. Maybe Dandolo refers in a confused way to Marco's successor Angelo Sanudo's (1227–1262) marriage to a daughter of Macaire of Sainte-Mènehould, which was celebrated in the imperial palace in Constantinople during Baldwin II's reign (Marino Sanudo Torsello, *Istoria del Regno di Romania*, p. 115).

⁴² This feudal tie between Marco Sanudo and the Latin emperor is attested in a 1282 charter by Marco II Sanudo: Hopf, *Urkunden und Zusätze zur Geschichte der Insel Andros*, n° 8, p. 243. Cf. Loenertz, *Marino Dandolo, seigneur d'Andros*, p. 168, n. 4. Idem, *Les Ghisi*, pp. 29–30. Koumanoudi, *The Latins in the Aegean after 1204*, pp. 248–263.

⁴³ Loenertz, *Marino Dandolo, seigneur d'Andros*, pp. 171–174.

that presented themselves (for example Geoffrey I of Villehardouin in Achaea, the Doukai in Epiros). This policy is to be found to the greatest extent under Emperor Henry's rule (1206–1216), which is logical in view of the fact that this superstructure was still to come into existence in that period. Emperor Peter (1217–1218) was also active in this field, but such interventions have not been attested for the periods under Empress Yolande (1217–1219) or Emperor Robert (1221–1228). The role played by the emperors in the recognition and consequent legitimization of a series of regional rulers in contradiction of the original distribution agreement of 1204, will certainly have contributed to a strengthening of imperial authority. The imperial legitimization made these feudal princes to a certain extent extra dependent on the emperor in Constantinople.⁴⁴

IMPERIAL REPRESENTATION IN THE FEUDAL PRINCIPALITIES OF THE EMPIRE

Physical representation in the territories outside the core quarter was a second instrument with which the Latin emperors tried to establish their authority with regard to the feudal principalities. An initial strategy was the establishment of imperial garrisons in these territories. It was in this way that in 1204 Emperor Baldwin installed a garrison in Thessalonike, despite the protests of Boniface of Montferrat to whom the city belonged. Later, however, he was obliged to undo this action.⁴⁵ In 1206 Emperor Henry sited a garrison in Adrianople, which belonged to Theodore Branas and which was theoretically in Venetian territory.⁴⁶ The direct reason for this was the Bulgarian threat. In 1208 a garrison was also established in Alexios Sthlabos' principality in the Rhodopes region, with Emperor Henry's bastard brother Eustace of Hainaut as its commander.⁴⁷ The Latin emperor was able to claim this prerogative on the basis of clauses in the basic treaties of March 1204 and October 1205, in which he was given the responsibility of defending the entire empire.⁴⁸ However, the example of Thessalonike

⁴⁴ Cf. Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean*, p. 164.

⁴⁵ Villehardouin, §272–299.

⁴⁶ Ibidem, §452.

⁴⁷ Valenciennes, §549.

⁴⁸ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 160, p. 572.

shows that imperial claims did not always go uncontested. The extent to which imperial garrisons—either temporary or permanent—were established in other regions cannot be ascertained. As far as we can tell, those garrisons that are known to us were not directly involved in the local administration, but their presence nevertheless provided a direct representation of central authority.

A second strategy was the expansion of the imperial domain outside the core quarter and the installation of local bearers of imperial authority in those areas. A first example is the earlier-mentioned town of Vrysis in Thrace, with a second being the region of Zetounion and Ravennika in southern Thessaly. Both of these were originally granted to the Knights Templar by Boniface of Montferrat and a few local Latin lords. Emperor Henry confiscated both circa 1209–1210 in the aftermath of his campaign in the Kingdom of Thessalonike because of the rather too enthusiastic support of the north Italian rebels in the kingdom by the local Templars.⁴⁹ He entrusted their administration to an imperial bailli, possibly Rainerio of Travale, a prominent baron of the Kingdom of Thessalonike.⁵⁰ Some other unnamed localities, which had previously belonged to the Archbishopric of Larissa, appear to have been part of this imperial domain.⁵¹

The source material does not allow us to give a further description of the competencies of the imperial bailli. It is possible that, in addition to the administration of the imperial domains, the safeguarding of the imperial prerogatives in the region and mediation in feudal or other

⁴⁹ Gerland, *Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches*, p. 204. Lock, *The military orders in mainland Greece*, pp. 334–335.

⁵⁰ In October 1210 Rainerio of Travale is cited without title as administrator of Zetounion and Ravennika in the name of the emperor to the prejudice of the Knights Templar (Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 323–324 (XIII, 136–137)). He is probably the same person who in July 1210 was designated explicitly in the same region as *balivus imperatoris* by Innocent III, in connection with a conflict concerning church ownership in the Bishopric of Gardiki (Ibidem, col. 298 (XIII, 102) and col. 301 (XIII, 109)). In our opinion the earlier view that the bailli can be identified as Berthold of Katzenelnbogen, Lord of Velestino, is incorrect. This postulation is based on two consecutive mentions of the *dominus de Valestino* and the *balivus imperatoris* in two papal letters. However, this is no more than a coincidence. In each of these letters a series of persons is enumerated, either by name, by their title or by their domain, but not by a combination of a number of elements. Indeed in other contemporaneous letters the Lord of Velestino is mentioned without reference of the title of imperial bailli (Ibidem, col. 298 (XIII, 102); col. 300 (XIII, 105); col. 301 (XIII, 109)). Additionally, in a letter of 1213, Emperor Henry refers to Berthold only as one of his barons in the Kingdom of Thessalonike, not as his bailli (Prinzinger, *Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs*, p. 414).

⁵¹ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 297 (XIII, 100).

conflicts were also part of his duties. Zetounion and Ravennika were in any event strategically situated, central with respect to the Kingdom of Thessalonike, the Principality of Epiros, and the southern Greek principalities and baronies. Nothing is known of the possible installation of imperial bailliz in other parts of the empire. Until their conquest circa 1220 by Theodore Doukas, ruler of Epiros, Ravennika and Zetounion probably remained in imperial hands. In 1259 Emperor Baldwin II of Courtenay gave an unnamed territory (*terra*) to William II of Villehardouin, Prince of Achaea. Longnon identified this gift hypothetically with land lying somewhere to the north of Bodonitza and Salona, between Larissa and Naupaktos.⁵² The similarity as regards its geographical location suggests that this refers to the imperial domain in southern Thessaly already discussed, the claims to which the Latin emperors thus seem to have retained until 1259.

A third strategy with regard to imperial representation in the feudal principalities was the appointment of vassals as imperial agents. It was in this way that in 1212 a number of barons from the Kingdom of Thessalonike, the rightful king of which was the then minor Demetrios of Montferrat, received the assignment to organize the defence of the region. In the imperial missive concerning this, Henry's previously mentioned bastard brother Eustace of Hainaut and Berthold of Katzenelnbogen—in 1208–1209 a loyal imperial vassal during the combat against the so-called Lombard rebellion and later the right-hand man of Margaret of Hungary, guardian of her son King Demetrios—were mentioned by name.⁵³ In this context it is not improbable that imperial influence also played a part in Berthold's appointment as regent of the kingdom—he is attested as being in this position in 1217.⁵⁴ It was the extraordinary situation created by the minority of Demetrios, that Henry seized upon to intervene in the kingdom's policy.

⁵² Longnon, *Le rattachement de la Principauté de Morée au Royaume de Sicile*, p. 142.

⁵³ Prinzing, *Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs*, p. 414, 417. Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 595 (XV, 71); col. 456 (XIV, 94). In connection with the emperor's good relationship with Berthold and with other German barons such as Wierich of Daun, Lord of Kitros (cf. also notes 134 and 336) it is interesting to note that in July 1203 in the context of the confrontation with Emperor Alexios III before the walls of Constantinople Henry had commanded *le tierche batalle* which included the German crusader contingent (De Clari, §46–47).

⁵⁴ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 526.

Eustace of Hainaut, who in all probability also gained fiefdoms in the region via his brother, must de facto have held a position as imperial viceroy in Thessalonike.⁵⁵ At the same time, Eustace possessed sizeable fiefdoms in Epiros, as a consequence of the marriage arranged by his brother to a daughter of Michael I Doukas, ruler of Epiros.⁵⁶ There too it must have been the intention that Eustace acted as representative of the central authority in Constantinople. In a way, the ruler of the Kingdom of Thessalonike could himself also be seen as an imperial representative from 1209 onwards. In consultation with guardian Margaret of Hungary, Emperor Henry then proceeded personally to crown the minor Demetrios as king.⁵⁷ The establishment of an imperial right of coronation created an additional dependence of the ruler of Thessalonike.

With Peter of Courtenay the policy of appointing imperial agents in Thessalonike was not continued. The option of also investing Demetrios' adult and consequently autonomously operating half-brother William VI of Montferrat with the rights to the Kingdom of Thessalonike in 1217, which did not represent an absolute political necessity, can be interpreted as a choice of the central authority to interfere less in the feudal principality. Active intervention in the kingdom now became less evident. The coincidental and simultaneous disappearance of Eustace of Hainaut and Berthold of Katzenelnbogen from the political stage in Thessalonike in the same years must have strengthened this decentralizing tendency.⁵⁸

The paragraphs above make it clear that the expansion of a representation of central authority in the various imperial territories was principally the work of the first two Latin emperors, Baldwin and his

⁵⁵ Perhaps there was a connection between Eustace's fiefdoms and the dowry that Emperor Henry must have gained as the result of his marriage in 1207 to Agnes of Montferrat, daughter of Boniface. Cf. Villehardouin, §450, 458.

⁵⁶ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 353 (XIII, 184).

⁵⁷ Valenciennes, §605.

⁵⁸ Eustace of Hainaut probably perished during Emperor Peter of Courtenay's dramatic march through Epiros in 1217. The last mention of Eustace dates from April 1217, when he was present in Rome at Peter and Yolande's imperial coronation (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 249, p. 195). Berthold of Katzenelnbogen no longer appears in the source material after 1217. His nephew Count Diether IV of Katzenelnbogen visited Thessalonike circa 1220 on his return from Syria. It remains unclear whether his intention was to visit his uncle or to present a claim to his inheritance. In 1222 Diether is again attested in his home region (Todt, *Graf Berthold II. Von Katzenelnbogen (vor 1183—nach 1217) im ägäischen Raum und im Nahen Osten*, pp. 84–85).

brother Henry. The Byzantine heritage, of which these emperors were duly conscious, must have been a powerful stimulus in this. However, the strategies pursued were not really consistent and displayed an ad hoc nature that lacked firm institutional foundations. One principality would see the installation of a garrison, permanent or otherwise, in another a close family member would be brought in as a local baron, and in yet another there was the possibility of installing an imperial bailli. In short, the emperor made use of the opportunities offered by the local political context and balances of power.

The provision of the treaty of October 1205 that the emperor should take all measures necessary to *manutenere* the empire, lent a certain legitimacy to the initiatives discussed. An additional factor that supported the idea of legitimacy was that the emperor operated in constant consultation with his barons. As we shall demonstrate in the next chapter, the barons in the imperial entourage who took part in determining imperial policy were however by no means a geographically speaking representative sample of the empire's ruling elite. In this sense the imperial policy was in contradiction of the concept expressed in the treaty of October 1205 that the mixed council should map out imperial policy.

Apart from the ad hoc nature of the imperial initiatives, in any event the number of direct imperial representatives whom we are informed about remained limited, and numerous regions continued to be without a representative appointed by the imperial authorities (including Achaea, Euboea, the Cyclades, Crete, Paphlagonia and Prosek). Nonetheless, the initiatives taken under Baldwin and Henry were sufficient to form a basis for the expansion of greater imperial authority over the empire. However, their successors did not pursue the same vigorous policy. On the contrary; in Thessalonike for example, the influence of central authority was scaled down on Emperor Peter's own initiative. In Zetounion-Ravennika the imperial bailli probably remained in his post, but there is no trace of an expansion of the number of baillis.

THE IMPERIAL COURT HIERARCHY AND THE IMPERIAL POLICY ON MARITAL ALLIANCE

By means of granting titles from the hierarchy of the imperial court and entering into marital alliances, the Latin emperors created personal bonds with their prominent vassals, which served to strengthen

the position of the imperial authority with regard to the feudal principalities. In addition, the creation of a supraregional imperial aristocracy could, by means of the measures mentioned, contribute to a feeling of political unity.

Apart from Doge Enrico Dandolo's title, which we shall discuss at a later stage, the first court titles were not attested until October 1205, under Henry's regency.⁵⁹ They were awarded to a number of important barons from the region around Constantinople whose fiefdoms lay in non-Venetian Thrace and probably also partially in the core quarter. In this manner, Cono I of Béthune was *protovestiarios* (or in the Latin version *protocamerarius*), Geoffrey of Villehardouin marshal, Manasses of l'Isle *major cocus*, Macaire of Sainte-Mènehould *panetarius*, and Milon le Bréban *buticularius*.⁶⁰ According to Hendrickx, the award of these titles was the work of the distribution commission, brought into being by virtue of the treaty of March 1204, whose competency it was not only to grant the *feuda*, but also the *honorificentiae*, which the author interprets as being these court titles. The titles, together with the fiefdoms, would have been allocated incirca October 1204.⁶¹ However, various objections can be raised to this hypothesis. Firstly, in February 1205 the personages named acted as witnesses to a number of imperial charters, but without mention of a court title. With regard to Geoffrey of Villehardouin, only his title of Marshal of Champagne is mentioned.⁶² Secondly, it is strange that the distribution commission, which was supposed to represent the interests of the entire crusading army, would only have awarded such court titles to persons from the imperial entourage, from the region around Constantinople. We assume therefore that the court titles mentioned were not granted

⁵⁹ The postulation that Hugh IV of Saint-Pol (+ spring 1205) was constable of the empire is unfounded (cf. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 197; Villehardouin, §335).

⁶⁰ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 160, p. 574. In a 1212 charter relating to a gift in his home region, Cono I of Béthune refers to himself as *protocamerarius*, clearly a translation of his Greek title (Warlop, *The Flemish Nobility before 1300*, II/1, p. 667).

⁶¹ Hendrickx, *La cour et les dignitaires*, pp. 192–194. Idem, *Le contrat féodal*, pp. 234–235.

⁶² Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 280, p. 614; n° 281, p. 616; n° 282, p. 619; n° 283, p. 621; n° 284, p. 623. Hendrickx is aware of this, but is unable to provide a plausible explanation. The fact that in his chronicle Geoffrey of Villehardouin refers to himself for the first time as marshal of the empire in a passage relating to the end of 1204 is not a convincing argument for the postulation that he effectively bore this title from that time onwards (cf. Hendrickx, *La cour et les dignitaires*, p. 192; Villehardouin, §325).

until after February 1205 and prior to October 1205 without reference to the distribution commission, either at the initiative of Emperor Baldwin, who on 14 April 1205 disappeared into Bulgarian captivity, or at the initiative of his brother, Regent Henry.

In addition to the court officials named above, by the end of 1205 Thierry of Looz is attested as seneschal and Thierry of Tenremonde as constable, both also barons from the region round Constantinople.⁶³ This time Hendrickx also assumes that these titles, in his opinion awarded later, were the work of the emperor.⁶⁴ In later years the previously mentioned Cono I of Béthune bore the title of *sebastokrator* (1219), which represented a promotion vis-à-vis his first title.⁶⁵ Nicolas of Mainvault, baron from the area of the capital, is known as a marshal in 1221.⁶⁶ In 1228 Narjot of Toucy, related to the imperial house of Courtenay, bore the title of *kaisar*.⁶⁷ To this summary of the dignitaries who bore court titles and who came from the area of Constantinople we can also add the names of Alexios and Isaac Laskaris, each of them *sebastokrator*.⁶⁸ They received their titles in the Nicaean Empire because of the position of their brother Emperor Theodore I Laskaris. However, in 1222 they fled to Latin Constantinople, where they played important political roles and possibly retained their titles in the court hierarchy.

During Emperor Baldwin I's reign, Doge Enrico Dandolo († June 1205) was awarded the title of *despotes*, with the exception of the emperorship itself, the highest rank in the Byzantine court hierarchy.⁶⁹ Who awarded him this title and when this took place is not mentioned in the source in question—Akropolites' chronicle. However, in view of the fact that in our opinion the distribution commission did not grant a single court title, it could possibly be assumed that this was the result of an imperial initiative in the context of the crucial posi-

⁶³ Villehardouin, §402.

⁶⁴ Hendrickx, *La cour et les dignitaires*, p. 194.

⁶⁵ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 256, p. 214.

⁶⁶ Philippe Mouskes, p. 409.

⁶⁷ Cessi, *Deliberazioni*, I, n° 140, p. 209. In 1219 he acts as a witness to a charter, still without mention of a title (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 256, p. 215). Cf. also note 80.

⁶⁸ Akropolites, §22.

⁶⁹ Akropolites, §8. Cf. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, pp. 148–149. Guiland, *Le despote*, pp. 52–89.

tion taken by Venice and her doge in the early phase of the empire. More specifically, it was clear that Dandolo had played a decisive role in Baldwin's election as emperor rather than Boniface of Montferrat, which could have led the emperor to awarding an extraordinary token of recognition.⁷⁰

In 1219 Jacopo Tiepolo (1219–1221), as the first Venetian podestà, bore the imperial court title of *despotes imperii Romanie*.⁷¹ Jacoby is of the opinion that the podestà assumed this title independently, without imperial intervention.⁷² However, Tiepolo was also referred to with the title of *despotes* in regent Cono of Béthune's charter confirming the basic treaties of the empire in 1219, in which Cono acted as author of the document in question.⁷³ It would seem unlikely that such a document would contain a court title usurped by Tiepolo. In addition, Jacoby's view does not explain either why Tiepolo's predecessors as podestà, nor Enrico Dandolo's successors as doge, would not have chosen to use the prestigious title.⁷⁴ The first Venetian podestà in particular, Marino Zeno (1205–1207), who nevertheless allotted to himself a number of imperial prerogatives and who claimed for himself the scarcely modest title of *Dei gratia Venetorum potestas in Romania ejusdemque imperii quarte partis et dimidie dominator*, a title which he a short time later had to relinquish to the doge himself, would not have neglected to usurp the court title of *despotes* if he had seen the opportunity.⁷⁵ What is remarkable in this respect is that in the

⁷⁰ Longnon, *L'empire latin*, p. 50. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, p. 75. Cf. Marin, *The Venetian "Empire" in the East*, pp. 185–214. Cf. Chapter I, p. 46.

⁷¹ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 256–257, pp. 214–216. Neither of the previous podestàs who are known to be authors of charters, Marino Zeno (1205–1207) and Ottaviano Quirino (1207–1209), ever refer to themselves as *despotes* (Wolff, *The Oath of the Venetian podestà*, p. 559).

⁷² Jacoby, *The Venetian Presence*, p. 148. Cf. Marin, "*Dominus quartae partis et dimidiaie totius Imperii Romaniae*", pp. 123–124. Jacoby and Marin view the Greek title *despotes* incorrectly as the equivalent of the Latin *dominator* in the title of the doge (*quartae partis et dimidiaie totius imperii Romaniae dominator*). In a number of charters the podestà uses both titles at the same time (Jacopo Tiepolo in 1219: Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 252, p. 205).

⁷³ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 256.

⁷⁴ Neither of the previous podestàs who are known to be authors of charters, Marino Zeno (1205–1207) and Ottaviano Quirino (1207–1209), ever refer to themselves as *despotes* (Wolff, *The Oath of the Venetian podestà*, p. 559; Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, pp. 67–68).

⁷⁵ The imperial prerogatives that Zeno allotted to himself: firstly, just as Regent Henry, he signed the basic agreement of October 1205 with the *menologema* in red ink (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 160, p. 574); secondly, he wore a single purple

years after Zeno there are no more known instances of the usurpation of imperial prerogatives by the podestà. There is attestation of Zeno's use of these prerogatives only in the second half of 1205, when no effective imperial authority existed during the regency of Henry of Flanders/Hainaut in the context of Emperor Baldwin's Bulgarian imprisonment.

A more convincing hypothesis concerning the acquisition of the title of *despotes* by Tiepolo is, in our opinion, that Empress Yolande (1217–1219) granted this to him. The increasingly difficult position of the empire incirca 1219, with the advance of Theodore Doukas of Epiros against the Kingdom of Thessalonike, can have moved the imperial powers to assure themselves of the loyalty and support of the podestà and the Venetian community in the empire through the award of a prestigious title. It is known of one of the recorded successors of Tiepolo in the period studied, Marino Storlato (1222–1223), that he also used this title.⁷⁶ It is possible that circa 1219 the title *despotes* evolved to the customary, but nevertheless not automatically granted title by the emperor to the podestà, with as example the title that Doge Enrico Dandolo incirca 1204–1205 had borne.⁷⁷ In this way the Byzantine tradition of granting the doge a title in the court hierarchy was continued by the Latin emperors with respect to the podestàs.⁷⁸

In 1206 Theodore Branas, ruler of Didymoteichon and Adrianople, was granted the important Byzantine title of *kaisar*, probably at the

kampagion or boot, a privilege of the emperor, who himself however wore two *kampagia* (*Venetiarum Historia Vulgo Petro Iustiniano Filio Adiudicata*, p. 145; Jacoby, *The Venetian Presence*, pp. 148–149).

⁷⁶ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 257, pp. 253–254. It is known that a number of later podestàs also bore the title: Egidio Quirino in a 1247 oorkonde charter/document (Tisserant, *La légation en Orient du Franciscain Dominique d'Aragon*, p. 340). Marco Gausoni in a notarial act drawn up in 1251 in Constantinople (ASV, Archivio Diplomatico, B. 14 (Arch. Fam. Venier dei SS. Apostoli)). Antonio Soranzo bears the title in a oorkonde charter/document that he promulgated/issued in Constantinople in 1253 (ASV, Cancellaria Inferiore, Notai, B. 8).

⁷⁷ In this context it is remarkable that in a 1221 oorkonde charter/document by Emperor Robert, Podestà Marino Michiel is not referred to as despot despite his elaborate title: *Marinus Michaelis qui in parte illustrissimi domini nostri ducis Veneciarum que est in Romania et in eadem quarta parte et dimidia tocius eiusdem imperii vicem eiusdem domini ducis Veneciarum rector* (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 260, p. 227). Apparently Michiel did not hold the title of *despotes* at that time.

⁷⁸ For example, the title of *protosebastos* was awarded by the Byzantine emperor to Enrico Dandolo prior to 1204 (Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, p. 123; Pertusi, *Venezia e Bisanzio 1000–1204*, p. 5).

same time as his award of the fiefdom of that region by Emperor Henry.⁷⁹ Branas was married to Agnes, daughter of the French King Louis VII and widow of emperor Andronikos I Komnenos. In this way he was allied to the French royal house, which in turn was related to the imperial families of Flanders-Hainaut and Courtenay. It is possible that Branas' successor and probable son-in-law, Baldwin of Béthune, son of *protovestiarios* and later *sebastokrator* Cono I, also bore the title of *kaisar*. The martyrology of Choques Abbey in his home region refers to him as *rex Adronopoli*, perhaps an imperfect Latin translation of the title *kaisar*, in view of the fact that no other source ever refers to the principality in question as a kingdom.⁸⁰

The same Emperor Henry granted Alexios Sthlabos, ruler of the Rhodopes region, the title of *despotes*. It is probable that Henry awarded this title because of Alexios's marriage to his natural daughter in 1208.⁸¹ The title was used in this instance—as against that of the doge and the Venetian podestà—in a context similar to that of Byzantium prior to 1204, namely as the title for an imperial son-in law. In Melnik, Sthlabos' capital from circa 1215–1218, an early 13th-century inscription in the St Nicholas Church mentions an aristocrat of Bulgarian origins with the title of *sebastos ton Phraggon*.⁸² Despite the fact that the precise position of this figure cannot be discovered, the mention of the term *Phraggon* suggests a link with imperial authority, of which he might have been a local representative.

In the Kingdom of Thessalonike, prior to August 1208 and after the death of the previous constable Thierry of Tenremonde in early 1206, Henry awarded the title of imperial constable by way of fief to

⁷⁹ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 169, p. 18.

⁸⁰ Duchesne, *Histoire généalogique de la maison de Béthune*, Paris, 1639, Preuves, p. 76. Branas was the hereditary ruler of Adrianople and Didymoteichon (Villehardouin, §404–423; Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 169, pp. 18–19), which implies that Baldwin must have inherited Adrianople from him. It is certain that Branas gave one daughter in marriage to the Constantinopolitan Baron Narjot I of Toucy, who in 1228 is attested as holding the title of *kaisar* after the example of his father-in-law (Longnon, *Les Toucy en Orient*, pp. 33–43). The fact that Baldwin of Béthune succeeded Branas in Adrianople has escaped Hendrickx' attention (Hendrickx, *Some notes on the "state" of Theodoros Branas*, p. 126). Whether Baldwin also succeeded in Didymoteichon can not be ascertained. Possibly Narjot I of Toucy inherited this fiefdom.

⁸¹ Akropolites, §24.

⁸² Dujcev, *Melnik au Moyen Âge*, pp. 35–36. Vlachos, *Die Geschichte des byzantinischen Stadt Melenikon*, p. 39. Nicol, *Refugees, mixed population and local patriotism*, p. 28. A number of Latin coins were also found in the same church (Milanova, *Enterrement dans l'église Saint-Nicolas à Melnik*, pp. 65–67).

Amé Pofey, who was already constable of Thessalonike. It is interesting to note that Pofey in his only known charter (1208) as baron of the Latin empire refers to himself exclusively as *totius Romanie magnus conestabilis*, not mentioning the substantial fiefdoms whereof he was lord or his Thessalonikan constable title.⁸³ The award has to be viewed within the context of the rapprochement between the courts of Thessalonike and Constantinople in 1207, in which the marriage between the emperor and Agnes of Montferrat, daughter of Marquis Boniface, was also an element.⁸⁴ In the same kingdom, Isaac Kokkalas, a prominent landowner in the neighbourhood of Thessalonike, called himself in a 1217 charter imperial *pansebastos sebastos*, a title below the rank of *kaisar* in the Byzantine court hierarchy.⁸⁵ In 1223 we encounter in Thessaly the local magnate Taronas as *parakoimomenos*, another prestigious title in the Byzantine court hierarchy.⁸⁶ Finally, circa 1217–1224 the Empress Yolande or the Emperor Robert probably concluded a marital alliance by which she or he promised her granddaughter respectively his niece Mathilde of Courtenay to John Angelos, son of Margaret of Hungary, mother of King Demetrios of Thessalonike, and Isaac II Angelos.⁸⁷

Circa 1209–1210 Emperor Henry arranged the marriage of his bastard brother Eustace of Hainaut to a daughter of Michael I Doukas,

⁸³ Valenciennes, §671. Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1433 (XI, 114), col. 1435 (XI, 119), col. 1471 (XI, 160); CCXVI, col. 323 (XIII, 136). Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 48, pp. 73–75. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 218. Blondel, *Amédée Pofey de Cologny, grand-connétable de Romanie*, p. 177. See also note 332.

⁸⁴ Villehardouin, §450.

⁸⁵ Miklosich & Müller, *Acta et Diplomata*, III, pp. 237–239. Moreover, Kokkalas referred to himself as *doulos*—or servant and subject—of the *basileus*. Cf. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 181–183.

⁸⁶ Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Noctes Petropolitanae*, n° 27, pp. 288–289. Lambropoulos, *Ioannis Apocaukos*, n° 89, p. 229. Magdalino, *Between Romaniae: Thessaly and Epiros*, pp. 100–101. Taronas was taken prisoner by Theodore Doukas, ruler of Epiros, in the context of his offensive against the kingdom of Thessalonike.

⁸⁷ On this marriage alliance: McDaniel, *On Hungarian-Serbian relations in the thirteenth century: John Angelos and Queen Jelena*, pp. 43–44. McDaniel's dating circa 1234–1235—'one possibility based upon circumstantial evidence'—to us would seem too late. In these years a marital alliance with Angelos, who had left for Hungary (some time before January 1227, cf. a papal letter published in: Tautu, *Margherita di Ungheria*, p. 77, note 64) and who was through his mother a nephew of King Andrew II, offered little political advantage. Mathilde was probably born around 1210, the year wherein her mother Margaret and her first husband Raoul III of Issoudun (†1215) married, so she must have reached the marriageable age around 1222 (cf. also DE WALQUE, *Les comtes et marquis de Namur, seigneurs de Courtenay*, pp. 24, 48–49). Nothing however excludes that she was promised in marriage before that time.

ruler of Epiros.⁸⁸ However, as far as is known, Doukas did not bear a title from the imperial court hierarchy. In Doukas' contract of fiefdom with Venice dated June 1210 he referred only to the title that his father, *sebastokrator* John Doukas, had borne.⁸⁹

Finally, with regard to the Peloponnese, in 1209 Emperor Henry gave the rank of seneschal in fief to Geoffrey I of Villehardouin, Prince of Achaea.⁹⁰ Furthermore, in 1217 Empress Yolande arranged the marriage of her daughter Agnes of Courtenay to Geoffrey I's oldest son and heir Geoffrey II of Villehardouin.⁹¹ Geoffrey II did not inherit the title of seneschal automatically but, just as his father, was awarded it by the emperor. Between 1225 and 1227 Geoffrey II succeeded his father. In the latter year he is attested as issuer of a charter with only the title of Prince of Achaea, without the title of seneschal that his father used in all his charters. This indicates that Geoffrey did not automatically inherit the title. It is possible that Emperor Robert gave the title to Geoffrey II during his visit to Achaea in 1227. In any event, from 1237—date of his next known charter—Geoffrey II used the title in charters.⁹²

An initial and remarkable characteristic of the imperial court hierarchy is its mixed Latin-Byzantine character. The Latin titles—those of chamberlain, marshal, seneschal, constable, cook, baker, cup-bearer—correspond to the traditional West-European court offices.⁹³ These titles, to which originally actual and well-described functions were linked, were purely honorary titles in the Latin empire, as was generally the case in the West at the beginning of the thirteenth century. For example, figures such as Cono I of Béthune, Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Milo II le Bréban, members of the close imperial entourage, fulfilled diplomatic and military missions of diverse natures, which had no connection with the functions originally connected with the titles

⁸⁸ Valenciennes, §693–694.

⁸⁹ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 223, p. 119.

⁹⁰ Valenciennes, §670. About this time the former seneschal Thierry of Looz had either died or had returned to his home territory (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 246).

⁹¹ Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 392.

⁹² Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 40. Strehlke, *Tabulae Ordinis Theutonici*, n° 133. Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 395.

⁹³ Lot-Fawtier, *Histoire des institutions françaises au moyen âge. II: Institutions royales*, pp. 48–67. WARLOP, *The Flemish Nobility before 1300*, I/1, p. 156, 230.

they bore. It is not surprising that the dignitaries who bore a similar, Western-inspired court title were without exception of Latin origin.

The example of Cono I of Béthune, who in the basic agreement of October 1205 was designated with the Byzantine title *protovestiarios* and who in 1212 in a charter destined for his home region used the Latin equivalent *protocamerarius* as title, demonstrates that Western court titles could be integrated within the Byzantine court hierarchy which, as regards meaning, had similar titles, and suggests that a number of Latin barons bore bilingual titles, the use of which in charters for example, was dependent on the addressee in question. It is probable that Geoffrey of Villehardouin also used such a title. It is in this way that in his chronicle, Niketas Choniates refers to Villehardouin as *mariskalkos*, equating this title explicitly with the Byzantine title *protostrator*.⁹⁴ We find a third instance concerning double titles in the Greek version of the fourteenth-century Chronicle of Morea, in which Geoffrey I of Villehardouin, nephew of the marshal, is designated as *megas domestikos*, a title that as regards meaning corresponded to that of seneschal and which was possibly used as the Byzantine equivalent thereof. A 1259 Venetian charter designates Prince William II as *magnus senescallus imperii Romanie*, which appears to allude to the Byzantine title of *megas domestikos*.⁹⁵ On the basis of an analogy as to the description of the function we can also suggest hypothetically the double titles *buticularius*—*epi tou kerasmatos*, *major cocus*—*epi tes trapezes*, and constable—(*megas*) *konostablos* (cf. Amé Pofey styling himself as *magnus conestabilis*).⁹⁶ The implementation of new—in this case Western or bilingual—titles into court hierarchy was not without precedents. For example, at the end of the eleventh and in the course

⁹⁴ Niketas Choniates, p. 600. The much later Greek version of the Chronicle of Morea uses the term *protostratoras* as the Greek equivalent for the Western title of marshal (*The Chronicle Of Morea*, v. 163). Originally, both titles signified a responsibility with regard to the royal stables (Longnon, *Recherches sur la vie de Villehardouin*, pp. 50–51. Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, II, p. 487, p. 496).

⁹⁵ *The Chronicle Of Morea*, v. 2606. (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, III, n° 339, p. 26). In 1262 William was granted the title of *megas domestikos* by Emperor Michael VIII Paleologos in the context of the peace that was then being concluded between both rulers (Pachymeres, I, §31).

⁹⁶ Cf. Blum, *Georgios Akropolites (1217–1282)*. *Die Chronik*, p. 252, 255. The *konostaulos* appears in the eleventh-twelfth century Byzantine court hierarchy; the title of *megas konostaulos* is attested from the mid-thirteenth century onward.

of the twelfth century the Komnenian emperors drastically innovated the court titles that were until then customary.⁹⁷

In addition to the purely Western and the Latin-Byzantine double titles, we also know of a series of purely Byzantine titles. These were borne by both Latin and Byzantine barons. As the above-mentioned equivalents have already demonstrated, the Latin emperors and their entourage understood very well the meaning of these, and the awarding of them was well thought out. This is apparent, for example, from the finding that the highest titles of *despotes*, *sebastokrator* and *kaisar* remained the prerogative of relatives of the imperial family, as also was customary prior to 1204. The only exception to this was the Venetian *podestà*, whose position in the empire was unique. In view of the limited material available, the extent to which the order of ranking within the imperial court hierarchy continued cannot be ascertained. However, it certainly did continue to a certain extent, as is apparent from the promotion gained by Cono of Béthune between 1205 and 1219, from *protovestiarios* to *sebastokrator*.

A second interesting characteristic vis-à-vis the court hierarchy is that during the early years of the empire (1204–1205) titles were awarded exclusively to barons who possessed fiefdoms in the region around Constantinople and who were part of the direct imperial entourage. However, the realization must have grown at court that awarding such titles could strengthen the loyalty of the lords and barons in the various regions of the empire with regard to the imperial authority. This evolution can be seen against the background of the disastrous Byzantine uprising in Thrace, which made the necessity for harmony between the various parts of the empire and population groups a matter of urgency. Consequently, from 1206, Latin and Byzantine lords and barons from the different regions of the empire were included within the court hierarchy. Other feudal princes were also linked to the imperial court via marital alliances. However, a number of regions remained outside this network of personal bonds with the imperial court, including the *ducatus* of Naxos (see however note 41), Crete, and Attica and Beotia (see however note 26). A possible explanation for this is that the emperor forged personal alliances with on one side the most prominent feudal princes and on the other with lords and barons whose territories were strategically situated. The status of the

⁹⁷ Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 180–184.

lords and barons in Attica, Beotia and the *ducatus* of Naxos was in any event relatively modest, and their territories lay wedged between the territories of rulers with whom the emperor did enter into personal alliances. In addition there was an imperial representative in the nearby imperial barony of Zetounion-Ravennika.

Not only the princes of large feudal principalities or the direct imperial entourage were granted prestigious court titles. In the Kingdom of Thessalonike in particular, local lords were granted a place within the imperial court hierarchy. Belonging to this category was also Imperial Chancellor and Archbishop of Thessalonike Warin, who resided in that city and never effectively exercised the office of chancellor. In this way the Latin emperor was able to form direct bonds with local figures from the feudal principalities. By means of these personal bonds he could hope to build up local loyalty vis-à-vis the imperial authority. Broadly speaking, this strategy of personal and direct bonds with the leading feudal princes and local barons is reminiscent of the analogous twelfth-century policy of the Komnenoi to ally the great aristocratic families of the empire to the imperial *genos* (lineage) and *oikos* (house).⁹⁸

A last conclusion regarding the court hierarchy is that in this period the emperors to a great extent maintained control of the allocation of court titles, although there was—under Western influence—a tendency towards heredity, which was connected with the fact that a number of titles were given in fief.⁹⁹ A factor that worked to the advantage of this imperial control was that initially many of the barons did not have any direct family members in the empire. The titles that became available of, for example, seneschal Thierry of Looz and constable Thierry of Tenremonde could as a consequence be awarded without a problem to other barons, and even if there were family members present, this did not mean that they necessarily inherited a title. In this way Nicolas of Mainvault succeeded Geoffrey of Villehardouin, who died circa 1218, as marshal and not the grandson of Villehardouin Geoffrey of Merry, although he did arrive in the empire before Mainvault.¹⁰⁰ Geoffrey II of Villehardouin did not automatically succeed his father as seneschal,

⁹⁸ Ibidem, pp. 186–187.

⁹⁹ Hendrickx, *Le contrat féodal*, p. 230.

¹⁰⁰ Geoffrey of Merry in 1219: Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 256, p. 215. In 1220, Nicolas of Mainvault was still in his home region: De Smet, *Cartulaire de l'Abbaye de Cambron*, n° 46, p. 689.

although in this case heredity clearly played a part in the award of the title by the emperor. We also see this criterion in the case of *kaisar* Narjot of Toucy, who married a daughter of *kaisar* Theodore Branas.¹⁰¹ That heredity was however no decisive element is illustrated by the case of Cono I of Béthune. In the course of his career, Cono followed a *cursus honorum* and used a succession of different titles, which suggests that the titles he used were apparently not linked irrevocably to his person—or by extension to his family.

THE FEUDAL OATH OF ALLEGIANCE AND MILITARY SERVICE AS BINDING FACTOR IN THE EMPIRE

Intervening in the feudal superstructure of the empire, installing imperial representatives in the regional feudal principalities, attempting to create a supraregional imperial aristocracy allied to the imperial court by means of personal bonds were centralizing strategies that the emperor unfolded—to a great extent on his own initiative. However, the basic treaties of the empire also allowed the emperor *de jure* two instruments that could establish imperial authority vis-à-vis the feudatories. The agreements of March 1204 and October 1205 stipulated that all vassals in the empire were obliged to swear an oath of fealty (*iuramentum*) to the emperor and to provide the military services (*servitium*) that were linked to the fiefdom they obtained.¹⁰²

With regard to the oath of fealty to the emperor, we have at our disposal a series of testimonies that are spread geographically over almost the entire empire and that embrace the whole period of this study chronologically. From these it is apparent that the successive Latin emperors were concerned with being able to receive the oaths effectively from their important vassals and local barons.¹⁰³ For Baldwin I's short reign, the oath of allegiance from Boniface of Montferrat for the Kingdom of Thessalonike is attested.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, it is reasonable

¹⁰¹ Cf. also p. 177 for Baldwin of Béthune, possibly Branas' other son-in-law.

¹⁰² Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267, p. 557, p. 559. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 160, p. 572.

¹⁰³ Hendrickx has demonstrated that in practice the feudal contract between the emperor and his vassal was not sealed solely with the oath of allegiance, but also with the other two traditional elements thereof, the homage and the kiss. Cf. Hendrickx, *Le contrat féodal*, pp. 227–228.

¹⁰⁴ Villehardouin, §496.

to suppose that as a result of the distribution of the fiefdoms in the autumn of 1204, all the newly enfeoffed barons and less prominent feudatories did swear the oath of allegiance.

Baldwin's successor Henry undertook various expeditions in order to extract the oath of allegiance from rebellious vassals. In 1208–1209 he travelled to the Kingdom of Thessalonike and southern Greece, where a group of principally northern Italian local barons were disputing the imperial suzerainty. In 1211–1212 the emperor undertook campaigns in Epiros and Macedonia, where Michael Doukas and Strez of Prosek repeatedly displayed contempt for their feudal oath of allegiance. However, the military pressure made it necessary for them to reconfirm this time after time. During these campaigns the emperor will certainly have taken the opportunity of receiving the oath of allegiance from loyal local feudatories.¹⁰⁵ In this sense Henry, in a letter of 1213, could actually describe the barons of the Kingdom of Thessalonike as *nostri barones*.¹⁰⁶

The intention to receive the feudal oath from the regional rulers and local barons is doubtless part of the reason why in 1217 Emperor Peter of Courtenay and Empress Yolande of Flanders/Hainaut each travelled via a different route from southern Italy to Constantinople. By means of a circular tour through the territories of the empire, the new imperial couple could see their authority recognized by vassals from regions far away from the capital. Via the sea route Empress Yolande was able to visit the Principality of Achaea, the Cyclades, Attica and Euboea.¹⁰⁷ Via the land route from Dyrrachion, Emperor Peter planned to traverse Epiros, the Kingdom of Thessalonike, Macedonia and Thrace. From Theodore Doukas, ruler of Epiros, he did indeed receive the feudal oath of allegiance. However, Doukas' subsequent rebellion, in which the emperor was taken prisoner, prevented the further realization of the plan.¹⁰⁸

During his journey to Constantinople from Western Europe via the Balkans in 1221, Robert of Courtenay had as emperor-elect the opportunity of receiving the feudal oath from the barons from the principalities around Philippopolis, the Rhodopes Mountains, and Adrianople.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Valenciennes, §600, 644, 669–670.

¹⁰⁶ Prinzing, *Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs*, p. 414.

¹⁰⁷ A sojourn in Achaea is attested: Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 392.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. the references in note 32.

¹⁰⁹ Philippe Mouskes, pp. 404–405.

In addition, during his involvement in the defence of the Kingdom of Thessalonike against Theodore Doukas circa 1221–1222 he probably undertook a military expedition in that area, during which it is reasonable to assume that he must have received the feudal oath of allegiance from the local barons.¹¹⁰ It is also known that Angelo Sanudo, ruler of the *ducatus* of Naxos, effectively honoured his liege Emperor Robert.¹¹¹

Linked to this discussion on the feudal oath sworn to the emperor we note that the treaty of March 1204 stipulated that all who chose to settle in the empire were obliged to recognize the terms of this agreement by means of an oath. The treaty of October 1205 prescribes similarly that all vassals of the empire were obliged to confirm all clauses with respect to providing military service with an oath.¹¹² One practical example of this type of oath is extant. In the agreement of 1221 between Emperor Robert and Podestà Tiepolo in which each of them confirms the treaties of 1204–1205, the emperor promised that the barons that had recently come over with him to Constantinople would affirm with an oath (*sacramentum*) all agreements made between the Latin emperors—and regents—and Venice vis-à-vis the podestà, just as the non-Venetian barons who had been settled in the empire for a longer period had done.¹¹³ This example shows that it was Venice in particular that was concerned about maintaining the original basic agreements, which were the foundation of their privileged position in the empire.

The Latin emperors also endeavoured to realize the military services with which—in theory—their vassals were obliged to provide them. In April 1205, troops from the imperial quarter and from Venetian and non-Venetian Thrace took part in the Battle of Adrianople.¹¹⁴ In 1206, contingents from the same regions and led by Regent Henry in person once again fought in the defensive campaign against Kalojan, Tsar of Bulgaria.¹¹⁵ In 1207 the fortress of Kibotos in Asia Minor was

¹¹⁰ Cf. Chapter VII, p. 379.

¹¹¹ Hopf, *Urkunden und Zusätze zur Geschichte der Insel Andros*, n° 8, p. 243.

¹¹² Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267, pp. 557–558. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 160, p. 572.

¹¹³ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 260, p. 230.

¹¹⁴ Villehardouin, §340–343, 347–351.

¹¹⁵ Ibidem, §436.

relieved by an analogously composed expeditionary fleet.¹¹⁶ In 1206–1208 imperial troops and David Komnenos' Paphlagonian forces regularly worked together in fighting Theodore Laskaris of Nicaea.¹¹⁷ In 1208, Byzantine contingents from Adrianople and Latin contingents from Thrace and the core quarter under Emperor Henry took part in the Battle of Philippopolis against the Bulgarian tsar Boril, who had invaded the empire's territory.¹¹⁸ In 1208–1209, local barons from the Kingdom of Thessalonike took part in the imperial campaign in that region against a number of different local rebellious barons.¹¹⁹ Circa 1211–1212 the same barons were part of the imperial army in the campaigns against rebel Michael Doukas, ruler of Epiros, and against Strez, Lord of Prosek. In 1212 the imperial army under the leadership of Henry's brother Eustace was involved in a battle with the rebellious vassal Strez of Prosek; this force consisted of troops supplied by Doukas, who at that time was once again reconciled with the imperial powers, Alexios Sthlabos, ruler of the Rhodopes region, and the Thessalonikan barons. In 1212–1213 the emperor carried out an offensive in Asia Minor with the assistance of troops from the core quarter and non-Venetian Thrace.¹²⁰ It is rather probable that Marco Sanudo, ruler of Naxos, was also involved in this expedition.¹²¹ In 1214 Henry undertook an expedition to Serbia, which was possibly co-ordinated with the offensives against Serbia being carried out at the same time by

¹¹⁶ Ibidem, §466.

¹¹⁷ Niketas Choniates, pp. 639–640. Valenciennes, §551–552. This latter chronicler remarks that David had always acted in a loyal manner vis-à-vis Emperor Henry.

¹¹⁸ Valenciennes, §543.

¹¹⁹ Ibidem, §682.

¹²⁰ Prinzing, *Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs*, pp. 414–416.

¹²¹ The fourteenth-century chronicle attributed to Enrico Dandolo is the earliest source mentioning an expedition by Sanudo against Smyrna, without however giving any chronological indication (the relevant fragment is published in: Saint-Guillain, *Les conquérants de l'archipel*, pp. 149–151; cf. also note 41). The campaign would however geographically tie in well with the imperial campaign: in January 1213 Henry was in Pergamon (Van Tricht, *La politique étrangère (2e partie)*, p. 415), about to move south in the direction of Nymphaion (only about 20 km from Smyrna) where he is attested sometime later (Akropolites, §15). Cf. also: Frazee, *The Island Princes of Greece*, p. 20. Koumanoudi, *The Latins in the Aegean after 1204*, p. 264. Sanudo in any case fulfilled his military commitments to the emperor on several (unspecified) occasions (cf. Marco II Sanudo's 1282 letter: Hopf, *Urkunden und Zusätze zur Geschichte der Insel Andros*, n° 8, p. 243).

his vassal Michael Doukas and Strez of Prosek, who in all probability had once again recognized the imperial suzerainty.¹²²

In 1217 Theodore Doukas of Epiros agreed to join Emperor Peter of Courtenay in a proposed offensive against the Sultanate of Konya.¹²³ Circa 1220–1224, Podestà Tiepolo participated in the defence of Latin Asia Minor against the Nicaean Emperor Theodore Laskaris.¹²⁴ It is also likely that local feudatories will have taken part in the assumed above-mentioned expedition led by Emperor Robert circa 1221–1222 in the defence of the Kingdom of Thessalonike. In 1223–1224 an imperial army under the leadership of Constantinopolitan barons and as far as can be ascertained consisting of contingents from the region around Constantinople, non-Venetian Thrace and perhaps also the Rhodopes region, undertook the siege of the town of Serres in the Kingdom of Thessalonike, which had been captured by Theodore Doukas.¹²⁵ In 1224, an army composed of Latin and Byzantine troops from the region round Constantinople—the core quarter and non-imperial Thrace—attempted to counter an offensive by Emperor John III Vatatzes of Nicaea.¹²⁶

A few figures provide an idea of the number of troops that the emperor had at his disposal in the core quarter and non-imperial Thrace. In 1208 at the Battle of Philippopolis the army was some 2,000 men strong, including approximately 400 knights and Byzantine contingents from the principality of Adrianople.¹²⁷ On 11 October 1212, during Henry's offensive in Asia Minor against Theodore Laskaris of Nicaea, at the Battle near the Rhyndakos river the imperial troops had some 275 knights. Including the mounted sergeants and foot soldiers, this army must also have had a strength of close to 2,000. Here one should factor in the knowledge that the emperor had stationed part of the troops from the areas indicated in Thessalonike, and that there were imperial garrisons in some parts of Thrace as protection against

¹²² Teodosije, *Zivot svetoga Save*, pp. 107–114. Stefan Der Erstgekrönte, *Das Leben des Hl. Simeon Nemanja*, pp. 117–120. Cf. Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens und Serbiens*, pp. 105–106, pp. 110–114, pp. 127–128. Maksimovic, *La Serbie et les contrées voisines avant et après la IV^e croisade*, pp. 279–280. Cf. also Chapter VII, p. 397.

¹²³ *L'Estoire D'Eracles*, pp. 290–293.

¹²⁴ Martin da Canal, *Les Estoires de Venise*, §95.

¹²⁵ Cf. Chapter VII, p. 384.

¹²⁶ Akropolites, §22. Philippe Mouskes, p. 409.

¹²⁷ Valenciennes, §521.

the Bulgarian threat.¹²⁸ We are unable to state the contribution of possible mercenaries to these figures.

No figures are known for the period after 1212, but the conquest of sizeable territories in Asia Minor must have expanded the military potential quite considerably. For example, in 1224 at the Battle of Poimanenon—and in contrast to the situation in 1212—the imperial army was more numerous than that of the Nicaean emperor, and at the same time a second imperial army was involved in operations near Serres.¹²⁹ In view of the core quarter having been doubled by the 1212–1213 conquests in Asia Minor, an estimated military potential of some 4,000 to 5,000 men for the region of Thrace and Latin Asia Minor in 1212–1224 would seem to be reasonable, comparable with the customary size of the contemporary armies of, for example, the Holy Roman emperor and the French king.¹³⁰ The feudal military potential of the empire as a whole must have been much larger than this, although this potential was of course never deployed during one and the same campaign.

Apart from the obligatory military services *strictu sensu* vassals throughout the empire were also expected to provide the emperor and his entourage or army, whenever he was campaigning or travelling, with lodgings and provisions. In 1206 David Komnenos, vassal prince of Paphlagonia, sent shiploads of provisions to Constantinople where at that time there was a shortage.¹³¹ In the spring of 1208 Emperor Henry and his entourage were accommodated near Adrianople, the capital of Theodore Branas's principality. Henry, planning an expedition against Boril of Bulgaria there assembled his army.¹³² On his way to Thessalonike in the winter of 1208 the emperor was accommodated in Venetian Rhaidestos, where this time he assembled his army.¹³³ During the expedition in the Kingdom of Thessalonike in 1208–1209 Wierich of Daun, Lord of Kitros, made a great effort to please the emperor during his stay there.¹³⁴ Feudatories who refused to provide lodgings

¹²⁸ Prinzing, *Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs*, p. 416.

¹²⁹ Akropolites, §16, 22.

¹³⁰ Cf. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, p. 135. France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000–1300*, pp. 128–131.

¹³¹ Niketas Choniates, pp. 639–640.

¹³² Valenciennes, §505.

¹³³ Ibidem, §563.

¹³⁴ 'Or sont nostre gent au Cytre venu; si ont la trouvé l'empereour et l'ost qui illuec sejournoit. Et me sire Orris dou Chitre lor a fait toute l'ounour que il pot; tant que li empereres avant et tout chil de l'ost apriés sen l'oerent molt durement.' (Ibidem, §644).

and provisions were considered to be traitors. The case of chatelain Raoul of Christopolis, during Emperor Henry's Thessalonikan campaign, makes this clear.¹³⁵

Another service of a military nature to which vassals were obliged, was giving assistance in the restoration of fortifications that had been damaged. In the summer of 1208 for example Henry ordered his vassals who had just taken part in the mentioned Bulgarian campaign to aid in the rebuilding of the castle of Pamphylon. Marshall Geoffrey of Villehardouin, whose fiefs were situated outside the core quarter, was to oversee the works.¹³⁶ It is notable that the two types of service just discussed do not figure in the treaties of March 1204 and October 1205. Apparently the Latin emperor—in casu Baldwin I or more likely Henry—manoeuvred in such a way that he got his vassals to accept that vis-à-vis him they were bound to these traditional feudal obligations.¹³⁷ Whether they were formally incorporated in the empire's feudal law code is however impossible to ascertain.¹³⁸

The overview presented above shows that the concept of military services due to the emperor was based on the principle that, in practice, the local rulers and barons only had to provide these within their own area of the empire. For example, troops from the Kingdom of Thessalonike were never operational in the defence of Latin Asia Minor. The almost constant threat from Bulgaria, and later also from Epiros, did not really make it opportune to concentrate the empire's military reserves in a single imperial territory. Indeed, the treaty of October 1205 restricted the obligation to provide military services when the vassal's own region was under threat.¹³⁹ The emperors chose the realistic option of campaigns led by themselves in person—or occasionally by an imperial lieutenant such as Eustace of Hainaut—within the framework of safeguarding the internal and external stability of the empire, to which end the local barons from the relevant imperial territories participated, evidently motivated by direct self-interest.

¹³⁵ 'Et de la fist tant par ses jornees que il [= Emperor Henry] vint a Cristople. Dont cuida entrer ou castiel a se volenté, comme chius qui nul malisse n'i pensoit. Mais li castelains dist bien ke il n'i meteroit le pié; ains fist commander a ses homes que on n'aportast en l'ost chose dont hom ne bieste peust vivre. Or poés oïr la commençaille de la trahison.' (Ibidem, §568).

¹³⁶ Ibidem, §550.

¹³⁷ Cf. Ganshof, *Qu'est-ce que la féodalité*, passim.

¹³⁸ On this feudal law code, see p. 207.

¹³⁹ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 160, p. 572.

Exceptions to this were the barons from the core quarter and non-Venetian Thrace, who also participated in imperial campaigns far beyond their own home regions. The exceptional positions they held in the administration of the empire and the prestige that they gained through these positions motivated the group to extra commitment.¹⁴⁰ The division of labour between these universally deployable troops from the region around Constantinople and the supplementary local troops in the regional principalities is in some ways reminiscent of the former Byzantine military organization. The basis thereof were the provincial army units in the *themata*, the soldiers of which were remunerated both by limited land ownership and monetary payment. When on campaign these provincial troops were supplemented with central units (the *tagmata*) stationed around Constantinople. In the 12th century the Komnenian emperors had attempted once more to expand this system of provincial army units, by means, inter alia, of the *pronoia* system, after it had been replaced for the most part in the eleventh century by mercenary armies.¹⁴¹

THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN POLICY AS IMPERIAL PREROGATIVE

Control of foreign policy was the prerogative of the emperor in virtually the entire period covered by this study, in the sense that the feudal princes did not autonomously pursue foreign policy: they did not enter into alliances, neither did they fight wars with neighbouring principalities that acted counter to imperial policy. Relationships with the neighbouring states in the Byzantine space were exclusively the emperor's terrain, and the imperial authority kept for itself the maintenance of diplomatic contacts with the Western powers such as the kings of France and England, the Holy Roman emperor and leading prelates.¹⁴² The local barons and feudatories of the Latin empire

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Chapter V, p. 254.

¹⁴¹ Haldon, *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World*, pp. 115–118. Birkenmeier, *The Development of the Komnenian Army*, p. xii and pp. 152–174.

¹⁴² The following sources attest to these contacts: With the French king in 1205 and 1226: Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 291. Philippe Mouskes, p. 539. With the English king in 1208: Rymer & Sanderson, *Foedera, conventiones et litterae*, I, p. 99. With the German king circa 1207–1208: *Chronicon Universale Anonymi Laudunensis*, p. 453. With Western prelates in 1213: Lauer, *Une lettre inédite d'Henri I d'Angré, empereur de Constantinople*, p. 201. With Western Christendom in 1204 and 1213: Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 274. Prinzing, *Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs*, p. 411.

usually maintained contacts with their own home regions, but theirs was not the domain of international policy. Nonetheless, a number of comments give nuance to the imperial monopoly vis-à-vis foreign policy.

Firstly, the regional feudal princes and local barons certainly did maintain contacts with one Western power, the popedom. In substance these contacts were generally concerned with property disputes between the laity and the Church, confirmation of gifts to religious institutions, the awards of all manner of dispensations, etc. On occasion the Pope also intervened in political issues, either at his own initiative or at that of local barons. For example, in the conflict about the position of the ecclesiastical possessions in the empire, Innocent III and Honorius III addressed themselves not only to the emperor, but also directly to local barons. Another example is the papal letter of April 1217 in which Honorius III notified his legate Giovanni Colonna of his having taken Demetrios of Montferrat under his protection. The Pope ordered Colonna to ensure that Demetrios' subjects remained faithful to him.¹⁴³ At the time in which this papal letter was being drawn up, the new imperial couple Peter and Yolande were in Rome for their coronation by Honorius, and their involvement in the letter's drafting is more than likely.

The papal interference in internal political relations, the contacts with Rome by regional feudal princes and local vassals vis-à-vis religious and other matters, and the manner in which the popedom wanted to prove its authority vis-à-vis the (Latin) patriarchate of Constantinople, were not factors that were conducive to the unity of the empire.¹⁴⁴ By Western standards this papal influence could have been described as completely normal, but in the Byzantine tradition such interference by a religious power that was established outside the empire was entirely unknown. Indeed, the earlier Byzantine patriarch in Constantinople by no means possessed the power that the papacy within the Latin empire not only tried to obtain but also received without problem from the Latin emperors and their vassals. The emperors were able to counter a specific papal interference, but never in principle challenged the papal right of intervention.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 506.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Chapter VI, p. 310.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Brehier, *Les Institutions de l'Empire Byzantin*, pp. 345–353. Hussey, *The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire*, pp. 299–303.

A second thorn in the flesh for the imperial claim to sovereignty over foreign policy was Venice, which was at one and the same time an independent state and a feudal partner in the empire. La Serenissima acted on its own initiatives vis-à-vis the neighbouring states of the Latin empire. For example, the podestà in Constantinople entered into trading agreements with the Empire of Nicaea (1219), and with the Seljuk Sultanate of Konya (prior to 1212, circa 1212–1220 and in March 1220). However, these agreements were in line with imperial policy vis-à-vis each of these states, and in this sense cannot be seen as being independent of imperial policy. Also, they exclusively related to issues of trade and commerce.¹⁴⁶ Conversely, in the case of the Venetian-Genoese war in the period 1204–1218, the battles of which were fought principally on Crete and in the Aegean Sea, it was the Venetian policy that determined the imperial attitude.¹⁴⁷ The basic treaty of March 1204 stipulated that enemies of Venice were not permitted to enter the empire, which curtailed the imperial freedom of activity. The emperors did not therefore enter into any relationships with the city of Genoa in the period 1204–1218.¹⁴⁸ In this period, trading privileges—in exchange for naval military support—were granted only to the city of Pisa, which at that time was on good terms with Venice. In April 1208 Emperor Henry confirmed the Pisan podestà and consuls the ‘*antiquam libertatem et antiquas consuetudines et iura que in Romanie consueverant habere imperio*’. It is interesting that the Latin emperor believed himself to be empowered to ratify integrally the privileges granted by the twelfth-century Byzantine emperors—which contained clauses applicable within the entire empire—not only for his own quarter, but for all imperial territories. In 1228 Regent Mary of Courtenay confirmed this privilege.¹⁴⁹ Apart from the consequences of

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Chapter VII, pp. 364, 373. Jacoby believes that it is purely coincidental that these Venetian agreements were in line with the imperial foreign policy (Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, p. 63). Cf. also: Hendrickx, *The pactum pacis et concordiae between Theodoros I Laskaris and Giacomo Tiepolo (1219)*, pp. 199–205. Brezeanu’s hypothesis that there might have been an earlier Venetian-Nicaean trading agreement does not stand up to scrutiny (Brezeanu, *Le premier traité économique entre Venise et Nicée*, pp. 143–146).

¹⁴⁷ Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, pp. 87–88.

¹⁴⁸ Balard, *Les Génois en Romanie entre 1204 et 1261*, pp. 471–475. Jacoby, *Les Génois dans le duché d’Athènes au 13^e siècle*, p. 270.

¹⁴⁹ Müller, *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane*, III, n° 55. Löwenfeld, *Une lettre de l’impératrice Marie de Constantinople*, pp. 256–257. Cf. also: Borsari, *I rapporti tra Pisa e gli stati di Romania nel Duecento*, p. 482. Jacoby, *Italian privileges and trade in Byzantium*, pp. 357–358.

the Venetian-Genoese conflict, La Serenissima had however no impact on imperial foreign policy. Furthermore, an alliance with Genoa was a matter of absolutely no priority to the Latin emperor so long as Venice and Pisa provided naval military support.

A third nuance vis-à-vis the Latin emperors' monopoly of foreign policy is linked with the weakening of imperial military power after the severe defeats of 1224 suffered in the conflicts with the rulers of Epiros and Nicaea, Theodore Doukas and John III Vatatzes. As a result, the central authority was no longer in a position to play a leading role in averting the enduring threat from outside and lost its position of monopoly as regards foreign policy. The defence of the remainder of the Kingdom of Thessalonike and southern Greece was now taken care of by the local feudal princes and foreign powers. The crusade against Theodore Doukas called for by the Pope and for the benefit of Thessalonike took place in 1225 under the command of Marquis William VI of Montferrat, half-brother of King Demetrios and jointly invested with the kingdom; this expedition occurred without any known imperial involvement.¹⁵⁰ After the failure of William VI's campaign, Demetrios' wife Hermingarde did indeed settle at the court in Constantinople, but he himself turned to the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen in order to regain his kingdom.¹⁵¹ Finally, the truce that was made by Regent Narjot of Toucy with Theodore Doukas in 1228 left Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Prince of Achaea, and other barons in southern Greece with the opportunity to continue the fight against Doukas independently.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Chapter VII, pp. 384–385.

¹⁵¹ Wellas, *Das westliche Kaiserreich*, pp. 113–120. Hermingarde, wife of Demetrios of Montferrat—and a daughter of Otto I of La Roche, Lord of Athens (cf. *Chronique Dite De Baudouin D'avesnes*, p. 585), has until now virtually escaped attention. Nonetheless, her existence was brought to light several decades ago. She is mentioned in the martyrology of the *Sancta Maria Sancti Angeli* abbey in Constantinople that was given the patronage of the Latin emperors, which indicates that she sojourned in the capital, presumably in particular after 1224, where she must have represented the interests of her husband. The other names appearing in the fragmentarily preserved martyrology are those of persons belonging to the elite of the region around Constantinople (CLAIR, *Les filles d'Hautecombe dans l'empire latin*, p. 274).

¹⁵² Cessi, *Deliberazioni*, I, n° 140, pp. 209–210. Jacoby is of the opinion that Venice was not involved in this suspension of hostilities (Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, p. 63). In Thrace, however, the border between Doukas' territories and the Latin domain was established according to an imaginary line from Ainos to Vrysis (cf. Chapter VII, p. 385), which implies that the truce also encompassed the Venetian territories in Thrace. Furthermore, the Principality of Achaea—which in principle fell under Venetian suzerainty—was also mentioned explicitly in the agreement.

IMPERIAL INITIATIVES TOWARDS JUDICIAL UNIFORMITY
WITHIN THE EMPIRE

The feudal structure of the Latin empire signified a considerable change for the Byzantine, centrally organized judicial system. The regional princes and prominent barons according to the March pact of 1204 in principle held total jurisdiction in their fiefdoms. However, in an earlier chapter we have proposed the hypothesis that the distribution treaty of 1204 contained an agreement between the commanders and barons of the crusading army to retain the Byzantine *leges* and *iura* to the greatest extent possible.¹⁵³ We find the echoes of this in the enfeoffment charters by Venice of Theodore Branas with Adrianople (1206) and of Ravano dalle Carceri with Négrepont (1209). Both documents contain a clause allowing the administrative practices in existence prior to 1204 to be respected.¹⁵⁴ We found the same principle in Emperor Baldwin's 1204 confirmation of the administrative privileges of Thessalonike in 1204.¹⁵⁵ The same emperor may even have promulgated a decree for the empire in its entirety confirming to a large extent the Byzantine law and justice system, thus formalizing what we think had been agreed upon by the crusade leaders and barons in the distribution pact.¹⁵⁶ In this way, a certain degree of judicial uniformity must have been maintained within the entire empire. Apart from the confirmation of Byzantine law the Latin emperors also strove for a certain measure of judicial uniformity throughout the empire in other ways. The legislative initiatives to be discussed can be seen as a manifestation of the view that the emperor possessed not only rights of suzerainty vis-à-vis the entire empire, but also certain rights of sovereignty.¹⁵⁷

The Imperial constitutio with Respect to a Ban on Religious Gifts

In the existing historiography it has usually been overlooked that the Latin emperors ascribed to themselves the right to promulgate new laws and to draw up legal procedures not only for the imperial core

¹⁵³ Cf. Chapter I, p. 52.

¹⁵⁴ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 169, pp. 18; n° 204, p. 92.

¹⁵⁵ Niketas Choniates, p. 599. Villehardouin, §280.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Chapter III, pp. 140–141.

¹⁵⁷ The royal *assises* in the Kingdom of Jerusalem can in any event be looked upon in the light of such claims of sovereignty: Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem*, pp. 145–146. Cf. also note 149.

quarter, but for the empire in its entirety as well.¹⁵⁸ An illustration of such a new law is Emperor Henry's *constitutio*, promulgated circa 1207, which stipulated a universal ban on property gifts to religious institutions. It was apparently issued after an agreement had been reached in 1206 between Henry, at that time still regent, and patriarch Morosini that determined the magnitude of the ecclesiastical possessions in relation to the secular possessions in the entire empire.¹⁵⁹

The constitution was probably in part inspired by the a provision in the March pact that prescribed that all feudatories with regard to their fiefs '*plenam habeant potestatem ad faciendum inde quicquid sue fuerit voluntatis salvo tamen jure et servitio imperatoris et imperii*.'¹⁶⁰ Donating part of a fief to an ecclesiastical institution would have gone against this clause, since it would have denied the emperor the service that was due to him. The limitations that feudal law in various West European regions and the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the twelfth century imposed vis-à-vis the acquisition of fiefdoms by religious institutions no doubt also influenced the authors of the March pact.¹⁶¹

Another source of inspiration for Henry's *constitutio* in our view was Emperor Manuel I Komnenos' 1158 *chrysoboulloi logoi*, which confirmed their possessions to the monasteries in the region around Constantinople, but which at the same time forbade them from undertaking any further time expansion of their property.¹⁶² It would seem likely to us that in preparation to the drafting of the *constitutio* Henry also consulted with the Byzantine members of his court and entourage. They then no doubt must have informed the emperor about Manuel's earlier legislative initiative, which had been confirmed by his under-age son and successor Alexios II in 1181.¹⁶³ The Latin emperors thus

¹⁵⁸ Cf. also Chapter III, pp. 140–141.

¹⁵⁹ The *constitutio* in question—which stipulated that no-one may gift property to religious institutions during his/her life, nor in his/her testament—is known only through allusions thereto in letters from Innocent III in the years 1208–1210: Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1348 (XI, 12), CCXVI, col. 296 (XIII, 98), col. 302 (XIII, 110); col. 597 (XV, 76).

¹⁶⁰ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267, p. 558.

¹⁶¹ Didier, *Le droit des fiefs dans la coutume de Hainaut au moyen âge*, pp. 152–157. Greilsammer, *Le livre au roi*, §1, p. 137; §45, pp. 271–272. Heirbaut, *Over lenen en families (ca. 1000–1305). Een studie over de vroegste geschiedenis van het zakelijk leenrecht in het graafschap Vlaanderen*, pp. 145–147.

¹⁶² Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, III, n° 1418–1419, 1425. Migne, *PG*, CXXXIII, n° IX–X, col. 727–736. Cf. also: Charanis, *The Monastic Properties and the State in the Byzantine Empire*, pp. 85–86, 91.

¹⁶³ Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, III, n° 1550. Migne, *PG*, CXXXIII, col. 790–791.

seemingly also wished to associate with their Byzantine predecessors in the area of legislation. The political background with regard to this particular example was the same: the concern to keep sufficient land available for the military aristocracy.¹⁶⁴

What is furthermore important to note concerning Henry's *constitutio* is that it was not promulgated just for the imperial core quarter, but for the entire empire. Letters of protest dated 1208–1212 from Innocent III, which ineffectively aimed at the cancellation or relaxation of the imperial edict, to prelates in southern Thessaly and Beotia and to the Venetian podestà in Constantinople indicate that the *constitutio* in those parts of the empire had been put into effect.¹⁶⁵ One need not be surprised that feudal princes and barons applied this imperial law in view of the fact that it served rather than harmed their interests.

A stipulation in the fourteenth-century feudal legal code of the Principality of Achaëa, the so-called *Assises de Romanie*, can be interpreted as a late, somewhat distorted echo of this *constitutio* in the sense that it placed gifts of fiefdoms to religious institutions under princely control.¹⁶⁶ Probably Henry's original *constitutio* was relaxed in this sense shortly after 1212. This is suggested for example by the foundation of a new Cistercian abbey in Constantinople by the Le Perchay family sometime before 1215 and by the absence of the issue in the papal registers after 1212.¹⁶⁷ The background of this relaxation was no doubt the continuing pressure exerted by the pope and the fact that the empire, and the imperial quarter in particular, was greatly expanded in Asia Minor due to Henry's successes against Theodore Laskaris in 1212. More than enough land was available now to both allow donations to ecclesiastical institutions and at the same time provide in the empire's defense through well-endowed feudatories.

The Issue of the Ecclesiastical Property Rights

The *constitutio* prohibiting property gifts to religious institutions was not the only legislative action that the Latin emperors undertook in the domain of ecclesiastical property rights. Of course there are the

¹⁶⁴ Ostrogorsky, *Pour l'histoire de la féodalité byzantine*, pp. 41–43.

¹⁶⁵ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1349 (XI, 14), CCXVI, col. 302 (XIII, 302), col. 597 (XV, 76).

¹⁶⁶ Recoura, *Les Assises de Romanie*, §96.

¹⁶⁷ On the abbey of *Sancta Maria de Percheio*: cf. Chapter III, note 187. On a 1246 document mentioning a *bona consuetudo imperii* allowing gifts to religious institutions: cf. note 205.

consecutive settlements that the emperors negotiated with the ecclesiastical authorities in the empire in the years 1206–1219, which already have been studied thoroughly in the past by various authors and which we further shall discuss below. Not or hardly noticed however are a number of decrees that the Latin emperors promulgated on their own initiative, whereby some of these seem to have been intended for the entirety of the empire. The actual decrees have not been preserved, but we find references to them in the 1219 settlement concerning the ecclesiastical possessions between regent Cono I of Béthune and papal legate Giovanni Colonna.

The said document refers in the following way to a decree that was promulgated by emperor Baldwin and afterwards must have been confirmed by his brother Henry: *'Ille [= omnes abbatie sive ecclesie stantes et non extantes] vero que sunt citra fluvium regium habebunt omnes possessiones sicut per predictos Imperatores [= Balduinum et Henricum] ordinatum est, et laici nihil amplius recipient in eis nisi quantum impositum fuit per Imperatores iamdictos.'*¹⁶⁸ Emperor Baldwin had thus issued an *ordinatio* determining the possessions of all abbatial and non-abbatial churches in the region *citra fluvium regium* and specifying what local lay lords were allowed to impose upon these churches. In order to grasp the meaning of this imperial decree it is crucial to comprehend what the notion *fluvium regium* exactly signifies. To our knowledge the 1219 settlement is the only document relating to the Latin Empire that contains this geographical expression. Wolff believed it referred to the Maritsa—the ancient Hebros—and he suggested that the river was used in this context as boundary between the Kingdom of Thessalonike and the imperial quarter and its surrounding baronies and principalities.¹⁶⁹ This identification however does not seem to stand up to scrutiny. Firstly, no source ever mentions the Maritsa functioning as border river between the two territories mentioned. On the contrary, from various sources it is clear that the coastal town of Makri (*Macra*), some 35 km west of the Maritsa, functioned as border point.¹⁷⁰ Secondly, the 1219 settlement

¹⁶⁸ Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, n° IV, p. 299. Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 95.

¹⁶⁹ Wolff, *Op. cit.*, p. 269.

¹⁷⁰ Papal letters from 1217–1218 and 1223: Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 584, 1435, 4302, 4541. The 1219 settlement that was confirmed by Emperor Robert in 1221 and by the pope in 1222: cf. references in note 168. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 257.

explicitly states at the beginning that it was concluded by the barons *citra Macram*, which in this context signifies east of Makri. It then seems improbable to us that the agreement would contain a clause (cf. the imperial *ordinatio*) that would have applied to the barons east of the Maritsa, but not to the barons whose fiefs were situated in the small strip of land between this river and Makri. This is indeed all the more implausible since between the Maritsa and Makri there was really only a single important barony, the one around the towns of Trajanopolis and Makri and the *Kosmosoteira* monastery in Bera, held by imperial marshal Geoffrey of Villehardouin.¹⁷¹

So the question remains: how is the phrase *citra fluvium regium* to be interpreted? We would like to propose that the component *regium* in this expression may refer to the small town of Rhegion on the coast of the Sea of Marmara. In Rhegion, which was part of the imperial core quarter, an ancient imperial palace was situated and nearby a river—nowadays called Sazlidere—flowed out into the sea.¹⁷² We have found no information as to how this river was called in Byzantine times. The term *fluvium regium* may have been a Latin invention or maybe it was simply a translation of the Greek *Basilos potamos* or *Vasilopotamos*. It was indeed not uncommon for rivers that were situated next to imperial possessions to be named in this way.¹⁷³ If our identification of the *fluvium regium* with the river near Rhegion is correct, this would mean that Baldwin's *ordinatio* was meant for the monasteries and churches to the east (*citra*) of the Sazlidere river, i.e. the metropolitan region and possibly also the region up to Nicomedia, which had been brought under effective Latin control by Baldwin's troops at the end of 1204 and which also could be considered to be lying east of the Sazlidere river.¹⁷⁴ That a decree would have been promulgated for the metropolitan region does not need to surprise us. The already mentioned *chrysoboulloi logoi* of 1158 by Manuel Komnenos, confirmed by his son Alexios II in 1181, similarly established the property rights of the monasteries situated in the region from Athyra (some 10 km west of Rhegion) to Nicomedia. All these churches were confirmed in their

¹⁷¹ Villehardouin, §382. Thomas & Constantinides Hero, *Byzantine Monastic Foundation Documents*, p. 783.

¹⁷² Alexander, *The Byzantine Apocalyptic Tradition*, p. 82.

¹⁷³ For example the small river *Tripotamos* near Berroia in Macedonia was called *Basilikos potamos* in the Byzantine period (Soustal, *Beobachtungen zu den Hydrynomen Makedoniens*, p. 426).

¹⁷⁴ Villehardouin, §312.

possessions, whether they had valid proofs of ownership to them or not. At the same time it was prescribed that they could not further enlarge their possessions.¹⁷⁵ The precise content of Baldwin's decree remains unknown since it has not been preserved. However it does not seem implausible that the Byzantine monastic communities of the metropolitan region may have approached the Latin emperor with the request to confirm the *chrysoboulloi logoi* from before 1204. Baldwin may have agreed to this, issuing a probably somewhat modified decree no doubt for Byzantine and Latin ecclesiastical institutions alike.

While the *ordinatio* discussed was in our view only issued for the metropolitan region, the 1219 settlement does mention in the following passage another imperial decree that seems to have been promulgated for the entire empire: '*Omnes abbacie sive ecclesie stantes et non extantes, que sunt ultra fluvium regium cuiuscumque fuerit vel fuit, que non habuerant tempore Grecorum ultra centum hyperperas terre, habeant libere et integre omnes possessiones suas sine acrostico, omni servitio, omni exactione, et laicali iurisdictione, ac sint in potestate prelatorum. Ille vero que habuerant plusquam centum hyperperas habeant quicquid habuerunt tempore latinorum; et si non habent centum hyperperas extra claustrum ad bonam assisiam imperatoris, addatur usque ad centum hyperperas et habeant libere sicut superius dictum est.*'¹⁷⁶ Clearly at some point an imperial *assisia* was issued for the region *ultra fluvium regium* stipulating that all monasteries and churches that before 1204 had owned possessions worth more than 100 hyperpera and after the Latin conquest were left with possessions worth less than 100 hyperpera (*extra claustrum*), were to be partially compensated for their losses. Furthermore, the *assisia* established that monasteries and churches with possessions worth no more than 100 hyperpera, were to be exempted from all taxes, including the *akrostichon* or land tax.¹⁷⁷ The 1219 text does not name the emperor who promulgated this *assisia*. Emperor Henry is however the most likely candidate, given his relatively long reign and the fact that he is known to have involved himself also in other ways in the issue of the ecclesiastical property rights. The *assisia*'s geographical scope in our view was the empire

¹⁷⁵ Cf. references in notes 162–163.

¹⁷⁶ Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, n° IV, p. 299. Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 95.

¹⁷⁷ On the *akrostichon*: Oikonomides, *The Role of the State in the Byzantine Economy*, p. 996.

in its entirety, excepting the metropolitan area up to Nicomedia for which Baldwin has issued a separate decree. An argument supporting our hypothesis is the fact that the 1219 settlement, and thus the imperial *assisia*, was also accepted without problem in the Kingdom of Thessalonike circa 1219–1221, suggesting that the imperial *assisia* already had been implemented there long before 1219–1221. Apart from Byzantine imperial legislative practices existing before 1204, the Latin emperors may have found some legal basis for their initiatives concerning ecclesiastical property rights in one of the provisions of the March treaty: ‘*de possessionibus vero ecclesiarum tot et tantum clericis et ecclesiis debent provideri quo honorifice possint vivere et substantari.*’¹⁷⁸ The pact however nowhere attributed any authority to the emperor to take initiatives in this respect. In fact the text does not specify how the *possessiones ecclesiarum* were to be determined, which no doubt provided the emperor with an opportunity to stretch his competencies.

The 1219 settlement further mentions imperial stipulations concerning the fiscal obligations of part of the clergy in the following passage: ‘*In casali ubi sunt viginti quinque ignes vel ultra usque ad septuaginta, duo erunt papates omnino liberi cum familiis et servientibus suis in potestate prelatorum, reddentes antiquum acroscopicum dominis terrarum siquod debebant tempore Alexii Imperatoris pro terris quas tenebant a dominis siquas nunc tenent; et si ultra septuaginta usque ad centum viginti quinque ignes, quattuor erunt papates liberi, sicut superius dictum de duobus, et si ultra, erunt sex, et ita deinceps. Si vero in aliquo casali non sunt viginti quinque ignes, adiungatur de aliis vicinioribus casalibus ita quod compleatur numerus viginti quinque, in quibus erunt duo papates liberi sicut superius est expressum. Reliqui vero rurales papates dabunt illud quod impositum est per imperatores latinos et erunt liberi ipsi cum familiis suis ab omnibus angariis, perangariis, exactionibus, et talliis, et ab omni laicali iurisdictione. Papates vero seu clerici cathedralium ecclesiarum qui clericatum habebant, erunt omnino liberi cum familiis et servientibus suis, solventes antiquum acroscopicum siquod debebant tempore Alexii Imperatoris pro terris siquas tenebant et tenent a dominis terrarum. De reliquis vero papatibus civitatum fiat sicut de papatibus ruralibus est ordinatum, et de cetero non ordinentur papates de hominibus laicorum contra voluntatem ipsorum*

¹⁷⁸ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267, p. 557.

ultra numerum pretaxatum.¹⁷⁹ From the underlined phrases we can deduce that the Latin emperors had stipulated the fiscal obligations of the *papates rurales* and *civitatum*. Using the same argumentation as for the *bona assisia* already discussed, we assume that these provisions were promulgated for the empire in its entirety. The fact that the plural *imperatores* is used, suggests that several decrees may have been issued by the consecutive emperors. It is not clear from the 1219 document what the fiscal obligations cited comprised. The fact that the settlement exempted some categories of *papates* from all taxes except the *akrostichon*, implies that the *papates*' fiscal obligations as laid down by the Latin emperors in any case comprised more than this single tax. Furthermore, the fact that the 1219 agreement prescribes that all *papates* and *clerici cathedralium ecclesiarum* had to pay the *akrostichon* '*siquod debebant tempore Alexii Imperatoris*' may suggest that the Latin emperors also had issued a decree altering, most likely increasing, its rate. Before 1204 the Byzantine emperors similarly had promulgated decrees laying down the fiscal obligations and exemptions of the clergy.¹⁸⁰ Thus once again the Latin emperors seem to at least partially have been following in the footsteps of their Byzantine predecessors.

The decrees discussed laying down aspects of the ecclesiastical rights of possession and of the clergy's fiscal obligations uniformly for the empire as a whole display the imperial endeavours to retain a certain juridical uniformity.¹⁸¹ In issuing these decrees the Latin emperors as has been seen probably partially based themselves on the March treaty of 1204, which as has been said stipulated that a number of possessions would be allocated to the religious institutions in the empire such that they could sustain an honourable living. The remaining religious properties of the period prior to 1204 were to be divided among the members of the crusading army.¹⁸² It goes without saying that the Pope and religious leaders of the empire contested this

¹⁷⁹ Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, n° IV, p. 299. Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 95.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. for example Manuel Komnenos' *chrysoboulloi* from 1144 concerning the fiscal obligations of priests living as *paroikoi* on imperial, ecclesiastical or aristocratic domains (Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, III, n° 1335–1336).

¹⁸¹ Extensively about the issue of ecclesiastical possessions: Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, pp. 255–274.

¹⁸² Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267, p. 557. On the giving in fief of abbeys and their possessions by the Emperors Baldwin and Henry: cf. Chapter III, p. 107.

large-scale confiscation of ecclesiastical possessions. In consequence, the unilateral imperial decrees also must have been met with suspicion and disapproval.¹⁸³ In this context in the years 1204–1219 the Latin emperors agreed to negotiations with the Church that resulted in various consecutive settlements. In 1206 a first series of negotiations led to a compromise between papal legate Benedictus and Patriarch Morosini on the one hand and Regent Henry on the other, this being reached with the assent of all *principes, barones, milites* and the *populus*. The main points of the agreement were that one fifteenth of all possessions in the empire outside Constantinople were to be given to the Church, in addition all monasteries were in principle to belong to the Church, for the moment annual tithes had to be paid only by the Latin population, and the clergy and their possessions were to be free of lay jurisdiction. What is important is that in principle the 1206 settlement was meant to come into effect in the entire empire, with the exception of the Venetian part.¹⁸⁴

However, not all barons and vassals in the empire were prepared to put the arrangement into effect. In 1210 a separate compromise was thus reached between the patriarch, the local episcopate and most of the leading Latin barons in the region ranging from Thessalonike to Corinth. This agreement came into being in the imperial Barony of Ravennika, in the presence of imperial representatives and with explicit imperial approval. It is true that the Ravennika settlement meant a further distancing from the aim of reaching a uniform arrangement for the empire as a whole, but the issue at least did remain under imperial supervision. The outlines of the settlement were that all ecclesiastical property from before 1204 was to be restored to the Church and the Latin and Byzantine clergy who held land from the barons were to pay the *akrostichon* tax. It should be noted that in principle the *resignatio Ravenicae* only applied to the barons (and their feudatories) who were explicitly mentioned at the beginning of the document. Margaret of Hungary, guardian for the underage king of Thessalonike Demetrios, for example does not appear in the agreement. Pokorný's proposition that the *resignatio* did not apply to Thessalonike and its surrounding area, but only to the region south of the Vardar (Axios) river to us

¹⁸³ Cf. the papal reaction to Emperor Henry's 1207 *constitutio* (supra).

¹⁸⁴ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 967–969 (IX, 142). Cf. Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, p. 257. It is the latter author's opinion that the agreement applied only to the region around Constantinople up to the town of Makri in Thrace.

seems stretched: the document unambiguously states that it applies to the region *a Thessalonica usque Corinthum*.¹⁸⁵ One of the barons mentioned in the *resignatio* was in fact *Guilelmus de Blanel* or William of Bloville, who is to be identified with *Guillaumes de Blendel/Blandel*, who came to meet Emperor Henry in 1208 in Vigneri (to the north-east of Thessalonike) and thus must have possessed a fief in this area, although Pokorny rejects that. The William mentioned however is no doubt to be identified with *Willelmus Blanaï*, who in 1217 had possessions in the archdiocese of Philippi, wherein Vigneri was situated.¹⁸⁶

Circa 1214–1215 a new agreement was reached between Emperor Henry and (probably) the papal legate Pelagius for the imperial core quarter and surrounding Thrace (the so-called region *citra Macram*, i.e. east of Makri, which as has been said functioned as border town with the Kingdom of Thessalonike), in this instance with the inclusion of the Venetian part of the empire. The 1206 settlement had not worked out well, primarily because of an ongoing conflict between patriarch Morosini and the French clergy concerning the distribution of the fifteenths. With respect to the new agreement we contentwise only learn that this time one twelfth of all property in the region in question was to be given to the Church. After it had been concluded the settlement however somehow, the details being unknown, gave rise to a conflict between Innocentius III and Emperor Henry and his barons and consequently it was never implemented.¹⁸⁷ At the end of 1219 therefore, Regent Cono I of Béthune negotiated another agreement with papal legate Giovanni Colonna for the same region, on this occasion without the inclusion of the Venetian partner after negotiations in this regard had failed. Nonetheless, the new agreement was to lead to an almost uniform arrangement on the status of the Church's rights of possession and fiscal obligations in the entire empire, or more precisely in

¹⁸⁵ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 48, pp. Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, pp. 260–261. 73–75. Pokorny, *Der territorialen Umfang des lateinischen Königreichs Thessaloniki*, pp. 555–560.

¹⁸⁶ Valenciennes, §571. Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 704. Cf. also: Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 168, and Chapter III, note.

¹⁸⁷ Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, pp. 262–263. Around 1214 Pelagius, without referring to the earlier *resignatio Ravenicae* also reached separate agreements with the Latin barons in Southern Thessaly, Beotia, Athens and Achaia. In 1215 Innocent III deemed these to be *compositiones minus utiles*, declaring them null and void and extending the scope of the *resignatio* now *per loca omnia citra Macram* (west of Makri)(Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 115, pp. 154–157).

all the feudal principalities under Latin rulers.¹⁸⁸ In 1221 Emperor Robert of Courtenay confirmed this agreement, and circa 1219–1221 Guido Pelavicino, Regent of Thessalonike, had also accepted this compromise.¹⁸⁹ In 1223 Venice approved the treaty, and in the same year Geoffrey I of Villehardouin, Prince of Achaea, and Otho I de La Roche, duke of Athens, accepted an agreement that was partly based on the 1210 treaty of Ravennika and partly on the 1219 arrangement.¹⁹⁰ It sounds plausible that imperial representatives brought pressure to bear in all these regions to accept the 1219 compromise, with or without consultation with the empire's religious leaders.

The outlines of the 1219 settlement were that all clerics with their families and servants were to be free of lay jurisdiction, to the cathedral churches were to be restored in principle all possessions that they had held under Alexios III Angelos, in compensation for the losses sustained by the various ecclesiastical institutions one eleventh of all property was to be given to the Church,¹⁹¹ that was to enjoy all the traditional ecclesiastical freedoms *secundum liberaliorem consuetudinem Francie*. Most clerics however were to pay the *akrostichon* for the lands that they held from lay lords, some of which also had to pay additional taxes. Furthermore all Latins had to pay tithes, while the Byzantine population only had to pay a thirtieth to the Church during the first decade following the conclusion of the agreement. What is remarkable about this compromise is that it, as has been seen, referred to several imperial decrees concerning the ecclesiastical property rights of clergy's fiscal obligations.¹⁹² We might even say that these decrees, which were invariantly at least partially confirmed, must have been used as a basis for the 1219 settlement. This suggests that in the periode 1204–1219 it were these imperial decrees that chiefly had regulated the issue of the ecclesiastical property rights and the clergy's fiscal obligations, and not so much the consecutive bilateral agreements with the Church. The

¹⁸⁸ In the feudal principalities under Byzantine rulers (Paphlagonia, Adrianople, the Rhodopes region, Prosek and Epiros) no break is known to have occurred with regard to the ecclesiastical possessions or the fiscal obligations of the clergy in comparison with the period before 1204.

¹⁸⁹ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 95, pp. 128–132.

¹⁹⁰ Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, n° VI, pp. 301–302. Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 115, pp. 154–157. Schabel, *Antelm the Nasty*, pp. 113–120.

¹⁹¹ An imperial *assisia* was to determine how each knight was to give one eleventh of his land to the Church.

¹⁹² For a detailed analysis of the settlement's content: Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, pp. 268–274.

1219 settlement can then be understood as an expansion and a partial modification of the earlier imperial legislative initiatives.

*The Relationship between Francigenae and Venetiani
in the Judicial Field*

The legal procedures with regard to a number of types of conflicts between non-Venetian Latins (*Francigenae*) and Venetians over possessions was also laid down centrally for the whole empire in a *forma iustitiae* between Emperor Henry and Podestà Marino Zeno and their respective advisors in 1207. There is no description to be found of the geographical reach of the agreement, and consequently it may be assumed that in principle it was applicable in the entire empire. However, an allusion to the *sylogos* of the *tabularioi* in Constantinople indicates that, in the first instance, it met the concrete needs of the metropolitan region.¹⁹³

As Rösch states, the legal procedures described in the document provide clear evidence of Venetian influence. However, the mild punishments for the delicts in question (handling stolen goods, theft and robbery) cannot be seen as advantageous to the interests of the Venetian traders, and evidence the influence of the imperial camp. In this connection, Rösch is in agreement with respect to the punishments for theft and robbery, but believes that the provisions laid down for handling stolen goods betray the influence of the Venetian trading interests. However, the author does himself state that the Venetian legislation vis-à-vis this offence was considerably more stringent than those in the *forma iustitiae* of 1207. There is, therefore, no reason to conclude that this agreement 'ganz wesentlich venezianische Interessen formuliert hat'.¹⁹⁴ On the contrary, the interests of the non-Venetian component, represented by the emperor, were also taken into account. Interesting in this context is that the document in question was probably drawn up in the imperial chancellery. After all, Jacoby has demonstrated that the *forma* was certainly not drawn up by a Venetian notary.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 180, pp. 49–52. So far as is known, this document is the last known trace of activity of the 'mixed council' (cf. Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, p. 62).

¹⁹⁴ Rösch, *Bemerkungen zur 'Forma iustitiae inter Venetos et Francigenas'*, p. 137.

¹⁹⁵ Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, p. 34.

There is little known about the application of this treaty. Jacoby has recently formulated the hypothesis that the matters described in the documents were not dealt with by a mixed court, but by judges appointed independently by each party, whereby a case came before a judge who had the same nationality as the accused (Venetian or *Francigena*), analogous to the situation in Acre in the Kingdom of Jerusalem.¹⁹⁶ Analogous to the procedure described in the treaty of October 1205 in the case of a conflict between the emperor and his liegemen, it appears to us to be more probable that the mixed council was responsible for the appointment of the competent judges. The example of one of the few known judges competent for mixed cases—designated in the relevant source as *iudex furisterorum*—supports our view. In a private notarial deed of March 1210, in which merchant Gilio da Foligno and *megas doux* Philokales entrust two Venetian traders with the collection of their share in three *colleganze*, appears as a witness a certain *Lanfrancus Vicecomes iudex furisterorum*.¹⁹⁷

Both the elements in the name of this person indicate Pisan origins, although Jacoby took him to be a Venetian. Lanfranco is a typical Pisan forename, although not completely unknown in Venice, as Jacoby has shown.¹⁹⁸ However, as far as we can ascertain, a family *Vicecomes*—Jacoby translates to *Vesconte*—did not belong to the Venetian elite of the time, whilst the name is indeed that of one of the most important dynasties of Pisa, the *Visconti*, who circa 1200 held important positions in the city's administration.¹⁹⁹ In the event that *iudex* Lanfranco is indeed a Pisan, it then seems unlikely that only the Venetian podestà—for whom a Venetian judge would have been the evident option—would have appointed him, which implies that the Latin emperor did have some part in this. The podestà's certain joint involvement is evident from the mentioned deed of 1210 in which Lanfranco gives evidence as the representative of the podestà, in order to give the document in question legal validity in Venetian courts, as

¹⁹⁶ Ibidem, pp. 52–53.

¹⁹⁷ Morozzo Della Rocca, *Documenti*, I, n° 519.

¹⁹⁸ Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, p. 53. The author mentions also another *iudex foresecus*, the Venetian Niccolò Priuli (1207).

¹⁹⁹ The possibility that *Vicecomes* is not a family name but an official title leads to a similar conclusion as regards Lanfranco's origins. The only known *vicecomes* in Latin Constantinople was the administrator of the Pisan quarter in the city (Müller, *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane*, III, n° 55; Löwenfeld, *Une lettre de l'impératrice Marie de Constantinople*, pp. 256–257).

Jacoby has quite correctly remarked. The logical conclusion is then that Lanfranco was appointed by the mixed council or by commissioners delegated by that council.

It is not possible to ascertain the extent to which the *forma* was applied outside Constantinople and the core quarter, in the feudal principalities. The fact that the treaty was no doubt intended for the empire in its entirety in any event demonstrates once again the imperial solicitude vis-à-vis judicial uniformity, and illustrates the imperial ambition to acquire certain rights of sovereignty.

A Uniform Feudal Legal Code for the Empire

The question as to whether a feudal legal code for the empire existed prior to the third quarter of the thirteenth-century is an issue that has been the subject of much discussion in the historiography. However, we shall try to demonstrate that such a legal code effectively came into being shortly after 1204, and that this was the result of an imperial initiative. Inter alia the previously discussed *constitutio* on the ban of gifts to religious institutions negates two hypotheses that until now have been accepted in the literature concerning imperial authority. Firstly, that as the result of the numerous wars the emperors never found the opportunity to devote themselves to legislative activities. Secondly, that in the area of legislation there was no influence from Latin Constantinople on the feudal principalities in the empire.²⁰⁰ We would point out that Raoul of Tiberias, a prominent legal scholar from the Kingdom of Jerusalem, sojourned at court in the years 1204–1206, and that Marshal Geoffrey of Villehardouin and court cup-bearer Milon le Bréban also had experience in feudal issues.²⁰¹ Emperor Baldwin himself had the feudal right of succession of the County of Hainaut set down in writing in 1200.²⁰² In short, present in Constantinople were specialists who were capable of elaborating a corpus of feudal legal

²⁰⁰ Cf. Recoura, *Les Assises de Romanie*, pp. 30–33. Topping, *The formation of the Assizes of Romania*, pp. 305–308. Jacoby, *La Féodalité en Grèce médiévale*, pp. 40–42, 59–62. This author does accept the existence of an oral corpus of feudal legal provisions for the empire as a whole, but does not accept that this corpus would have influenced the *Assises de Romanie* in the Princedom of Achaëa.

²⁰¹ Villehardouin, §316. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 174, p. 35. Jacoby, *La Féodalité en Grèce médiévale*, pp. 39–40. Longnon, *Recherches sur la vie de Villehardouin*, n° 92, p. 207.

²⁰² Wolff, *Baldwin of Flanders and Hainaut*, pp. 283–283.

rules. The pacts of March 1204 and October 1205 had in any case already established a number of basic principles of feudal rights.

In 1229 we find for the first time a mention of the *approbatas consuetudines imperii*, which by virtue of his agreement with the barons of Constantinople Emperor-elect John of Brienne was to uphold.²⁰³ A charter dated 1275 from Euboia shows that a *bonum usum imperii Romanie* was already applicable in the region incirca 1217.²⁰⁴ The question arises as to what these *consuetudines* and this *usum* implied, and how they related to the later *Assises de Romanie*, also designated as *Usages et Coutumes de l'Empire de Romanie*, an early 14th-century private codification of feudal rights in the Princedom of Achaea. Information about the above-mentioned *consuetudines imperii* for the remaining thirteenth century is limited to a few records, which in general provide no clue as to their content.²⁰⁵ However, a 1282 charter of Marco II Sanudo, lord of the *ducatus* of Naxos and Andros, in which he defended his rights to the island of Andros vis-à-vis the Venetian doge, throws more light on the matter. Two passages allude to concrete provisions of the *usus et consuetudo imperii Romanie* in connection with a question that goes back to the reign of Marco's father, Angelo Sanudo (1227–1262).²⁰⁶ The first passage states that the *consuetudines*

²⁰³ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 273, p. 269.

²⁰⁴ Ibidem, III, n° 366, p. 131. On the dating: Jacoby, *La Féodalité en Grèce médiévale*, p. 59.

²⁰⁵ In 1246 Emperor Baldwin II of Courtenay cited a *bona consuetudo imperii* which allowed the making of gifts to religious institutions (Ruano, *Balduino II de Constantino y la Orden de Santiago*, n° 3, p. 33). In 1251 Angelo Sanudo, lord of the *ducatus* of the Cyclades, enfeoffed a vassal with fiefdoms *ad bonum usum imperii Romanie* (ASV, San Stefano, B. 1 pergg. (Archivio Familia Venier dei Santi Apostoli). In 1266 Baldwin II enfeoffed Hugh IV, Duke of Burgundy, with the Kingdom of Thessalonike according to the *us et costumes de l'empire* (Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux pour servir à une histoire de la Domination française*, I, pp. 28–29). In 1267—with the signing of the Treaty of Viterbo by which the Latin emperor transferred the suzerainty over the Princedom of Achaea to Charles I of Anjou, King van Sicily—and in 1270 William II of Villehardouin, Prince of Achaea, had to ensure that his viscounts and barons swore allegiance *iuxta consuetudinem imperii Romanie* to the Sicilian monarch (Longnon, *Le traité de Viterbe entre Charles Ier d'Anjou et Guillaume de Villehardouin*, p. 312; Filangieri Di Candida, *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, p. 81). In the previously-mentioned charter of 1275 from Euboia there is an allusion to the *homagium ligium* and the military services *ad bonum usum imperii Romanie* (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, III, n° 366, p. 131).

²⁰⁶ Hopf, *Urkunden und Zusätze zur Geschichte der Insel Andros*, n° 8, p. 244. Jacoby believes, in our view incorrectly, that the term *usus et consuetudo imperii Romanie* in this document stands for the feudal rights of the Princedom of Achaea, as this is known from the *Assises de Romanie*. Between 1248 and 1255 the Prince of Achaea

contained specific conditions concerning the inheritance of fiefdoms, and in particular relating to the time within which heirs must make known their claim to a fiefdom. The second passage indicates that the *consuetudines* stipulated that a dispute between a vassal and his lord should be settled before the *curia* of the lord and not before another legal institution. Both of these passages suggest that, before 1262 at the latest, the *consuetudines imperii Romanie* formed a corpus that contained elaborate stipulations on a diversity of questions of feudal law, and was much more comprehensive than the summary feudal principles that had been described in the constitutional treaties of 1204 and 1205. Mentions of the *usus imperii Romanie* in 1246 and 1275 are in a similar vein.²⁰⁷

From the finding that references to a legal corpus designated by the term *consuetudines imperii Romanie* (or a variant thereof) occur in a number of parts of the empire (Constantinople, Achaea, Négrepont, and Naxos), we can deduce that the *consuetudines* were brought into being on the initiative of the Latin emperors and were disseminated from Constantinople to these various regions, otherwise it would be impossible to explain how a single feudal rights corpus could have come into being in the different regions. Contrary to prevalent opinion, this also implies that the fourteenth-century codified version of the *Assises de Romanie* from the Princedom of Achaea must also be based partially on the original *consuetudines*. If such a legal corpus did indeed come into being as the result of an imperial initiative, the question then remains as to the date of its creation. In our opinion, the years 1204–1224, when central authority was at its highest point and the emperor could exercise effective influence on the regional lords and barons, would seem to be the most likely. The lack of sources make it impossible to elaborate further on the precise content of the *consuetudines*, and the same applies to the question as to which feudal

received the suzerainty over inter alia the *ducatus* of Naxos and Andros and also Euboea. According to Jacoby, in this context after the fall of Constantinople in 1261 the feudal rights of the princedom could in a certain sense apply as the feudal rights of the entire empire (Jacoby, *La Féodalité en Grèce médiévale*, pp. 22, 60–61). However, the *usum imperii Romanie* was already mentioned in a 1251 enfeoffment charter of Angelo Sanudo, lord of the *ducatus* of Naxos and Andros, when Constantinople was still in the hands of the Latin emperor (ASV, San Stefano, B. 1 perg. (Arch. Fam. Venier dei SS. Apostoli)).

²⁰⁷ Cf. note 205.

law codes had any influence on its composition, although those of the home regions of the imperial entourage are very likely candidates.

Little is known about the manner in which the emperors introduced this feudal corpus in the empire. Interesting information is provided by the early fourteenth-century French version of the Chronicle of Morea, for a long time not taken seriously as regards the view represented in it of the coming into being of the *Assises de Romanie*. At the parliament of Ravennika in 1209 during the imperial campaign in the Kingdom of Thessalonike and Southern Greece, Emperor Henry is said to have given Geoffrey I of Villehardouin, Prince of Achaea a written version of the *Usages de l'empire*.²⁰⁸ In our opinion it would seem very possible that at this parliament the emperor indeed did impose a number of feudal stipulations on the vassals present. In any event, feudal matters certainly were raised at Ravennika, as is evidenced by the feudal oath of allegiance pledged by inter alia Villehardouin to the emperor.²⁰⁹ From circa 1209 there were also local imperial representatives established in a number of regions of the empire via whom ordinances could be disseminated. In this context, the existence of a written version of the *consuetudines* is not improbable. We should bear in mind that we do indeed have available to us written versions of the *forma iustitiae* between non-Venetian Latins and Venetians and the agreement on church possessions. It is also almost certain that the imperial *constitutio* of 1207 was drawn up in writing. The confrontation with Byzantine tradition must have had an inspirational working. The introduction of a feudal corpus itself was certainly an element with Western origins, which was of course coupled directly with the feudalization of the empire, but which the imperial authority nonetheless seized upon as a tool for the furtherance of the political unity of the empire.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN EMPEROR AND VASSALS

In the period studied, the emperors were involved in serious conflict with a number of their vassals on several occasions. The constitutional treaty of October 1205 prescribed that such disputes were subject to the judgment of a commission of judges that had to be assembled

²⁰⁸ *Chronique De Moree*, J. Longnon (éd.), Paris, 1911, §185.

²⁰⁹ Valenciennes, §667–671.

by the mixed council of non-Venetian barons and the podestà and his counsellors. The question then arises as to whether such disputes between the emperor and his liegemen were actually solved in the prescribed manner.

Very soon after Baldwin I's imperial coronation in May 1204, a serious conflict broke out with Boniface of Montferrat. In the summer of 1204 Emperor Baldwin set out on an expedition to take possession of Thrace. On his arrival in Adrianople the message reached the emperor that the former Emperor Alexios III Angelos was in Mosynopolis. Baldwin then decided to depart for this town, but before the Latin emperor reached Mosynopolis, Alexios fled further, in the direction of Thessaly. Once arrived in Mosynopolis, Baldwin decided, before leaving for Thessalonike, to wait for Marquis Boniface, who in the meantime had also left Constantinople with an army, and to whom Thessalonike had been given as a fiefdom.²¹⁰ When Boniface arrived at Mosynopolis, he asked the emperor's permission to take possession of Thessalonike personally and without imperial involvement. However, Baldwin refused, he himself wanting to set out for Thessalonike, although the marquis threatened that in that event he would abandon the campaign.

Emperor Baldwin then continued his journey to Thessalonike and took possession of the city, where he installed a garrison. In the meantime Boniface returned to Thrace, where he took possession of the city of Didymoteichon, proclaiming the underage Manuel Angelos emperor, and began to besiege Adrianople, which was occupied by an imperial garrison.²¹¹ The imperial commander of this city despatched messengers to the barons who had remained—inter alia Count Louis of Blois, Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Cono of Béthune—and to the doge in Constantinople to inform them about the conflict. The barons and the doge succeeded in convincing both Boniface and Baldwin to subject themselves to their judgment. At a *parlement* held in the presence of Emperor Baldwin and Marquis Boniface it was decided that Thessalonike should be handed over to Boniface as it had been

²¹⁰ Cf. Chapter I, note 24.

²¹¹ Manuel was the eldest son (born circa 1193–1195) of Margaret of Hungary, whom Boniface had married shortly after Baldwin's imperial election, and Isaac II Angelos (Hendrickx, *Boniface de Montferrat et Manuel Angelos*, pp. 71–74).

awarded to him as a fiefdom, and that the marquis would again relinquish Didymoteichon in exchange.²¹²

The difference of opinion between Emperor Baldwin and Marquis Boniface concerning the taking possession of Thessalonike can be understood to be a feudal rights conflict, in which each party wished to have confirmed what they believed to be their rights to the city, that is to say Boniface's right of fiefdom and Baldwin's imperial suzerainty rights.²¹³ What is important is that both the emperor and Boniface showed their preparedness to subject themselves to the judgment of the great barons in Constantinople and the Venetian doge, thus according to the stipulations thereto that were to be laid down in the agreement of October 1205. It is possible that these clauses were included in this treaty precisely as the result of the conflict between Baldwin and Boniface.

In 1208–1209 there occurred a second major conflict between the emperor and a number of his vassals. In these years, a group consisting principally of North Italian—or Lombard—barons in the Kingdom of Thessalonike and in Southern Thessaly, Beotia and Euboia, tried to make Thessalonike and the contiguous territories completely independent of imperial suzerainty.²¹⁴ At the same time they wanted to depose Boniface's minor successor Demetrios of Montferrat from the throne and replace him with his half-brother William VI, Marquis of Montferrat. The plotters furthermore saw no room for Byzantine participation in the kingdom's government. Emperor Henry reacted by setting out for Thessalonike with an army in order to set matters to rights. In collaboration with the Latin—chiefly French and German—and Byzantine political elite in the kingdom who were opposed to the Lombard plans and who supported Latin-Byzantine co-operation, the emperor was able to quash the rebellion by means of a combination of diplomacy and military force.²¹⁵

²¹² Villehardouin, §272–299. De Clari, §99–105. Niketas Choniates, pp. 598–600. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, pp. 55–61.

²¹³ Cf. Hendrickx, *Le contrat féodal*, pp. 240–241. The author is of the opinion that Baldwin was indeed the suzerain of the empire, but nevertheless did not possess suzerainty over the Kingdom of Thessalonike.

²¹⁴ This objective of the Lombard barons, which eluded Hendrickx, undermines his legalistic view of this conflict (*Ibidem*, pp. 241–242).

²¹⁵ On the Lombard rebellion: Valenciennes, §560–588. Haberstumpf, *Dinastie*, pp. 164–173. On the two political factions in the kingdom, see also p. 247.

Important here is that, in contrast to what happened in 1204, the emperor and his personal entourage saw fit to act against rebellious liegemen without a mixed council of judges ever having been appointed, which had been one of the stipulations of the October 1205 agreement. For example, during the rebellion the commander of the Lombard party, Oberto II of Biandrate, Regent of Thessalonike, was repeatedly subjected to the judgment of the emperor and the imperial court, which in this context could be supplemented by members of the Thessalonikan court, including, *inter alia*, Margaret of Hungary, mother and guardian of King Demetrios of Montferrat.²¹⁶ The evolution observed can be explained by the fact that the procedure laid down in 1204–1205 was only workable as long as there were barons present in Constantinople who, as regards their political prestige, could provide a sufficient counterbalance against the ambitions of the Latin emperor. In 1204 with Count Louis of Blois and Doge Enrico Dandolo this was still the case. In 1208–1209 however, these persons—and also, for example, Boniface of Montferrat and Count Hugh IV of Saint-Pol—had disappeared from the scene, as the result of which the emperor had a free hand. Less socially prominent barons who were resident in Constantinople, such as Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Cono of Béthune and who in 1204 had functioned as neutral arbiters between Baldwin and Boniface—had in the meantime converted to the imperial side.

Emperor Henry also appears to have acted without the intermediation of the mixed council against Michael Doukas, ruler of Epiros, who in the years 1210–1212 repeatedly broke his oath of allegiance to the emperor and who tried to bring Southern Thessaly and Thessalonike under control, and his ally Strez of Prosek. Indeed, Doukas also broke with Venice and, probably in the same years, was able to capture Corfu from La Serenissima. Doubtlessly the rulers of Epiros and Prosek tried to regain the independence they had enjoyed prior to 1209. In 1209 they had accepted the imperial suzerainty only because of the threatening proximity of the imperial army. For Doukas it may have been in particular the award of a dowry to the value of one-third of his territories to Emperor Henry's brother Eustace of Hainaut, who in 1209–1210 married his daughter, that was a bridge too far. However,

²¹⁶ Ibidem, §607–610, 626, 646, 679, 687. Hendrickx, *Le pouvoir impérial*, pp. 112–116.

repeated defeats brought the two rulers to recognize the imperial suzerainty once again in 1212, with which for Doukas the annexation of Corfu—whether or not with tacit imperial consent—can have sweetened the pill to some extent.²¹⁷ In this conflict—and also in the case of the Lombard rebellion, which threatened the integrity of the empire—the high-handed imperial action could be legally based by virtue of the basic agreement of 1205 that stipulated that the emperor should at all times act *ad defendum en manutenendum imperium*.²¹⁸

A case circa 1213 indicates how the emperor saw himself empowered to act against vassals outside the core quarter, even when the preservation of the empire was not at stake. A magnate in the Kingdom of Thessalonike—about whom we have no further information—had built a fortress on Mount Athos, from which he terrorized the local Byzantine communities of monks. The emperor took the initiative to remove this person in a manner that was far from gentle.²¹⁹ We may infer from this that there existed an imperial court that considered itself qualified to act in any area of the empire in the event of conflicts of a diverse nature. We can ask ourselves whether the imperial powers took an initiative to legitimize and institutionalize such interventions, and to do so in contravention of the pact of October 1205. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a late testimony indicates that the *consuetudines imperii Romanie* determined that a dispute between vassal and lord should be settled before the lord's *curia*.²²⁰

Around 1216 the Lombard question resurfaced in the Kingdom of Thessalonike. Emperor Henry saw himself obliged to undertake a second expedition in support of the still underage king Demetrios. Maybe Henry at the same time wanted to deal with some vassals who had usurped imperial rights and incomes.²²¹ During the expedition Henry however fell ill near Thessalonike and he died shortly afterwards on the 11th of Juin, causing rumours of poisoning to be spread in the

²¹⁷ Van Tricht, *La politique étrangère (1re partie)*, pp. 232–237.

²¹⁸ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 160.

²¹⁹ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 957 (XVI, 168).

²²⁰ Hopf, *Urkunden und Zusätze zur Geschichte der Insel Andros*, n° 8, p. 244.

²²¹ Circa 1215–1216 at Henry's request Innocent III instructed three further unnamed bishops in Latin Romania to compel a number of barons to relinquish certain imperial rights and incomes to the emperor. Although the extant summary of the papal letter contains no clues as to where these barons were located in the empire, we may surmise that they were situated in the kingdom of Thessalonike, where there had already been similar troubles in 1208–1209 (Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Slavorum Meridionalium*, I, n° 25–26, p. 64).

West.²²² A papal letter from August 1216 taking Demetrios under the protection of the Holy See indicates that Henry had not had the time to appease the renewed tensions.²²³ It was up to the new imperial couple, Peter of Courtenay and Yolande of Flanders/Hainaut, to solve the problem. It is significant that they did not wait until they had arrived in Constantinople. On the contrary, in april 1217—while still in Rome where Honorius III had crowned them—Peter decided autonomously to go along with the Lombard lobby and to co-invest William VI of Montferrat with the Kingdom of Thessalonike.²²⁴ Once again however we find no reference to the mixed council in the resolution of this conflict.

After 1217 there are no more known initiatives of a judicial nature on the part of the Latin emperor with regard to the feudal principalities. It is difficult to discover whether this is the consequence of the meagre situation with respect to the sources or of a change of policy.

An exceptional source of conflicts and tension was the relationship between the emperors and the city of Venice, which in the basic treaties of 1204–1205 had managed to gain for herself a theoretically major role in the government of the empire, together with extensive economic privileges. However, converting these principles and rights in practice appeared not to be evident. For example, in Epiros and Achaëa, territories belonging to La Serenissima, as we remarked earlier, the local rulers pledged the feudal oath first to the emperor and only later to Venice, as the result of which it was the emperor who legitimized these rulers' dominion over the territories they had acquired. In Constantinople it was not until 1223 that the emperor agreed to seek an arrangement that was satisfactory for Venice with regard to the division of the proceeds of the *campi* from the Latin trading colonies. In a *privilegium*—so formally by virtue of imperial favour and not as the result of a bilateral agreement—in February 1224

²²² De Clari states that Henry crowned Demetrios king during the expedition. Presumably the chronicler confuses the campaign of 1216, which is corroborated by other sources, with Demetrios' coronation in 1209. A second coronation indeed seems rather unlikely, but we can infer indubitably from De Clari's text that Henry's intention was to support Demetrios (De Clari, §119; Roberti Autissiodorensis Chronici Continuatio, p. 281). On the poisoning rumours: Chronographia Sigeberti Gemblacensis. Continuatio Bergensis, p. 439. Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, pp. 401–402.

²²³ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 19.

²²⁴ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 508.

Robert granted 3/8 of the income from the *campi* of the *Provinzales* and the *Hyspani* to Venice.²²⁵ Nonetheless, in July 1224 the question of the *campi* was still not settled definitively.²²⁶ In Constantinople, non-Venetian barons of the imperial entourage, including *protovestiarios* Cono I of Béthune, still owned properties in the Venetian quarter.²²⁷ It would seem to us not very probable that such a prominent figure would have taken much heed of Venetian jurisdiction.²²⁸ The imperial foundation in the Venetian quarter of the Cistercian monastery *Sancta Maria Sancti Angeli* in Petrion in 1214, patronized by numerous imperial barons, can equally have been a thorn in the flesh for Venice.²²⁹ Also with regard to the *casalia monetae* that were jointly exploited by the emperor and Venice, La Serenissima does seem to have seen her rights denied. This suggests in any case the explicit mention of the Venetian claim of 3/8 thereof in the 1231 agreement between Emperor-elect John of Brienne and Doge Pietro Ziani.²³⁰ The denial of Venetian rights appears in a more general way from Villehardouin's description of the enfeoffment of Adrianople, part of the Venetian quarter, to Theodore Branas in 1206. The marshal does not make a single mention of the Venetian rights to the city.²³¹

The evolution in the concrete circumstances of the confirmation of the constitutional pacts through an oath sworn by the successive emperors indicates that this ceremony also caused some tension, although

²²⁵ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 269. On these *campi*: Jacoby, *The Venetian Quarter*, p. 162. Other agreements between the emperor and the podestà retained an explicitly bilateral character: Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 180, n° 260, n° 267; Longnon, *Recherches sur la vie de Villehardouin*, n° 83.

²²⁶ Cessi, *Deliberazioni*, I, n° 69: 'De facto camporum quos Francigene suos dicunt.'

²²⁷ Cono's possessions are mentioned in a Venetian receipt of May 1211: AVS, Mense Patriarchale, B. 9, n° 21. Maltezou, *Il quartiere veneziano di Constantinopoli*, n° 34.

²²⁸ A contrasting view in: Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, p. 50.

²²⁹ Janin, *Notes d'Histoire et de Topographie: l'abbaye cistercienne 'Saint-Ange de Pétra' (1214-1261)*, pp. 171-173. Clair, *Les filles d'Hautecombe dans l'empire latin de Constantinople*, pp. 269-270.

²³⁰ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 277, p. 283. To see that the position of the podestà, and in particular with respect to the Venetian colonies in Venetian Thrace, was rather weak: Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 257, pp. 218-219. Cessi, *Deliberazioni*, I, n° 69, pp. 66-67.

²³¹ Villehardouin, §423. However, Podestà Zeno managed to have the Venetian rights formally recognized by Branas: Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 169. Cf. Hendrickx, *Some notes on the "state" of Theodoros Branas*, pp. 123-124.

the principle thereof was never called into question.²³² However, the Venetian share in the government of the empire via membership of the mixed council, which the treaty of October 1205 had brought into being as in theory the central decision-making instrument of the empire, did become seriously undermined. The council played no role of any importance after circa 1207. For example, Venice had no voice in the conflict between Emperor Henry and the Lombard party in Thessalonike, although the solution of feudal disputes between the emperor and his liegemen was indeed one of the competencies of the mixed council. A second illustration of the exclusion of Venice from political decision-making is the manner in which in 1219 after the death of Empress Yolande the non-Venetian barons elected her son Philip of Courtenay as her successor, without any Venetian say in the matter, which caused concern to Podestà Tiepolo.²³³ Another important area in which the emperors, in collaboration with the Pope and with the non-Venetian clergy, denied the Venetian rights, concerned the city's monopoly of the patriarchate, an issue we shall discuss later.²³⁴

From her side, neither did Venice always demonstrate loyalty vis-à-vis the constitutional treaties. An illustration of this is the deal between Venice and Boniface of Montferrat at the time of the conflict between

²³² In 1206 Regent Henry swore this oath eight days prior to his imperial coronation: '*Nos quidem Henricus moderator imperii Constantinopolitani ante altare sancte Sophie ut deberemus coronari a domino Patriarcha secundum Dei providentiam*'. (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 174, p. 34). In 1217 the oath was sworn only after the coronation of the imperial couple Peter and Yolande. Furthermore, neither Peter nor Yolande swore the oath themselves, each nominated a person from their entourage to do so in their place (Ibidem, n° 249, p. 195). In 1221 the oath was sworn again after the imperial coronation. Moreover, Emperor Robert and the podestà drew up a document in which they jointly confirmed the basic treaties of 1204–1205 (Ibidem, n° 260, pp. 227–229).

²³³ Tiepolo expresses this in a letter to Doge Pietro Ziani as follows: '*Sciatis pro certo quod barones palam dicunt et manifestant quod ipsi iuraverunt dominae imperatrici et suis heredibus et quod pro certo dicunt quod habent pro domino et imperatore Philip-pum filium eiusdem dominae imperatricis et ipsum expectant venturum ad Romaniam usque ad primum venturum festum nativitatis Joannis Baptistae super quibus prudentia vestra secundum vestram discretionem provideat. Et pro certo sciatis quod in his duobus videlicet in facto patriarchatus et imperatoris pendent ea omnia quae ad honorem vestrum et patriae nostrae in hoc imperio pertinent et modo est necesse ut haec manuteneatis ad honorem vestrum quia tempus est super his providendi*'. (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 257, p. 220).

²³⁴ An interesting passage in this connection is in the letter from Tiepolo mentioned in the previous note: '*Et tam ipse [= papal legate Giovanni Colonna] quam omnes barones et Francigenae clerici atque laici conantur de diminutione vestra in facto patriarchatus*'. (Ibidem, p. 219).

Emperor Baldwin and the marquis. In August 1204, messengers of Doge Dandolo were part of the deputation that was intended to persuade Boniface to seek a peaceable solution to the conflict.²³⁵ However, Dandolo's envoys also carried out other discussions with the marquis. The result thereof was that Boniface of Montferrat relinquished the island of Crete (given to him by Emperor Alexios IV Angelos), a claim of 100,000 hyperpera (promised to him by the same emperor), the *feodum* that the late Emperor Manuel Komnenos had given his brother Renier, the territories near Thessalonike that had been awarded to him, together with his other possessions in the empire. In exchange the marquis received immediately 1,000 silver marks, together with possessions in the western part of the empire to the value of 10,000 hyperpera, which he would hold in fief from the doge. Although the *imperatoris fidelitas* and the *servitia imperatoris et imperii* were recognized in the agreement, this was nonetheless in conflict with the stipulations of the treaty of March 1204 in the sense that by means of this Venice endeavoured to gain a claim on considerably more than her allocated 3/8 of the empire's territory, together with part of the imperial coffer.²³⁶ The Venetian ambitions must have doubtless caused the Latin emperor some concern.²³⁷

The feudal agreements that Venice entered into in 1209 and 1216 with the lords of Euboea and in 1210 with Michael Doukas of Epiros demonstrate a similar lack of loyalty vis-à-vis imperial authority. The

²³⁵ Cf. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, p. 55.

²³⁶ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 123, pp. 513–514. BORSARI, *Il dominio veneziano a Creta nel XIII secolo*, pp. 12–13. Haberstumpf, *Dinastie*, pp. 60–61. Madden has recently argued that the agreement between Dandolo and Boniface created no bond of vassalage (Madden, *The Latin Empire of Constantinople's Fractured Foundation*, p. 50, note 21). However, the text uses similar terms to describe the relationship between Boniface and Venice ('*quas si quidem possessiones per predictum dominum Ducam et successores et homines Venecie tenere et habere debeo imperpetuum*') and that between Boniface and his vassals ('*omnes homines qui ipsas possessiones per me habebunt*'). In addition the agreement required Boniface to take an oath (*iuramentum*) to '*auxilium prestare contra omnes homines qui ipsos [= the Venetians] ex parte vel ex toto de suprascriptis omnibus possessionibus et honorificentis mollestare aut expellere voluerint salva tamen imperatoris fidelitate*.' In our view the terminology used clearly implies that a feudal relationship was established between the marquis and Venice.

²³⁷ We don't agree with Madden's conclusion that the treaty between Boniface and Venice was really part of an intricate plan by which doge Dandolo brokered peace between the marquis and Emperor Baldwin in the context of their conflict over Thessalonike (Madden, *Op. cit.*, pp. 51–52; idem, *Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice*, pp. 184–189). Cf. our critique on Maddens line of reasoning in the previous note and Chapter I, note 24.

same conclusion applies to the documents in relation to the award of fiefdoms on Crete.²³⁸ In none of these agreements that were drawn up by the Venetian chancellery is there any reference to be found of imperial rights. Only in the Treaty of Sapienza of 1209 with Geoffrey I of Villehardouin concerning the Princedom of Achaea figures the phrase *salva fidelitate domini imperatoris*, but there were imperial representatives involved in the creation of this agreement.²³⁹ A further denial of imperial authority is shown by the peace treaty that Venice signed in 1218 after many years of drawn out conflict with Genoa. In this, La Serenissima assigned to Genoa all the commercial rights that the city had enjoyed prior to 1204 in the Byzantine Empire, without any reference to imperial authority.²⁴⁰

CLERICS AS IMPERIAL AGENTS

In order to establish real authority in the various parts of the empire, the emperors did not forbear from involving the Church. This strategy to exercise political influence can be found in Western Europe as well as in Byzantium. However, the influence of the Latin emperors on the Church was never as all-encompassing as that of their Byzantine predecessors, and was sooner comparable with that of contemporary Western rulers. This relationship of the Latin emperors with the Church, which thus can be characterized sooner as Western, we also found in their dealings with the religious aspect of the Byzantine imperial ideology. Nonetheless, we shall demonstrate that for a number of their prerogatives they were inspired by the rights of the Byzantine emperor vis-à-vis the Church.

The Imperial Prerogatives with Regard to the Patriarchal Election, the Chapter of Saint Sophia and the Collegiate Churches of Constantinople

The Byzantine emperors played a decisive role in the election of the patriarch of Constantinople. The patriarchal synod, composed of all the metropolitans, selected three candidates, from whom the emperor then chose one. In the event that none of the candidates was to the

²³⁸ Cf. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 205, n° 229–230, n° 241–242.

²³⁹ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 207, p. 98.

²⁴⁰ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 251, pp. 202–203.

emperor's liking, he was at liberty to appoint someone else.²⁴¹ The Latin emperors in no way played such a preponderant role, and could exert influence only indirectly. In theory the appointment of the patriarch was the prerogative of the Venetian community by virtue of the agreement of March 1204, as compensation for the emperorship that was allotted to the non-Venetian component of the crusading army.²⁴² However, the Pope swiftly challenged the Venetian grip on the patriarchate. As early as May 1205, after the controversial appointment of Thomas Morosini, Innocent III specified that in future the patriarch should be chosen by the Chapter of Saint Sophia and by the prelates of all collegiate churches of Constantinople.²⁴³ As the result of this, the right of appointment in the Chapter of Saint Sophia and in the collegiate churches in the years 1205–1210 became the issue in a conflict between the Venetian and non-Venetian clergy of Constantinople, in which Innocent supported the non-Venetian party.

As regards the Chapter of Saint Sophia, circa 1208–1209 Innocent managed to ensure that Patriarch Thomas Morosini publicly abjured his 1204 non-canonical oath to Venice to appoint only Venetian canons, and that the Venetian canons also abjured their oath to accept only Venetians into the Chapter in future.²⁴⁴ From 1206 the Pope had already appointed a number of non-Venetian canons to the patriarchal church, either doing so himself or via his legates.²⁴⁵ In these years, with papal support Emperor Henry too was able to have a number of clerics from his entourage appointed to the Chapter of Saint Sophia, and with Innocent he stood up for the rights of the non-Venetian canons.²⁴⁶ As Wolff correctly remarks, in doing so the emperor acted as the natural leader of the non-Venetian Latin clergy in the capital.²⁴⁷

²⁴¹ Brehier, *Les Institutions de l'Empire byzantin*, pp. 381–382.

²⁴² Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267, p. 557.

²⁴³ Wolff, *Politics in the Latin patriarchate of Constantinople*, n° 2, p. 297. Venetian clerics who had appointed themselves as canons of Saint Sophia in 1204 chose papal subdeacon Thomas Morosini as patriarch. Innocent III condemned the whole procedure, but nonetheless chose himself the same Morosini as patriarch (Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 516 (VII, 203)).

²⁴⁴ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1387 (XI, 76); col. 1392 (XI, 77); CCXVI, col. 118 (XII, 105).

²⁴⁵ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 951 (IX, 134); col. 1196 (X, 128).

²⁴⁶ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 946 (IX, 129); CCXVI, col. 147 (XII, 113); col. 217 (XIII, 18).

²⁴⁷ This is apparent from the finding that clerics from the imperial entourage were often participants in the delegations that the non-Venetian clergy sent to the Papal Curia in order to defend their interests against Patriarch Morosini, and that inversely the Pope regularly requested imperial clerics to push through his policies vis-à-vis

Circa 1212 nine canons out of thirty-two appear to have belonged to the non-Venetian camp.²⁴⁸ In 1219–1225 there were thirteen canons out of thirty-eight belonging to the same group.²⁴⁹ Approximately one-third of the Chapter of Saint Sophia was therefore pro-imperial.

The prelates of the *praepositurae* or collegiate churches of Constantinople formed the second group of clerics that had a vote in the patriarchal election by virtue of the above-mentioned letter from Innocent in May 1205. In 1204–1205, thirty churches in the non-Venetian quarter of Constantinople were converted into *praepositurae* by papal legate Pietro Capuano in Constantinople. He assigned the right of presentation of these thirty churches to the emperor. In 1206–1207, Patriarch Morosini contested this prerogative, with the intention of safeguarding the Venetian monopoly of the patriarchal election, at which the emperor defended his right with the argument, *inter alia*, that numerous Western kings possessed similar prerogatives. Capuano's successor as papal legate Benedictus, Cardinal of Saint Susanna, circa 1207 assigned the right of presentation of only seven *praepositurae* to the emperor. The other 23 lost their status as *praepositura* and as a consequence their role in the patriarchal election.

However, on the event of the patriarchal election in 1211 it appeared that the non-Venetian clergy, and certainly the Latin emperor too, had refused to take heed of Benedict's decision: there were still considerably more than seven non-Venetian *praepositurae* and the non-Venetian camp thus demanded more than seven prelates for the representation of these churches, which naturally elicited protest from the Venetian clergy and the podestà. In 1217, at the request of the Chapter of Saint Sophia—or rather the Venetian camp therein—Honorius III confirmed the *cassatio* of twenty-three collegiate churches, just as Innocent III had already done. By that time a number of the thirty collegiate churches had certainly fallen into decline, as is evident from a letter of 1219 from the Venetian podestà. However, during his mission in 1218–1221 and with the agreement of the same Honorius, papal legate Giovanni Colonna restored all collegiate churches, the number of which had in the meantime risen to thirty-two. In 1222 at the request of Emperor Robert, the Pope confirmed his right of

a Venetian patriarch. Cf. Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1363 (XI, 37); col. 1395 (XI, 78); col. 1392 (XI, 77).

²⁴⁸ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 677 (XV, 156).

²⁴⁹ Cf. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 257, p. 219; Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 5501.

presentation over the thirty-two collegiate churches in the non-Venetian part of Constantinople, as exercised by his predecessors, and again emphasized their right of participation in the patriarchal election. It is true that the Venetian clergy also had a few collegiate churches in the Venetian part of Constantinople, but these could not be described as numerous. In the election of 1211 the Venetian party had only one *praepositus*. Moreover, in 1219 legate Giovanni Colonna had called into question the right of participation of those Venetian collegiate churches in the patriarchal election.²⁵⁰

The question remains as to whether the imperial influence and prerogatives described led to actual influence on the patriarchal elections. As we have said already, Morosini's election in 1204 took place entirely as the result of Venetian initiative, without any imperial interference. At that moment Doge Enrico Dandolo was still present in person in Constantinople, and Emperor Baldwin, who had just ascended the throne, was not in a position from which he could immediately challenge the Venetian rights to the patriarchate. The election after the death of Morosini in 1211 however does certainly evidence imperial influence. A first round of elections, in which the Venetian canons of Saint Sophia attempted to exclude the non-Venetian, imperial clergy from participation, was contended by the latter at the Papal Curia and declared null and void by Innocent III. The second round at the end of 1211, in which the non-Venetian clergy did participate, ended in a double election. The non-Venetian clergy opted for Gervasius, the Venetian Archbishop of Herakleia in Thrace, while the Venetian party chose Ludovicus, *plebanus* of St Paul's Church in Venice. Each party attempted to gain a favourable judgment at the Papal Curia and, after the matter had dragged on for several years, at the time of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 Innocent finally appointed Gervasius as Patriarch of Constantinople. The candidate of the non-Venetian, imperial clerics was successful, their lobbying in the Papal Curia having apparently been effective.²⁵¹

²⁵⁰ The following documents deal extensively with the question of the collegiate churches: Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1349 (XI, 16); CCXVI, col. 459 (XIV, 97); col. 675 (XV, 156). Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 18, p. 37. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 257, p. 219. Wolff, *Politics in the Latin patriarchate of Constantinople*, n° 5, p. 301. Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, p. 47.

²⁵¹ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 459–460 (XIV, 97); col. 675–681 (XV, 156). Wolff, *Politics in the Latin patriarchate of Constantinople*, pp. 247–252.

After the death of Gervasius at the end of 1219, the choice of patriarch once more turned out to be a double election, and the imperial and Venetian parties again appealed to the judgment of the Papal Curia. It is possible that, prior to the election, the doge attempted to win the Pope over for a Venetian candidate on the advice of his podestà in Constantinople, who may have seen the prospect of a double election. In any event, when it became apparent in the Curia that the representatives of each party would not reach agreement, Honorius III himself made the decision and appointed the Venetian Mattheus, Bishop of Jesolo and suffragan of the Patriarchate of Grado, as patriarch in early 1221.²⁵² This choice of a Venetian without ties with the Latin emperorship answered Venetian aspirations. Without doubt, the circumstance that the imperial throne was vacant during these years played a role that was disadvantageous to the imperial, non-Venetian party.

After the death of Patriarch Mattheus in 1226, the now familiar scene repeated itself once more. The imperial clergy opted for Milo of Châtillon, Bishop of Beauvais. Milo had connections with John of Béthune, a baron of the imperial entourage.²⁵³ The Venetian party protested against this and both camps embarked on an action at the Papal Curia. After much consideration Honorius III chose Jean Halgrin, Archbishop of Besançon at the end of 1226. The geographic origins of Halgrin, whose family came from Abbeville and who was active as a cleric in Amiens until 1225, suggests that on this occasion Honorius rather favoured the imperial party.²⁵⁴ Halgrin went to Rome, but declined the position and subsequently became Cardinal

²⁵² Santifaller, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des lateinischen Patriarchats*, pp. 192–193. Wolff, *Politics in the Latin patriarchate of Constantinople*, pp. 276–277. The imperial nature of the non-Venetian party is illustrated here by the participation of Magister G., Canon of St Michael's Church in the imperial Boukoleon Palace, in the mission to Rome. G. must have been the leader of the mission, since the only other member mentioned by Honorius III was indicated only as a cleric.

²⁵³ Milo's brother Gaucher II, Lord of Nanteuil, was married to Aleyde, sister of the mentioned John of Béthune and niece of Cono I of Béthune. Milo was also a cousin of Gaucher III, Lord of Châtillon (+ 1219), who was married to Elisabeth, Countess of Saint-Pol and daughter of Hugh IV, one of the leaders of the Fourth Crusade. John of Béthune was Elisabeth's second husband (cf. Hareau & De Sainte-Marthe, *Gallia Christiana*, t. 9, col. 740; Nieus, *Le comté de Saint-Pol*, I/1, p. 154). Other Constantinopolitan barons, such as Peter of Bracheux and William of Sains, also had links with the region of Beauvais (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 91, 98).

²⁵⁴ Several prominent Constantinopolitan barons originated from precisely that region, for example Anseau I of Cayeux, near Abbeville, and Nicolas of Mailly, near Amiens (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 199–200).

Bishop of St Sabina. After the death of Honorius in March 1227, His successor Gregory IX appointed a new patriarch, Simon of Maugastel, former Archbishop of Tyre, without there having been a new election in Constantinople. This appointment was probably linked to the discussions taking place at the same time at the papal court between the Constantinopolitan barons and the potential Emperor-elect, John of Brienne, former King and thereafter Regent of Jerusalem (1210–1212 and 1212–1225), as the result of which we can place Simon's appointment between circa mid-1228 and April 1229, the period in which the negotiations took place.²⁵⁵ Simon was as Archbishop of Tyre a trusted figure for Emperor-elect John of Brienne.²⁵⁶ His geographic origin from the County of Perche and his reputation in Northern France through his preaching of the crusades there in 1216–1217 can again have found favour with the barons.²⁵⁷ As regards the Venetian party, Simon was not in the least an ideal choice: as Archbishop of Tyre he was for many years in conflict with the local Venetian community about the Church of St Mark in the Venetian quarter in Tyre.²⁵⁸ In short, we must conclude that imperial preference played an important part in the patriarchal election in 1226–1229.

In summary, we can state that the Latin emperor could exercise considerable influence on patriarchal election, on one hand via the imperial representatives in the electoral college and on the other via negotiations at the papal court, where the ultimate decision was always made. In two of the three elections in which imperial authority was

²⁵⁵ An argument in favour of this dating is that in July 1229 Gregory IX awarded Simon a series of traditional privileges that the patriarchs before him had also received (Auvray, *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, n° 328). It is probable that this award took place quite shortly after his appointment to the patriarchate. This invalidates Mayer's choice of the years 1227–1228 (cf. Mayer, *Die Kanzlei der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem*, I, pp. 360–361). Wolff's view that Simon was not appointed until the middle of 1229 is equally incorrect, since Simon had already been mentioned in April 1229 as being the patriarch (Wolff, *Politics in the Latin patriarchate of Constantinople*, pp. 282–283).

²⁵⁶ In the April 1229 agreement between John of Brienne and these barons on the emperorship of Constantinople, Patriarch Simon, together with four barons, was designated to specify the dowry of John's daughter Mary of Brienne, who was to marry the emperor-successor Baldwin II of Courtenay. Simon was clearly John's representative in this matter (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 273, p. 268).

²⁵⁷ A number of barons in the Latin empire originated in this region, for example: Stephen of Perche, who had however already fallen in 1205; Gervais of Châteauneuf (†1212) and his son Hervé, who possibly sojourned in Constantinople until circa 1220. The majority of the barons in Constantinople originated in the wider region of Northern France. Cf. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 85–88, 105.

²⁵⁸ Mayer, *Die Kanzlei der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem*, I, pp. 342–361.

involved, a candidate supported by this authority was appointed. It was no coincidence that the one patriarchal election in which the imperial candidate was unsuccessful took place in a period of regency.

The Imperial Prerogatives vis-à-vis the Episcopate

The Byzantine emperors possessed the right to appoint bishops whenever they saw fit, although this was sometimes contested by prominent prelates, and the emperors made regular use of this, going against the normal procedure for such appointments in which the bishops of the circumscription concerned—possibly with the participation of a wider section of the clergy and the local population—were supposed to elect the new bishop.²⁵⁹ To a limited extent, the Latin emperor also possessed not unimportant influence in episcopal appointments, which, however, is connected more with the Western political tradition of monarchs to intervene in such appointments. After the Investiture Controversy, Western monarchs were also able to determine these appointments in two ways: either by indicating personally and directly a candidate without involving the canonical procedure, a course of action that usually created protest and in the later twelfth century occurred only as an exception in the Holy Roman Empire, or indirectly by means of all manner of pressure vis-à-vis the cathedral chapter.²⁶⁰

Circa 1206 Warin, Canon of Saint-Amé in Douai, was appointed Archbishop of Vrysis in Thrace, in all probability at the request of the emperor. Warin can be associated with the imperial entourage in the first place via the person of Henry's bastard brother Godfrey, who was Provost of Saint-Amé. Secondly, a few years after 1206 Warin—certainly thanks to imperial support—was appointed Archbishop of Thessalonike, this being only after a difficult procedural battle in which some of the Thessalonikan barons attempted to thwart his appointment and which dragged on until 1212.²⁶¹ Warin, as archbishop of this city, will have retained the imperial trust, as prior to 1216 he gained the title of imperial chancellor.²⁶² After the conquest of Thessalonike

²⁵⁹ Brehier, *Les Institutions de l'Empire byzantin*, pp. 405–406.

²⁶⁰ Imbart de la Tour, *Les élections épiscopales dans l'Eglise de France du IX au XII^e siècle*, pp. 439–442. Benson, *The bishop-elect*, pp. 284–285.

²⁶¹ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1425 (XI, 106), col. 1478 (XI, 171); CCXVI, col. 213 (XIII, 13), col. 555 (XV, 18). Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 43, p. 104.

²⁶² Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1130–1131 (X, 35–36). Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 187.

by Theodore Doukas at the end of 1224, Warin was awarded as compensation the care of the Bishopric of Négrepont, by which, in view of his chancellorship, we can also assume imperial intervention.²⁶³ Circa 1210 Imperial Chaplain Arduinus obtained the archbishopric of Thebes via imperial support, after a problematic procedure in which a minority of the canons supported an opposing candidate.²⁶⁴ In 1211 the treasurer of Nicomedia enjoyed imperial support in his election as bishop of this city, against the wishes of the patriarch.²⁶⁵ In 1215 we encounter John, former monk of Gembloux, as Archbishop of Neopatras.²⁶⁶ His appointment probably also evidences imperial interposition. His connection with the abbey of Gembloux, with which the lineage of the Counts of Hainaut had links, together with his possession of relics from the imperial treasury, suggest this.²⁶⁷ In December 1217, at the request of Empress Yolande, Honorius III instructed the Bishop of Olena and the Deacon of Koron in Achaea and the Deacon of Châlons-sur-Marne in Champagne, who at that time was probably a member of Yolande's entourage, to arrange the appointment of a certain W. as Bishop of Lakedaimonia in the Peloponnese.²⁶⁸ W. had originally been consecrated as Bishop of Olena by Antelm, Archbishop

²⁶³ Auvray, *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, n° 1175.

²⁶⁴ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 324 (XIII, 138).

²⁶⁵ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 455 (XIV, 90).

²⁶⁶ Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 41, pp. 100–101. We believe that this John is the successor to the unnamed Archbishop of Neopatras who we encounter in the papal correspondence of the years 1208–1211. In 1211 the unnamed prelate was the subject of some commotion, which led to an investigation of the matter being ordered by the papacy. Probably he was subsequently removed from office because of his excesses, although there is no known papal judgment in this question. Cf. Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1492 (XI, 19) & CCXVI, col. 460–461 (XIV, 98).

²⁶⁷ There is nothing to suggest that John was part of the entourage of one of the local barons from the Counties of Flanders and Hainaut. There are no known contacts between either Nicolas of Saint-Omer, feudatory in the neighbourhood of Thebes, or Walter Stombe, feudatory in Attica or the Peloponnese, with the abbey of Gembloux. Only Jacques of Avesnes—who obtained a fiefdom on Euboia, but had already deceased by August 1205 (cf. note 26)—had a link with the abbey via his father (Roland, *Chartes de l'abbaye de Gembloux*, n° 58). On the contacts between Gembloux and Emperor Henry's brother Philip of Namur: Walraet, *Actes de Philippe Ier, dit le Noble, comte et marquis de Namur*, pp. 26, 75. Possessions located in Dion were given to the abbey by Emperor Henry's distant forefather Reginar IV, Count of Hainaut (†1013). The abbey also had other possessions in Soye and in Souvret, these being in the Counties of Namur and Hainaut (Linck, *Sozialer Wandel in klösterlichen Grundherrschaften des 11. bis 13. Jahrhunderts*, p. 28, pp. 33–34). In 1215 Archbishop John gave the abbey of Gembloux a number of relics, some of which certainly must have come from the imperial treasury in Constantinople (Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 41, p. 101).

²⁶⁸ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 912.

of Patras, but had subsequently been rejected by Honorius, who then appointed the candidate chosen by the cathedral chapter of Olena. It follows that Yolande must have developed good relations with W.'s patron Antelm, most likely during her stay in Achaea in the spring of 1217.²⁶⁹ This is not surprising since the connection between the imperial court and archbishop Antelm probably predated Yolande's reign. On Antelm's advice prince Geoffrey I of Achaea had in 1210 founded a daughter house of the Cistercian Hautecombe abbey in Savoy.²⁷⁰ In 1214 another daughter house of Hautecombe—the abbey of *Sancta Maria Sancti Angeli*—was founded in Constantinople by the emperor Henry.²⁷¹ It seems not unlikely to us that Antelm had some part in this foundation too. He certainly was a benefactor of *Sanctus Angelus*: a 1231 document shows that he had at some point lent the sum of 1098 hyperpera to the abbey.²⁷² A 1224 letter from Honorius further seems to attest to the connection between Antelm and the imperial court, in that it suggests that the Latin emperors had granted Antelm several *privilegia*.²⁷³

The source material, limited to the papal correspondence in view of the fact that virtually no archive remains of the Latin patriarchate of Constantinople or of the episcopate of the Latin empire, does not allow us to estimate the extent to which this imperial influencing of the appointment of bishops was a widespread phenomenon. In any event, the appointment of even only a limited number of faithful followers as archbishops or bishops in regions that were far removed from the core quarter (Lakedaimonia, Négrepont, Neopatras, Thebes, Thessalonike) offered opportunities for the strengthening of central authority. The examples quoted indicate that this form of imperial influence sometimes aroused local protest from the clergy or from secular lords who felt that their own prerogatives had been encroached upon. This form of interference with episcopal appointments was indeed not an exclusively imperial prerogative. For example, in 1206 the Chapter of Thessalonike elected Nivelon of Quièrzy, Bishop of

²⁶⁹ On Bishop W. of Lakedaimonia and Archbishop Antelm of Patras: Schabel, *Anselm the Nasty*, p. 127.

²⁷⁰ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 341–342 (IX, 167).

²⁷¹ Cf. references in Chapter III, note 131.

²⁷² Blanchard, *Histoire de l'abbaye de Hautecombe*, pp. 572–573.

²⁷³ Schabel, *Anselm the Nasty*, p. 130.

Soissons, as Archbishop *ad instantiam* of Boniface of Montferrat.²⁷⁴ In 1209 we encounter as Bishop of Koron in the Principality of Achaea a certain Eudes, nephew of Geoffrey I of Villehardouin.²⁷⁵ In 1212–1213 Michael I Doukas, ruler of Epiros, supervised the appointment of metropolitans for Larissa and Dyrrachion.²⁷⁶

The emperors had at their disposal a second instrument by which to assure themselves of the loyalty of the bishops in their empire. In a papal letter of 1208 Innocent III, when so requested by Emperor Henry, acknowledged that archbishops and bishops, as well as other prelates, were obliged to swear an oath of fealty (*fidelitas*) to the emperor for the *regalia* that they held. In order to preclude interference with the spiritual rights, the Pope specified expressly that this concerned the type of rights that secular barons held by virtue of the same oath of fealty to the emperor.²⁷⁷ On the basis of the West European situation, Henry clearly claimed the right of conferring on bishops-elect and other prelates the *regalia* associated with their position, and with this the right to demand an oath of fealty of them. In this way the prelates were included in the feudal structure of the empire. In principle therefore, the emperor could refuse the conferment of the *regalia* on a new bishop-elect or already ordained bishop, and could furthermore strip a bishop in office of his *regalia*. In view of the fact that the cathedral chapters that chose the new bishop also fully realized this, persons not known for their loyalty to imperial authority had less chance of promotion to the office of bishop.²⁷⁸

The issue of the *regalia* was never a major point of conflict between the imperial and ecclesiastical powers. Only once does this question appear in a papal letter. In 1209, after receiving complaints from Emperor Henry, Innocent III ordered the Archbishops of Vrysis, Thebes and Larissa to compel a number of Latin and Byzantine archbishops and bishops who had refused to pledge an oath of fealty to

²⁷⁴ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1037 (IX, 200). Emperor Henry supported this choice wholeheartedly, and asked Innocent III to ratify it. In 1204–1205 Nivelon of Quièrzy was part of the imperial entourage.

²⁷⁵ Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 73.

²⁷⁶ Nicol, *The despotate of Epiros*, pp. 40–41. Karpozilos, *The ecclesiastical controversy*, p. 52.

²⁷⁷ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1363 (XI, 38). Fried, *Der Regalienbegriff im 11. und 12. Jahrhundert*, pp. 453–461.

²⁷⁸ Cf. Becker, *Studien zum Investiturproblem in Frankreich*, pp. 160–167.

Henry to do so.²⁷⁹ In view of the fact that the letter was addressed both to the Archbishops of Thebes and Larissa—the Archbishop of Vrysis in Thrace was at that moment the imperial confidant Warin, whose appointment as Archbishop of Thessalonike was still pending—we can suppose that the emperor came into contact with the recalcitrant prelates in question during his expedition in the Kingdom of Thessalonike and in Southern Greece in 1208–1209. If this supposition is correct, the Latin bishops surely belonged to the anti-imperial Lombard party. The Byzantine prelates mentioned were perhaps moved by more religious motives. An oath of fealty to the emperor was not a tradition in Byzantium, and its innovative nature doubtlessly aroused resistance. A number of the Latin prelates can also have been moved by analogous considerations. We encounter nothing more concerning this question after 1209, which suggests that henceforth the imperial rights were respected.

The fact that episcopal investiture never occasioned serious conflicts indicates that the emperors pursued a moderate policy in this respect. They satisfied themselves by appointing prelates in a number of strategic locations in regions that were geographically far removed from the imperial domain, and these prelates were expected to represent imperial authority there: Thessalonike, capital of the similarly-named kingdom, Thebes, the most important city in Beotia and Attica, Neopatras, situated close to the border with Epiros, and Négrepont, capital of Euboea, which fell under Venetian suzerainty. The oath of fealty vis-à-vis the episcopal *regalia* assured the emperor of an instrument with which to act against prelates who were not loyal. Although not comparable with the *Reichskirche* in the Holy Roman Empire, nonetheless influence could be exercised upon the political ins and outs of the far-flung territories of the empire through a loyal episcopate. We can find a good example of this in the Archbishopric of Philippi in the Kingdom of Thessalonike. In 1212 the archbishop mediated in a conflict about possessions between the Bishop of Gardiki and the Knights Hospitallers of Phteleon. In doing so he did not neglect to consult the emperor, who would later assent to the compromise reached thereby.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁹ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 147 (XII, 114).

²⁸⁰ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 912 (XV, 115).

A last imperial prerogative concerned the authority over the division of the Patriarchate of Constantinople into archbishoprics and bishoprics. To a certain extent, the first Latin emperors inherited from their Byzantine predecessors the privilege of deciding upon the status of the bishoprics and changing the territorial circumscriptions thereof.²⁸¹ In 1209 Innocent III instructed Patriarch Thomas Morosini to nullify his amalgamation of the Bishoprics of Daonion and of the unidentified *Euthlochum* in view of his having carried out the amalgamation without consulting Emperor Henry, who had lodged a complaint about this with the Papal Curia.²⁸² In 1206 Innocent had only promised Morosini that he, in consultation with the current papal legate Benedictus, could entrust the control of a number of bishoprics to the same prelate without, however, changing the administrative classification.²⁸³ After 1209 there is no attestation of further conflicts between emperor and patriarch on this issue.

In 1217 Pope Honorius III granted his legate Giovanni Colonna the right, if necessary, to split or amalgamate ecclesiastical circumscriptions, in doing so, remarkably enough, referred nowhere to the imperial prerogative in this matter.²⁸⁴ The cardinal then appears only in a late phase of his mission, which lasted from 1217 until the spring of 1221, to have proceeded to change a number of episcopal circumscriptions, in view of the fact that Honorius did not ratify his interventions until March 1222, again without any allusion to the imperial rights in this matter.²⁸⁵ Colonna's circumspect, rather slow, action suggests however that account was taken of the claims of the central powers, in those years represented by Empress Yolande and after her death by Regent Cono I of Béthune. It should be said that in the period 1220 until early 1221, at a time when both the emperorship and the patriarchate were vacant, the legate was charged with both the secular and the religious government of the empire.²⁸⁶ As the highest, temporary holder of the

²⁸¹ Brehier, *Les Institutions de l'Empire byzantin*, p. 350.

²⁸² Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 148 (XII, 117). Daonion was a suffragan bishopric of Herakleia in Venetian Thrace. *Euthlochum* was probably situated in non-Venetian territory, which would explain Henry's attitude.

²⁸³ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 963–964 (IX, 140). After the departure of the legate, Morosini was to be enabled to exercise this prerogative personally, but still under papal supervision.

²⁸⁴ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 11.

²⁸⁵ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 92–93.

²⁸⁶ Cf. Chapter V, p. 292.

patriarchal *and* the imperial powers, in those years Colonna was able carry out the above-mentioned actions without problem, and without prejudice to anyone's prerogatives.

The Imperial Prerogatives vis-à-vis Monastic Institutions

The Latin emperors also continued another Byzantine religious institution that offered the opportunity to establish concrete imperial influence in the empire as a whole: the imperial monasteries. The status of these monasteries in the period preceding 1204 has not been explained completely in the existing historiography. These were in some instances imperial foundations, in others monasteries lying within the imperial domains, and in some cases also monasteries that enjoyed imperial protection in particular. The monasteries paid a tribute to the emperor and new *hegoumenoi* had to be appointed with imperial assent. This was a clearly defined group of monasteries, a register of which was kept by the imperial administration. There is, however, little known about the identity of these monasteries and under Latin rule too there is only little information available.²⁸⁷ In 1208 Innocent III agreed to Emperor Henry's proposal that these monasteries in *temporalia* should be dependent on imperial authority and in *spiritualia* directly on the Pope. The superiors of these monasteries were obliged to swear an oath of fealty to the emperor which, however, just as the episcopal oath was contested briefly by a number of Latin and Byzantine abbots in circa 1209. The identification of the imperial monasteries is problematical. For example, the abbey of *Sancta Maria Sancti Angeli* founded by Emperor Henry in 1214 in Constantinople and patronized by his successors possibly belonged to this category.²⁸⁸ The Great Lavra monastery on Mount Athos, where a portrait of Emperor Henry was to be found, may also have been part of this group of monastic institutions.²⁸⁹

The case of the abbey of Chortaiton in the Kingdom of Thessalonike, certainly an imperial institution prior to 1204, illustrates how difficult it could be for the emperor to make good his claims. Originally, Chortaiton was allocated by Boniface of Montferrat, with the assent of the then papal legate Soffredo, to the Cistercian abbey of Locedio,

²⁸⁷ Herman, *Ricerche sulle istituzioni monastiche bizantine*, pp. 348–352.

²⁸⁸ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 4487. JANIN, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, pp. 580–581. Clair, *Les filles d'Hautecombe dans l'empire latin de Constantinople*, pp. 269–270.

²⁸⁹ Cf. Chapter II, p. 88.

which had been founded by the Montferrat family and the abbot of which had taken part in the Fourth Crusade. Care of the abbey was entrusted to a number of monks from Locedio, who squandered the abbey's possessions. Marquis Boniface resolved to intervene and to restore the abbey to the original Byzantine community, which had fled at the time of Boniface's invasion of the region. However, his death in 1207 prevented the realization of this resolve. Emperor Henry thereupon intervened, and restored the abbey effectively to the Byzantine community, confirmed with an imperial privilege.²⁹⁰ The emperor made use of the problematic succession in Thessalonike caused by the lack of years of Demetrios of Montferrat in order to realize his claims on the monastery. However, the monks of Locedio, with the support of Boniface's son William VI of Montferrat, lodged an appeal with the Pope, who, having been informed unilaterally, judged in 1212 that the abbey was rightfully theirs. Probably with the support of a number of local barons, the Latin monks drove out the Byzantine community and took possession of the abbey once more. In turn the Byzantine community brought the issue before the Pope—this being with imperial support. They reasoned that their abbey had been subjected to imperial authority since time immemorial and that the monks of Locedio were guilty of heinous deeds. In 1213 the Pope ordered his legate Pelagius, Bishop of Albano, to investigate the matter and to pass judgment on it. Pelagius' judgment is not known, but in 1218 and again in 1224 we encounter a Latin abbot in Chortaiton.²⁹¹ At first glance the Latin emperor and the Byzantine community thus lost the case. However, the chance cannot be excluded that a compromise was reached in which the abbey was divided between the Latin and Byzantine communities, in the same way as the neighbouring Greek-Georgian Iviron Monastery on Mount Athos, for example.²⁹²

The case of Chortaiton is not an isolated incident. In 1210, Margaret of Hungary, guardian of her son King Demetrios of Montferrat, claimed a number of the imperial monasteries within the kingdom as being

²⁹⁰ A variant in a passage of Henry of Valenciennes' chronicle indicates that in 1208 the Byzantine abbot and monks already would have had the Chortaiton monastery effectively in their possession (Valenciennes, §573).

²⁹¹ The whole case is known about via the papal registers: Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 594 (XV, 70); col. 951 (XVI, 162). Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 1391. Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 128, p. 174. Haberstumpf, *Dinastie*, pp. 184–186.

²⁹² Lefort, *Actes d'Iviron*, III, pp. 4–8.

royal monasteries, this occurring with the approval of Innocent III.²⁹³ Did Margaret and Emperor Henry, who were on good terms, reach a compromise as to which of the monasteries in the kingdom were to be looked upon as royal or imperial? Or did Margaret simply claim all the former imperial monasteries? Circa 1215–1216, after receiving complaints from Henry, Innocent III instructed three bishops to compel certain persons (whose names are unknown to us) to respect imperial rights with regard to a number of monasteries.²⁹⁴ Although the bishops are not named, we may assume that the problems will have occurred principally in regions far removed from the core quarter. After 1215–1216 the question no longer appears in the papal registers. Perhaps we may assume of the basis of this that an acceptable *modus vivendi* was achieved between the imperial powers and the local barons, or perhaps the emperors no longer defended their rights.

Apart from the imperial monasteries, the Latin emperor also claimed the role of patron of other monastic communities within or outside the core quarter. Two examples of these are known. In 1210 Emperor Henry supported the Byzantine monks of the *Hosios Loukas* Monastery in the Bishopric of Daulia in Beotia in their resistance to the gift of their monastery by papal legate Benedictus to the Chapter of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem a few years previously.²⁹⁵ Circa 1213 the same emperor made a stand for the Byzantine monasteries of Mount Athos by forcibly removing a local lord, who had built a bastion there, thus causing severe damage to the monastic communities.²⁹⁶ This action was greatly appreciated by the communities of Byzantine monks, and this is evidenced by a portrait of Emperor Henry that was kept in the Great Lavra monastery.²⁹⁷

We can find no further traces of this imperial protection of Byzantine monasteries outside the core quarter after this date. Quite the reverse; during the vacancy of the imperial throne in 1220 we see how papal legate Giovanni Colonna, at that time *de facto* regent of the empire, apparently without protest from the barons at the imperial court, gave Byzantine *metochia* from the region around Constantinople, which either did or did not wish to recognize papal authority, to Western

²⁹³ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 228 (XIII, 39).

²⁹⁴ Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Slavorum Meridionalium*, I, p. 64, n° 25.

²⁹⁵ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 303–304 (XIII, 114–115).

²⁹⁶ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 957 (XVI, 168).

²⁹⁷ Lemerle, *Actes de Lavra*, IV, p. 6.

institutions.²⁹⁸ The inaction of the imperial barons suggests a relative weakening of this group vis-à-vis other political actors, in this case the papal legate. By comparison, circa 1214 Emperor Henry, after the intervention of the Byzantine dignitaries of Constantinople and completely against the wishes of the then legate Pelagius, had freed the Byzantine monks and priests whom the legate had imprisoned.²⁹⁹

THE ATTITUDE OF THE FEUDAL PRINCES VIS-À-VIS THE IMPERIAL IDEOLOGY AND POLICY OPTIONS

The topics discussed so far show us that by the use of a variety of instruments the Latin emperors attempted to make imperial authority a reality also in the parts of the empire located outside the core quarter. Important for the success of this what could be described as centralist policy was the reaction to it from the feudal princes and barons in these territories. We have already seen above, inter alia, that feudatories in the various regions accepted the principle of imperial suzerainty and its associated feudal oath of fidelity, they fulfilled the requirements of military services to the emperor when required, and they set store by the court titles and marital alliances with the imperial family. We have also already dealt with conflicts between the emperor and some of his vassals. The question is now as to how these magnates related to the imperial ideology propagated by the emperors and to the governmental choices that were made in the core quarter, two domains in which the principle of the greatest possible degree of continuity with the period prior to 1204 was a central issue. Here we work from the premise that, on the basis of the make-up of the local political elites in the empire of Constantinople, there were in existence three types of political entities.

The Latin Principalities

Firstly there were regions that were under the rule of a Latin ruler and where at the level of the principality or lordship the political decision-making was in the hands of a mainly Latin elite. Falling within this category are: the region of Attica-Beotia, the island of Euboea,

²⁹⁸ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 99–100.

²⁹⁹ Akropolites, §17.

the Principality of Achaea, together with the *ducatus* of Philippopolis and the *ducatus* of Naxos, although in each of these latter regions the local aristocracy held a more prominent position than in the former.³⁰⁰ The Venetian territories in the empire that fell under the rule of La Serenissima or its podestà, also belong within this category.

The titles they adopted for themselves and the names they used for their principalities provide an idea as to what vision the rulers and prominent barons in these regions held vis-à-vis their take-over of the former Byzantine territory during the period studied. Philippopolis and Naxos were always designated as *ducatus*, the Latin translation of the Greek *thema*, whilst the rulers called themselves either *dominus* or *dominator*.³⁰¹ Occasionally the ruler of Athens and Thebes called himself—or rather had himself called (inter alia by Innocent III)—*dux*, after the Byzantine name of a provincial governor (*doux*), but in his own charters he seems to have limited himself to the title of *dominus*.³⁰² Equally, the three lords of Négrepont sometimes used the title of *dux Nigropontis*, as is apparent from a document of 1262, but the title of *dominus* was also in use.³⁰³ The circumspect way in which these rulers handled the title of *dux* was no doubt related to the problematical nature of this title—which had a quite different meaning in the Latin West than the title of *doux* had in Byzantium—in imperial eyes, whereby we refer to the choice of the title of *pretor* or *praitor* (instead of *dux* or *doux*) for the governors of the provincial circumscriptions (*ducatus* or *themata*) in the core quarter. La Serenissima also awarded its governors of the former *themata* Crete and Dyrrachion the title of *dux*, but more local officials in Modon, Koron, Négrepont, Rhaidestos and Kallipolis carried titles of Western origins (*capitaneus*, *baiulus*, *castellanus*), just as the podestà in Constantinople who, however, as we have stated earlier, could obtain from the emperor the proudly-borne title of *despotes*, which also figured on the seal of the podestà

³⁰⁰ Jacoby, *Les états latins en Roumanie: phénomènes sociaux et économiques*, pp. 3–51. Angelov, *Die bulgarischen Länder und das bulgarische Volk in den Grenzen des byzantinischen Reiches*, pp. 152–158. Maltezou, *Les grecs de la Mer Egée*, pp. 143–145. Cf. Koumanoudi, *The Latins in the Aegean after 1204*, p. 263.

³⁰¹ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 273, p. 269. Morozzo Della Rocca & Lombardo, *Documenti*, n° 774.

³⁰² Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1435 (XI, 121). Guillaume, *Histoire généalogique des sires de Salins*, I, pp. 66–67. Gauthier, *Othon de la Roche, conquérant d'Athènes*, p. 143. Longnon, *Les premiers ducs d'Athènes et leur famille*, p. 64.

³⁰³ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 348, pp. 46–47.

that was of a mixed Latin-Byzantine nature, just as the imperial seal.³⁰⁴ The ruler of Achaea took on the title of *princeps*, possibly following the example of the Principality of Antioch, over which the Byzantine emperors had always—and sometimes successfully—claimed suzerainty and which effectively recognized the suzerainty of the Latin emperor after 1204. In addition, the Princes Geoffrey I and II carried the court title granted by the emperor of (*totius*) *Romanie senescallus*, with the Byzantine *meas domestikos* as equivalent.³⁰⁵

Many of the titles and designations mentioned evidence the—maybe somewhat superficial—desire to formally continue the Byzantine Empire and, just as was the case with the Latin emperors, represented an instrument with which to legitimize themselves vis-à-vis the local aristocracy and population as regional princes or local lords or administrators of this empire. However, one point of difference from the emperors, who explicitly sought association with the Byzantine imperial ideology, was that they seem to have viewed this Latin continuation of Byzantium from a mainly Western perspective. Evidence of this is, for example, the use of the term (*totius*) *Romanie*—instead of *Romanorum*—in the seneschal title of the princes of Achaea and the way these rulers referred to the Latin emperor as *imperator Constantinopolitanus* instead of *imperator Romanorum*. In contrast to the emperor, there was for the regional rulers little advantage to be had from using as a basis the Byzantine view of the empire, in which the imperial authority took such a central position. The adoption of Byzantine titles was not a general custom, as indeed has been indicated by the overview presented above. The ruler of Bodonitza, for example, used the exclusively Western title of *marchio*, derived from the status of the patrimonial possession in Northern Italy, the Marquisate of Scipione.³⁰⁶ We also see Western inspired self-representation of the

³⁰⁴ Jacoby, *The Venetian presence*, pp. 141–201. Wolff, *The Oath of the Venetian Podestà*, pp. 539–573. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, pp. 78–81. Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, n° 94).

³⁰⁵ Cf. p. 180. Longnon, *Recherches sur la vie de Geoffrey de Villehardouin*, n° 96, p. 208; n° 100–101, pp. 210–211; n° 116, p. 219; n° 149, p. 239. Buchon, *Recherches historiques sur la principauté française de Morée et ses hautes baronies*, II, pp. 375–376. Mayer, *Die Kanzlei der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem*, II, Exkurse 19., pp. 921–922. Riant, *Exuviae Sacrae Constantinopolitanae*, II, n° 52, p. 113.

³⁰⁶ Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople*, n° IV, p. 300. To the Byzantine population the lord of Bodonitza was known with a hellenized version of his Western title (*markeses*), as would appear from the fourteenth-century Greek version of the Chronicle of Morea (*The Chronicle of Morea*, v. 1559). In the same way

Latin princes and barons in their seals, the known examples of which display absolutely no Byzantine influence.³⁰⁷ However, the use of a *pierre antique gravée* as counter-seal by Otho of La Roche, ruler of Athens, nonetheless indicates a desire to emphasize the continuity with the glorious history of the city.³⁰⁸ The popularity of the Trojan saga in Southern Greece, as this appears from frescos in the archiepiscopal *hospitium* at Patras, further indicates that, just as in Constantinople, the local Latin lords looked upon themselves as the legitimate rulers of the region, which according to the myth was part of their ancestral heritage.³⁰⁹ Also through the popularity of the ideal of the crusade that, *inter alia* is apparent from frescos referring to it in the gatehouse of the Akronauplion and the castle of the family of Saint-Omer at Thebes, there was an ideological similarity between the imperial court in Constantinople and the Latin courts of southern Greece.³¹⁰

As regards administrative organization, the implementation of the feudal system and the accompanying fragmentation of the public rights in most regions meant a clear break with the period prior to 1204, although exploitative systems that could be described as feudal already existed previously in the Byzantine empire.³¹¹ An exception was formed by the territories under direct Venetian rule, where La Serenissima opted for a more centralized form of governance, through which she tried to take over the former prerogatives of the Byzantine state.³¹² For a number of regions—such as Eubolia, Achaea, Venetian Crete, the *ducatus* of Naxos and the neighbouring islands—it

the prince of Achaea was known as the *prigkipas* (v. 2791) and the lords of Eubolia as the *tertseria* (after their Latin title *tercieri*)—or more commonly the *aphentes*—of Euripos (v. 1562, 2797, 3186). By contrast the lord of Athens became known as the *meas kyres* (v. 1555, 2891), for which there seems to be no Byzantine precedent, and the lord of Naxos as the *doukas* (v. 2796, 8035), titles which did not refer to Western antecedents. Of course, the prince of Achaea was also known as the imperial *meas domestikos* (v. 2606).

³⁰⁷ Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, n° 48–49, 95, 103.

³⁰⁸ *Ibidem*, n° 80.

³⁰⁹ Gerstel, *Art and Identity in the Medieval Morea*, p. 265. Hirschbichler, *Monuments of a syncretic society*, pp. 126–131. Cf. Chapter II, note 66.

³¹⁰ Gerstel, *Op. cit.*, pp. 265–266. Hirschbichler, *Op. cit.*, pp. 132–134. On the not negligible presence of the military Orders in southern Greece: cf. Chapter VI, p. 340.

³¹¹ Jacoby, *La féodalité en Grèce médiévale*, *passim*. *Idem*, *From Byzantium to Latin Romania: continuity and change*, *passim*. Koumanoudi, *The Latins in the Aegean after 1204*, pp. 258–263. Cf. also p. 190.

³¹² Gasparis, *The period of Venetian rule on Crete*, pp. 239–240. McKee, *Uncommon Dominion*, pp. 26–30.

is attested that local Byzantine magnates were included in the feudal system. Outside the feudal framework too, Byzantines continued to be part of the socio-economic elite of these areas, which doubtlessly stimulated their preparedness to accept Latin dominion.³¹³ An element that likewise must have contributed to this was the fact that, within the feudalized governmental entities, the Byzantine administrative organization at local level was continued to quite a considerable degree.³¹⁴ This circumstance ensured a degree of continuity with the preceding period, and was at the same time a factor of uniformity within the empire as a whole.

For the greater part, the lords and barons of the territories discussed here were loyal with respect to the imperial authority, the participation of a number of barons in Beotia and Euboia in the Lombard rebellion in 1208–1209 being the exception. In general, the local lords were not too concerned that the Latin emperors—certainly in the period 1204–1217—pursued a policy aimed at establishing a sound imperial influence within the entire empire. The social origins of most of them and their place in the feudal hierarchy in their home regions could in most instances be described as somewhat modest.³¹⁵ Through the position they achieved as regional ruler or as prominent baron in Latin Romania they made a remarkable social advancement. Looked at from this point of view, they could indeed have been prepared to accept a certain imperial influence or presence. The sometimes difficult relationship with La Serenissima, as already mentioned above, was the inevitable result of the high-handed imperial acts with regard to a number of Venetian rights and of the fact that the Lagoon City looked

³¹³ Jacoby, *Les archontes grecs et la féodalité en Morée franque*, pp. 468–469. Idem, *The encounter of two societies: western conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnesus after the fourth crusade*, pp. 887–888. Idem, *Les états latins en Roumanie: phénomènes sociaux et économiques*, P. 7, P. 26. Idem, *The Demographic Evolution Of Euboia*, P. 134–137. Kordoses, *Southern Greece under the Franks (1204–1262)*, p. 41, p. 89. Ilieva, *Frankish Morea*, pp. 177–196. Ferluga, *L'aristocratie byzantine en Morée au temps de la conquête latine*, p. 79. Darrouzes, *Notes sur Euthyme Tornikès, Euthyme Malakès et Georges Tornikès*, pp. 152–153. Kolovou, *Euthymios Tornikes als Briefschreiber*, pp. 64–65. Maltezou, *Cythère. Société et économie pendant la période de la domination vénitienne*, pp. 33–34. Koumanoudi, *The Latins in the Aegean after 1204*, pp. 258–263. Saint-Guillain, *Seigneuries insulaires: les Cyclades*, p. 32. McKee, *Uncommon Dominion*, pp. 68–78. Gasparis, *Catastica Feudorum Crete*, pp. 56–57.

³¹⁴ Jacoby, *From Byzantium to Latin Romania: continuity and change*, passim. Idem, *Un aspect de la fiscalité Vénitienne*, pp. 404–408.

³¹⁵ Cf. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, passim.

upon her territories in Romania primarily as being part of the Venetian empire and less as belonging to the empire of Constantinople.³¹⁶

The Byzantine Principalities

A second category of feudal principalities in the Latin empire were those under the control of Byzantine rulers, Paphlagonia under David Komnenos, Adrianople-Didymoteichon under Theodore Branas, the Rhodopes region under Alexios Sthlabos, Prosek under Strez, and Epiros under the Doukas family. Not only were the rulers of these territories Byzantine, the rest of the administrative elite was also Byzantine which, as has already become clear above however, did not exclude a limited—and possibly temporary—Latin presence within the scope of military co-operation or marital alliances, for example.

For the Byzantine feudal rulers, the idea of the empire as an entity consisting of autonomous principalities under imperial suzerainty was a rather new political concept, although in the Byzantium of the years prior to 1204 precedents did exist in the border territories of the empire, for example in Serbia and in Cilician Armenia. At the same time, at the end of the twelfth century in certain groups in the imperial elite and also in regional magnates the ambition had arisen to acquire their own principalities, which would be administratively autonomous from Constantinople.³¹⁷ To a certain extent, the Latin feudalization fulfilled their wishes. In exchange for positions as regional rulers, Byzantine—Greek or Bulgarian—magnates were initially prepared to recognize Latin imperial authority. For David Komnenos and Alexios Sthlabos this was even more the case, as such an autonomous status was less achievable in the neighbouring Nicaean and Bulgarian empires respectively, which aspired to the annexation of their respective territories. For the Doukas family in Epiros and Strez in Prosek it was the military might of the Latin emperor that led them to give up their initial independence in favour of regional autonomy. In the case of Adrianople it was the Latin protection against Bulgarian aggression that was for the local aristocracy a deciding factor to subscribe to the concept of the Latin *renovatio* of Byzantium.

³¹⁶ Marin, *The Venetian Community—between Civitas and Imperium*, pp. 84–85. Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, p. 64.

³¹⁷ Cf. Prologue, pp. 26–27.

With respect to administrative organization, the situation in the Byzantine principalities remained largely unchanged in comparison with the period prior to 1204.³¹⁸ As compared with the Byzantine period this was an important factor in the continuity, and it contributed to a certain degree of uniformity within the empire, in view of the fact that in the core quarter and in the Kingdom of Thessalonike too, the Byzantine administrative structures were retained to a not insignificant extent at the regional and local levels. There was also continuity in the area of ecclesiastical organization, which remained completely Byzantine. These Byzantine principalities were in essence autonomous ecclesiastical provinces, which in fact were dependent neither on the Latin patriarchate nor on the Byzantine patriarchate in Nicaea.³¹⁹ This religious autonomy must have been an additional factor that made it possible for the rulers and elites of these principalities to fit in with the Latin empire.³²⁰ From the titles borne by the rulers in question it would appear that these Byzantine magnates claimed nothing more for themselves than a position as regional ruler, without nursing imperial ambitions.³²¹ We may surmise that they saw themselves as territorial

³¹⁸ Adrianople: Tafel & Thomas, II, n° 169, p. 18. Epiros and Prosek: Prinzing, *Studien zur Provinz- und Zentralverwaltung im Machtbereich der epirotischen Herrscher I*, p. 95, pp. 104–107; II, pp. 96–97. Idem, *Das Verwaltungssystem im Epirotischen Staat der Jahre 1210—ca. 1246*, pp. 116–117. Rhodopes region: Lefort, *Actes de Vatopédi*, I, n° 12–13. Asdracha, *Les Rhodopes dans la deuxième moitié du XIII^e siècle*, pp. 275–279. Dujcev, *La littérature des Slaves méridionaux au XIII^e siècle*, pp. 234–235. Paphlagonia, where the larger towns may have acquired a large degree of autonomy: Booth, *The Sangarios Frontier*, p. 72. Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile*, p. 240.

³¹⁹ These regions are mentioned neither in the papal correspondence, nor in the *Provincialia Romana* of 1210 and 1228 (the latter does not take into account Theodore Doukas' conquests of 1224–1225), with the exception of Adrianople, where however in 1222 it is certain that a Byzantine metropolitan bishop was in office (Wolff, *The organization of the Latin patriarchate of Constantinople*, pp. 51–56; Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, I, pp. 226–228; Vasiljevskij, *Epirotica saeculi XIII*, n° 17, p. 274; Lambropoulos, *Ioannis Apocaukos. A contribution to the study of his life and work*, n° 70, p. 216). About autonomy vis-à-vis the patriarchate in Nicaea: Vasiljevskij, *Epirotica Saeculi XIII*, n° 17, n° 26. Karpozilos, *The ecclesiastical controversy*, p. 50. Breidenkamp, *The "Sampson incident"*, pp. 20–26. In circa 1212–1213 Michael Doukas did try to obtain patriarchal approval for the appointment of the metropolitan bishops of Larissa and Dyrrachion, which had come about at his request; this however appears to have been an isolated case (Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros*, pp. 40–41; Karpozilos, *Op. cit.*, p. 52).

³²⁰ About the organization of the church in the rest of the empire: Chapter VI, p. 307.

³²¹ Michael I and Theodore Doukas (prior to his rebellion) refer to themselves as *doux*, as son of *sebastokrator* John Doukas, or as members of a prestigious lineage, which had provided emperors in the past (Doukas/Komnenos)(Stavridou-Zafraka, *The political ideology of Epiros*, p. 316; Stiennon, *Les origines du despotat d'Epire*, pp. 120–126). On his seals, David Komnenos referred to himself as *basileggonou* (grandson of

princes within a Byzantine empire that was now headed by a Latin imperial dynasty.

As far as can be ascertained, in comparison with the Latin principalities, imperial interference in the Byzantine territories was more limited. The emperors tried to create personal bonds with the Byzantine rulers by means of marital alliances and the granting of court titles or, as the opportunity presented itself, they installed imperial garrisons in those regions, but no attempts were made, for example, to install imperial confidants as bishop in the regions. Although the principle of mutual feudal allegiance and support was generally respected (although not always, cf. the Doukai of Epiros and Strez of Prosek), as far as is known the Byzantine rulers were never involved in the arrangements related to the relationship between secular and ecclesiastical possessions that were drawn up in various parts of the empire. This is not illogical since there is no trace of major issues in this regard between the secular and ecclesiastical authorities in these principalities. Equally, the *consuetudines imperii* are not attested in a single Byzantine principality, which, in view of their feudal nature, is not surprising. Neither is there, for example, any trace of the imperial *constitutio* on a ban on religious gifts in any Byzantine principality.

The absence of various elements of imperial centralist policy in the Byzantine regional principalities can be explained to some extent by a lack of source material about the governance of these regions. Nonetheless, broadly speaking it would seem to us that a looser bond had existed between these Byzantine rulers and the imperial authority in comparison with the relationship of the Latin rulers and barons with this same authority. We can interpret this as a being a token of consideration for the desire for autonomy of these Byzantine—Greek and Bulgarian—princes who, after all, did belong either to former imperial lineages or to the Bulgarian royal family. In spite of this imperial consideration it appeared that a time span of two decades at the most was too short a period for the solid integration of these

the emperor) or *basilegonou* (descendant of the emperor) (Zacos & Vegler, *Byzantine Lead Seals*, n° 2754, pp. 1571–1574; Karpov, *The Black Sea region, before and after the fourth crusade*, pp. 288–289; cf. Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations à Byzance*, pp. 468–469). Alexios Sthlabos bore the title of *despotes* that had been granted to him by Emperor Henry (Lefort, *Actes de Vatopédi*, I, n° 13). There is no source material available about the way Theodore Branas and Strez of Prosek referred to themselves. Branas may have used his title of *kaisar*, granted to him by Emperor Henry (cf. the references in notes 79–80).

principalities within the empire. These rulers had entered into a marriage of convenience with the Latin emperors on a pragmatic or opportunistic basis, the motives for which were either shared interests or the emperor's military superiority. When these motives no longer existed, the rulers in question had no problem in choosing a political future outside the Latin empire. This will become apparent in the years after 1217 in the wake of the successful rebellion of Theodore Doukas of Epiros, which was to signify a fundamental turning point in the existence of the empire. So far, the motives for Theodore's rebellion against Emperor Peter of Courtenay remained unexplained, in view of the fact that it was assumed in the historiography—in our view incorrectly—that Michael Doukas had already terminated his feudal contract with Constantinople circa 1210–1212. However, there are no conclusive reasons to assume that in the years 1212–1216 Michael or Theodore would not have acknowledged themselves as being vassals of the Latin emperor.³²²

On the basis of the sources available to us we can reconstruct Emperor Peter's confrontation with Doukas as follows.³²³ Shortly after his coronation in Rome in early April 1217 and still before he had reached the empire, Emperor Peter implemented a number of important changes of policy. Firstly he recognized William VI of Montferrat's rights to the Kingdom of Thessalonike, in addition to those of his younger half-brother, King Demetrios of Montferrat.³²⁴ Secondly, Emperor Peter entered into an agreement with Venice to retake the port of Dyrrachion for La Serenissima, this shortly before having been captured by Theodore.³²⁵ The consequential siege of Dyrrachion by the emperor in collaboration with Venice was not an immediate success. After only a short time, Theodore Doukas, accompanied by a military

³²² Van Tricht, *La politique étrangère de l'empire de Constantinople (1re partie)*, pp. 237–238.

³²³ The best informed, most detailed source: *L'Estoire D'Eracles*, pp. 290–293. Texts, partly dependent on the previous source, but with additional original information: Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 393. Andreas Dandolo, *Chronica per extensum descripta*, p. 287. An independent account that confirms both sources: *Annales Ceccanenses*, p. 301. Alternative accounts, that were less favourably disposed to the person of Peter of Courtenay or the Latin emperorship: Robertus Autissiodorensis, *Chronologia*, pp. 284–285. *Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium*, p. 728. Richardus De San Germano, *Chronica*, p. 338. Cf. Nicol, *The fate of Peter of Courtenay*, pp. 377–379.

³²⁴ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 508. Cf. also p. 171 and Chapter V, p. 298.

³²⁵ Robertus Autissiodorensis, *Chronologia*, p. 284. Cf. also note 32.

force, arrived with the intention of defending his claim vis-à-vis the coastal stronghold. Initially, Doukas opted for a diplomatic solution, and Emperor Peter was also prepared to acquiesce. In exchange for an enduring acceptance of the imperial suzerainty, Peter of Courtenay was prepared to recognize Doukas' claims to the city, notwithstanding the Venetian rights. In this way a military confrontation was avoided, the results of which would have been uncertain for either side. Furthermore Doukas pledged his support to an imperial expedition for the benefit of the Holy Land, which doubtlessly fitted within the framework of the Fifth Crusade, which had commenced in 1217 and in which Peter had promised his participation.³²⁶

Although for Theodore Doukas the military threat vis-à-vis his principality was averted, nevertheless Peter's above mentioned policy options must have disturbed him quite considerably. Firstly, Doukas could have asked himself the extent to which the threat vis-à-vis Dyrrachion actually had been averted. The return of an imperial expedition under renewed pressure from Venice perhaps appeared not to be improbable. Secondly, Peter's involvement in the Kingdom of Thessalonike in favour of William VI also had a disturbing side for the Epirote ruler. The Lombard faction there, whose power would inevitably increase with William VI's arrival, had already claimed suzerainty over Epiros.³²⁷ Thirdly, the presence of papal legate Giovanni Colonna in the imperial entourage will not have been greeted warmly. The action of the previous papal legate Pelagius had led to great indignation in Byzantine circles both within and outside the empire.³²⁸ For Theodore Doukas and his entourage, the pro-Latin—pro-Venetian, pro-Lombard and pro-papal—policy options of the new emperor could easily be perceived as a real threat to his principality, certainly in the longer term. The pragmatic loyalty that had been displayed in the preceding years (1209/1212–1216) vis-à-vis the Latin emperor in exchange for a large autonomy, appeared no longer to offer any advantage. The alternative was obvious: the development of an independent principality, as had

³²⁶ Cf. Chapter VIII, p. 463.

³²⁷ Valenciennes, §574–591. It is possible that the presence at the Latin court of Achaea of minor Michael II Doukas—whose rights Theodore had denied at the time of the succession in Epiros after Michael I's death in circa 1214–1215—also caused Doukas some concern. After the unsolved murder of his father Michael I, Michael II and his mother fled to Achaea (Job Monachus, *Vita Sanctae Theodorae Reginae*, col. 905–906).

³²⁸ Cf. Chapter VI, p. 314.

been attempted by his brother Michael several years previously. Peter of Courtenay's presence in Epirote territory offered a unique chance to realize this project. By taking the emperor prisoner, he could shed his irksome suzerainty and deal a severe blow to the empire. The extent to which Theodore had already decided on such a plan at the time of his homage at Dyrrachion is unclear. In any event, this homage and the promise with regard to the crusading expedition created an ostensible bond of trust between the emperor and his vassal that was to be fatal to Peter.

Attempts to secure the emperor's release, *inter alia* by Pope Honorius III, were unsuccessful. At the end of 1217, Doukas did free papal legate Giovanni Colonna and confessed himself an obedient son of the Church of Rome. With this, the papal anger vis-à-vis Doukas cooled quite quickly, although Emperor Peter died in captivity. Early in 1218, Honorius called off a planned crusading expedition against the ruler of Epiros and took his principality under his protection.³²⁹ This papal action, which clearly harmed the interests of the empire, must at least have hindered an efficient military reaction from Constantinople. Doukas profited from this by taking the initiative himself and in the same year opening a new and successful offensive against the Kingdom of Thessalonike, where the internal tension had mounted as the result of Peter's policy.³³⁰

The Mixed Latin-Byzantine Principalities

In a last type of principality, the political elite was mixed Latin-Byzantine, as was also the case in the core quarter. In the later years of the period studied the principality of Adrianople can be categorized in this class. The successor to Theodore Branas was Baldwin of Béthune, a son of *protovestiarios* and later *sebastokrator* Cono I.³³¹ However, there is no further information about this principality extant for these later years. Beside Adrianople, Thessalonike was the only regional principality where both the Latin and the Byzantine aristocracy took part in policymaking. As regards political ideology, it is probable that the point of view of the Latin elite tied in with the thinking in this respect that existed in the Latin principalities, although as has been seen, an imperial intervention in 1208–1209 was necessary to suppress

³²⁹ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 24–24a, pp. 43–44.

³³⁰ Cf. Chapter VII, p. 377.

³³¹ Cf. above, p. 103.

the separatist line of the Lombard rebels.³³² After 1209 the integration of the kingdom as a feudal entity within the empire was no longer the subject of discussion. For the Byzantine elite, the status of Thessalonike as an autonomous principality in the empire was something new that can however have tied in with local political ambitions, as was the case in the Byzantine feudal principalities. From the meagre source material available it would appear that this Byzantine elite looked upon the Latin emperor as the legitimate Byzantine emperor.³³³

The administrative organization of the kingdom displayed a split nature. As in the imperial core quarter, in the royal domain the Byzantine administrative organization was adopted to quite a major extent, whilst in the Latin feudal baronies the situation was decidedly comparable with the fragmentation of public rights in the Latin feudal principalities.³³⁴ In the regions that were under the control of Byzantine magnates, the Byzantine administrative traditions were probably continued within a regionalized framework. Therefore, different degrees of administrative continuity were prevalent in the various territories of the Kingdom of Thessalonike in comparison with the period prior to 1204.³³⁵ The administrative elite itself displayed the same diversity. Belonging to the Latin elite were barons from, inter alia, the Rhineland,

³³² For example the Roman character of the empire seems not to have been acknowledged by the Thessalonikan barons. Imperial constable Amé Pofey, who in his only known post-1204 charter styled himself solely as imperial constable (and not as a Thessalonikan baron, cf. also p. 178), used in his title (*totius Romanie magnus conestabilis*) the term *Romanie* instead of *Romanorum* (Blondel, *Amédée Pofey de Cologny, grand-connétable de Romanie*, p. 177; Mallet, *Documents*, n° IX, p. 17). The idea of the Latin empire as the main support for the Latin Orient on the other hand does seem to have enjoyed some popularity, given the substantial amount of possessions that the military orders acquired in the kingdom (cf. Chapter VI, p. 340 and also Chapter VIII, note 72).

³³³ In 1209 during his expedition in the kingdom the emperor Henry was greeted with traditional imperial acclamations by the population of various towns. Valenciennes testifies that Byzantines from Halmyros wished that God may guard their emperor (Valenciennes, §663, 671–673, 683; Van Tricht, “*La gloire de l’empire*”, pp. 223–224).

³³⁴ In 1213 is attested *doux* or provincial governor George Phrangopoulos in Thessalonike: Demetrios Chomatenos, *Ponemata Diaphora*, n° 106. Cf. Simon, *Witwe Sachlikina gegen Witwe Horaia*, p. 329, p. 335. Circa 1219 in the same city we also find the head of the city’s administration, the *eparchos*: Teodosije, *Zivot svetoga Save*, p. 226. Cf. Guiland, *L’Éparque. II. Les éparques autres que l’éparque de la ville*, p. 195. In addition, there are also known to have been Latin viscounts in various cities of the royal domain—Christopolis, Serres in Thessalonike: Valenciennes, §608, 612–614, 620, 622, 637.

³³⁵ On the mixed ecclesiastical organisation of the kingdom: cf. Chapter VI, notes 104–105.

Northern Italy, Provence, Champagne and Burgundy: Imperial Marshal Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Lord of Mosynopolis; William of Bloville, who possessed a fiefdom near Vigneri; Margaret (originating from Champagne), Lady of Berroia; Wierich of Daun, Lord of Kitros; Roland Pesce, Lord of Platamon; Amé Pofey, Lord of Pharsalos, Domokos and Kalindos; Berthold of Katzenelnbogen, Lord of Velestino; Abbon of Pleurs, who held possessions in the bishopric of Gardiki; Renier of Travale, who held possessions in the bishopric of Kitros; regent (1207–1209) Oberto II of Biandrate, whose possessions remain unidentified; and a certain William, Lord of Larissa.³³⁶ Within the Byzantine elite we find members of families which prior to 1204 had belonged to the imperial aristocracy: ex-Empress Margaret of Hungary, widow of Isaac II Angelos and of Boniface of Montferrat, her sons John and Manuel Angelos, members of the families Phrangopoulos,³³⁷ Petraliphas³³⁸ and Charsianites.³³⁹ Belonging to the local elite were members of the families Maliasenos,³⁴⁰ Kokkalas,³⁴¹ Cheimadas and Logaras.³⁴² Taronas, Lord of Megale Vlachia, also belongs to this last group.³⁴³

³³⁶ Geoffrey of Villehardouin: cf. Chapter V, note 21. William of Bloville: cf. Chapter III, note 185. Margaret, lady of Berroia: Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 416. William, lord of Larissa: Valenciennes, §660. Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1468 (XI, 154); CCXVI, col. 300 (XIII, 105). Abbon of Pleurs, Wierich of Daun, Berthold of Katzenelnbogen, Renier of Travale, Roland Pesce, Oberto of Biandrate: Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 214, 217–219, 223, 236–237, 240–241, 244–245, 248. On the Latin elite of the kingdom see also: Haberstumpf, *I conti di Biandrate in Outremer*, pp. 220–230. Blondel, *Amédée Pofey de Cologny, grand connétable de Romanie*, pp. 177–200. Hendrickx, *The incorporation of Pieria*, pp. 243–256. Todt, *Graf Berthold II. Von Katzenelnbogen*, pp. 65–87.

³³⁷ Cf. references in note 342. Nicol, *Symbiosis and integration*, pp. 114–115.

³³⁸ Berthold of Katzenelnbogen granted the Saint Hilarion monastery near Halmyros to Maria Petraliphas, who married Theodore Doukas circa 1211 (Miklosich & Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi*, IV, pp. 345–349; Nicol, *The despotate of Epiros*, pp. 215–216; Polemis, *The Doukai*, pp. 165–166).

³³⁹ Simon, *Witwe Sachlinkina gegen Witwe Horaia*, p. 329, 335.

³⁴⁰ As apperas from a 1215 charter of Arsenios, bishop of Demetrias, Constantine Maliasenos then founded the Makrinitissa monastery in his diocese. Demetrias was still under Latin control at that time (Miklosich & Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi*, IV, pp. 382–383; Trapp, *Chronologisches zu den Diplomatarien des Paulosklosters*, p. 210; Polemis, *The Doukai*, pp. 142–143; Van Tricht, *La politique étrangère (2de partie)*, pp. 228–231—we now accept the 1215 dating of Arsenios' charter (instead of 1230), since Theodore Doukas is mentioned in it without imperial title).

³⁴¹ Cf. *supra* p. 178.

³⁴² Jeremias Cheimadas was *sakellarios* and Romanos Logaras was also a cleric (precise function unknown) attached to the metropolitan church of Thessalonike under the Latin archbishop Warin around 1213 (Demetrios Chomatenos, *Phonemata diaphora*, n° 106; Simon, *Witwe Sachlinkina gegen Witwe Horaia*, p. 335).

³⁴³ Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Noctes Petropolitanae*, n° 27. Magdalino, *Between Romaniae: Thessaly and Epiros in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 100–101. Cf. also note 86.

Thessalonike was the region in which the Latin emperor implemented the most clearly defined and centralist policy, and this through all the means that we have discussed above. This need not be surprising in view of the fact that Thessalonike held a crucial position in the empire. Firstly it was the largest principality, and secondly it was from a geopolitical point of view the link between the core quarter and both the southern and western territories in the empire. If the imperial powers wanted to gain a real influence within the empire, a certain degree of control over Thessalonike was of primordial importance. However, the imperial influence in Thessalonike was ultimately unable to contribute to the build-up of a stable internal political constellation in this crucially positioned kingdom. The minor succession by Demetrios of Montferrat in 1207 gave occasion to a fierce competition for political dominance between the two large factions within the local elite. On one side was the so-called Lombard camp, dominated by North Italian barons, that on no less than two occasions—in 1208–1209 and in 1216–1217—attempted to place the leadership of the kingdom into the hands of Marquis William VI of Montferrat. They wanted the governance of the kingdom to be exclusively in the hands of Latin, and then mostly North-Italian, barons. This Latin or Lombard camp stood in opposition to the party that supported Latin-Byzantine cooperation and a harmonic balance of power in the governance of the kingdom.³⁴⁴ This second camp included the pro-Byzantine Margaret of Hungary, guardian until circa 1220–1221 for her son King Demetrios of Montferrat,³⁴⁵ and most of the French and German barons—including Berthold of Katzenelnbogen who in 1217 was regent of the kingdom—and the Byzantine elite. This last faction enjoyed the continuous support of Emperor Henry, himself a proponent of a equitable Latin-Byzantine division of power. Peter of Courtenay, who was not familiar with the delicate Latin-Byzantine balance of power, was to promise his support to the group around William VI, whom he co-invested with

³⁴⁴ Boniface of Montferrat himself had adopted a policy directed at Latin-Byzantine cooperation, although there also were moments of conflict with the Byzantine elite (cooperation: Villehardouin, §498; Migne, PL, CCXVI, col. 951 (XVI, 162). Raimbaut de Vaqueiras, *The poems of the troubadour Raimbaut de Vaqueiras*, n° 22, v. 49–60; Hendrickx, *Boniface de Montferrat et Manuel Angelos*, pp. 73; Pokorny, *Der territoriale Umfang des lateinischen Königreichs Thessaloniki*, p. 579; conflict: Niketas Choniates, p. 600, 620).

³⁴⁵ In 1220 or 1221 Demetrios, who was born in 1205 or 1206, feudally speaking reached his majority (Goddling, *Le droit privé dans les Pays-Bas méridionaux du 12^e au 18^e siècle*, pp. 70–71).

the kingdom in 1217.³⁴⁶ The fact that the internal political constellation in Thessalonike was not very stable made the kingdom vulnerable to the external aggression of Theodore Doukas, who in 1218 was to launch a successful offensive against the kingdom.

CONCLUSION

In the period covered by this study, the Latin emperors pursued an active policy aimed at establishing their authority within the empire as a whole. The strategies employed in this were many and various: interference with the feudal superstructure and exploiting the feudal rights given to them by virtue of the basic pacts of 1204–1205; the installation of imperial representatives in the various regions of the empire; the use of religious leaders as imperial agents; the creation of a supraregional imperial aristocracy via the court hierarchy and marital alliances; the pursuit of uniformity in legal policy; the retention of a relative monopoly of foreign policy and defence policy. Despite this abundance of centripetal strategies we established that these were institutionally not well founded, or—insofar as the source material allowed us to discover—were not applied very systematically. Although a number of the imperial prerogatives could be legitimized on the grounds of the basic treaties of 1204–1205, they were mainly the result of the prevailing balances of power. In particular the emperor's strong position within his extensive core quarter enabled him to undertake centralist initiatives and, if need be, to force them through.

The strategies summarized are comparable with those applied by contemporary Western rulers in their attempts to expand central authority within their kingdoms. However, the idea itself of pursuing a centralist policy in respect of the entire empire is, in our opinion, Byzantine-inspired. The Latin emperors adopted the Byzantine imperial ideology to a major extent and must have tried to align this with the political reality through means available to them within their

³⁴⁶ Sources on the factional struggle in Thessalonike: Valenciennes, §560–688. Prinz, *Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs*, pp. 417–418. Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 227 (XIII, 34), CCXVI, col. 456 (XIV, 94); col. 595 (XV, 71). Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 19, 499, 506, 508, 526, 2856, 4754. Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople*, pp. 260–261. Fejer, *Codex Diplomaticus Hungariae Ecclesiasticus et Civilis*, III/1, p. 284. An narrative account in: Gerland, *Das lateinischen Kaiserreich*, pp. 161–189. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, pp. 106–111. Wolff, *The Latin empire*, p. 206.

feudalized empire. It should be noted here that to a certain extent the strategies discussed fitted in with Byzantine administrative traditions. Of course, in the 12th century in the core areas of the Byzantine Empire the imperial administration was firmly in place, assuring the *basileus* of the direct governance of the lion's share of the imperial territory. However, at the same time there were territories that were deemed to be part of the empire, which escaped this system of direct governance. For example, throughout most of the twelfth century Serbia and Cilician Armenia were under the only indirect control of Constantinople. In order to establish at least some degree of imperial authority over these regions, measures were employed such as the awarding of titles, marital alliances, religious appointments, in short strategies that the Latin emperors utilized vis-à-vis the feudal principalities within their empire.³⁴⁷ On the basis of this antithesis between on the one hand territories that were under direct imperial rule and on the other hand territories that were only indirectly under imperial control, we are able to conclude that in the Latin Empire the relationship between these two types of territory was reversed in comparison with the situation prior to 1204. This view allows the Latin take-over of the Byzantine Empire to fit into a Byzantine frame of reference, as a consequence of which the Latin feudalization and restructuring of the empire take on a less drastic nature.

In the policy that the emperors pursued with respect to the empire as a whole, two periods can be distinguished. We established that for quite some centripetal strategies after circa 1217 we have only a little information at our disposal. This can be explained to some extent by the situation as regards sources, which after 1213 is not very favourable, but in our opinion the tendency appears to be too clear to explain matters in this way alone. Furthermore, a number of elements indicate that the emperor consciously pursued a less centralist—and consequently with regard to the empire in its entirety less Byzantine-inspired—policy, evidenced for example by Peter of Courtenay's action with regard to William VI of Montferrat vis-à-vis the Kingdom of Thessalonike. However, this relatively less centralizing policy did not prevent a number of centripetal strategies being maintained, inter alia

³⁴⁷ Charanis, *The Armenians in the Byzantine Empire*, pp. 53–54. Mutaftian, *Le Royaume arménien de Cilicie, XII^e–XIV^e siècle*, pp. 17–41. Stephenson, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier*, passim.

the development of a supraregional aristocracy by means of granting court titles and entering into marital alliances, the partial retention of imperial representatives in various territories of the empire, the defence of the imperial prerogatives with regard to the patriarchal election, and the attitude adopted vis-à-vis Venice. After 1224 the tendency of a less centralizing policy appears to have continued with increased strength, which resulted, *inter alia* in the explicit abandonment of the relative imperial monopoly on foreign and defence policies. The background to this were the successful offensives by Emperor John III Vatatzes of Nicaea and Theodore Doukas, ruler of Epiros that reduced the territorial dimensions of the core quarter enormously and in doing so decimated the imperial resources. In order to find an explanation for the evolution we have recorded, in the following chapter we subject to further analysis the group of persons who together with the emperor outlined imperial policy.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE CENTRAL ELITE

In order to find an explanation for the shift in imperial policy circa 1217–1219 in the direction of a less centralist and less Byzantine inspired government, we make an analysis of the group of persons surrounding the Latin emperor who, together with him, determined governmental policy and to whom we shall refer further as the central elite.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE CENTRAL ELITE

In theory, the starting point for the study of the central elite should be the mixed council of the empire described in the constitutional pact of October 1205, consisting on one side of the emperor and the non-Venetian *magnates* and the podestà and his councillors on the other. However, nowhere is it apparent that this mixed council formed the central focus of political decision-making.¹ Only in the critical early years of 1204–1207 did the council play a certain role in the government of the empire.² From an imperial point of view, the stabilization of the military situation in circa 1207 reduced the necessity for further collaboration with the Venetians on a permanent basis. In addition, the death of Doge Dandolo in 1205 and the temporary nature of the mandates of the podestà and his *consilarii* weakened the Venetian position for pushing forward the mixed council as the central decision-making

¹ Cf. Jacoby, *The Venetian presence*, p. 147. idem, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, p. 62.

² In the conflict between Emperor Baldwin and Boniface of Montferrat and in the struggle against the Bulgarian ruler Kalojan in Thrace and against Theodore Laskaris in Asia Minor we see the mixed council in action at a number of critical moments (Villehardouin, §283, 340, 423, 477). However, in other analogous decisions in the same period the council appears to play no role (Ibidem, §453, 466, 488). Remarkably enough, these latter examples all date from the period after the death of the doge († June 1205). It is also significant that nowhere in his chronicle covering the period 1208–1209 does Valenciennes cause us to think of any Venetian influence upon imperial government, which cannot only be explained by his pro-imperial attitude (Valenciennes, *passim*).

instrument.³ After 1207 there is no longer any trace of the functioning of the mixed council.⁴

Determining the empire's policy was to be the role of the imperial *consilium*, which throughout the whole of the period studied we see appearing in the sources as the centre of political decision-making.⁵ However, this *consilium* was not a strongly institutionalized body with precisely termed competencies or a clearly defined composition.⁶ Its members were variously designated as *barones*, *consilarii et barones*, *fideles* and *hommes*. This terminology indicates that two types of member could be distinguished within the imperial council: *barones* and *consilarii*. By analogy with the situation in Western Europe we may assume that by the term *barones* are meant prominent vassals. The influence that these barons had was a typically Western element that was also customary in the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine.⁷ In the Byzantine tradition the emperor as *autokrator* in principle only depended on counsellors and personnel of his choice, but in practice he generally also had to involve the leading aristocratic families in decision-making. This was particularly the case at the end of the 12th century when under the influence of the pro-aristocratic policy of the Komnenoi and the Angeloi the power of these families had become very considerable.⁸ The term *consilarii* refers to more personal imperial

³ A mandate of podestà or *consiliarius* never lasted much longer than circa two years (Wolff, *The Oath of the Venetian Podestà*, pp. 559–560, 570–571).

⁴ Cf. Chapter IV, p. 217. Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, p. 62.

⁵ A few explicit mentions of this *consilium* as central decision-making organ: 1206: Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XIX, pp. 527–528; 1213: Prinzing, *Der Brief*, p. 412; 1221: Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 260, p. 227. Also: Villehardouin, §428–429, 466, 488; Valenciennes, §505, 560.

⁶ In this way, the envoys that in 1229 reached agreement with John of Brienne about the emperorship of Constantinople were only designated as representatives of Regent Narjot I of Toucy and the barons of the '*imperium Romanie*.' About the *consilium*, of which the same barons—Vilain of Aulnay and Ponce of Chaponnay—nevertheless were part, there is no mention (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 273; Cf. Lot & Fawtier, *Histoire des institutions françaises au Moyen Âge. II: Institutions royales*, pp. 75–76: the authors point out the not very institutionalized nature of the French royal *consilium* until the late thirteenth century).

⁷ Ganshof, *Qu'est-ce que la Féodalité*, p. 246. Bournazel, *Le Gouvernement Capétien*, p. 168. Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus*, pp. 29–31. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility*, p. 103.

⁸ Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations*, pp. 440–441. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire 1025–1204*, pp. 243–245. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 226–227.

counsellors, for example clerics who were associated with the imperial court and persons who belonged to the imperial *familia* or *maisnie*.⁹

When endeavouring to ascertain the concrete composition of the *consilium* and of the imperial *familia*, the problem arises that in the sources almost no one is indicated explicitly as a member of one or other of these groups. From this point of view it is necessary to introduce a number of criteria for selection: 1. fulfilling important diplomatic, military or advisory tasks in imperial service; 2. holding a prominent function in the central governance; 3. acting as witness to imperial charters; 4. being found regularly in the imperial entourage; 5. possessing a title in the imperial court hierarchy; 6. having bonds of consanguinity with the imperial family; 7. having a prominent social status in one's home region. We can consider persons who combine a number of these criteria as being members of the *consilium*. To consider someone as being in the category of the barons or in that of the *consiliarii* and the imperial *familia*, we use as a criterion that, from a socio-economic point of view, barons have at their disposal a certain basis of power in the form of considerable fiefdoms, whilst the *consiliarii* and *familiares* were more directly dependent on the emperor for their livelihoods.

In our prosopographical research of the central elite of the Latin Empire we have applied the above-mentioned criteria quite stringently, at the risk of ascribing the imperial *consilium* with a more institutionalized nature than in reality was the case. In connection with membership of the council we also observe that, with regard to the imperial *familia*, it is for the most part almost impossible to ascertain who effectively sat in the council and who exercised political influence via informal channels. Because the data on quite a large number of persons is restricted to a minimum, the ascription of persons to the category of the barons or that of the council members and the *familia* is often of a rather hypothetical nature. Chronologically we distinguish two periods, 1204–1217 and 1217–1228. We have established above that there is a change in the imperial governmental policy from circa 1217, and it would seem to us an attractive hypothesis to examine whether this mutation does not coincide with a changed

⁹ Cf. Boutruche, *Seigneurie et Féodalité. II: L'Apogée*, p. 265. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility*, p. 103. Bournazel, *Le Gouvernement Capétien*, pp. 152–155, pp. 162–163.

composition of the central elite. If both phenomena were to coincide, we can assume an actual correlation.

The Composition of the Central Elite in the Period 1204–1217

In the category of the barons in the imperial council it is in this first period advisable to apply an additional chronological breakdown. The Latin defeat at Adrianople (April 1205), in which numerous prominent barons met their end, was to ensure at once important shifts in the composition of the imperial *consilium*. For the period 1204–1205 we therefore shortlist some twelve figures:¹⁰ Cono I of Béthune,¹¹ Count Louis of Blois,¹² Milo II le Bréban,¹³ Doge Enrico Dandolo,¹⁴ Manessier of L'Isle,¹⁵ Boniface of Montferrat,¹⁶ Renaud of Montmirail,¹⁷ Stephen of Perche,¹⁸ Count Hugh IV of Saint-Pol,¹⁹ Renier of Trith,²⁰ Geoffrey

¹⁰ For the members of the central elite we provide in the following footnotes in each case the references to all sources and literature with respect to the person concerned, in order not to overload the critical apparatus on the following pages.

¹¹ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 33, 45, 65, 113, 128, 138, 148, 155, 280–284. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 160, 207, 256. Riant, *Exuviae*, II, p. 195. Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 910 (XVI, 115). Villehardouin, §368, 430, 436, 496. Valenciennes, §574–591, 656–658. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 145–147. Warlop, *The Flemish Nobility*, II/1, p. 667. Maltezou, *Il Quartiere*, n° 34.

¹² Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267. Villehardouin, §283–299, 305, 314, 319–320, 336, 340–341, 348, 350–353, 358–360. De Clari, §96. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 79–82. Von Isenburg, *Stammtafeln*, I/2, n° 42.

¹³ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 280–284. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 160. Longnon, *Documents*, I, p. xiii, n. 2. Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 912 (XV, 115). Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 526. Villehardouin, §268, 430, 436, 457, 464, 466, 468, 478. Valenciennes, §533, 540, 561. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 48–51, 55–56.

¹⁴ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267. Villehardouin, §283–299, 340, 351, 364–366, 375, 384–385, 388. Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, *passim*. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, pp. 99–108. Madden, *Enrico Dandolo and the rise of Venice*, pp. 173–194.

¹⁵ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 160. Villehardouin, §305, 307, 343–344, 354–356. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 42–48.

¹⁶ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267. Villehardouin, §450, 496 *en passim*. De Clari, §96 *en passim*. Kölzer, *Bonifaz I. von Mon(f)ferrat*, col. 421–422. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 227–228. Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, *passim*.

¹⁷ Villehardouin, §315, 452, 461. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 114–115.

¹⁸ Villehardouin, §315–316, 452, 461. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 104–105.

¹⁹ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267. Villehardouin, §314, 334–335. De Clari, §96. Nieuws, *Le comté de Saint-Pol*, I/1, pp. 82–94. pp. 123–125. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 195–197. Warlop, *The Flemish Nobility*, I/1, 266 & I/2, p. 520.

²⁰ *Thesaurus Diplomaticus*, II: 1200–1250, n° 12039. Villehardouin, §296. Valenciennes, §515, 518. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 150–151, p. 170.

of Villehardouin,²¹ and Henry of Flanders/Hainaut.²² Surviving members of this group after the Battle of Adrianople were: Cono I of Béthune, Milo II le Bréban, Manessier of L'Isle, Renier of Trith and Geoffrey of Villehardouin, and Henry of Flanders/Hainaut firstly as regent and afterwards as emperor. From circa 1205–1206 we encounter as newcomers: Peter of Bracheux,²³ Theodore Branas,²⁴ Anseau I of Cayeux,²⁵ Thierry of Tenremonde,²⁶ Peter of Douai,²⁷ Thierry of Looz,²⁸ Nicolas of Mailly,²⁹ Philokales,³⁰ Jean Payen of Orléans,³¹ William of

²¹ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 160. Longnon, *Documents*, I, p. xiii, n. 2. Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 910 (XVI, 115). Villehardouin, *passim*. Valenciennes, *passim*. Longnon, *Recherches*, *passim*. idem, *Les compagnons*, pp. 26–27.

²² Lauer, *Une lettre inédite d'Henri I d'Angre*, pp. 191–201. Prinzing, *Der Brief*, pp. 395–431. Villehardouin, §269–299, 310, 321–323, 340, 347, 380–384. Valenciennes, *passim*. Van Tricht, *De jongelingenjaren*, pp. 218–219. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 140–145.

²³ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 160. Prinzing, *Der Brief*, p. 412. Villehardouin, § 305, 319–320, 341, 369–374, 384–385, 396, 430, 436, 453–454, 462, 476–479, 489. Valenciennes, § 522, 525, 533, 540. Philippe Mouskes, p. 408. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 92–93. Clair, *Les filles d'Hautecombe dans l'empire latin de Constantinople*, p. 273 (Isabelle de Bracheux).

²⁴ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 169. Villehardouin, §249, 403, 413 and p. 215, n. 3. Valenciennes, §543, 549. Albericus Trium Fontium, p. 885. Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations*, pp. 121–122, p. 152. Kazhdan, *L'aristocrazia bizantina*, p. 304.

²⁵ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 256. Teulet, *Layettes*, n° 2744. Villehardouin, §322, 403, 421, 430, 436, 453, 462, 478, 493. Valenciennes, §515, 518, 595 and *passim*. Akropolites, §24. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 200.

²⁶ Villehardouin, §316, 322, 402, 405–409. Warlop, *The Flemish Nobility*, II/1, p. 758.

²⁷ Valenciennes, § 512–518, 529–530, 574–591, 657, 689–693. Warlop, *The Flemish Nobility*, II/1, p. 770. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 182–183. Van Tricht, *De jongelingenjaren*, p. 214.

²⁸ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 174. Villehardouin, §306, 322, 402, 409, 430, 436, 455, 478, 480–489. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 245.

²⁹ Pokorny, *Zwei Briefe*, n° 1, p. 202. Villehardouin, §322, 388. Valenciennes, §522, 525, 533, 540, 574–580, 584, 591. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 199.

³⁰ Morozzo Della Rocca, *Documenti*, I, n° 519; Laurent, *Les registes des actes du patriarchat*, I/4, n° 1219, p. 24. Lemerle, *Actes de Lavra*, IV, pp. 134–135. Andreas Dandolo, *Chronica*, p. 282. Kazhdan, *L'aristocrazia bizantina*, p. 293, p. 297. Jacoby, *The Greeks of Constantinople*, p. 60. Cf. also Chapter III, note 32.

³¹ Villehardouin, §305, 319–320, 341, 369–374, 384–385, 420, 430, 436, 453, 476–479. Valenciennes, § 561. Philippe Mouskes, p. 408. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 90.

Sains,³² Macaire of Sainte-Mènehould,³³ Raoul of Tiberias,³⁴ Eustace of Hainaut,³⁵ and Thierry of Flanders.³⁶

In the category of the non-baronial *consiliarii* in the imperial entourage or *familia* we can designate as clerics: Nivelon of Quièrzy, Bishop of Soissons,³⁷ Peter, Bishop of Bethlehem,³⁸ Chancellor Jean Faicete of Noyon,³⁹ Chancellor Walter of Courtrai,⁴⁰ Amaury, Provost of Arras,⁴¹ *clavicularius* Hugo, former Abbot of Saint-Ghislain,⁴² imperial cleric Warin, later Archbishop of Vrysis and after that of Thessalonike and also Chancellor,⁴³ the imperial chaplains Philip⁴⁴ and Arduinus, later

³² Villehardouin, § 460, 463. Valenciennes, § 611, 638, 652–654 Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 98.

³³ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 280–284. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 160. Villehardouin, §312, 347, 411, 421, 430, 436, 446, 460, 464, 478, 481. Philippe Mouskes, p. 408. Marino Sanudo Torsello, *Istoria del Regno di Romania*, p. 115. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 45–48.

³⁴ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 174. Villehardouin, §316. Greilsammer, *Le Livre au Roi*, p. 87. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility*, p. 22, p. 114, pp. 152–159. Kedar, *The Fourth Crusade's Second Front*, pp. 104–105.

³⁵ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 249. Prinzing, *Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs*, pp. 412–417. Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 353 (XIII, 184). Villehardouin, §446, 453, 462, 478, 493. Valenciennes, §549, 571, 645, 693–694. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 175. Van Tricht, *De jongelingenjaren*, p. 213.

³⁶ Villehardouin, §493. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 145.

³⁷ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271, p. 572. Pokorny, *Zwei unedierte Briefe*, n° 1, p. 202. Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1037–1038 (IX, 200); CCXVI, col. 1082–1083 (IX, 252). Villehardouin, §388. De Clari, §96–97. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 115–116. Newman, *Les seigneurs de Nesle*, pp. 157–160. Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, p. 71.

³⁸ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271, p. 572. Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 1239. Villehardouin, §361. Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, II, p. 58.

³⁹ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271. Villehardouin, § 290. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 165–166.

⁴⁰ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, I, pp. 328–329, II, n° 280–284. Riant, *Exuviae*, II, p. 9. Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 946 (IX, 124 & 129). Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 191. Strubbe, *Egidius van Breedene*, p. 44.

⁴¹ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 280–284. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 192.

⁴² Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 27, 40. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 193.

⁴³ Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 43, 67. Migne, *PL*, CCXV, 1130–1131 (X, 35); CCXVI, col. 147 (XII, 114–115); col. 148 (XII, 117); col. 213 (XIII, 13); col. 228 (XIII, 38); col. 564 (XIV, 26 & 30); col. 575 (XV, 42); col. 579 (XV, 48); col. 591 (XV, 69 & 80); col. 597 (XV, 75). Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 48–49. Wauters, *Exploration des chartes et des cartulaires*, n° 10, pp. 189–190, n° 13, p. 194. Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 3854. Huillard-Breholles, *Historia Diplomatica Frederici Secundi*, II, p. 328, 458. Auvray, *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, n° 1175. Valenciennes, §600. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 187. Voordeckers & Milis, *La croix byzantine d'Eine*, pp. 481–484.

⁴⁴ Valenciennes, §522–524, 536–539.

Archbishop of Thebes,⁴⁵ the imperial clerics Henry of Valenciennes,⁴⁶ Simon of Beaumont,⁴⁷ Daniel of Ecaussines,⁴⁸ G.,⁴⁹ R.,⁵⁰ and the monk P.⁵¹ Other clerics who belonged to the imperial entourage were members of the chapters of each of the churches in the imperial palaces, the Church of Saint Michael (or *Nea* church) in the Great Palace and the Church of Saint Mary (or *Theotokos ton Blachernon* church) in the Blacherna Palace, such as Chaplain Lambert of Noyon, Provost of Saint Michael.⁵² We can probably also include in the imperial entourage a number of the clerics who, via imperial intervention, obtained a benefice in one of the thirty-two collegiate churches in the capital, the right of presentation of which accrued to the emperor, or in the Saint Sophia Chapter. One example is W. Cocart, Provost of the *Sancta Trinitas* Church.⁵³ Byzantine clerics were also to be found in the imperial entourage.⁵⁴ Finally, there were also archbishops and bishops who exercised influence in the imperial entourage, and here we can think in the first instance of prelates from the core quarter.⁵⁵

As laymen among the *consiliarii* there are several figures who fulfilled private or confidential missions in imperial service and who as far as is known did not have the status of baron and can therefore probably be placed within the imperial *familia*: Knight Petrus

⁴⁵ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 48, p. 75. Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 324 (XIII, 138–139). Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, II, p. 222. Hugo, *Sanctae Antiquitatis Monumenta*, Epistola Gervasii n° 88, pp. 78–79.

⁴⁶ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 715 (VIII, n° 136). Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 48, p. 75. Valenciennes, *passim*. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 180–181.

⁴⁷ Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 27. Huyghebaert, *Iperius et la translation de la relique du Saint-Sang*, p. 152. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 184, 193.

⁴⁸ Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 23.

⁴⁹ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 147 (XII, 113). Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 4118, n° 4122–4123.

⁵⁰ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 1222 (X, 125).

⁵¹ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 639 (VIII, 73).

⁵² Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 7. Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 77 (XII, 70).

⁵³ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1363 (XI, 36–37), col. 1395 (XI, 78).

⁵⁴ Circa 1205–1206 Regent Henry entrusted the search for his brother Baldwin, who had been taken prisoner during the Battle of Adrianople, inter alia, to a number of Byzantine monks (*L'Estoire D'Eracles*, p. 288).

⁵⁵ Valenciennes attests to the advisory and diplomatic role of a number of bishops during the imperial campaign in Thessalonike in 1208–1209 (Valenciennes, §594, 648). In concreto we can think of Archbishop Warin of Thessalonike, a former imperial cleric who at the same time was imperial chancellor, and of Archbishop Arduinus of Thebes, a former imperial chaplain. Archbishop John of Lesbos (in the core quarter) also had a clear link with the central elite: at an unspecified time Cono I of Béthune donated a relic to him (Riant, *Exuviae*, II, p. 195; see also note 198).

Girardus,⁵⁶ *camerarius* Gualterus,⁵⁷ *familiaris* Ponce of Chaponnay,⁵⁸ Jean Bliaud⁵⁹ and Leonard of Hélesmes.⁶⁰ Officials that could also have been part of the imperial council on a professional basis are *scriptor*, *notarius* and *iudex* Vivianus.⁶¹ Major Byzantine functionaries can also have had influence upon central government, and here we can think for example of the *epi ton deeseon*, who by virtue of his function was in close contact with the emperor. Also included within the imperial *familia* are Emperor Henry's two spouses, Agnes of Montferrat and an anonymous Bulgarian princess.⁶² It would seem almost certain that a number of figures of Thessalonikan and Bulgarian origins respectively would have been introduced into the imperial entourage by these two women.⁶³

The Composition of the Central Elite in the Period 1217–1228

In this second period we encounter in the baronial category a number of barons whom we already have met in the preceding period: Cono I of Béthune, Peter of Bracheux, Theodore Branas, Milo II le Bréban, Anseau I of Cayeux, Jean Payen of Orléans, Macaire of Sainte-Mènehould, and Eustace of Hainaut. In addition, one or two persons appear that are also familiar to us from the preceding years, but whom we had not yet included in the the category of barons: Ponce of Chaponnay and Leonard of Hélesmes. Newcomers were: Hugh of Arras,⁶⁴ Vilain

⁵⁶ Rymer, *Foedera*, I/1, p. 47.

⁵⁷ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 910 (XVI, 115). Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XIX, p. 514.

⁵⁸ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 260. Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 81. Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 146 (XII, 112). Valenciennes, §666, 679–680. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 219.

⁵⁹ Pokorny, *Zwei unedierte Briefe*, n° 1, p. 202. Villehardouin, §388, 493. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 173. Van Tricht, *De jongelingenjaren*, p. 214.

⁶⁰ Valenciennes, §508–511, 513, 533, 561. Philippe Mouskes, p. 408. D'Herbomez, *Histoire des châtelains de Tournai*, II, n° 24, 27, 30, 32, 36, 39–40.

⁶¹ Cf. Chapter III, note 65.

⁶² Villehardouin, §450, 457–458, 496. De Clari, §96–98. *Chronographia Sigeberti Gemblacensis. Continuatio Bergensis*, p. 439.

⁶³ There is virtually nothing known about the concrete role played at court by either empress. It is known of Agnes that in circa 1207 she gave 300 hyperpera to Patriarch Morosini with a view to the support of papal legate Benedictus, which indicates in any event that she had a personal income. In the same context her husband made a gift of 1200 hyperpera (Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1387, 1395 (XI, 76 & 78)).

⁶⁴ Philippe Mouskes, p. 539. Bedier, *Les chansons de croisade*, p. 136. Feuchere, *Les châtelains d'Arras*, pp. 23–30. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 55.

of Aulnay,⁶⁵ Cono II of Béthune⁶⁶ and Baldwin of Béthune,⁶⁷ Robert of Boves,⁶⁸ Jean I le Bréban⁶⁹ and Milo III le Bréban,⁷⁰ Anseau II of Cayeux,⁷¹ Clarembaud (of Chappes?),⁷² Macaire of Clermont,⁷³ William of Douai,⁷⁴ Gerard of Estreux,⁷⁵ Baldwin of Hainaut,⁷⁶ Alexios Laskaris and Isaac Laskaris,⁷⁷ Gerard La Truie,⁷⁸ Petrus Lupus,⁷⁹ Nicolas of Mainvault,⁸⁰ Manetus (= Dominikos Manios?),⁸¹ Geoffrey of Merry,⁸²

⁶⁵ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 273. Teulet, *Layettes*, n° 2744, 2753, 3123. Buchon, *Recherches historiques*, II, pp. 378–379. Saige, *Trésor des chartes de Rethel*, n° 132. Longnon, *Recherches*, pp. 43–44. Bon, *La Morée franque*, p. 128, p. 700.

⁶⁶ Philippe Mouskes, p. 408. Cf. also Chapter III, note 15.

⁶⁷ Duchesne, *Histoire généalogique de la maison de Béthune. Preuves*, p. 76.

⁶⁸ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 249. Valenciennes, §652–653. Newman, *Les seigneurs de Nesle*, II, p. 99.

⁶⁹ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 249. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 55–56.

⁷⁰ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 260. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 56.

⁷¹ Loenertz, *Les seigneurs tiersiers*, n° 1, p. 268. Akropolites, §24, 47.

⁷² Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 260. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 57–59.

⁷³ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 256. Philippe Mouskes, p. 408. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 48. Clair, *Les filles d'Hautecombe dans l'empire latin de Constantinople*, p. 273. Martin, *Un acte de Baudouin II*, p. 215. Cf. also Chapter III, note 15. Auvray, *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, n° 1138 (Isabelle de Clermont).

⁷⁴ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 273. Warlop, *The Flemish Nobility*, II/1, n° 61.

⁷⁵ Duvivier, *Actes et documents anciens*, II, pp. 274–275. Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, p. 492, n. 10. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 260, 273. Teulet, *Layettes*, n° 2744, 2753. Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 377.

⁷⁶ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 256. Albericus Trium Fontium, p. 947, p. 949. Richard, *A propos de la mission de Baudouin de Hainaut*, pp. 115–121. Verlinden, *Boudewijn van Henegouwen*, pp. 122–129; Duvivier, *La querelle des d'Avesnes et des Dampierre*, I, p. 76. Vanderkindere, *La chronique de Gislebert de Mons*, tabl. IV–V. Dereck, *Guillaume l'Oncle*, pp. 78–91.

⁷⁷ Akropolites, §22.

⁷⁸ Philippe Mouskes, pp. 405–407. Teulet, *Layettes*, n° 1123, 1139. Duvivier, *Actes et documents anciens*, II, n° 25. De Hemptinne & Verhulst, *De oorkonden*, II/2, n° 285. D'Herbomez, *Histoire des châtelains de Tournai*, II, n° 43. Cartellieri, *Philipp II. August*, t. IV/1, p. 387, p. 390, p. 447, p. 452, p. 454, pp. 458–459, p. 468. Bocquillet, *Un héros de Bouvines*, pp. 78–81.

⁷⁹ *Thesaurus Diplomaticus*, I, n° 10713, 10723, 10730. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 256.

⁸⁰ Philippe Mouskes, p. 409. Duvivier, *Actes et documents anciens*, II, n° 66. D'Herbomez, *Histoire des châtelains de Tournai de la maison de Mortagne*, pp. 16–17. idem, *Chartes de l'abbaye de Saint-Martin à Tournai*, I, n° 224. De Smet, *Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Cambron*, II, p. 114, 689, 773, 907. Vanderkindere, *La chronique de Gislebert de Mons*, p. 213. LUYKX, *Johanna van Vlaanderen en Henegouwen*, p. 608.

⁸¹ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 260. Cf. also Chapter III, pp. 114–116.

⁸² Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 256. Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 76. Teulet, *Layettes*, n° 2744, 2753. Loenertz, *Les seigneurs tiersiers*, n° 1, p. 268. Auvray, *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, n° 6089. Longnon, *Recherches*, pp. 116–120. Clair, *Les filles d'Hautecombe dans l'empire latin de Constantinople*, p. 273. Martin, *Un acte de Baudouin II*, p. 215. Cf. also Chapter III, note 15.

Narjot I of Toucy,⁸³ William of Sancerre,⁸⁴ Guy de Valasso⁸⁵ and Thierry II of Walcourt.⁸⁶

For this second period we have only little information available to us about persons belonging to the non-baronial category. A number of clerics that were associated with the palace churches, with the imperial collegiate churches or with the Church of Saint Sophia remain in this category. Examples are *magister* G., Canon of Saint Sophia (possibly identifiable as the G. from the years 1205–1217), and Warnerus, Canon of the Church of Saint Michael in the Great Palace.⁸⁷ An anonymous Byzantine priest held a prominent position at the court of Emperor Robert.⁸⁸ Bishops also continued to be part of the imperial entourage, for example John, Bishop of Madytos,⁸⁹ and Chancellor Warin, Archbishop of Thessalonike, who remained connected with the imperial court. Prominent laymen whom we can include among the imperial *familia* were the knights Thibaud of Raches⁹⁰ and a certain Bar(tholomeus?).⁹¹ Emperor Robert's sister Mary of Courtenay, who as widow of Emperor Theodore Laskaris of Nicaea also lived in Constantinople after his death in 1222, also belongs in this category.⁹²

⁸³ Tisserant, *La légation en Orient*, p. 340. Teulet, *Layettes*, n° 3954. Lurier, *The Chronicle of Morea*, p. 105. Longnon, *Les Toucy en Orient*, pp. 38–39. Bon, *La Morée franque*, p. 128, 708.

⁸⁴ Robertus Autissiodorensis, *Chronologia*, pp. 284–285. De Mas Latrie, *Trésor de chronologie*, col. 1679.

⁸⁵ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 260. Valasso may be identified with Le Valasse (Valassia) in Normandy in the diocese of Rouen, where a Cistercian abbey was located (Cottineau, *Répertoire topo-bibliographique des abbayes et prieurés*, II, col. 3268). Archbishop Guilelmus of Philippi in the kingdom of Thessaloniki for example also originated from Normandy (Rouen)(Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, II, p. 193; Riant, *Exuviae*, II, pp. 3–4). Another option is that Valasso is to be identified as Valas (attested in a 1186 charter—near Bolzano in Northern Italy, situated on the important trade route from Venice to Augsburg), although to our knowledge no other persons from that region are attested in the Latin empire.

⁸⁶ Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 33. Philippe Mouskes, p. 409. Lahaye, *Cartulaire de la commune de Walcourt*, pp. xvii–xxviii. Cf. also Chapter III, p. 146.

⁸⁷ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 2131. See also note 49.

⁸⁸ *Chronicon Turonense*, pp. 310–311.

⁸⁹ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 27. Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 93, 101. Auvray, *Les registres de Grégoire IX*, n° 5296.

⁹⁰ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 249. Blommaert, *Les châtelains de Flandre*, pp. 94–95. Warlop, *The Flemish Nobility*, I, pp. 132–34 & II/1, pp. 769–770. Feuchere, *La châtellenie de Raches*, pp. 5–6.

⁹¹ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 249.

⁹² Löwenfeld, *Une lettre de l'impératrice Marie de Constantinople*, pp. 256–257. Cessi, *Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio di Venezia*, I, n° 140. Saunier-Seite, *Les Courtenay*, pp. 46–71, pp. 147–153.

The same applies to Robert's anonymous spouse who apparently was of mixed Latin-Byzantine origins.⁹³

CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CENTRAL ELITE, 1204–1217

We discuss the central elite in the first period with regard to their geographical and social origin, their geographical location within the empire, and their socio-economic position within the empire. In addition, we examine the functioning of this elite and the political-ideological attitudes within this group, with special attention being devoted to the Latin-Byzantine relations.

Geographical Origins

We can summarize the geographical origins of the barons in the early years 1204–1205 schematically as follows:

Table 4: The geographical origins of the imperial elite (baronial group) in 1204–1205.

1. Cono I of Béthune	County of Flanders
2. Louis of Blois	Counties of Blois and Clermont
3. Milo II le Bréban	County of Champagne
4. Enrico Dandolo	City State of Venice
5. Manessier of L'Isle	County of Champagne
6. Boniface of Montferrat	Marquisate of Montferrat
7. Renaud of Montmirail	French crown domain
8. Stephen of Perche	County of Perche
9. Hugh IV of Saint-Pol	County of Saint-Pol
10. Renier of Trith	County of Hainaut
11. Geoffrey of Villehardouin	County of Champagne
12. Henry of Flanders/Hainaut	Counties of Flanders and Hainaut

In this early period, the barons in the *consilium* not surprisingly correspond with the commanders of the various contingents in the crusading army. The presence of Doge Enrico Dandolo means that the imperial council corresponded to the concept of the mixed council, which had already been described in its embryonic stage in the of March 1204 and was defined further in the pact of October 1205.

⁹³ *Chronicon Turonense*, pp. 310–311. On Emperor Robert's wife: cf. p. 301.

The imperial *familia* provides the following picture:

Table 5: The geographical origins of the imperial elite (*familiares*) in 1204–1205.

1. Hugo, Abbot of Saint-Ghislain	County of Hainaut
2. Jean Faicete of Noyon	French crown domain
3. Walter of Courtrai	County of Flanders
4. Amaury, Provost of Arras	County of Artois
5. Lambert of Noyon	French crown domain
6. P., monk	?
7. Peter, Bishop of Bethlehem	The Kingdom of Jerusalem
8. Warin, Canon of Saint-Amé	County of Flanders
9. Nivelon of Quiërzy, Bishop of Soissons	French crown domain

Most of the eight figures whose geographical origins we have discovered belonged to the former comital entourage van Emperor Baldwin or they had a link with the courts of Flanders and Hainaut. Lambert of Noyon originated from a neighbouring region and was possibly introduced by Jean Faicete of Noyon, who was from the same region. Bishop Nivelon of Soissons was also from a neighbouring region and was one of the prominent clerics during the Fourth Crusade. The ecclesiastical elite of the Holy Land was represented in the imperial entourage in the person of Bishop Peter of Bethlehem.

In the period 1205–1217 we do see partial continuity as regards composition, but quite a number of new figures also appear on the scene. The baronial group:

Table 6: The geographical origins of the imperial elite (baronial group) in 1205–1217.

1. Cono I of Béthune	County of Flanders
2. Peter of Bracheux	County of Clermont
3. Theodore Branas	Byzantium
4. Milo II le Bréban	County of Champagne
5. Anseau I of Cayeux	County of Saint-Pol
6. Thierry of Tenremonde	The Kingdom of Jerusalem—County of Flanders
7. Peter of Douai	County of Flanders
8. Manessier L'Isle	County of Champagne
9. Thierry of Looz	County of Looz
10. Nicolas of Mailly	French crown domain
11. Philokales	Byzantium

Table 6 (*cont.*)

12. Jean Payen of Orléans	County of Blois
13. William of Sains	County of Clermont
14. Macaire of Sainte-Mènehould	County of Champagne
15. Raoul of Tiberias	The Kingdom of Jerusalem
16. Narjot of Toucy	County of Auxerre
17. Renier of Trith	County of Hainaut
18. Geoffrey of Villehardouin	County of Champagne
19. Eustace of Hainaut	County of Hainaut
20. Thierry of Flanders	County of Flanders

We find most regions that we encountered in 1204–1205 represented once more: Blois (1), Champagne (4), Clermont (2), Hainaut (2), Saint-Pol (1), Flanders (3). The result of the departure of Boniface of Montferrat at the end of 1204 for Thessalonike, followed by the majority of the crusading barons from Northern Italy and the Holy Roman Empire, was that a considerable part of the original crusading army was no longer represented in the imperial council. It is probable that Emperor Henry's marriage in 1207 to Boniface's daughter Agnes, whom we numbered among the *familia*, may to some extent have been motivated towards continuing the influence of the Thessalonikan court in Constantinople. However, the death of Boniface in 1207 and the premature death of the empress in 1208 was an obstacle to this.⁹⁴ The death of Enrico Dandolo in June 1205 also caused the gradual disappearance of the Venetian component. The loss of the leaders of the crusading expedition created chances for less prominent figures of the crusading army and for barons from the Holy Land, a number of whom had come over to Constantinople at the end of 1204.⁹⁵

We also see the arrival of Byzantine aristocrats in the council. The uprising in Thrace, which ended in a disastrous defeat of the Latins at Adrianople in April 1205, originated partly as the result of discontent about what was considered by the Byzantines to be their too insubstantial participation in the Latin government.⁹⁶ Indeed, under Baldwin there is not a single Byzantine attested as having taken

⁹⁴ Villehardouin, §450, 457–458, 496.

⁹⁵ Kedar, *The Fourth Crusade's second front*, pp. 102–105.

⁹⁶ Villehardouin, §303. Niketas Choniates, pp. 612–613. Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens und Serbiens*, pp. 1–11, pp. 25–34.

part in the decision-making at the highest level, although the same emperor certainly did employ Byzantines in the lower echelons of his administration.⁹⁷ The defeat at Adrianople made the Latin elite realize that it was necessary to admit the Byzantine aristocracy to the highest level of governance if the empire were to have any chance of success. We should remark here that the two known figures, Theodore Branas and Philokales, had a Latin connection through marital bonds, with the French royal family—which itself was related to the Latin imperial line—and the Venetian aristocratic family Navigaioso, respectively. Emperor Henry's second wife, a Bulgarian princess, culturally speaking also had a partially Byzantine background.

We can ask ourselves whether these few people reflect adequately the Byzantine contribution in the council. After all, Akropolites reports in his chronicle that Emperor Henry included numerous Byzantines among his high-ranking dignitaries.⁹⁸ It is plausible that a number of them participated in decision-making at the highest level. The nature of the source material can explain why these persons are not known to us by name. Almost without exception, the sources that provide detailed information about the imperial entourage are the work of Western authors writing for a Western readership. We find one illustrative passage with Valenciennes. The author often provides the individual names of commanders of military forces or garrisons, but does not report the names of the commanders of the three Byzantine corps present at the Battle of Philippopolis.⁹⁹

The majority of the imperial *familia* continued to originate principally from the emperor's home region. Nevertheless, the case of Ponce of Chaponnay shows that outsiders also had a chance. One way for outsiders to gain admission to this group may, for example, have been via Emperor Henry's two spouses. We recall that we had also encountered Byzantine clerics in circa 1205–1206 in the imperial entourage; they probably continued to be a part of this in the years that followed.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Niketas Choniates, p. 598, p. 612. Ferjancic, *Rapports entre Grecs et Latins*, pp. 171–176. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, p. 64. Cf. also Chapter III, p. 151.

⁹⁸ Akropolites, §16. Cf. also Prologue, pp. 24–39.

⁹⁹ Valenciennes, §543.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. note 54.

Table 7: The geographical origins of the imperial elite (*familiares*) in 1205–1217.

1. Hugo, Abbot of Saint-Ghislain	County of Hainaut
2. Philip, cleric	?
3. R., cleric	?
4. Arduinus, cleric	?
5. Warin, Canon of Saint-Amé	County of Flanders
6. Simon of Beaumont, cleric	County of Flanders
7. W. Cocart, cleric	?
8. Daniel of Ecaussines, cleric	County of Hainaut
9. Henry of Valenciennes, cleric	County of Hainaut
10. G., Canon of Sint-Sophia	?
11. Gualterus (camerarius)	?
12. Warnerus	?
13. Jean Bliaud	County of Hainaut
14. Ponce of Chaponnay	County of Lyons
15. Petrus Girardus	?
16. Leonard of Hélesmes	County of Hainaut
17. Nivelon of Quièrzy, Bishop van Soissons	French crown domain
18. Vivianus	?
19. Agnes of Montferrat, empress	Principality/Kingdom of Thessalonike
20. anonymous Bulgarian princess, empress	Bulgarian Empire

Social Origins

A superficial view shows us that the majority of the population studied were part of the Western feudal class, within which we can distinguish four levels:¹⁰¹ 1. major territorial princes; 2. minor territorial princes; 3. barons and viscounts; 4. lords and vassals of a more modest rank. We use the following categories for the Byzantines:¹⁰² 1. military aristocracy; 2. civil aristocracy. For the early years 1204–1205 this gives us for the barons:

¹⁰¹ Boutruche, *Seigneurie et Féodalité. II: L'Apogée*, pp. 248–275.

¹⁰² Kazhdan, *L'aristocrazia bizantina*, pp. 260–269.

Table 8: The social origins of the imperial elite (baronial group) in 1204–1205.

1. Cono I of Béthune	Baronial
2. Louis of Blois	Princely (major)
3. Milo II le Bréban	Baronial
4. Enrico Dandolo	Princely (major)
5. Manessier of L'Isle	Seigneurial
6. Boniface of Montferrat	Princely (major)
7. Renaud of Montmirail	Baronial
8. Stephen of Perche	Princely (minor)
9. Hugh IV of Saint-Pol	Princely (minor)
10. Renier of Trith	Baronial
11. Geoffrey of Villehardouin	Baronial
12. Henry of Flanders/Hainaut	Princely (major)

We observe a remarkable majority of figures of princely rank which—linked with their leading role during the crusade—must have been the most important criterion for their inclusion in the council. Additionally, we see a number of figures of baronial level and a single ordinary lord. The criteria that determined the inclusion of these persons in the council were: an important advisory role during the crusade (for example Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Manessier L'Isle); consanguinity with the figures of princely rank (for example Cono I of Béthune, Renaud of Montmirail); an important position of those figures at court prior to the crusade (for example Renier of Trith).

The social position of the members of the imperial *familia* is more difficult to ascertain. We find Walter of Courtrai prior to 1204 as *scriptor* in Baldwin's comital chancellery. We also encounter Jean Faicete of Noyon in Baldwin's entourage prior to 1204. During the crusade he already served as the count's chancellor. His title of *magister* indicates that he had followed some form of higher education.¹⁰³ The *clerici* Hugo and Amaury, who also bore the title *magister* were, prior to 1204, Abbot of Saint-Ghislain and Provost of Arras respectively. Warin was a canon of the Chapter of Saint-Amé in Douai, of which the emperors Baldwin and Henry's bastard brother Godfrey was provost. There is absolutely nothing known about the antecedents of Lambert of Noyon. As regards their social origins, did they belong to the feudal world, or were they part of urban societies? Recent studies of the personnel of

¹⁰³ Weijers, *Terminologie des universités au XIII^e siècle*, pp. 133–134.

religious institutions and princely entourages show that both groups were represented.¹⁰⁴

In the period 1205–1217 we see a notable shift with regard to the social origins of the barons:

Table 9: The social origins of the imperial elite (baronial group) in 1205–1217.

1. Cono I of Béthune	Baronial
2. Peter of Bracheux	Seigneurial
3. Theodore Branas	Byzantine military aristocracy
4. Milo II le Bréban	Baronial
5. Anseau I of Cayeux	Seigneurial
6. Thierry of Tenremonde	Baronial
7. Peter of Douai	Baronial
8. Manessier of L'Isle	Seigneurial
9. Thierry of Looz	Princely (minor)
10. Nicolas of Mailly	Seigneurial
11. Philokales	Byzantine civil aristocracy
12. Jean Payen of Orléans	Baronial
13. William of Sains	Seigneurial
14. Macaire of Sainte-Mènehould	Seigneurial
15. Raoul of Tiberias	Baronial
16. Narjot of Toucy	Baronial
17. Renier of Trith	Baronial
18. Geoffrey of Villehardouin	Baronial
19. Eustace of Hainaut	Princely (major)
20. Thierry of Flanders	Princely (major)

Persons of baronial and lordly rank now dominated the imperial council.¹⁰⁵ The only two persons who belonged to a princely lineage were both bastards who were part of the imperial family. This change was the result of the perishing of virtually all the figures of princely rank in the Battle of Adrianople or shortly afterwards on one hand, and on the other hand the result of the departure of Boniface of Montferrat to Thessalonike, which provided opportunities for lower-ranking newcomers. We can distinguish five categories within this second group:

¹⁰⁴ Renardy, *Le monde des maîtres universitaires*, p. 112. Pycke, *Le chapitre cathédral Notre-Dame de Tournai*, p. 86. Gerzaguët, *L'abbaye d'Anchin*, pp. 115–119.

¹⁰⁵ In the early 12th century the political elite of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem consisted principally of persons originating from the lower regions of the feudal hierarchy (Prawer, *Le Royaume latin de Jérusalem*, I, p. 467; Runciman, *The Families of Outremer*, pp. 6–7).

1. persons who had played a notable role during the crusade and who belonged to the entourage of the fallen princes (for example Peter of Bracheux, Macaire of Sainte-Mènehould, Jean Payen of Orléans); 2. persons who in the years 1204–1205 moved in the circles surrounding Henry of Flanders/Hainaut, after the defeat at Adrianople Regent of the Empire and subsequently Emperor (for example Anseau of Cayeux, Thierry of Looz, Thierry of Tenremonde, Nicolas of Mailly); 3. persons belonging to the imperial lineage (for example Eustace of Hainaut, Thierry of Flanders); 4. barons who had come over from the Kingdom of Jerusalem, for example Raoul of Tiberias, and once more Thierry of Tenremonde); 5. persons who belonged to the Byzantine aristocracy.

With regard to the social origins of the members of the imperial *familia* we refer to what we said earlier for the years 1204–1205. Figures such as Jean Bliand, Simon of Beaumont, Daniel of Ecaussines and Leonard of Hélesmes belonged to modest noble lineages. Ponce of Chaponnay, from the area of Lyons, was a member of both the feudal and urban societies. W. Cocart and Daniel of Ecaussines, who both held the title of *magister*, represented the highly educated intellectuals, as in the preceding years.

Socio-economic Position within the Empire of Constantinople

For the period 1204–1205 we find that the barons in the imperial council were the major feudal princes from the various regions of the empire. Within the imperial quarter or as the result of imperial initiative, Louis of Blois had been granted a *duché* around Nicaea, Renier of Trith a *duché* at Philippopolis, Stephen of Perche a *duché* around Philadelphia, and Henry of Flanders/Hainaut a principality round Adramyttion in north-western Asia Minor. Outside the imperial quarter Boniface of Montferrat obtained the Kingdom of Thessalonike and Hugh IV of Saint-Pol the important city of Didymoteichon in Thrace. Enrico Dandolo was as doge head of the Venetian 3/8 part of the empire. In addition, there were figures with more modest possessions and with a more modest status in their home regions, such as Geoffrey of Villehardouin, who was granted the region around Makri and Trajanopolis, including the *Kosmosoteira* monastery in Bera, in Thrace.

With respect to the period 1205–1217 we can give an idea of the possessions of only a few barons. Peter of Bracheux, Jean Payen of

Orléans and Philokales owned quite considerable fiefdoms within the imperial quarter, being the towns of Pegai (and Kyzikos until 1207 and possibly again after 1212), Athyra and the island Lemnos, respectively. Renier of Trith and Theodore Branas owned extensive areas of land in Thrace outside the imperial quarter, the *ducatus* of Philippopolis and the region around the cities of Adrianople and Didymoteichon—the chief part of the former *thema* of Adrianople—respectively. In addition to his possessions already mentioned, Geoffrey of Villehardouin gained the town of Mosynopolis in the Kingdom of Thessalonike in 1207. Circa 1209, Emperor Henry's bastard brother Eustace of Hainaut obtained extensive fiefdoms in Epiros and possibly also in Thessalonike. The status of baron in the central elite therefore continued to be characterized by the possession of considerable baronies or principalities, even if they were more often of a more modest level than those in the years 1204–1205.

With reference to the non-barons in the imperial entourage and the imperial *familia*, we know that Walter of Courtrai held a prebend as canon in Saint Sophia, and in all probability was also provost of the *Sancta Maria Ypanimnitos* church in Constantinople. Lambert van Noyon was Provost of Saint Michael in the Great Palace. W. Cocart was Provost of the *Sancta Trinitas* church in Constantinople. Cleric R. held as a benefice the church of the island of *Kufan*, perhaps a name for one of the Princes' Islands near Constantinople. Ponce of Chaponnay, the only lay *familiaris* about whose possessions anything is known, owned the unidentified places *Keriscoth* and *Calavath*, where there was a *castrum*. It is possible that a number of *familiares*, and barons too, had incomes in the form of money fiefs, as was the case in Western Europe and in the neighbouring Kingdom of Jerusalem, for example.¹⁰⁶

The most remarkable finding is that the possessions of the persons that constituted the central elite in the period 1205–1217 were located in the wide area around Constantinople, either within the core quarter or outside it, in Thrace. It was only in the second instance that Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Eustace of Hainaut obtained fiefdoms in more far-flung territories. As a consequence, these regions were hardly represented in the imperial council if at all, which does not mean that barons from these far-off principalities could not have been involved

¹⁰⁶ Prawer, *Le Royaume latin de Jérusalem*, I, pp. 473–474.

on occasion in the decision-making during imperial campaigns in those regions. The imperial attempts to create a supraregional imperial aristocracy via, *inter alia*, entering into marital alliances and awarding court titles, together with the various forms of imperial representation in the different regions of the empire, ensured that bonds with the regional elites in the feudal principalities were indeed developed.

Hierarchy and the Allocation of Tasks within the Central Elite

If we evaluate the political activity of the members of the central elite in the years 1204–1217, it is striking that, during that entire period, three of them played a predominant role in comparison with their colleagues, who for the most were involved in the making or execution of decisions either for only a number of years or in a less continuous manner.¹⁰⁷ These three key figures were the barons Cono I of Béthune, Milo II le Bréban and Geoffrey of Villehardouin. A good illustration of their exceptional position is provided by the request of the Archbishop of Philippi at the end of September 1212 to these three barons to ratify a compromise reached—with difficulty—between the Bishop of Gardiki and the Knights Hospitaller of Phteleon.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, these same barons fulfilled important military and diplomatic assignments, they ensured the continuity of central rule in the capital in the emperor's absence, and they acted as imperial agents in dealing with conflicts with, for example, the podestà or religious authorities. None of the other barons combined such a package of responsibilities.

Barons such as Louis of Blois (†1205), Enrico Dandolo (†1205), Thierry of Tenremonde (†1206), Peter of Douai (circa 1208–1209), Manessier of L'Isle (1204–1205), Thierry of Looz (1205–1207), Boniface of Montferrat (1204), Renaud of Montmirail (†1205), Stephen of Perche (†1205), Raoul of Tiberias (circa 1205–circa 1206), and Hugh IV of Saint-Pol (†1205), participated in the government for only a short period. A number of them fell during the severe military confrontations in the early years of the empire. Others (Raoul of Tiberias, for example) left the empire quickly, possibly because of this difficult early period. Yet others came to Constantinople after 1204

¹⁰⁷ Cf. the references to sources and literature about these figures in the notes above.

¹⁰⁸ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 912 (XV, 115). Emperor Henry was at that moment conducting a campaign in Asia Minor.

as crusaders, and never intended to settle in the empire (for example Peter of Douai). Furthermore, there were those who did indeed participate in the imperial council for a longer period, but then on a less permanent basis. Various factors played a role in this. A number of figures were often away from the imperial court for longer periods, either having been given missions in the service of the empire (for example Anseau of Cayeux, Ponce of Chaponnay, William of Sains, Macaire of Saint-Mènehould and Eustace of Hainaut), or to devote themselves to the management of their fiefdoms (for example Peter of Bracheux, Theodore Branas, Philokales, and Renier of Trith). With respect to Jean Payen of Orléans we have at our disposal too little information to enable us to place him on the same footing as the preceding threesome.

It is notable that the triumvirate mentioned were exclusively of Latin origin. However, we must bear in mind that Theodore Branas presumably gave a daughter in marriage to Cono I of Béthune's son Baldwin.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, we may also suppose that Emperor Henry's Bulgarian wife, who had a partially Byzantine cultural background, will certainly herself and via her entourage have exercised influence on the imperial court on an informal basis. In this way the Byzantine elite was represented indirectly in the core group of the central elite. It is difficult to discover the extent to which there were persons in the group of the non-barons who managed to set an important seal on imperial policy. The finding that in the period 1217–1228 Ponce of Chaponnay and Leonard of Hélesmes had climbed to the status of baron suggests that they had played an important role in the preceding years. It would also seem evident that figures with prominent functions—such as Lambert, Provost of Saint Michael, *clavicularius* of the reliquary Hugh of Saint-Ghislain, those with chancellery responsibilities such as Jean Faicete of Noyon and Walter of Courtrai—carried important political weight. The promotion of Chaplain Arduin to Archbishop of Thebes at imperial request displays that the emperor was also able to place great trust in persons of a lower status.

Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Milo II le Bréban had already played a not inconsiderable part in the government in their region of origin, the County of Champagne, as marshal and chamberlain respectively. Cono I of Béthune was a relative of Emperors Baldwin and Henry.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Chapter IV, note 80.

During the crusade these three figures had already played an important role as advisers of the commanding princes. These elements were doubtless an important reason for their prominent position. However, it is our hypothesis that in the last instance it was imperial favour, founded on personal sympathy and esteem, which was the determining factor. We can state unequivocally that such favour was decisive as regards a person's influence in decision-making when we look at the person of Peter of Douai, well known at the comital court of Flanders and Hainaut at the end of the twelfth century. He came over to Constantinople within the framework of the crusading expedition of 1206–1207 in order to serve on a temporary basis, and immediately took a prominent place as counsellor to Emperor Henry.¹¹⁰ The freedom enjoyed by the emperor to select trusted advisers from among the Western barons, the Byzantine aristocracy, and his personal entourage was on one hand in keeping with a similar situation at the Western royal courts, and on the other hand with the relative dependence of the Komnenoi and Angeloi emperors on the prominent Byzantine aristocracy and the form of household government that these emperors introduced in the twelfth century.¹¹¹

*The Choice of the Emperor and Regent as Specific Tasks
of the Central Elite*

The situation that was brought about by the capture of Emperor Baldwin I in the Battle of Adrianople was not provided for in the basic treaty of March 1204, which gave occasion to improvisation.¹¹² In Rhaidestos, where the remainder of the Latin army had sought refuge, the surviving barons together with Doge Enrico Dandolo chose Baldwin's brother Henry as regent. The determining factor was Henry's close consanguinity with Baldwin and perhaps also the circumstance that at that moment he commanded the strongest, not battered contingent of troops, he and his troops having arrived from Asia Minor too late to take part in the battle. Henry's appointment was subsequently

¹¹⁰ Valenciennes, §512–518, 529–530, 574–591, 689–693. Cf. about the crusading expedition: Chapter VIII, p. 457.

¹¹¹ Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility*, p. 103. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire*, pp. 243–245. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 226–227.

¹¹² Hendrickx, *Le Pouvoir Impérial*, pp. 140–141.

ratified in the capital.¹¹³ The figures that determined and ratified the choice belonged to the central elite: Enrico Dandolo, Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Manessier of L'Isle, Peter of Bracheux, Jean Payen of Orléans, Nicolas of Mailly, Anseau of Cayeux, Thierry of Looz and Thierry of Tenremonde (in Rhaidestos); Cono I of Béthune and Milo II le Bréban, who at the time of the expedition to Adrianople had remained in Constantinople.¹¹⁴ Hendrickx indicates that, with regard to the regency unlike the emperorship it was not partly divine providence but exclusively the choice made by the barons that formed the theoretical source of power.¹¹⁵

In charters Henry described himself as *moderator imperii (Romani)*, in doing so usually referring to his consanguinity with the emperor (*frater imperatoris Constantinopolitani*). A seal gives him the title of *despotes* in the Greek legend and that of *custos imperii* in the Latin legend. With this, Henry as regent used titles that the emperor himself used (*moderator*, the Latin equivalent for *autokrator*, and *despotes*), whilst a new title (*custos*) was also created. Henry also referred to himself as *ballivus* or *bajulus imperii* and Villehardouin too described him as *baus de l'empire*.¹¹⁶ It is possible that the inspiration for this title could be found in the situation in Flanders and Hainaut after the departure of the count on the crusade. In Hainaut, Baldwin's uncle William the Uncle deputized as regent with the title of *bailivus*, and in Flanders Baldwin had appointed a Regency Council, the members of which bore the title of *ballivus*.¹¹⁷ Hendrickx argues convincingly that Henry, as regent, exercised complete imperial power, a manifestation of which was the cited use of the title of *moderator*.¹¹⁸ The nuance should however be made here that the barons of the imperial entourage occupied an exceptional position alongside the regent. This is testified to in a passage by Villehardouin about the despatch envoys to the West in the aftermath of the defeat at Adrianople: '*Lors pristrent li baron un conseil que il envoieroient a l'apostoile de Rome Innocent et*

¹¹³ Cf. Villehardouin, §385. Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 389. Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XVIII, p. 527.

¹¹⁴ Villehardouin, §322, 362, 364, 368–369, 380, 384–385.

¹¹⁵ Hendrickx, *Le Pouvoir Impérial*, p. 145.

¹¹⁶ Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XVIII, p. 526. Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 23. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 160. Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, p. 168. Villehardouin, §385, 395.

¹¹⁷ Luykx, *Johanna van Constantinopel*, pp. 60–68.

¹¹⁸ Hendrickx, *Le Pouvoir impérial*, p. 146.

*en France et en Flandre et par les autres terres por conquerre secors.*¹¹⁹ The prestige enjoyed by the regent was also not as great as that of the emperor. An element that demonstrates this is the use in charters of the first person singular instead of the pluralis majestatis that was customary in imperial charters.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, Henry's position was stronger than that of the later regents. He was after all the heir apparent to the imperial throne, as was expressed by the term *coronandus* on the aforementioned seal.¹²¹

After Emperor Henry's death in June 1216 a new regent was appointed, Cono I of Béthune. The only source that provides us with any information about this is a papal letter of 1217, in which Honorius III announces to *bajulus imperii* Cono of Béthune the impending arrival of papal legate Giovanni Colonna. It is notable that the pope also wrote to other Constantinopolitan barons about this, and in particular Milo II le Bréban and Narjot of Toucy.¹²² Once more, this illustrates the exceptional position held by this group during the periods of regency. Although the manner of Cono's appointment is not known, it is probable that he gained the regency by means of election by the barons and with the assent of the Venetian podestà, as was the case later, in 1219. Cono's prominent position at the imperial court and his consanguinity with the deceased Emperor Henry account for their choice.

The designation of a new emperor in the event of the death of his predecessor was another example of matters not determined by the basic pact of March 1204, which again created a need for improvisation. During the campaign of the regent Henry in Thrace in July 1206, Renier of Trith brought to Stenimachos the news of Baldwin's death in Bulgarian captivity. Upon this, and still in the course of the expedition, it was decided that Henry be crowned emperor, present at this being the leading figures in the central elite: Cono I of Béthune, Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Macaire of Sainte-Mènehould, Milo II le Bréban, Peter of Bracheux, Jean Payen of Orléans, Anseau of Cayeux and Thierry of Looz. It is possible that Theodore Branas was also present. The presence of a single corps of Venetians under the command of the further

¹¹⁹ Villehardouin, §388.

¹²⁰ Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XVIII, p. 527.

¹²¹ 'H(enricus). F(rater). R(omanorum). I(m)P(er)A[toris] [Cu]stos. I(m)P(er)II Z.(= et) Coro[n](andus)' (Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin*, p. 168).

¹²² Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 526.

unknown Captain Andrea Valaresso can have been of little influence.¹²³ In Constantinople the *principes et barones et totus populus Franciae* confirmed the choice, and they asked patriarch Morosini to proceed with the coronation. However, the latter refused, and neither was the Venetian community in immediate agreement. De Clari tells how the Venetians, including the patriarch and the podestà, were extremely anxious to take the famous *Hodegetria* icon into their possession. After mediation by the papal legate Benedictus and on the insistence of both Henry himself and the barons, Morosini finally crowned Henry as emperor (20 August 1206), after the latter had given the icon in question to the patriarch.¹²⁴ The deciding element with respect to Henry's election was his close consanguinity with the previous emperor. In a letter of September 1206 to his bastard brother Godfrey, Provost of Saint-Amé in Douai, Henry himself made it clear that he was elected '*praesertim cum nullus esset in imperio Romano cui de jure dari oppoteret nisi nobis.*'¹²⁵

After the death of Emperor Henry in 1216 it was again the barons of the central elite that conferred the imperial title, where again the criterion of heredity was of importance. Initially they showed indecision between Andrew II of Hungary, who was married to Henry's niece Yolande of Courtenay, and Peter of Courtenay, who was married to Henry's sister Yolande of Flanders/Hainaut, but finally they elected for the latter couple.¹²⁶ The fact that the Venetian podestà and his entourage now also played no role the election is apparent from the composition of the delegation that informed Peter and Yolande of their election: Eustace of Hainaut, Robert of Boves, and imperial chancellor and archbishop of Thessalonike Warin.¹²⁷ In addition, we draw attention to a contemporary Western source that indicates that the *Graeci*

¹²³ Villehardouin, §430, 436, 441.

¹²⁴ De Clari, §114. Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XVIII, p. 529. On the affair of the relic in question: Wolff, *A footnote to an incident of the Latin occupation*, pp. 319–328. Jacoby, *The Venetian Government and Administration*, p. 38. Maltezos, *La chiesa ortodossa*, pp. 330–331. An additional motive for the unco-operative attitude of the Venetians was perhaps the attempts of the regent to have imperial clerics appointed as canons in Saint Sophia (Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 946 (IX, 129); Gerland, *Das lateinischen Kaiserreich*, p. 53, n. 3).

¹²⁵ Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XVIII, p. 529.

¹²⁶ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 291.

¹²⁷ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 249. Riant, *Exuviae*, t. 2, n° 43. Wauters, *Exploration des chartes et des cartulaires belges existants à la Bibliothèque Nationale à Paris*, n° 10, pp. 189–190.

elected Peter of Courtenay as the new emperor. This can perhaps be looked upon as an echo of the position that Byzantine aristocrats held within the central elite.¹²⁸

The Political Attitude of the Central Elite and Latin-Byzantine Relations

In the matter of the political attitude we can ascertain that in the early years 1204–1205 there existed two important antitheses within the central elite. The first of these related to the attitude to be taken with respect to the Byzantine aristocracy. As has been seen, Emperor Baldwin himself opted for a policy of Latin-Byzantine co-operation, as is witnessed by the confirmation of administrative privileges of Thessalonike and the inclusion of a number of high Byzantine functionaries in the administration.¹²⁹ Baldwin's brother Henry also chose co-operation with the local elite and population, evidenced by his coalition with the Armenians of the Scamander region in north-western Asia Minor and the favourable attitude of the Byzantine population at Adramyttion.¹³⁰ Renier of Trith, a member of Baldwin's earlier entourage, also succeeded in coming to an understanding with the local elite and population in Philippopolis.¹³¹ Boniface of Montferrat's marriage to former Empress Margaret of Hungary, the initial presence of Michael Doukas, the later ruler of Epiros, in his entourage, and his popularity with the Byzantine population, illustrate that the marquis too was favourably inclined to co-operation with the Byzantines.¹³² During their campaign, the lieutenants of Louis of Blois that were to capture for him his principality around Nicaea, Peter of Bracheux and Jean Payen of Orléans, also displayed a conciliatory attitude towards the population of the regions that, without opposition, subjected themselves to Latin rule.¹³³

Others such as Hugh IV of Saint-Pol and doge Enrico Dandolo appear to have supported a less tolerant policy. The Byzantine uprising that broke out in Thrace in early 1205 first manifested itself in their

¹²⁸ *Annales Ceccanenses*, p. 301.

¹²⁹ Villehardouin, §310. Niketas Choniates, p. 599, p. 643.

¹³⁰ Villehardouin, §310, 321–322, 380–381, 385.

¹³¹ Niketas Choniates, p. 627. Villehardouin, §311, 345–346, 399–400.

¹³² Villehardouin, §301. Niketas Choniates, pp. 599–600. Cf. also Chapter IV, note 344.

¹³³ Niketas Choniates, pp. 601–602. Villehardouin, §305.

fiefdoms, in particular in the cities of Didymoteichon and Adrianople.¹³⁴ Acute anti-Latin feelings in reaction to the policy of the local Latin authorities that could not be described as favourable to the Byzantines would appear to us to be the main explanation why the revolt that took place originated and had its focus in precisely these cities. The fact that both these places were military strongholds will certainly have played a role in their choice as the base of operations for the uprising, but the same can be said of other localities in Thrace, such as the imperial fortified towns of Tzouroulon and Vizye. The outlined discord concerning the societal model was without doubt a factor that caused the Byzantine aristocracy not to be included in the highest cenacles of political decision-making in these early years. This rejection was then also at the basis of the Byzantine uprising in Thrace.

An antithesis also came into being in respect of the balance of power between imperial authority and the regional principalities. This was crystalized in the conflict about Thessalonike between Baldwin and Boniface in the summer of 1204. Baldwin, supported by a number of figures from the central elite (inter alia his brother Henry, his relative Hugh IV of Saint-Pol, and Chancellor Jean Faicete of Noyon), attempted to gain effective political influence in Thessalonike, against the will of local ruler Boniface. At the judgment of the question by the barons that were still in Constantinople, it appeared that the majority—with as its most important figures Enrico Dandolo, Louis of Blois and Geoffrey of Villehardouin—rejected the imperial aspirations.¹³⁵ The explanation for this position is simple: out of self-interest the major barons that did not belong to Baldwin's personal entourage opted for principalities or baronies that would have the greatest possible autonomy from the imperial rule. Persons with closer ties with the imperial court were able to profit from a strong imperial authority.

In the period 1205–1217 we can find within the sensitively altered composition of the central elite no more traces of these differences of opinion. With regard to a large number of barons it can be substantiated that they were well disposed to the idea of a harmonious Latin-Byzantine societal model. Conversely, there is no knowledge of any baron at all having adopted an anti-Byzantine attitude. Furthermore, it can be said of a number of barons that they, just as the Latin emperors

¹³⁴ Villehardouin, §335–336. Niketas Choniates, pp. 612–613.

¹³⁵ Villehardouin, §272–299. Cf. Chapter IV, p. 211.

themselves, sought links with the Byzantine imperial ideology, in which powerful imperial authority was one of the key concepts. We should remark here that in these years there can be found within the central elite absolutely no form of opposition to the imperial attempts to gain influence in the feudal principalities. It is probable that, ideologically speaking, other figures were sooner attracted by the concept of the empire as an essential basis of support for the Latin principalities in the Holy Land.

In the group that was inspired ideologically by the Byzantine heritage we can include Cono I of Béthune, Milo II le Bréban and Geoffrey of Villehardouin. Cono bore the Byzantine court titles of *protovestiaris* and later *sebastokrator*, and witnessed in the Latin equivalent of the first title his acquaintanceship with the Byzantine imperial ideology (*protocamerarius Romanus*). In all probability he arranged the marriage of his son Baldwin to a daughter of *kaisar* Theodore Branas.¹³⁶ The court titles of Milo II le Bréban and Geoffrey of Villehardouin, *Romanorum buticularius* and *Romanorum marescaulus* respectively, again indicate the adoption of a core element of Byzantine political ideology, which identified the Byzantine Empire with the Roman Empire.¹³⁷ The Byzantines that made their entrance into the central aristocracy, Theodore Branas and Philokales, of whom there is known a mixed Latin-Byzantine seal as regards both its iconography and legend, may also be numbered among this group, together with Emperor Henry's second spouse, the Bulgarian princess of unknown name.¹³⁸

Members of the group that was prepared to co-operate with the Byzantine aristocracy, but about whose ideological position we have no information, were Peter of Bracheux, Jean Payen of Orléans and Renier of Trith, already mentioned with regard to the years 1204–1205.¹³⁹ Some time after 1224, Anseau II van Cayeux was to marry Eudokia, daughter of Emperor Theodore Laskaris of Nicaea, which also suggests an attitude in favour of Latin-Byzantine co-operation in his father

¹³⁶ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, I, n° 160, II, n° 256. Warlop, *The Flemish Nobility*, II/1, p. 667.

¹³⁷ Longnon, *Documents relatifs au comté de Champagne et de Brie*, I, p. xiii, n. 2. On Villehardouin's probable interest in Byzantine historiography: Aslanov, *Aux sources de la chronique en prose française*, pp. 155–164.

¹³⁸ S.n., *Byzantine Seals from the Collection of George Zacos*, II, n° 160, p. 25. Saint-Guillain, *Deux îles grecques au temps de l'empire latin*, p. 603.

¹³⁹ In circa 1206–1207 Peter of Bracheux, with the help of some local prominent figures, inter alia Varinos Sthlabos, was able to retake the town of Pegai from Theodore Laskaris (Niketas Choniates, p. 641).

Anseau I.¹⁴⁰ We find similar sentiments with Emperor Henry's brother Eustace of Hainaut, who entered into a marital alliance of political expediency with a daughter of Michael Doukas, Despot of Epiros, and possibly with Henry's cousin Thierry of Flanders, who during the crusade in 1203 at Marseille had married the daughter of Isaac Doukas Komnenos, the self-proclaimed Emperor of Cyprus (1185–1191).¹⁴¹ With respect to the imperial *familia* we mention the policy of Warin, who was later the Archbishop of Thessalonike, which was oriented towards a harmonious Latin-Byzantine society, and the interest of imperial Cleric Henry of Valenciennes in ancient Graeco-Roman and Byzantine culture.¹⁴²

It can be assumed of Thierry of Tenremonde and Raoul of Tiberias, both of whom originated from the Kingdom of Jerusalem, that they saw the empire as a Christian bastion for the benefit of the Holy Land; we can also place Peter of Douai, who took part in a crusade to Constantinople circa 1208–1209, in the same category. Milo II le Bréban's gift in 1216 to the Templars of Provins in his home region testifies to an analogous view. Other barons too supported the idea of the empire's Christian mission, in particular with respect to the Holy Land. This is apparent from a passage by Valenciennes, who relates how in 1208 the imperial army at Philippopolis joined battle with their Bulgarian adversary with the spontaneous cry *Saint Sépulcre* on their lips.¹⁴³

The absence of conflict together with the consensus as regards opinions on the imperial administration within the central elite in the years 1205–1217 are remarkable. We can put forward two explanations for this. Firstly, a number of major figures—inter alia Boniface of Montferrat and Enrico Dandolo—who had been the leading players in a weak imperial authority, were no longer to be found in the imperial *consilium*. Remaining in the council were only persons from the territories around the capital. The individual fiefdoms of this group were no longer mainly regional principalities, but rather medium to large sized baronies. Centrifugal tendencies towards the largest possible regional autonomy must have been less present within this group,

¹⁴⁰ Georgios Akropolites, §24. Albericus Trium Fontium, p. 911.

¹⁴¹ Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, pp. 352–353. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 145. Cf. chapter VIII, pp. 440–442.

¹⁴² Simon, *Witwe Sachlinkina gegen Witwe Horaia*, p. 329, 335. Teodosije, *Zivot svetoga Save napisao Domentijan [sic]*, p. 226. Valenciennes, §567, 570.

¹⁴³ Valenciennes, §539.

whose members were as regards social background was of a more modest status. The only exceptions were Theodore Branas' principality round Adrianople and Renier of Trith's *ducatus* round Philippopolis. The barons from the region around Constantinople, who during these years formed the central elite, must have seen in a centralist imperial policy a means of increasing their own prestige and powers within the empire. In this way they were able to identify themselves with the imperial ambitions, and these became a matter of common interest.

A second element that probably stimulated unity was that the defeat at Adrianople in April 1205 had demonstrated that dissension concerning essential political options could have disastrous consequences. The rebellion made it clear that the Byzantine aristocracy should also be involved at the highest levels in political decision-making and imperial policy. The Latin conquerors, who inevitably remained as a small minority in the Byzantine space, simply could not afford not to allow the Byzantine elite actual involvement in the governance of the empire.¹⁴⁴ These considerations must have provoked thought amongst both the old and new members of the central elite and prompted them to greater political unity. However, it should be remembered that this consensus was not general in the lower echelons of the Latin administrative elite in the region around Constantinople, where doubts remained, in particular about Latin-Byzantine co-operation.¹⁴⁵

CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CENTRAL ELITE, 1217–1228

We shall now investigate whether during this second period any notable shifts took place within the central elite that could provide an explanation for the changing imperial governmental policy from 1217 onwards.

Geographical and Social Origins: Continuity or Discontinuity?

Just as for the preceding period, we shall look at the geographical and socio-economic origins of the central elite. At the same time, we wonder: 1. the extent to which the figures from the period 1217–1228 are identical to persons that we already encountered in the preceding

¹⁴⁴ About Western auxiliary troops for the Latin Empire after 1204: cf. Chapter VII, p. 382 and Chapter VIII, p. 457.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Chapter III, p. 150.

period, whether or not as members of the central elite (indicated as 'known,' with the specification 'region' if in the preceding period they only belonged to the regional elite); 2. whether they were related to persons from the preceding years (indicated as 'related,' with the specification 'region' if in the preceding period family members belonged only to the regional elite); 3. the extent to which persons who prior to 1217 are unknown in the empire and who also had no family there, belong to the group in question (indicated as 'new'); belonging to this last category can be both figures who prior to 1217 do not appear in the sources relevant to the empire and persons who were active only after 1217.

As regards its composition, the central elite displayed clear familial continuity: twenty-four of the thirty-three members belong to families that we had already encountered in the preceding period, or to lineages related to them. To an important extent, descendants of the families that in 1205–1217 were part of the central elite ensured political succession, which indicates that heredity was an important criterion for membership. We can consider as being part of the group of families that dominated the central elite during the entire period 1204–1228: the related families of Flanders and Hainaut (related to the family Béthune)—Courtenay (related to the families Sancerre and Toucy)—Laskaris; the related families Villehardouin-Merry-Aulnay; the related families Sainte-Mènehould-Clermont; the (probably) related families Trith-Estreux; the Bracheux family; the Cayeux family; the related families Douai-Raches.

In addition, we see that a number of figures we catalogued in the first period under the imperial *familia* (for example Ponce of Chaponnay, Leonard of Hélesmes), climbing to join the group of the barons. Figures that we originally numbered in the regional elite of the core quarter (for example Robert of Boves), also gained admission to the group of barons in the central elite. Furthermore, relatives of persons that in the first period belonged to the regional elite, we encounter anew within this category (for example Thierry II of Walcourt, a relative of Gerard of Walcourt). We also encounter new figures and families of local or Western origin. Falling within this category are Manetus, possibly a Byzantinized Italian (*infra*), and Gerard La Truie, Petrus Lupus, Nicolas of Mainvault and Guy *de Valasso*. These examples demonstrate that, despite the criterion of heredity, access to the central elite remained relatively open and that there were opportunities for social advancement, although the factors that determined these are difficult to unearth. With regard to the figures from the Latin empire itself we

Table 10: The geographical and social origins of the imperial elite (baronial group) in 1217–1228.

1. Hugh of Arras	County of Artois	Baronial	New
2. Vilain of Aulnay	County of Champagne	Seigneurial	Related
3. Cono I of Béthune	County of Flanders	Baronial	Known
4. Cono II of Béthune	County of Flanders	Baronial	Related
5. Baldwin of Béthune	County of Flanders	Baronial	Related
6. Peter of Bracheux	County of Clermont	Seigneurial	Known
7. Robert of Boves	French crown domain	Baronial	Known (region)
8. Milo II le Bréban	County of Champagne	Baronial	Known
9. Milo III le Bréban	County of Champagne	Baronial	Related
10. Jean le Bréban	County of Champagne	Baronial	Related
11. Anseau I of Cayeux	French crown domain	Seigneurial	Known
12. Anseau II of Cayeux	French crown domain	Seigneurial	Related
13. Ponce of Chaponnay	County of Lyons	Seigneurial	Known
14. Clarembaud (of Chappes?)	County of Champagne (?)	Baronial (?)	Related (region)(?)
15. Macaire of Clermont	County of Champagne	Seigneurial	Related
16. William of Douai	County of Flanders	Baronial	Related
17. Gerard of Estreux	County of Hainaut	Seigneurial	New
18. Leonard of Hélesmes	County of Hainaut	Seigneurial	Known
19. Baldwin of Hainaut	County of Hainaut	Princely	Related
20. Eustace of Hainaut	County of Hainaut	Princely	Known
21. Alexios Laskaris	Byzantium/Nicaea	Byz. elite	Related
22. Isaac Laskaris	Byzantium/Nicaea	Byz. elite	Related
23. Gerard La Truie	French crown domain	Baronial	New
24. Petrus Lupus	County of Flanders (?)	Seigneurial (?)	New
25. Nicolas of Mainvault	County of Hainaut	Seigneurial	New
26. Manetus (= Dominikos Manios?)	Byzantium / Northern Italy (?)	?	New
27. Geoffrey of Merry	County of Champagne	Seigneurial	Related
28. Jean Payen of Orléans	County of Blois	Baronial	Known
29. Macaire of Sainte-Mènehould	County of Champagne	Seigneurial	Known
30. William of Sancerre	County of Sancerre	Princely	Related
31. Narjot I of Toucy	County of Auxerre	Baronial	Known
32. Guy <i>de Valasso</i>	= Le Valasse in the Duchy of Normandy, or Valas near Bolzano?	Seigneurial (?)	New
33. Thierry II of Walcourt	County of Namur	Baronial	Related (region)

may suppose that as the result of loyal service to the emperors they acquired considerable properties that conferred upon them the status of baron. Of the newcomers, Gerard La Truie for example, who had distinguished himself within the French royal entourage, could boast a prominent political role in his home region. It is possible that because of their personal qualities, persons of more modest rank were able to find imperial favour. As a result, persons who came from the regions from which the elite that were already in Constantinople originated, were undoubtedly at an advantage. It was in this way that Nicolas of Mainvault from the county of Namur, who arrived in the empire only after 1220, was granted with remarkable rapidity—certainly by 1224—the important court title of marshal.

Despite the continuity referred to, there are also families that we no longer encounter after 1217. As far as is known, figures such as Thierry of Looz, Manessier of L'Isle and William of Sains were not succeeded. The reasons why a number of persons had no successors are difficult to discover, and can vary greatly. In general we can state that to establish oneself permanently in an empire far from one's roots was not an obvious step to take, even if there was another family member that had been established there for a considerable length of time.¹⁴⁶ As regards the imperial *familia*, the person of Thibaud of Raches illustrates that people from the home region of the emperors continued to be part of it, whether with bonds of consanguinity with families that were settled in Constantinople or not.¹⁴⁷ The unnamed Byzantine priest, whom we encounter in a position of trust in the court of Emperor Robert of Courtenay, demonstrates the continued Byzantine presence in the imperial *familia*.

The contexts within which or the time at which new persons in the central elite came to Constantinople were various. A number of them arrived in the retinue of a new emperor-elect. For example, William of Sancerre, Jean le Bréban, Thibaud of Raches, Marshal Bar(tholomeus?) and Herbert of Chaumesnil were part of the entourage of the imperial couple Peter and Yolande in their journey from their Western home region to the Queen of Cities in 1216–1217. About the travelling companions of Robert of Courtenay, who travelled to Constantinople in

¹⁴⁶ Cf. the comparable situation in the Kingdom of Jerusalem early in the 11th century: Prawer, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem*, I, p. 471.

¹⁴⁷ The Raches family was related to the Douai family (Blommaert, *Les châtelains de Flandre*, pp. 94–95).

1220–1221, nothing is known. In 1219, Hugh of Arras took part in the Fifth Crusade at Damietta, afterwards going to Constantinople. In 1220 Thierry II of Walcourt planned to participate in the ongoing crusade and is attested in Constantinople circa 1220–1221. The Laskaris brothers sought refuge at the Latin imperial court in Constantinople after the succession to the Nicaean throne in 1222 by Theodore Laskaris' son-in-law John III Vatatzes, a succession that they had disputed.¹⁴⁸ However, as regards the majority of our population we can only indicate when they were first attested in the empire, and in some instances when it can be ascertained with certainty that they were to be found in their home region.

Table 11: The date of arrival of new members of the imperial elite in Constantinople (1217–1228).

	Arrived in the empire exactly:	Still attested in home region:	First attested in the empire:
1. Hugh of Arras	circa 1219 via Damietta	/	in 1225
2. Vilain of Aulnay	?	?	in 1229
3. Cono II of Béthune	?	?	in 1224
4. Baldwin of Béthune	?	?	in 1225
5. Milo III le Bréban	?	?	in 1221
6. Jean le Bréban	in 1217	/	/
7. Anseau II of Cayeux	?	?	circa 1224
8. Clarembaud (of Chappes ?)	?	?	in 1221
9. Macaire of Clermont	?	?	in 1219
10. William of Douai	?	?	in 1229
11. Gerard of Estreux	?	?	in 1219
12. Baldwin of Hainaut	?	?	in 1219
13. Alexios Laskaris	in 1222	/	/
14. Isaac Laskaris	in 1222	/	/
15. Gerard La Truie	?	in 1216	in 1221
16. Petrus Lupus	?	?	in 1219
17. Nicolas of Mainvault	?	in 1220	in 1224
18. Manetus (= Dominikos Manios?)	?	/	in 1221
19. Geoffroy of Merry	?	in 1215	in 1219
20. William of Sancerre	in 1217	/	/
21. Guy <i>de Valasso</i>	?	?	in 1221
22. Thierry II of Walcourt	?	in 1220	circa 1221–1222

¹⁴⁸ Akropolites, §22.

This table shows that, despite familial continuity, a considerable proportion of the central elite was new in the empire. Certainly seven barons are attested to having still been in their Western home region in circa 1217. Also new were the Laskaris brothers, who came over from Nicaea. On the other hand, it is a fact that we had already encountered eleven persons from the group of thirty-three in the period 1204–1217 (see preceeding table). However, in the years 1217–1228 a number of them played only a limited role, in view of their deaths in the first years of this second period (for example Cono I of Béthune and Eustace of Hainaut). In these years, the central elite was thus also characterized by an important degree of discontinuity. Important in this was that the group of recent arrivals could scarcely have been very familiar with the subtle political balance that had been built up between the Latin and Byzantine aristocracies in the years 1205–1217.

From the established continuity with respect to the leading baronial families it also follows that continuity also prevailed to an important extent as regards geographical and social origins. The more modest levels of the Western feudal hierarchy continued to hold the upper hand. With the reign of the Courtenay family from 1217, in particular after the death of Empress Yolande of Flanders/Hainaut in 1219, we also establish a reduction in status at the level of the imperial family. For example, Emperor Baldwin united the counties of Flanders and Hainaut, while Emperor Peter of Courtenay only possessed the Seigneurie of Courtenay and, via his wife, the relatively small and territorially splintered county of Namur, which was feudally dependent on the county of Hainaut. Via his marriage to his first wife Agnès van Nevers and as guardian of his daughter Mahaut, Peter also had held the counties Nevers (1185–1199) Auxerre and Tonnerre (1185–1217) in his possession, but these did not belong to his ancestral patrimony. The consanguinity with the French royal house—Peter was a grandson of Louis VI—was a certain measure of compensation. As regards geographical origins, the principalities already mentioned continued to hold the lion's share in the home regions of the central elite: the counties of Flanders, Hainaut, Namur, Champagne, the neighbouring Auxerre, the French crown domain. With Guy *de Valasso* someone from a different region joined the baronial category, whether *Vallaso* is to be identified with Le Valasse in Normandy or with Valas near Bolzano in Northern Italy. The promotion of Ponce of Chaponnay, who had belonged to the imperial entourage for many years, can be seen within this framework. The Latin principalities in the Holy Land

no longer provided the central elite with barons, although figures from that region certainly did remain present in the regional elite.

As in the preceding period, we have only sparse information about the Byzantine component of the central elite. Nonetheless, we can establish that with the arrival of the Laskaris brothers the highest Byzantine aristocracy was represented once more. The Branas family also retained a connection with the central elite via the marriage of Theodore Branas' daughter to Narjot I of Toucy. As has been said it is further probable that Branas married a second daughter to Baldwin of Béthune. This indicates partial continuity also in the Byzantine component of the central elite. The case of a figure such as Manetus suggests—if our identification of this person with *eparchos* Dominikos Manios, who was probably a Byzantinized Italian, is correct—that families who were unknown prior to 1204 could climb to the highest administrative level under Latin rule. We had already established such opportunities for social advancement within the Byzantine component of the administrative elite of the core quarter.¹⁴⁹

Socio-economic Position within the Empire of Constantinople

As far as is known, the fiefdoms of the central elite in the years 1217–1228 lay almost exclusively in the broad region around Constantinople.¹⁵⁰ Among the new figures we find Gerard of Estreux as the successor to Renier of Trith in Philippopolis. Baldwin of Béthune succeeded Theodore Branas in Adrianople. Geoffrey of Merry acquired the town of Ainos in the neighbourhood of the fiefdoms of his relative Geoffrey of Villehardouin and held several possessions within the imperial core quarter in Asia Minor, inter alia Daskylion. It should be noted that possession of a certain fiefdom did not necessarily lead to inclusion in the central elite. For example, whilst Peter of Bracheux, the first Lord of Pegai, was irrefutably one of the prominent barons in the imperial council, arguments for a similar position for his successor in Pegai, Henry of Grand Gerin, cannot be substantiated.¹⁵¹ Whilst in the years 1204–1217 barons such as Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Eustace of Hainaut who possessed fiefdoms in more remote feudal principalities

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Chapter III, p. 153.

¹⁵⁰ For the persons who in the years 1217–1228 were already part of the central elite, please see the preceding chapter.

¹⁵¹ Cf. Chapter III, note 184.

(Thessalonike, Epiros) were still members of the imperial council, we find no trace of them after 1217. However, via the person of Imperial Chancellor Archbishop Warin, the Kingdom of Thessalonike did retain a direct link with that central elite.

We can establish for this period that the families that were part of the central elite entered into marital alliances among themselves. For example, Isabelle, daughter of Milo II le Bréban and sister of Milo III and Jean, married Hugh of Arras, which for the latter also meant admittance to the central elite. Isabelle of Clermont, probably daughter of—or certainly a relative of—Macaire of Clermont, was given in marriage to Milo III le Bréban. There are also attestations for mixed Latin-Byzantine marriages. As has already been mentioned, Narjot of Toucy married a daughter of Theodore Branas, just as was probably the case for Baldwin of Béthune. Anseau II of Cayeux married Eudokia Laskaris, daughter of Emperor Theodore of Nicaea. With the exception of the imperial family and families related to them such as de Toucys and the Béthunes, as far as is known the leading families in Constantinople did not enter into relationships with the prominent lineages in the other parts of the empire, which is what we also established for the preceding period. By the same token, there are virtually no connections attested between the central aristocracy and the elites of the feudal principalities. One exception is the link between the princely family Villehardouin in Achaea and the related Aulnay and Merry families in Constantinople. However, these relationships, which we had already established for the period 1204–1217 with Marshal Geoffrey of Villehardouin, were of dates prior to the occurrences of 1204.

In summary, it would seem that relatively speaking the central elite was somewhat more distanced from the regional elites of the empire than had been the case in the preceding period. This growing relative isolation can be interpreted as a particularistic reflex of at least part of the central elite outside the imperial clan, who apparently did not view the strengthening of the bonds with the feudal principalities as a priority.

The Homogenization within the Central Elite

As against what was the case in the years 1205–1217, with respect to this second period it is difficult to discover a core group that could have dominated central decision-making. This is particularly the case

for the years after the departure from the scene of well-known political heavyweights such as Cono I of Béthune and Eustace of Hainaut in circa 1217–1219. In the lists of witnesses to imperial charters that we have at our disposal for this period, the names of different Constantinopolitan barons appear time and again.¹⁵² The military command of the succession of expeditions that took place in the direction of Thessalonike and in Asia Minor in the years 1220–1224 was repeatedly in the hands of different barons, whom we cannot trace in the diplomatic sources.¹⁵³ To some extent we can also find these military commanders with the persons charged with diplomatic missions, but here again we encounter barons that we have not come across anywhere else.¹⁵⁴ All this suggests that there were no especially noticeable differences between the barons of the central elite as regards political influence and participation in policy-making.

Nonetheless, we should remark that two persons did enjoy exceptional status. The first was Narjot I of Toucy. In 1217, together with Cono of Béthune and Milo II le Bréban, he was one of the three Constantinopolitan barons that had been informed in writing by Honorius III about the proposed visit of papal legate Giovanni Colonna.¹⁵⁵ In 1219 he acted as the second witness to a charter of regent Cono I of Béthune.¹⁵⁶ In 1228 he succeeded regent Mary of Courtenay to the same function. His marriage to a daughter of Theodore Branas and

¹⁵² Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 249 (in 1217: Eustace of Hainaut, Robert of Boves and Jean I le Bréban), n° 256 (in 1219: Anseau of Cayeux, Narjot of Toucy, Macaire of Clermont, Baldwin of Hainaut, Petrus Lupus, and Geoffrey of Merry), n° 260 (in 1221: Gerard of Estreux, Ponce of Chaponnay, Milo III le Bréban, Guy de Valasso, Manetus, and Clarembaud (of Chappes?)).

¹⁵³ The 1221 expedition in Asia Minor was under the command of Gerard La Truie. For the campaign in Asia Minor in 1224 (cf. Chapter VII, p. 369) the sources report four different commanders: Thierry II of Walcourt and Nicolas of Mainvault (Philippe Mouskes, pp. 406–409) and Alexios and Isaac Laskaris (Akropolites, §22).

¹⁵⁴ The diplomatic mission undertaken by Theodore Laskaris circa 1221–1222 relating to the planned marital alliance between Robert of Courtenay and Eudokia Laskaris was led by Gerard La Truie and Thierry II of Walcourt (Philippe Mouskes, p. 407). A mission to Emperor Louis VIII of France in 1226 was entrusted to Hugh of Arras (Ibidem, p. 539). The two diplomatic delegations who in 1228–1229 were to reach an agreement with Emperor-elect John of Brienne in respect of the succession in the empire, consisted of, respectively, Vilain of Aulnay and Ponce of Chaponnay, and of this same Vilain of Aulnay and William of Douai (Cf. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 273).

¹⁵⁵ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 526.

¹⁵⁶ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 256.

Agnes, daughter of Louis VII of France, created a relationship with the French royal family, and therefore also with the Latin imperial family. The second person is Anseau I of Cayeux, who acted as first witness to the previously mentioned charter of 1219. Anseau II of Cayeux, who was probably the son of Anseau I, or in any case a close relative of his, married Eudokia Laskaris, daughter of Emperor Theodore of Nicaea, who had firstly been intended for Emperor Robert himself. This imperial bride displayed the exceptional prestige that the Cayeux family enjoyed in Constantinople. However, each of these barons can only be seen as *primi inter pares* and their position would seem not to be comparable to the triumvirate of the years 1204–1217.

As an explanation for a homogenization in the group of barons we can indicate the discontinuity in imperial rule in the years 1216–1221, with regencies in 1216–1217 and in 1219–1221. The position of the regent, which was dependent on the barons, gave the barons the chance to be politically active on equal terms, in view of the temporary absence of the imperial favour with regard to certain barons. This must have been even more the case after the death of the experienced administrator and regent Cono I of Béthune at the end of 1219. In 1220–1221 papal legate Giovanni Colonna functioned as regent, as the result of which none of the barons occupied a leading position. When the young and inexperienced Emperor Robert ascended the throne in 1221 it must have been difficult to break through the homogenization that had occurred by relying once again on the support of a limited group of trusted followers.

A process that against the same background of discontinuity in the imperial power went hand-in-hand with the above-mentioned homogenization was the quantitative expansion of the group of barons in the central elite. Although the situation with respect to the sources makes it difficult to establish the status of certain figures as barons within either the central elite or the regional elite of the core quarter and the surrounding area, it appears that in comparison with the period 1205–1217 the number of barons that participated in central decision-making seems to have increased strikingly. In the first period we had a total of some twenty names, in the second period we encounter more than thirty persons, although there is significantly less source material available for the latter period. We have already seen that local families from the core quarter that in the first period played a role that was only local or regional now also aspired to roles at a central level,

and that figures that originally belonged to the imperial *familia* had climbed to the position of independent barons.¹⁵⁷

Each of the trends discussed indicate that vis-à-vis the emperor himself the barons of the central elite increased their influence on imperial policy. A similar process took place in the later twelfth century in the Kingdom of Jerusalem against the background of similarly weakened royal powers resulting from long-lasting periods of minority and regency.¹⁵⁸

The Choice of Emperor and Regent as Specific Tasks of the Central Elite

As against that which has been put forward by Hendrickx, the imprisonment and death in captivity of Emperor Peter of Courtenay did not occasion a new period of regency.¹⁵⁹ Peter's wife Yolande, whose government this author describes with the term *régence impériale*, was an empress in her own right, and for the legitimacy of his emperorship her husband was to an extent dependent on her as the sister of the previous emperors. It became apparent in April 1217 in Rome that Yolande was deemed to be empowered to reign in her own name when she, together with her husband, had confirmed the constitutional conventions of the empire in the presence of the envoys of the Venetian doge, something that is unknown of any other empress.¹⁶⁰ From a thirteenth-century Venetian catalogue of emperors it appears that Cono I of Béthune occupied an important place at her side in the imperial administration, this ensuing from Yolande's position as a woman on the imperial throne. She ruled, whilst he governed.¹⁶¹

Yolande's death in September 1219 however, did lead to the appointment of a regent, her right-hand man Cono of Béthune. Formally, Cono acquired the title of regent this second time through election

¹⁵⁷ An analogous evolution took place within the *familia* of the French kings (Bour-nazel, *Le Gouvernement Capétien*, pp. 110–111).

¹⁵⁸ Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility*, p. 101. Prawer, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem*, I, p. 586.

¹⁵⁹ Hendrickx, *Le pouvoir impérial*, pp. 142–143.

¹⁶⁰ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 249.

¹⁶¹ 'Cognoscens autem uxor predicti Petri eum captum imperium rexit; comes autem Betunie ministrabat imperium.' (*Catalogus Imperatorum E Codice Vaticano Urbinati Latino 440*, p. 186). This passage should however not be interpreted as if Yolande did not play any active role in the government of the empire. She was a strong-willed woman: it was for example on her instigation that her husband Peter of Courtenay had accepted the imperial crown (*Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium*, col. 318).

by the *barones Francigenae* and the Venetian podestà at Salymbria in October, as Tiepolo informed the doge in December 1219.¹⁶² In this election the barons' choice was decisive. As is apparent from Tiepolo's letter, Cono had already acted as leader of the barons prior to his official appointment as regent, which made him the only possible candidate for the regency. Just as in 1216, his consanguinity with the imperial lineage together with his political influence, which only gained in strength under Yolande, explain Cono's appointment. The Venetian influence remained limited to ensuring the pledging of the oath by the regent in confirmation of the basic pacts in the presence of the podestà.¹⁶³ The only other information known to us about Cono's second regency is that at the end of 1219 he and papal legate Giovanni Colonna worked out a new arrangement concerning the ecclesiastical possessions for the region around Constantinople. In the 1221 confirmation of this by Emperor Robert he appears bearing the title *bajulus imperii*, which he already bore in the aforementioned oath (*baiulus imperii Romanie*), preceded by his court title of *sebastokrator*.¹⁶⁴

The death of Cono on 17 December 1219 prompted the appointment of a new regent, papal legate Colonna. The fact that it was not a local baron that was appointed as regent but an outsider who probably was considered to be neutral, indicates that Colonna was a compromise candidate. That the dissension in respect of the choice of regent was not on the part of the barons of the central elite and the Venetian podestà is apparent from the circumstance that Colonna was not favourably disposed towards the Venetians in quite a number of areas—including, inter alia, the matter of the then election of the patriarch and the question of the church's possessions, as is indicated in the above-mentioned letter from Tiepolo.¹⁶⁵ The choice of Colonna must have been the consequence of dissension within the central elite, which was probably connected with the homogenization and growing faction forming within this group (*infra*). It is known of Colonna's policy that with regard to the church he pursued a rather uncompromising anti-Byzantine policy vis-à-vis the local clergy when

¹⁶² Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 257.

¹⁶³ Ibidem, n° 256.

¹⁶⁴ We note here that the document in question is known only from copies in the Venetian registers. Consequently, we should not attach any conclusions to the presence of the term *Romanie* instead of *Romanorum*.

¹⁶⁵ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 257.

they refused to acknowledge papal authority.¹⁶⁶ The legate seems to have displayed little inclination towards any initiatives in the political sphere, as witnessed by the stimuli of Honorius III in 1220.¹⁶⁷ It is perhaps the case that the conflict situation that led to his appointment provided him with little opportunity in that respect.

In our opinion, Emperor Robert of Courtenay in 1227 himself appointed his sister Mary as regent, when after a serious conflict within the central elite he journeyed to the papal court. With this, Mary was to be the first regent to be appointed independently by an emperor in order to deputize for him on his absence.¹⁶⁸ The only thing known about her regency is that in February 1228 she confirmed the trading privileges of the Pisan community in Constantinople, and in doing so carried not only the title of *bajula imperii Constantinopolitani* but also that of *imperatrix*, as widow of the Nicaean Emperor Theodore Laskaris. She signed the document with the imperial *menologema*.¹⁶⁹ These imperial elements suggest that as Robert's close relative it was Mary's intention to exercise full imperial authority, just as Baldwin's brother Henry had done in the years 1205–1206. The duration of her regency was only short, since as early as September 1228 we see Narjot I of Toucy taking over the regency. It is possible that by then Mary was already deceased. We find no further mention of her in the sources, and in view of the fact that within the central elite Narjot belonged to the same faction as Mary, her disappearance need not be seen within the framework of the conflict between the factions at that time.

Not a single source reports on the appointment of Narjot of Toucy as regent. However, the leading position he held in the imperial

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Chapter VI, p. 315.

¹⁶⁷ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 2557.

¹⁶⁸ Schaube, Longnon and Hendrickx inter alia believe that Mary was appointed as regent only after the death of Robert on 6 November 1227 (Schaube, *Eine bisher unbekannte Regentin*, pp. 587–594; Longnon, *L'empire latin*, p. 169; Hendrickx, *Le pouvoir impérial*, p. 144; about Robert's date of death in the martyrology of the abbey of *Sancta Maria Sancti Angeli* in Constantinople: Clair, *Les filles d'Hautecombe dans l'empire latin*, p. 274—the reported year therein of 1228 is evidently incorrect). Although Mary is not attested as regent until her mention in a charter of February 1228, in which Emperor Robert is indicated as being deceased, we may assume that Robert did appoint a regent on his departure to Rome. Direct precedents are not available but, for example, during his campaign in the Kingdom of Thessalonike at the end of 1208–1209 Emperor Henry appointed three barons in Constantinople, to whom he entrusted the administration and defence of the capital and surrounding area in his absence (Valenciennes, §561).

¹⁶⁹ Löwenfeld, *Une lettre de l'impératrice Marie de Constantinople*, pp. 256–257.

entourage, certainly since 1217, and his consanguinity with the imperial family, must have been the deciding factors. None of the other barons had a combination of these elements. In the only known charter of his period of regency, in addition to his court title of *kaisar* Narjot also used the title of *potestas et ordinator et bajulus imperii Constantinopolis*.¹⁷⁰ In our opinion the intention of this combination of titles was to strengthen the authority and prestige of the regent vis-à-vis the co-author of the treaty text in question, Theodore Doukas. In other documents, the regent is referred to simply as *bajulus imperii Romanie* or *baylucus imperii Constantinopolitani*.¹⁷¹ With regard to the policies pursued by Narjot, we have knowledge of the truce he negotiated with Theodore Doukas in September 1228, the diplomatic contacts that he maintained with the Seljuk court in Konya at about the same time, and the search for a new emperor that was concluded in April 1229 by the agreement with Emperor-elect John of Brienne.¹⁷² The documents concerning these policies display how the barons of the central elite again played an important role alongside the regent. What is new is that Narjot also involved other figures in imperial policy in order to build up a broader basis of power. The crisis situation in which the empire found itself as the result of the successes of Theodore Doukas and John III Vatatzes and the factional dissension in Constantinople provide the explanation for this. Thus it was for example that the Venetian Marco Longo took part in Narjot's mission to the Seljuk court.¹⁷³ In 1231, to be found in the entourage of Emperor-elect John of Brienne, then on the point of coming to Constantinople, was Petrus *de Altomanno*, who in circa 1223 had already been the envoy of Geoffrey I of Villehardouin, Prince of Achaea, to the papal court.¹⁷⁴ Although in this way Narjot attempted to expand the group that participated in imperial policy-making, as the result of the crisis he nonetheless felt the need to relinquish certain imperial prerogatives. It was thus that the 1228 truce with Theodore Doukas gave Geoffrey I of

¹⁷⁰ Cessi, *Deliberazioni*, I, n° 140, p. 209.

¹⁷¹ In the 1229 agreement with Emperor-elect John of Brienne: Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 273, p. 267. In the Venetian registers in 1228: Cessi, *Deliberazioni*, I, n° 134, p. 208.

¹⁷² Theodore Doukas: Cessi, *Deliberazioni*, I, n° 140, p. 209. Konya: Ibidem, n° 134, p. 208. John of Brienne: Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 273.

¹⁷³ On Marco Longo: Jacoby, *The Economy of Latin Constantinople*, p. 205.

¹⁷⁴ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 277, p. 282. Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 115. Petrus negotiated John's transport deal with Venice.

Villehardouin and other further unnamed vassals the freedom to join in with the agreement.

Just as the right to appoint a regent was reserved for the central elite, so—initially—was the choice of emperor the prerogative of this group. After Empress Yolande's death in September 1219 it was the barons of the central elite that elected her eldest son Philip of Courtenay, count of Namur, as the new emperor. Their argument was that they *iuraverunt dominae imperatrice et suis heredibus*. Apparently Empress Yolande had been successful in convincing the barons to recognize her heirs as the rightful successors. The Venetian community was not consulted in this matter.¹⁷⁵ However, Philip refused the offer made to him by a delegation of barons, but in consultation it was decided that his younger brother Robert would succeed.¹⁷⁶ It is possible that the delegation was in possession of mandates to this effect: in any case, the envoys that in 1228–1229 were to negotiate with John of Brienne possessed the *plena et libera potestas* in order to make certain decisions.¹⁷⁷ In any event, in the early part of 1221 Robert was accepted by the barons of Constantinople and was crowned emperor.¹⁷⁸

The choice of emperor after Robert's death at the end of 1227 was a difficult process and gave occasion to a long interregnum. We can find an initial option that the central elite considered in respect of ensuring the exercise of imperial authority with the early fourteenth-century author Marino Sanudo Torsello, who relates how after Robert's death the Bulgarian Emperor Ivan II Asen made a proposition to the barons in Constantinople to recapture the lost Western imperial territories on the provision that the minor Baldwin II (°1217), as Robert's brother and heir, would marry his daughter. Asen is said to have thought that, were his plan to come to fruition, he could take up the position of regent of the empire for the young Baldwin. In the first instance the barons agreed to the proposal, and an agreement was reached and an oath to that effect sworn. However, the Latin barons afterwards reconsidered their decision and broke the agreement. As motivation, Sanudo states that the barons feared that in time Baldwin II would take revenge upon them for the disgrace they had brought upon his

¹⁷⁵ Podestà Tiepolo's letter of December 1219: Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 257.

¹⁷⁶ Philippe Mouskes, p. 404. Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 393.

¹⁷⁷ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 273.

¹⁷⁸ Philippe Mouskes, p. 406.

brother Robert.¹⁷⁹ In our opinion, this should be interpreted in such a way that the breakdown of the Latin-Bulgarian agreement was the result of the factional struggle in Constantinople between the party that was for Latin-Byzantine co-operation and the Latin party, which had become dramatically embroiled in a conflict with Emperor Robert and which must have been responsible for the sinking of the agreement with Ivan Asen.¹⁸⁰ A second and until now unnoticed option with regard to the choice of the new emperor was that of offering the emperorship to a scion of the imperial lineage: Humbert V van Beaujeu, the son of Guichard IV van Beaujeu and Sybilla of Flanders/Hainaut, sister of Empress Yolande and of the Emperors Baldwin I and Henry. Two Western chronicles report his choice but, just as was the case earlier with Philip of Courtenay, he did not accept the emperorship.¹⁸¹ The crisis that was gripping the empire in circa 1228 and Humbert's already prominent position in the French royal court might explain his reluctance.¹⁸²

Finally, a call was made for papal mediation to convince John of Brienne to take the emperorship upon himself, without prejudicing the rights of the minor Baldwin II. John, who in 1225 had been cheated out of the Kingdom of Jerusalem by Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, was in the years 1226–1229 the military commander of the papal troops in Gregorius IX's conflict with the same excommunicated Frederick II.¹⁸³ According to the chronicle of Ernoul and Bernard le Trésorier there was consensus in Constantinople about the choice of John of Brienne.¹⁸⁴ Within the context of the factional

¹⁷⁹ Marino Sanudo Torsello, *Liber secretorum fidelium crucis*, pp. 72–73. Adopted by: Andreas Dandolo, *Chronica per extensa discripta*, p. 292. About the disgrace in question: see p. 301.

¹⁸⁰ We do not share Vasileva's reasoning, which states that the barons would never have seriously considered linking the fate of the empire with the Bulgarian emperor. Vasileva sees the brief flirtation with Ivan II Asen as a manoeuvre to neutralize the threat represented by Theodore Doukas, in anticipation of finding a candidate that could be considered as being acceptable. Cf. Vasileva, *Les relations politiques bulgaro-latines*, pp. 81–83.

¹⁸¹ *Gesta Ludovici VIII*, p. 310, note (a). *Chronicon Turonense*, p. 328. This latter chronicle incorrectly reports the name *Benedictus* as the forename of the chosen emperor.

¹⁸² Wade Labarge, *Saint Louis*, p. 44, p. 77. Meras, *Humbert V, connétable de France*, pp. 23–29.

¹⁸³ Böhm, *Johann von Brienne*, pp. 81–88. Van Cleve, *The Emperor Frederick II*, p. 194.

¹⁸⁴ Ernoul & Bernard Le Trésorier, *Chronique*, p. 470.

struggle, Brienne had the advantage that he was a neutral party from outside. Furthermore, he had demonstrated that he was a capable ruler, in the West he was known and respected on all fronts, and he had close links with the papacy, which would possibly put him in a position to gain substantial support for the empire. The agreement signed in April 1229 specified that John would be lifelong emperor and that the heir Baldwin would marry his daughter Mary.¹⁸⁵ Although the barons that negotiated this agreement at the papal court all belonged to the category of the central elite (Vilain of Aulnay, Ponce of Chaponnay, William of Douai and Bishop John of Madytos), it is possible that consultations with the elite of the regional principalities also took place. This might perhaps be inferred from the presence in 1231 of the already-mentioned Petrus *de Altomanno*, who had a link with Geoffrey I of Villehardouin, Prince of Achaea, in the entourage of the emperor-elect—who was then still sojourning in Italy.

The Political Attitude of the Central Elite and Latin-Byzantine Relations

In the period 1217–1228 we can attribute an attitude that was in favour of Latin-Byzantine co-operation to only a limited group of families. We have already discussed the pro-Byzantine position of Eustace of Hainaut, Milo II Le Bréban, Jean Payen of Orléans, Peter of Bracheux, Anseau I of Cayeux and Cono I of Béthune. As we have seen, in all probability Cono's son Baldwin married a daughter of Theodore Branas, and Anseau II of Cayeux, probably son of Anseau I, married Eudokia, daughter of Theodore Laskaris, the Emperor of Nicaea. Eudokia's uncles Alexios and Isaac Laskaris were linked to the imperial Courtenay family via the marriage of Empress Yolande's daughter Mary of Courtenay to Theodore Laskaris. Narjot I of Toucy, also related to the Courtenay family, was likewise married to a daughter of Theodore Branas. We can also include *castellanus* Manetus in this group, if our identification of this person with *eparchos* Dominikos Manios is correct. What is notable in this overview is that it almost exclusively relates to families that we already know from the preceding period, and that most of the families had familial links with the imperial lineage.

¹⁸⁵ Ibidem, p. 471. Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 273.

With respect to most of the other members of the central elite there is absolutely no evidence that points to their being in favour of Latin-Byzantine co-operation, although there is indeed evidence to the contrary. Let us take as our point of departure the sympathy of a number of newcomers for the crusading ideal. For example Hugh of Arras and Thierry II of Walcourt, both of whom took part in the Fifth Crusade, belong within this category. We may also include in this category Jean le Bréban, as is evidenced by his gift to the Knights Templars in 1216 whilst still in his home territory in the West. Although the crusading spirit was part of imperial ideology, we should here make a distinction between what this amounted to at the imperial court and what in the West it was believed to represent vis-à-vis the Latin Empire. In the West, support for the empire, either in the form of a crusade or otherwise, was preached in propagandist anti-Byzantine religious terms by the popes, whilst in their encyclicals directed towards Western Christendom the Latin emperors themselves repeatedly made use of typically anti-Byzantine invectives (for example *innata malitia et perfidia consueta*).¹⁸⁶ Concerning content this tied in with the traditional Western preconceptions with regard to the Byzantines.¹⁸⁷ On the other hand, in Constantinople itself the crusading ideal was put forward in practice only in the context either of campaigns for the support of the Holy Land, or fighting battles with opponents in the surrounding area with whom no *modus vivendi* had been achieved and who were branded as enemies of the Church of Rome. With the exception of one or two isolated excesses, there was no question of a generalized internal crusade against the local Byzantine elite, clergy or population within the empire.¹⁸⁸

This ambiguous relationship with the crusading ideal can be compared with the situation in the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine. In the West, the Muslims were portrayed as devils incarnate so to speak, the intention being to spur on the greatest possible number of crusaders to participate in an expedition to the Holy Land. However, having arrived, the crusaders discovered to their chagrin that the local Latin aristocracy had reached compromises with the neighbouring Muslim

¹⁸⁶ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, p. 602. Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XVIII, p. 525. Lauer, *Une lettre inédite d'Henri I d'Angre*, p. 201. Prinzing, *Der Brief*, p. 412, p. 415. Migne, *PL*, CXXV, col. 634–635 (VIII, 69).

¹⁸⁷ Ebels-Hoving, *Byzantium in Westerse ogen*, pp. 263–269.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Chapter VI, p. 312.

rulers and the local Muslim population, and had opted for a form of peaceful coexistence rather than a permanent situation of continuing military confrontations.¹⁸⁹ Similarly, it can have been something of a shock for figures such as Hugh of Arras, Thierry II of Walcourt and other newcomers to encounter in Constantinople a form of Latin-Byzantine co-operation that endeavoured to rise above the religious and cultural differences. In any event they were unfamiliar with the subtle Latin-Byzantine balance of power that had come into being in the period 1204–1217.

This unfamiliarity also manifested itself at the highest imperial level of decision-making. The intervention of Emperor Peter of Courtenay (newly crowned in Rome) in the government of the Kingdom of Thessalonike in April 1217 is a striking example of this. After the intervention of Emperor Henry in that region in 1208–1209 the party that supported an equitable Latin-Byzantine power balance—under the leadership of ex-Empress Margaret of Hungary, guardian of her son King Demetrios of Montferrat, and Berthold of Katzenelnbogen—had gained the upper hand over the Lombard party, which was not inclined to give the local Byzantine aristocracy any substantial participation in the administration. In this way, a delicate Latin-Byzantine balance of power came into being in the region. When Peter of Courtenay in 1217 also invested Demetrios' half-brother William VI, Marquis of Montferrat, with the rights to Thessalonike, this disturbed the balance of power. The marquis could after all be seen as being the natural leader of the Lombard party, which had already asked him for help in 1208.¹⁹⁰ The issue did not just have a destabilizing effect in Thessalonike, but must also have a detrimental effect on the trust of the pro-Latin Byzantine aristocracy in imperial authority as a guarantee of the Latin-Byzantine balance of power.

Of the persons that were in the imperial entourage at the time of Peter's decision about Thessalonike, we can classify only Eustace of Hainaut as a proponent of a harmonious Latin-Byzantine power balance. We do not know whether Robert of Boves, whom we already

¹⁸⁹ Runciman, *The Kingdom of Jerusalem*, pp. 316–320. Kedar, *The Subjected Muslims of the Frankish Levant*, p. 249, p. 263.

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Chapter IV, p. 212. The fact that William VI was not very predisposed towards the Byzantines is apparent from his intervention circa 1212, which was to the detriment of the Byzantine monastic community of the abbey of Chortaiton at Thessalonike (Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 594 (XV, 70)).

encountered in the empire prior to 1217, held similar views. William, count of Sancerre, Jean le Bréban, Thibaud of Raches, Herbert of Chaumesnil and marshall Bar(tholomeus?) were all newcomers, whose outlook on Byzantine society was probably predetermined by the Western stereotypes. As we have just seen, William VI supported the Lombard party.¹⁹¹ Vis-à-vis Thessalonike, in Rome Eustace of Hainaut was apparently unsuccessful in convincing the newcomers of the importance of an equitable Latin-Byzantine balance of power to the political stability of the empire. The fact that shortly afterwards Emperor Peter was prepared to come to a compromise with the Byzantine feudal prince Theodore Doukas in the neighbourhood of Dyrrachion shows that the emperor was swift to learn, and that in the meantime Eustace's influence had perhaps grown.¹⁹²

After her arrival in Constantinople, the news of Doukas' imprisonment of her husband must have made Empress Yolande realize that a serious blunder had been made in Rome. With the experienced Cono I of Béthune at her side as her most important counselor she again directed imperial policy more in the direction of stable Latin-Byzantine co-operation, as indeed her husband had tried—eventually and unsuccessfully—to do vis-à-vis Doukas. Testimony to this is the alliance she entered into with the Nicaean Empire via the marriage of her daughter Mary of Courtenay to Emperor Theodore Laskaris.¹⁹³ Yolande or her son and successor Robert probably also concluded a marriage alliance with Margaret of Hungary, by promising Mathilde of Courtenay—Yolande's granddaughter and Robert's niece—to Margaret's son John Angelos.¹⁹⁴ However, irreparable harm must have been caused in Thessalonike, where the Lombard faction had again risen to prominence.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore some of the central elite no longer adhered to the imperial views. This is apparent from the scarcely conciliatory policy that papal legate Colonna was able to pursue with regard to the Byzantine clergy during the regency in the

¹⁹¹ About these persons: Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 249, pp. 194–195. Robertus Autissiodorensis, *Chronologia*, pp. 284–285. *L'Estoire D'Eracles*, pp. 291–292.

¹⁹² Cf. Chapter IV, p. 243.

¹⁹³ Cf. Chapter VII, p. 364.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Chapter IV, note 87.

¹⁹⁵ Guido Pelavicino was appointed regent circa 1218–1221 (cf. Chapter IV, note 22). Oberto II of Biandrate, regent of Thessalonike in 1207–1209 and leader of the then Lombard rebellion (who disillusioned had left the empire by 1210), had again assumed a pivotal position in the kingdom by 1224 (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 4754).

years 1220–1221, without—as far as is known—provoking a reaction from the barons. It would seem that a sufficiently numerous segment of the central elite supported the actions of the legate. Included in this group were not only a number of barons (*infra*), but also prelates from the core quarter, for example the archbishop of Nicomedia who around 1223 concerned himself with Byzantine monks who did not recognize the Roman *obedientia*.¹⁹⁶

In addition to the imperial party that supported Latin-Byzantine cooperation, we also record here the existence within the central elite of a party that rejected the model of a equitable Latin-Byzantine balance of power. There are a number of reasons for the coming into existence of this Latin party. Firstly, we established in the preceding period the presence of elements within the regional elite of the core quarter that viewed the pro-Byzantine imperial policy with suspicion, as this could represent a risk to their own position of power. Secondly, in the years 1217–1228 the central elite had among their numbers quite a few newcomers who, prior to their arrival in Constantinople had made acquaintanceship with Byzantine culture only via the rather negative Western perspective thereof. An occurrence such as the imprisonment of Emperor Peter by Theodore Doukas must have increased the anti-Byzantine preconceptions of many—this being different for Empress Yolande, who was surrounded by pro-Byzantine counsellors such as Cono of Béthune. Thirdly, the new generation had not experienced the disastrous consequences of the battle of Adrianople. Consequently, they were not as aware of the necessity for the Latin-Byzantine model of harmony. Finally, the succession of periods of regency in 1216–1217 and 1219–1221 provided a wider group of barons with the opportunity to enter the political limelight, which probably stimulated the opposition to the imperial policy of Latin-Byzantine co-operation that may have appeared threatening or limiting to their own ambitions.

The formation of factions within the central elite can have done no good to the political stability in the core quarter and the surrounding region in Thrace, where this group was established. However, it was not until the succession of severe military defeats in 1224 at the hands both of Theodore Doukas at Serres and Emperor John III Vatatzes at

¹⁹⁶ On legate Colonna in the years 1217–1221: cf. Chapter IV, pp. 221–222, 230–232, 243–244 and Chapter VI, pp. 315–316. On the archbishop of Nicomedia in 1223: cf. Chapter VI, note 73.

Poimananon that the tense situation came to a head in what Longnon described as a '*drame de sérail dans la Constantinople franque*.'¹⁹⁷ After the crusading expedition of 1225 under the leadership of William VI van Montferrat that was intended to provide support to the Kingdom of Thessalonike and the empire in general had ended in complete failure, and after a request for support from Emperor Robert to his relative Louis VIII in 1226 had not led to the desired result because of the death of the French king, 1227 saw an acute conflict between Emperor Robert and a number of his barons.¹⁹⁸

Although the sources available—the anonymous *Chronicon Turonense*, which was drawn up in circa 1227 and is generally rather well-informed on Latin Romania, and the interdependent chronicle of Ernoul and Bernard le Trésorier and *L'Estoire D'Eracles*, both dating from circa 1230 and drawn up in the Latin Orient, and Andreas Dandolo's fourteenth-century *Chronica per extensum descripta*—provide differing information about this conflict, we take it that these do not so much contradict but rather supplement one another.¹⁹⁹ We can then reconstruct the occurrences in the capital as follows. After the disastrous territorial losses of 1224–1225 in Asia Minor, Thrace and Thessalonike at the hands of the Byzantine rulers Theodore Doukas and John III Vatatzes, Robert decided to continue to honour the policy of Latin-Byzantine co-operation and a balanced division of powers. In order to make this clear, he married a woman of Latin-Byzantine descent, the daughter of Baldwin II of Neuville and his wife, who apparently was of Byzantine origins (the *Chronicon Turonense* states that Robert's wife was a *Graecula*), and with whom Robert had fallen in love, despite her being of relatively modest birth.²⁰⁰ According to the *Chronicon*

¹⁹⁷ Longnon, *L'empire latin*, p. 167.

¹⁹⁸ Louis VIII promised to send 200 to 300 knights to the empire at his cost. However, as far as is known, his death shortly afterwards meant that this promise was never fulfilled. It is possible that Robert's envoy was Archbishop John of Lesbos, who was present in Reims at the coronation of Louis IX (Philippe Mouskes, p. 539; Eubel, *Hierarchia*, I, p. 354, n. 2). At the same time, an imperial delegation also visited the English court. At the end of 1226, King Henry III granted a certain Baldwin, envoy of the Emperor of Constantinople, the sum of four marks sterling to pay his expenses. The extent to which the English king offered further support is unknown (Stevenson, *Calendar of the Liberate Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office: Henry III*, I, p. 6).

¹⁹⁹ *Chronicon Turonense*, pp. 310–311. Ernoul & Bernard Le Trésorier, *Chronique*, p. 394. *L'Estoire D'Eracles*, pp. 294–295. Andreas Dandolo, *Chronica per extensum descripta*, p. 291.

²⁰⁰ In Byzantine history we find with Romanos II (959–963) another emperor who for love married below his station the daughter of a wine merchant, named Anastaso

Turonense a Byzantine priest, who must have been part of the imperial entourage, solemnized the marriage, after which Robert crowned his wife empress. In doing so, he and his entourage seem to have denied at least a number of barons any kind of participation in the matter: *L'Estoire D'Eracles* states that the marriage took place *coiement*, the *Chronicon Turonense* uses the term *clanculo*. These ignored barons in our opinion should be identified with the Latin faction, who can scarcely have been happy with the high-handed action of their emperor. After the dramatic loss of territory, a balanced division of power with the Byzantine aristocracy must no longer have been an option for this group.²⁰¹ Furthermore, the successes of Doukas and Vatatzes must have made them exceptionally suspicious of the local Byzantine aristocracy, whom they according to the *Chronicon Turonense* appear to have suspected of plotting against Latin authority, and population. The concerns and objections they voiced to their emperor fell on deaf ears, which suggests autocratic tendencies in Robert's style of ruling.²⁰² The barons in question—in the context of the homogenization within the central elite—could not reconcile themselves with this: they resorted to drastic measures, and undertook violent action against the Byzantine elite and population of the capital. The Byzantine influence in the

(Theophano)(Lilie, *Byzanz. Das zweite Rom*, p. 237). Baldwin II of Neuville (cf. Chapter III, note 192) can perhaps be identified as Robert's envoy to the English court in 1226 (see note 198). The *Chronicon Turonense* states that Robert's marriage to this Byzantine woman caused the Byzantines to rebel against the Latins, which sounds completely illogical (since this would have increased Byzantine influence in the imperial entourage) and therefore incorrect in our opinion. That Robert married a woman of (partly) Byzantine descent is echoed by the Aragonese version of the Chronicle of Morea (identifying his bride as *la filla del emperador grieguo*—clearly also an allusion to the negotiations concerning a marital alliance between Robert and Theodore Laskaris), which for that matter gives a rather distorted account of events (*Libro De Los Fechos*, §73–74, p. 19).

²⁰¹ During the whole of Robert's reign the Byzantine influence in the imperial entourage may have been on the increase (cf. Chapter II, note 149). The presence of Alexios and Isaac Laskaris in Latin Constantinople in the years 1222–1224 might explain this evolution.

²⁰² In harmony with this is Aubry of Trois-Fontaines' judgment of Robert as *quasi rudis et idiota*, perhaps to be understood in the sense that the emperor took insufficient account of the traditional feudal, Western balances of power (Albericus Trium Fontium, p. 910). Robert denied some of his *chevaliers* access to him *pour besoingne que il euissent* (Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 394). We may also refer to Robert's *privilegium* from 1223 for Venice (cf. Chapter II, p. 75). Cf. also previous note.

imperial entourage was also dealt with in the person of Robert's wife (mutilated) and her mother (murdered).²⁰³

After these occurrences Robert decided to turn to the papal court with the intention of personally acquiring means for the reconquest of the lost territories and of everyone's fiefdoms. The recent tragedy demonstrates that this was the only way in which the Latin-Byzantine model of harmony could survive. If our hypothesis about Robert's appointment of his sister Mary, the widow of Theodore Laskaris, as regent is correct, then this indicates that prior to his departure for Rome he had managed at least in part to regain his authority after the actions of the Latin party. In any event, those of the faction round the emperor that was in favour of Latin-Byzantine co-operation were still sufficiently powerful and had perhaps allowed themselves to be taken unawares by the actions of the Latin faction. After the death of Robert in November 1227 and probably of Mary in the course of 1228, again another member of the imperial family and a proponent of the model of Latin-Byzantine power-sharing, Narjot of Toucy, was appointed regent. This is certain to have led to disillusionment and frustration in the Latin party, some of the prominent members of which left the empire about this time, including Thierry II of Walcourt, to be found once again in his home region in 1232. Via this criterion we could perhaps also categorize Nicolas of Mainvault, attested as being in his home territory in October 1228, as being a member of the Latin faction. Although human capital was lost to the imperial court in this way, their departure must certainly have been of benefit to the political stability of the region.

In the process of faction forming and factional conflict that we have sketched, we can see the most important cause of the relative weakening of the central power vis-à-vis the feudal principalities of the empire from 1217 onwards. On one hand there were emperors—and in particular Peter of Courtenay—who chose to support the Latin party and consciously pursued a less centralist policy. The explanation for this is that Peter, who prior to his election as emperor had always remained in the West, during his short reign, was not—or could not become—familiar with the Byzantine political heritage, and could see matters only from a Western viewpoint. Given that the centralist policy of

²⁰³ Cf. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, p. 167. Wolff, *The Latin Empire*, pp. 215–216. Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean*, p. 177.

the Emperors Baldwin I and Henry were to some extent inspired by Byzantine imperial ideology, in this context the ambition of the central authority over the feudal principalities must have been diminished. On the other side, under the reign both of the certainly pro-Byzantine Empress Yolande and of Emperor Robert—who although also newcomers from the West did have time to acquaint themselves with Byzantine heritage, surrounded by people such as Cono I of Béthune and Narjot I of Toucy—the internal tensions must have had a paralyzing effect and therefore eroded the might of imperial authority.

CONCLUSION

In the years 1205–1217 the central elite was a factor that benefited the political unity of the Latin empire, as it was typified by a concordant view on policy. Its members stood behind the imperial state policy, characterized by a moderate centralist policy vis-à-vis the feudal principalities and by a preparedness to co-operate with the Byzantine aristocracy. Furthermore, during this period there was within the central elite a clear and undisputed hierarchy, with the decision-making powers concentrated in the hands of a small number of figures surrounding the person of the emperor. To an important extent this consensus was the result of the disastrous consequences of the Latin defeat at Adrianople in April 1205. The background to this lay in the unwillingness on the part of the Latin aristocracy to accept a more or less balanced Latin-Byzantine division of powers in the years 1204–1205. The realization of this brought the Latin elite, now more than ever aware that they formed a small minority in the Byzantine space, to choose as one man a policy of co-operation with the Byzantine elite.

The most important weakness of the central elite in the years 1205–1217 was that they did not represent the aristocracy of the entire empire. Only the territories and principalities surrounding the capital Constantinople were represented in the imperial politics. More distant regions, under both Latin and Byzantine rulers, had no direct representatives therein, although ties of kinship and other forms of alliances were entered into with the most important rulers in an attempt to create an supraregional aristocracy that was linked to the imperial powers via personal relationships. The rather limited representativeness of the central elite however did not form a problem, as long as this group had at their disposal the means to pursue its centralist policy vis-à-vis the

empire and as long as the available means of the regional rulers who were not in danger of eclipsing that of central authority.

From 1217 the central elite began increasingly to become a factor that undermined the political stability of the empire because the consensus on policymaking came under pressure. The background to this was the circumstance that the moment of crisis of circa 1205–1206, which had contributed to the formation of the initially united position of the imperial elite, was by 1217 a thing of the past, and that the majority of the architects of the original formula for success were by that time deceased. On the contrary, in circa 1213–1217 there was peace within the empire and there was room for expansion.²⁰⁴ To a certain extent, this situation meant that attention could be directed towards the internal relationships within the central elite. The cause for tension within this group was the arrival of Western newcomers in Constantinople. These persons wished to assure themselves of a place at the imperial court and in policymaking, and to some extent therefore needed to enter into competition with the established elite. Because of their Western background it was in a way natural that in doing so they contested the Latin-Byzantine model of harmony. For these newcomers it must have been confrontational that Byzantines took up positions of importance in the government, in the light of the traditional Latin preconceptions, which incidentally also figured in the propaganda aimed at the West by the Latin emperors. The sometimes autocratic style of rule employed by the emperors, who were inspired in this by the Byzantine imperial ideology, also must not have appeared very acceptable to the newcomers in question (cf. the crisis in 1227 under Robert of Courtenay).

It was in this way that the Latin-Byzantine model of co-operation in Constantinople came under pressure. It is possible that this evolution in the capital underwent influence from Thessalonike, where an analogous development was taking place at the same time. The fact that, in the period in question, the former Byzantine feudal prince Theodore Doukas of Epiros marched unstopably on Thessalonike must certainly have played a role too.²⁰⁵ In this way, there developed in Constantinople on the one side a Latin faction and on the other side a faction that championed Latin-Byzantine co-operation. The energy

²⁰⁴ Cf. Chapters VII and VIII.

²⁰⁵ Cf. Chapter IV, p. 382.

consuming rivalry between each of these factions must have had a paralyzing effect on the centralist imperial policy vis-à-vis the feudal principalities. The fact that the central elite was scarcely representative of the aristocracy of the entire empire was an element of weakness more than ever before. Ultimately the internal discord, in combination with the resultant weakening of the political unity of the empire and the undermining of the Latin-Byzantine model of harmony, was to ensure that the emperors—or the empire as a whole—could not offer any effective resistance to the offensives of Theodore Doukas, firstly against Thessalonike and subsequently against Constantinople (1218–1228), or of John III Vatatzes against the territories in Asia Minor (1224–1225). In turn, the major territorial losses that were the result of Doukas' and Vatatzes' victories, meant that after circa 1224–1225 the emperor no longer had the means at his disposal to pursue a centralist policy vis-à-vis the regional principalities.

CHAPTER SIX

RELIGION, CHURCH AND EMPIRE

Apart from the imperial authority there were in the Latin Empire other bodies in existence, the sphere of action or influence of which was of a supra-regional nature. By this we allude to the (Latin) patriarchate of Constantinople and to a number of Western religious orders that were established in various parts of the empire. It is worth making the effort to examine the extent—if at all—to which these supra-regional bodies may have or may not have contributed to the unity of the empire.

THE PATRIARCHAL CHURCH OF CONSTANTINOPLE

The constitutional treaty of March 1204 determined the fundamental situation regarding the ecclesiastical organization of the Latin Empire.¹ This was characterized principally by major challenges and potential sources of conflict. Indeed, the treaty determined that the patriarchal throne fell to that party—either to the Venetian or the non-Venetian component of the crusading army—that did not gain the emperorship. Firstly, this created the prospect of a confrontation between emperor and patriarch on the basis of national interests. Secondly, the Latinization of the patriarchate led inevitably to a conflict with the Byzantine clergy. Depending on the policy pursued, the manner in which this problem was dealt with by the Latin patriarch and clergy could either harm or, on the other hand, benefit the political stability of the empire. Thirdly, the Latin patriarchs were confronted with the feudalization of the Byzantine Empire. By pursuing a policy that was aimed at establishing a powerful patriarchal authority in the various feudal components of the entire empire, they could contribute to its unity. Conversely, the absence of such a policy would sooner serve the centrifugal forces.

¹ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 267, p. 557. Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, pp. 227–228.

The Relations between Patriarch and Emperor

In the pre-1204 Byzantine Empire, it was the idea of solidarity between emperor and patriarch that served as the model. With this, the patriarchate was to a certain extent under the guardianship of the emperor, who was the patron of the Church and whose duty it was to oversee the purity of the faith and the ecclesiastical organization and discipline.² In the discussion of ideology we saw that from their Western background the Latin emperors did not claim such a position vis-à-vis the Church. The emperors restricted their authority to the secular domain, although on occasion they did call upon the ecclesiastical prerogatives of their Byzantine predecessors.³ The fact that the Latin emperor and patriarch were in a different relationship to one another than their Byzantine predecessors, did not however have to prevent their relationship from being determined by the principle of mutual solidarity.

In their correspondence with the Latin emperors and patriarchs of Constantinople the successive popes referred repeatedly to the desirability of a harmonious relationship between the two. It was in this way that Innocent III recommended the newly appointed Patriarch Thomas Morosini to Emperor Baldwin in early 1205.⁴ In 1208 the pope urged Emperor Henry to advise and assist the patriarch in his attempts to achieve the obedience of the Byzantine clergy and faithful to the Church of Rome.⁵ Honorius III in 1216 urged Patriarch Gervasius to enter into peaceful and harmonious relations with the imperial authority.⁶ In April 1217 the same pope ordered Gervasius to welcome the imperial couple Yolande and Peter favourably.⁷ In a letter later that year to Gervasius concerning the capture of Emperor Peter, Honorius once more emphasized the importance of the unity between the imperial and patriarchal authority.⁸ The concept of mutual solidarity between emperor and patriarch in the interests of the empire was

² Brehier, *Les Institutions de l'Empire byzantin*, pp. 345–353. Hussey, *The Orthodox Church*, pp. 299–303.

³ Cf. Chapter II, p. 77, and Chapter IV, p. 194.

⁴ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 517 (VII, 204).

⁵ *Ibidem*, col. 1352 (XI, 21).

⁶ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 20.

⁷ *Ibidem*, n° 497.

⁸ *Ibidem*, n° 720.

under papal impulse certainly known about at both the imperial and the patriarchal courts.

This concept of solidarity was also turned into reality on a number of occasions. In the context of the constant hostilities against the Bulgarian and Nicaean empires in the years 1206–1207, Patriarch Morosini lent substantial sums of money to Emperor Henry.⁹ Furthermore, in mid-1205 Morosini had already supported Henry's expedition against the rebellious Adrianople by, together with papal legate Pietro Capuano, threatening with excommunication the knights and soldiers that remained in the capital if they did not join the regent's army.¹⁰ In the difficult years from 1224 onward the patriarch contributed to the defence of the empire by means of financial support to Emperor Robert. In a papal letter of 1227 it appears that the late Patriarch Mattheus had granted Emperor Robert certain ecclesiastical incomes in order to alleviate the straits in which the empire found itself.¹¹

Against these tokens of co-operation between emperor and patriarch in moments of crisis there is also a multitude of conflicts. Conflicts between emperor and patriarch in all manner of areas were also not unknown in pre-1204 Byzantium. In the 12th century the relations between these two powerful figures could remarkably frequently be described as being extremely tense, in particular under the reign of Alexios I and Manuel I Komnenos, and in the run-up to 1204.¹² The difficult relationship between the Latin emperors and patriarchs after 1204 can be seen as the continuation of this. A first group of interrelated disagreements concerned the imperial role in the patriarchal election, in the appointment of canons in the Saint Sophia chapter, and in the appointment of clerics in the *praepositurae* of Constantinople. The tension relating to this lasted through the entire period 1204–1228, with varying degrees of intensity.¹³ The question of the ecclesiastical possessions was a second issue in which emperor and patriarch, and more generally the secular authorities and the clergy, came face to face in frequently fiery confrontations. In spite of this, both parties found themselves prepared to reach mutually acceptable compromises.¹⁴

⁹ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1391 (XI, 76); col. 1395 (XI, 78).

¹⁰ Niketas Choniates, p. 623.

¹¹ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 157, pp. 205–206.

¹² Angold, *Church and Society in Byzantium*, pp. 45–136.

¹³ Cf. Chapter IV, p. 219.

¹⁴ Cf. Chapter IV, p. 196.

The papal registers further attest to a whole series of less serious disputes and issues. For example, Patriarch Morosini misused Henry's imperial coronation in 1206 in order to bring the emperor-elect to relinquish the renowned *Hodegetria* icon.¹⁵ In 1207 Innocent III took Henry into his protection against any possible arbitrary and poorly founded ecclesiastical *censurae* imposed by the patriarch, which indicates a strained relationship between emperor and patriarch at that time.¹⁶ In 1209 a dispute arose concerning the amalgamation of a number of Thracian bishoprics by Patriarch Morosini, who had not consulted the emperor about the matter. The issue came before the papal court, where the decision fell in the emperor's favour.¹⁷ In 1211 Morosini opposed the election of S., treasurer of Nicomedia, as bishop of Nicomedia; this election had been supported by the emperor, and again Innocent judged in the emperor's favour.¹⁸ Circa 1215–1216 there was a conflict between emperor and patriarch about the payment of the tithes in the imperial quarter.¹⁹ In 1224 a conflict arose about the legacy of imperial *buticularius* Milo II le Bréban in which the patriarch and the chapter of Saint Sophia claimed part of Milo's bequest to a number of religious institutions. The deans of the Church of Saint Michael in the Boukoleon Palace and of the Church of Saint Mary in the Blacherna Palace played an important role in this, which suggests the involvement of the imperial authority.²⁰

A factor that brought about a substantial change in the relations between emperor and patriarch as compared to the pre-1204 situation in Byzantium was the attitude of the Latin emperor vis-à-vis the papacy. The emperor regarded not the patriarch of Constantinople but the pope in Rome as his equal with regard to religious matters. This is apparent from the fact that in the case of numerous religious issues the emperors turned directly to the papal court, without involving the patriarch. It was in this manner that in 1208 Innocent III acquiesced to Henry's request that the bishops and the other prelates be obliged to pledge an oath of loyalty for the *regalia* that they held from him.²¹ In

¹⁵ Cf. Chapter V, p. 275.

¹⁶ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1216 (X, 120).

¹⁷ Ibidem, CCXVI, col. 148 (XII, 117).

¹⁸ Ibidem, col. 455 (XIV, 90).

¹⁹ Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Slavorum Meridionalium*, I, n° 89, p. 66.

²⁰ Pressutti, *Regesta*, II, n° 5166, 5175. Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, p. 280.

²¹ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1363 (XI, 38).

the same year the emperor turned to the pope with the request that the former Byzantine imperial monasteries be dependent on the emperor in worldly matters and on the papacy in matters spiritual.²² Also in 1208 Henry obtained the agreement of Innocent that the Churches of Saint Michael and Saint Mary, which were attached respectively to the Boukoleon and Blacherna Palaces, should be directly dependent on the pope.²³ Circa 1215–1216 Henry asked for papal intervention in connection with the repudiation of certain of his rights and incomes by a number of barons.²⁴ In 1223 Honorius III agreed to Emperor Robert's request that laymen who lived in the monasteries in the imperial quarter of the capital would be subject to imperial jurisdiction.²⁵ In 1224 Robert received the papal allocation of one-tenth of the annual church income in the region *citra Macram* in the framework of the difficult predicament in which the empire found itself.²⁶ In connection with this, it is remarkable how scarce are the mentions of the patriarch in the narrative sources emanating from the imperial entourage. The chronicles of Villehardouin and Valenciennes do not mention the person of the patriarch at all, and in Emperor Henry's 1206 letter to his half-brother Godfrey, Provost of Saint Amé in Douai, the patriarch is referred to briefly as *patriarcha*, whilst papal legate Benedictus is described in the same passage as *dominus venerabilis cardinalis apostolice sedis legatus*.²⁷

The fact that the Latin emperor looked upon his relationship with the papacy as being of primary importance is to some extent linked with the often strained relationship with the patriarch, which made it necessary for the emperor to seek a partner elsewhere with regard to religious matters. Even more important however was that in Western eyes the papacy represented the highest spiritual authority, whilst the Latin emperor looked upon himself as the highest worldly authority. It was then more in accordance with the imperial dignity that it was rather the pope than the patriarch that would be the emperor's equivalent in religious matters. Although such an outlook on the relationship between emperor, pope and patriarch had its origins in

²² Ibidem, col. 1365 (XI, 41).

²³ Ibidem, col. 1364 (XI, 37).

²⁴ Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Slavorum Meridionalium*, I, n° 25–27, p. 64.

²⁵ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 110.

²⁶ Ibidem, n° 128. Cf. Chapter VII, p. 311.

²⁷ Villehardouin, *passim*. Valenciennes, *passim*. Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XVIII, p. 529.

the Western background of the Latin emperors, it should be pointed out that there does exist a Byzantine precedent from the period prior to 1204. In the 1160s and 1170s Emperor Manuel Komnenos pursued a policy vis-à-vis Pope Alexander III that testified to a preparedness to recognize the papal primacy and the papal jurisdiction in respect of the Byzantine Church, in exchange for the papal recognition of Manuel's emperorship as the only legitimate one, at the expense of the Holy Roman imperial title.²⁸ Although the negotiations between Manuel and Alexander ultimately produced no result, the blame for which could be attributed to the pope rather than to the Byzantine emperor, Manuel's position does illustrate that the Byzantine emperor could be prepared to breach the dual principle of emperor and patriarch and to begin to view the relations between emperor and pope as being of primary importance. We should mention here that, in the course of the twelfth century and certainly in the last couple of decades, the Byzantine patriarch in any case played a rather secondary role in relation to the imperial authority.²⁹

The Attitude as Regards the Byzantine Church

Innocent III accepted in 1204 the basic fact with regard to the ecclesiastical organization of the Latin Empire as laid down in the basic treaty of March 1204: the patriarchate of Constantinople came to stand under Latin leadership. There was no realistic alternative.³⁰ On this basis Innocent inaugurated with regard to the Byzantine clergy a policy in which obedience vis-à-vis papal and patriarchal authority was central. The pope instructed Patriarch Morosini that such obedience should be obtained using tact and patience. For example, in 1206 Innocent gave Morosini the order that Byzantine bishops who refused to comply with *obedientia* to the patriarch should be called before the patriarchal court up to three times; only after this should these Byzantine prelates be excommunicated and removed from control of their dioceses. Furthermore it was deemed that Byzantine bishops were to be appointed in bishoprics with an exclusively Byzantine population, with Latin bishops being appointed to dioceses with a mixed

²⁸ Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 83–92. Angold, *Church and Society in Byzantium*, p. 109.

²⁹ Angold, *Church and Society in Byzantium*, pp. 134–135.

³⁰ Gill, *Innocent III and the Greeks*, pp. 100–105.

population. The pope also prescribed that the patriarch must tolerate the use of Byzantine rites in the Eucharist and other sacraments.³¹ In 1208 Innocent stated that Byzantine bishops who were prepared to offer *obedientia* to pope and patriarch, should not additionally be anointed, as was the custom in Latin episcopal consecrations. New Byzantine bishops however were to be consecrated in accordance with the Latin rites.³² In this the pope stood for a fairly moderate policy vis-à-vis the Byzantine Church, which is also apparent from the papal protection of Byzantine monasteries, for example those on Mount Athos (1214) and the *Theodosius Coenobiarcha* monastery in Berroia (1216).³³ However, the idea of a double ecclesiastical hierarchy with, in addition to a Latin patriarch, also a Byzantine patriarch and with, in the same episcopal sees, a Byzantine episcopate beside a Latin episcopate, found no grace in the eyes of Innocent III. A request in this vein by some of the Byzantine prelates from the metropolitan region in late 1206, after the death of Patriarch John X Kamateros, was refused.³⁴

³¹ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 963–964 (IX, 140).

³² *Ibidem*, col. 1353 (XI, 23).

³³ Extensively on the papal view: Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz*, pp. 187–196. Wolff, *The Organization of the Latin Patriarchate*, pp. 34–36. Gill, *Innocent III and the Greeks*, p. 103. Hendrickx, *L'église grecque de Constantinople*, pp. 149–150. Violante, *Innocenzo III e l'Oriente bizantino*, pp. 311–352. Andrea, *Innocent III and the Byzantine rite*, pp. 111–122. On the Mount Athos monasteries: *Ibidem*, CCXVI, col. 956 (XVI, 168). On the *Theodosius Coenobiarcha* monastery: Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 1 & 22–23—the editor suggests that this monastery presumably has to be identified with the institution of the same name near Jerusalem, whose community appears to have resettled in Berroia sometime after the Muslim conquest of the Holy City in 1187. The monastery in any case maintained excellent relations with the papacy: in 1217 one of its monks (*Efrem*) was part of the papal delegation sent to Theodore Doukas to negotiate legate Giovanni Colonna's release from captivity, and in 1218 the monastery obtained a partial exemption from the payment of tithes. This good rapport with the papacy may suggest that the Byzantine monastic community also entertained positive relations with the local Latin secular authorities in Berroia (a *Margareta domina Berriæ* is attested in a 1217 papal letter, not to be confused with Margaret of Hungary who is consistently referred to in the papal registers with her Byzantine name Maria; cf. references in Chapter VII, note 112; Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 416; Tautu, *Op. cit.*, p. 41—the author is in our view wrong in identifying the lady of Berroia with the former empress). It is further interesting to note that a Byzantine bishop of Berroia was in place in 1213, which also seems to point in the direction of rather harmonious Latin-Byzantine relations (cf. note 104).

³⁴ After 1204, Patriarch Kamateros played absolutely no role in the area of religious policy: Wirth, *Zur Frage eines politischen Engagements Patriarch Joannes X. Kamateros*, pp. 239–252. Gill, *Innocent III and the Greeks*, p. 100. Richard, *The Establishment of the Latin Church*, p. 48.

The pope attempted to have this outline policy implemented not only by the Latin patriarch and the local Latin clergy, but also regularly sent legates to Romania in order to implement the papal point of view on the integration of the former Byzantine patriarchate in the Latin Church. As early as the end of 1204—prior to Patriarch Morosini's arrival in Constantinople—Pietro Capuano, cardinal priest of Saint Praxedis and papal legate of the crusading army, commenced discussions with the Byzantine prelates that were present in the capital, however without success.³⁵ Legate Benedictus, cardinal priest of Saint Susanna, in the years 1205–1207 completed a mission to Constantinople that was aimed, *inter alia*, to bring about religious unity with the Byzantine Church. The cardinal held discussions on this subject with local Byzantine prelates in Thessalonike in 1205, and with the Byzantine capital's clergy in the course of 1206. Although a number of Byzantine bishops decided individually to recognize papal authority, these discussions did not lead to the hoped-for union of the Churches. During his mission, the legate did not resort to sanctions, and displayed tolerance in matters relating to the acceptance of the Byzantine rites. In the area of dogma (the *filioque*) and *vis-à-vis* papal primacy, the Latin and Byzantine standpoints seemed to be irreconcilable.³⁶

Legate Pelagius, cardinal bishop of Albano, was considerably less moderate in the years 1213–1214, when the Latin patriarchal throne was vacant (1211–1215). Using draconic measures, he tried to bring the Byzantine clergy to recognize papal authority: unwilling monks and priests were imprisoned and Byzantine churches were closed. The Byzantine aristocracy however protested vehemently to Emperor Henry about the actions of the legate, and Henry ordered the prisoners to be released and the churches reopened.³⁷ Nevertheless, a considerable number of monks left the capital for Nicaea, where at the beginning of 1208 a Byzantine patriarch of Constantinople in exile was appointed, this being on the initiative of that part of the Byzantine metropolitan clergy whose request (at the end of 1206) for their own patriarch of

³⁵ Hoeck & Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto*, p. 32.

³⁶ Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz*, pp. 182–186. Hoeck & Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto*, pp. 30–54. Van Dieten, *Das lateinische Kaiserreich von Konstantinopel*, p. 102.

³⁷ Henry's action may have caused some tension, but he nevertheless managed to maintain a good relationship with Pelagius, as is apparent from a 1216 papal letter (Hampe, *Aus verlorenen Registerbänden Innozenz III.*, n° 15, p. 561).

Byzantine origin was refused by Innocent III.³⁸ Pelagius subsequently decided on a more tactful approach, and engaged in negotiations with the Nicaean emperor Theodore Laskaris and with the Nicaean clergy. However, just as in 1204 and 1206, the discussions—which covered the papal primacy, the *filioque* and the issue concerning the azymes—produced no satisfactory results.³⁹

In the years 1218–1221, partly during Patriarch Gervasius' period of office (1215–1219), papal legate Giovanni Colonna, cardinal priest of Saint Praxedis, was active in Constantinople. His assignment included, inter alia, settling relations between the Byzantine and the Latin Church within the empire, but in this the legate encountered numerous problems. For example, a number of Byzantine clerics were not ordained by their diocesan bishop. Excommunicated Byzantine clerics continued to celebrate Mass in churches that had been placed under interdict, held to the Byzantine rites and refused to obey their Latin superiors. Both Latin and Byzantine bishops carried out ordinations and received tithes outside their own dioceses. Members of the Byzantine laity divorced their wives at will, remarried without delay, and did not observe the Sundays and feast days. In addition, both Latin and Byzantine magnates *contra iustitiam* managed abbeys and churches, refused to pay tithes, and ignored sentences of excommunication. In 1218 the pope advised his emissary to adopt a moderate attitude vis-à-vis these issues, except in the event of extreme excesses.⁴⁰ In the same sense, in 1220 Honorius instructed his legate that he should allow Byzantine monks suspended or excommunicated on the grounds of *inobedientia*, who wanted to profess the faith of the Church of Rome by means only of a simple *promissio manualis*, to do so without having to undergo the *iuramentum iuxta formam Ecclesiae*.⁴¹

In spite of this, Cardinal Colonna instead pursued a policy of strictness vis-à-vis disobedient Byzantine clergy. This is already apparent from the reported excommunications and suspensions of Byzantine clerics in the papal letters of 1218 and 1220. The measures taken by Colonna with regard to a number of Byzantine monasteries also bear

³⁸ Akropolites, §17. On the establishment of the Byzantine patriarchate in Nicaea, see references in note 34.

³⁹ Donovan, *Pelagius and the Fifth Crusade*, pp. 16–22. Hoeck & Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto*, pp. 54–62.

⁴⁰ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 39.

⁴¹ Ibidem, n° 71.

witness to an attitude that was anything but moderate. In April 1220 he bestowed the metochion *Mileas*, which shortly before had been recovered from an unnamed secular lord, upon the Church of Saint Praxedis in Rome. Prior to 1204 it had belonged to the *monasterium Kehiriani* in the bishopric of Constantinople. However, the monks of this monastery refused to recognize the Roman *obedientia* and as a consequence the legate did not restore the above-mentioned metochion to them.⁴² In a context that was probably similar, the *Theotokos tes Hodegetrias* monastery in the capital lost its metochion *Tasipa* in the diocese of Chalkedon; Colonna gave this—also in April 1220—to the Church of Saint Cosmas and Saint Damian in Rome.⁴³ At the end of 1220, the monastery of Matzukes lost for good the metochion of Rhaiktor in the bishopric of Chalkedon, which Colonna, in doubtless similar circumstances, gave to the Pisan prior of the Church of Saint Peter in Constantinople.⁴⁴ It is known that Honorius III certainly ratified the first two of Colonna's gifts, from which we may deduce that, possibly judging these cases as presenting grave excesses, the pope was in agreement with the actions of his legate.

How did the patriarchal policy with respect to the Byzantine Church now relate to the papal point of view, which in principle preached moderate action, but which was in some instances not afraid of taking hard measures. In any event, the first Latin patriarch, Thomas Morosini (1204–1211), engaged himself actively in attempting to bring about religious unity with the Byzantine clergy. During legate Benedictus' mission in Constantinople he took part in the cardinal's discussions with the Byzantine clergy. Beside this, he also took the initiative of carrying out discussions in his own name with the Byzantine clergy, without Benedictus' involvement.⁴⁵ Although these discussions also did not bring a religious union into being, they did nonetheless result in moving a number of Byzantine bishops to recognize Morosini as patriarch, as is apparent from a papal letter of March 1208.⁴⁶ A papal

⁴² Ibidem, n° 99.

⁴³ Ibidem, n° 100. The *Theotokos tes Hodegetrias* monastery probably continued to be Byzantine, as there is nothing known of a Latin occupation. Cf. Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, pp. 200–201.

⁴⁴ Ughello, *Italia Sacra*, III, col. 420. About both these monasteries in the bishopric of Chalkedon: Janin, *Les Eglises et les Monastères des Grands Centres Byzantins*, pp. 42, 60. On the Rhaiktor metochion see also p. 320.

⁴⁵ Op 30 August 1206 a *disputatio* took place between the Latin and Byzantine clergy on the initiative of Patriarch Morosini (Hoec & Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto*, pp. 41–44).

⁴⁶ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1353 (XI, 23).

document of 1212 indicates that one of these prelates was John, Bishop of Rhaidestos.⁴⁷ At the same time there were of course Byzantine clerics and laymen that also refused to recognize the Latin patriarchal authority. Morosini did not hesitate to make use of forms of ecclesiastical punishment, which is apparent from a second papal letter of March 1208, in which Innocent III ordered the emperor and his barons to comply with the patriarchal sentences against *Graecos rebelles*.⁴⁸

Therefore in the years 1204–1228 a situation grew in which some of the Byzantine clergy and faithful were prepared to accept the Latin religious hierarchy, whilst another group was unwilling to do so. The latter component was able to turn for moral support to Nicaea, where since 1208 a Byzantine patriarch of Constantinople had again been established, and where a considerable proportion of the capital's clergy had settled after the failure of the discussions on religious unity in the years 1204–1206. The refusal to recognize the papal *obedientia* had its origins in numerous factors. Firstly there were the long-standing disagreements with the Church of Rome with respect to dogma and liturgy, and the differing views on papal primacy. Secondly there was the violent manner in which the Latin crusading army had taken possession of the patriarchate of Constantinople, whereby large numbers of Byzantine prelates were driven out of their bishoprics, monasteries and churches and were obliged to take flight.⁴⁹ Thirdly there was within some of the Latin clergy the continuing lack of respect vis-à-vis the Byzantine Church, also after the taking of the capital in 1204. Illustrative of this is the taking by the Venetian prior Robaldus of the *Theotokos Psychosostrias* monastery circa 1214 of the body of the martyr Saint John of Alexandria from a nearby Byzantine *Theotokos* church.⁵⁰

Let us try to gain a degree of insight into the Byzantine clergy who refused to accept the Roman obedience. To do so, we concentrate on the region around Constantinople, including Latin Asia Minor and Thrace, the territories that were geographically closest to the seat of Latin patriarchal authority. Circa 1214 it was presumably a monk of the

⁴⁷ Ibidem, CCXVI, col. 647 (XV, 134–135).

⁴⁸ Ibidem, CCXV, col. 1352 (XI, 21).

⁴⁹ Cf. Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz*, pp. 202–206. Angold, *Church and Society in Byzantium*, pp. 515–519. Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, pp. 579–580. Hendrickx, *L'église grecque de Constantinople*, p. 150. Gemeinhardt, *Der Filioque-Streit zwischen Ost und West*, pp. 114–130. Avvakumov, *Der Azymenstreit*, pp. 9–12.

⁵⁰ Petrus Calo, *Translatio Sancti Ioannis Alexandrini*, pp. 179–182. On the *Theotokos Psychosostrias* church: Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, p. 243.

Theotokos monastery on the island of Chalki near Constantinople who drew up a tract that defended the Byzantine standpoint on the issue about the azymes.⁵¹ In 1215 one of the canons of the Fourth Lateran Council concerning Latin Romania condemned Byzantine clerics for cleaning altars that had been used by Latins and for re-baptizing children that had been baptized by Latins.⁵² Until circa 1220, the Byzantine monastic community of the Roufinianes monastery near Chalkedon, which despite Latin interference had refused to join the Church of Rome, managed to stand firm. Circa 1213–1214 legate Pelagius had provisionally conferred their monastery upon the Cistercians of *Sancta Maria Sancti Angeli* in Constantinople. Only if they converted to the Church of Rome before the Lateran Council of 1215 would the gift be nullified. On his arrival in Constantinople after the Council, Patriarch Gervasius however ratified Pelagius' gift in view of the fact that the monks held to their principles. In practice however, the gift changed nothing. It was only during Giovanni Colonna's mission that the monks took the decision to leave their monastery and to flee, after the legate had repeatedly insisted on their acceptance of papal obedience. Only then did the monastery effectively come into the hands of the mentioned Cistercians.⁵³ In 1223 there were Byzantine monastic communities in the diocese of Nicomedia that had professed the faith of the Church of Rome, but who had then recognized the *obedientia* of the Nicaean patriarch. Pope Honorius advised the local archbishop to bring them back to the Roman obedience by means of ecclesiastical *censurae*, if necessary with the support of secular authority.⁵⁴ Letters from the Nicaean Patriarchs Theodore II Eirenikos and Germanos II of circa 1214–1215 and 1223 respectively to the clergy and faithful of

⁵¹ Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Documents grecs pour servir à l'histoire de la Quatrième croisade*, pp. 540–555. Hoeck & Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto*, p. 39, n. 51. The hypothesis put forward by Hoeck and Loenertz that the author of the tract would be Nicolas Mesarites, does not sound very plausible. The author of the tract himself states that his informant about the occurrences and questions described was the (former) *skeuophylax* of the imperial palace (*mega palation*). In all probability this *skeuophylax* was none other than Mesarites, as Hoeck and Loenertz themselves indicate.

⁵² Haluscynskij, *Acta Innocentii Papae III*, n° 1, p. 482.

⁵³ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 97. On the Roufinianes Monastery: Janin, *Les Eglises et les Monastères des Grands Centres byzantins*, pp. 38–39.

⁵⁴ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 118. Cheynet, *Les biens de l'église latine de Constantinople en Asie Mineure*, pp. 170–171. In view of the fact that Nicomedia belonged to the imperial domain, the secular authority in question consisted of the local imperial representatives.

Constantinople show that a considerable proportion of the Byzantine capital's clergy and population remained loyal to the Byzantine faith and to the patriarch in Nicaea. That this group managed to hold its ground within the Latin Empire indicates that the Latin patriarchs and other Latin religious authorities pursued a rather lenient policy vis-à-vis the anti-Latin component of the Byzantine clergy—either from conviction or from a lack of means—in accordance with the papal, and also imperial, view. What is interesting in this is that the prominent Byzantine magnates at the Latin imperial court such as, for example *megas doux* Philokales, were able to correspond with the Nicaean patriarch without let or hindrance.⁵⁵ With regard to that group of the Byzantine clergy and faithful in the region around Constantinople that elected to co-operate with the Latin clergy, we have already pointed out a number of bishops that recognized the Roman obedience and the Latin patriarch. In 1208 one Jacob Naziraios, who had thrown in his lot with the Latin side, thwarted the plans of Nicolas Mesarites—who describes Jacob as a former friend—during a secret mission in Constantinople that had been ordered by Emperor Theodore Laskaris of Nicaea. Jacob forced Mesarites to leave the capital and thus break off his mission after news of Mesarites' assignment had reached the ears of the Latin authorities, in this case the Venetian podestà.⁵⁶ Further, it appears from the above-mentioned anti-Latin tract on the azymes question of circa 1214 that some of the Byzantine population of the capital became inclined to accept the Latin view on a number of controversial issues between the two Churches. The unnamed author wrote his tract because some of the faithful had begun to question the Byzantine standpoint in this matter.⁵⁷ From the patriarchal letters of Theodore II Eirenikos and Germanos quoted, it is also apparent that some of the Byzantine clergy and population in Constantinople had converted to the Church of Rome. Patriarch Eirenikos writes explicitly about clerics and believers that had turned their backs on the Byzantine Church and had embraced the Latin religion.⁵⁸ Germanos is less explicit, but his earnest exhortations to preserve the purity of the faith can be seen as

⁵⁵ Laurent, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat*, I/4, n° 1219, 1233.

⁵⁶ Mesarites, *Reisebericht*, pp. 43–44.

⁵⁷ Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Documents grecs pour servir à l'histoire de la Quatrième croisade*, pp. 551–552.

⁵⁸ Laurent, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat*, I/4, n° 1219.

an allusion to the fact that certainly not the entire metropolitan community remained faithful to the Byzantine faith.⁵⁹

One anecdote in this regard is the story of Theodora, one of the Byzantine lay persons who had converted to the Roman *obedientia*. This *pauper mulier Constantinopolitana*, whose name betrays her Byzantine origins, had left her husband B., a *civis Constantinopolitanus*, because he adhered to a heretical belief and had for years forbidden her to exercise her faith. She took her case to the papal court with the request that part of the marital possessions be awarded to her. At the end of 1232 Gregory IX agreed to her divorce from her husband on the grounds of *fornicatio spiritualis* and instructed a number of Latin metropolitan prelates to comply with her request.⁶⁰ The circumstance that the woman in question was able to bring her case to the papal court suggests that she was a member of the well-to-do class, although it would appear that at the time of her divorce from her husband she found herself in a financially difficult situation. Probably her husband had cut her off from her former means of support. In the bishopric of Chalkedon the Byzantine monastic communities of the metochion of Rhaiktor and the monastery of *Sanctus Angelus tu Kirclimi* had recognized the Roman obedience and the local Latin diocesan authority. In 1220, Legate Colonna granted both monasteries to the prior of the Pisan Church of Saint Peter in Constantinople, on the provision that the monks would not be driven away.⁶¹ It is probable that *hieromonachos* Matthaios Perdikaes, who in 1240 ordered the restoration of the *Hagia Trias* Monastery that his parents had founded, also recognized Latin religious authority. The deed in which he had set down the institution's future was drawn up by *epi ton deeseon* Demetrios Pyrros, with as witnesses a number of Byzantine functionaries who were attached to the patriarchal church of Saint Sophia and who apparently had also accepted the Latin authority: *archon ton kon-takion* Konstantinos Kapelabes, *protopapas* Joannes Blachernites and *domestikos* Joannes.⁶² The fact that the relations between the Latin and

⁵⁹ Ibidem, n° 1233. The patriarch was nevertheless reasonably pleased with the situation in the capital. At about the same time he held the Constantinopolitan faithful up as an example to the Byzantine Church on Cyprus, which in theory also fell under Latin ecclesiastical authority (Ibidem, n° 1234).

⁶⁰ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 182.

⁶¹ Ughello, *Italia Sacra*, III, col. 420. On these two communities: Janin, *Les Eglises et les Monastères des Grands Centres byzantins*, pp. 42, 59. On the Rhaiktor metochion see also p. 316.

⁶² Cf. references in Chapter III, note 88.

Byzantine communities could be good is also illustrated by the enthusiastic reception enjoyed by Nicolas Mesarites in 1214 from both the Latin and Byzantine citizens when he visited Constantinople within the framework of the discussions with Cardinal Pelagius about religious unity. The *Translatio Symonensis* in a passage referring to the years 1204–1205 in its own way shows that Latins, in casu Venetians, could appreciate Byzantine piety.⁶³

All in all, the picture just sketched of the Latin-Byzantine religious relationships on the basis of the fragmented qualitative information concerning the region around Constantinople offers a scarcely satisfying answer to the question as to the position occupied by the Byzantine clergy in the Latin Empire. On the basis of this, it is impossible to confirm or refute the widespread view—based on equally fragmentary material—that the Church in the Latin Empire was characterized by a virtually complete Latin episcopal hierarchy with only a Byzantine clerical presence in the subordinate echelons.⁶⁴ Richard has recently expressed doubts as to the accuracy of this hypothesis and suspected that the Byzantine share in the episcopate was greater than until now had been assumed.⁶⁵ By means of a case study relating to the nationality of the bishops in the imperial core quarter and in that part of Thrace that neither belonged to the principality of Adrianople nor was Venetian territory, let us try to gain a clearer view of the share of the Byzantine clergy in the episcopate.

In this case study it is essential to discover the episcopal organization in the region indicated. The starting point here is the Byzantine episcopal structure that was in existence prior to 1204, which is known from the *Notitiae Episcopatum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae*. Thereafter, we examine what is known about the various metropolises, archbishops and suffragan bishops under Latin rule, doing so on the basis of the available *Provincialia Romana* (respectively of circa 1210–1212 and 1228) and the papal correspondence, which provides complementary information about the episcopal organization under Latin rule.⁶⁶

⁶³ Mesarites, *Der Bericht über die politischen und kirchlichen Ereignisse des Jahres 1214*, §14. Chiesa, *La traslazione a Venezia del corpo di Simeone profeta*, §13, p. 458. Cf. Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz*, p. 218.

⁶⁴ Cf. inter alia: Wolff, *The Organization of the Latin Patriarchate*, pp. 40–41. Fedalto, *Il Patriarcato latino*, p. 200. Jacoby, *The Latin Empire of Constantinople*, p. 542.

⁶⁵ Richard, *The Establishment of the Latin Church*, p. 47.

⁶⁶ The version of circa 1210–1212 in: Tangl, *Die Päpstlichen Kanzleiordnungen*, pp. 28–30. The version of circa 1228: Fabre & Duchesne, *Le Liber Censuum* de

The following tables provide a schematic overview of the evolution post-1204 in the Byzantine episcopal organization in the region studied. At the same time, we indicate—in so far as these are known—what the nationality was of the holders of the episcopal sees in question.

Table 12: The episcopal reorganization in the imperial quarter:
Latin Asia Minor.

I. The episcopal reorganization in Latin Asia Minor			
Byzantine archbishopric / metropolis ⁶⁷	Byzantine suffragans ⁶⁸	Nationality of incumbent of diocese ⁶⁹	Status of the diocese under Latin patriarchate ⁷⁰
Chalkedon	(none)	Latin (1215) ⁷¹	<i>united with Constantinople circa 1220</i> ⁷²
Nicomedia	(Daskylon)	Latin (1208) ?	<i>suffragan Kyzikos—archbishopric</i> ⁷³ not attested

l'Eglise Romaine, II, pp. 6–8. Also: Wolff, *The Organization of the Latin Patriarchate*, pp. 51–56. Fedalto, *Il Patriarcato latino*, pp. 229–231.

⁶⁷ This column shows the metropolises and archbishoprics as they appear in the Byzantine episcopal organization of pre-1204. Used principally here was the late twelfth-century *Notitia* 13 in: Darrouzes, *Notitiae Episcopatum*, pp. 354–372. The names of archbishoprics and metropolises placed within square brackets are of those located outside the region studied.

⁶⁸ This column indicates the suffragans of the metropolises named in the first column. Nothing is known under Latin rule about the suffragan bishoprics named within round brackets. The bishoprics named within square brackets are of those located outside the region studied.

⁶⁹ This column indicates the nationality of the incumbent of the episcopal see in question. The designation ‘?’ means that the nationality of the incumbent is unknown. The designation ‘\’ indicates that the question is not applicable.

⁷⁰ This column indicates what the status was of the diocese in question under Latin rule, when a number of modifications were made in the Byzantine episcopal structures. In this way, for example, dioceses could lose their position as archbishopric or metropolis, they could be transferred as a suffragan bishopric to another archdiocese, or they could be united with another diocese. When the statute of a diocese in the episcopal organization under Latin rule changed, this is shown in italics. Unless indicated otherwise, the information originates from the *Provincialia Romana*. The designation ‘\’ indicates that the question is not applicable.

⁷¹ In 1215, Angermer van Courbetaux was lector of the episcopal church of Chalcedon, which indicates that this episcopal see had a Latin incumbent (Riant, *Exuviae Sacrae Constantinopolitanae*, II, n° 44).

⁷² Legate Colonna (1218–1221) entrusted the control of the bishopric of Chalcedon to the patriarch of Constantinople (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 5429).

⁷³ There is known in 1208 to have been an unnamed bishop-elect of Nicomedia who was repeatedly entrusted with ecclesiastical matters by Innocent III. From this it may

Table 12 (*cont.*)

I. The episcopal reorganization in Latin Asia Minor

Byzantine archbishopric / metropolis	Byzantine suffragans	Nationality of incumbent of diocese	Status of the diocese under Latin patriarchate
	(Prainetos)	?	not attested
	(Helenopolis)	?	not attested
	(Daphnousia)	?	not attested
	[Prusa]	\	\
	[Basilinopolis]	\	\
	[Appolonias]	\	\
	[Neokaisareia]	\	\
	[Adranoi]	\	\
	[Gallos or Lophoi]	\	\
	[Eristè]	\	\
Kyzikos		Byzantine? ⁷⁴	Archbishopric
	Baris	?	suffragan Kyzikos
	Lampsakos	?	<i>suffragan Parion</i>
	Palaia / Pionia	?	suffragan Kyzikos
	Troas	Latin (1222) ⁷⁵	suffragan Kyzikos
	(Achyraeus)	?	suffragan Kyzikos ⁷⁶

be inferred that he was a Latin prelate. In 1211 he was succeeded by a certain S., who was elected by the local Latin chapter and who enjoyed the support of Emperor Henry. In 1223 the local archbishop concerned himself with Byzantine monks who did not recognize the Roman *obedientia* (Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1365 (XI, 41); Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 118; Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, II, p. 170). In the *Provincialia* Nicomedia is designated as suffragan bishopric of Kyzikos. In accordance with this the local prelate was initially designated as *episcopus* in the papal registers. However, as of the years 1222–1223 this prelate was indicated as *archiepiscopus*. It would appear that Nicomedia regained the status of archbishop, which it had also had prior to 1204. However, the new situation appears not have been registered in the *Provinciale Romanum* of 1228.

⁷⁴ Laurent dates a seal of Stephanos, metropolitan of Kyzikos, in the early thirteenth century (Laurent, *Le Corpus des Sceaux*, V/1, n° 357). He thus may have been active under Latin rule, since Kyzikos was in Latin hands from 1204 until after 1228 (with a possible interruption circa 1208–1211, cf. Chapter III, note 24). In any case no Latin incumbent is known for this see (Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, p. 278).

⁷⁵ In 1222 a cathedral chapter following the Latin model is attested in Troas, and there is a Latin Bishop Philippus known of in 1223. Both the local bishop and the dean were charged with a number of missions by Honorius III (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 3886–3887, 4571–4572; Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, p. 233).

⁷⁶ In all probability *Lacorensis* in the *Provinciale Romanum* of 1228 can be identified as the bishopric of Achyraeus (Loenertz, *Athènes et Néopatras*, p. 316; Cheynet, *Les biens de l'église latine de Constantinople en Asie Mineure*, p. 163).

Table 12 (*cont.*)

I. The episcopal reorganization in Latin Asia Minor

Byzantine archbishopric / metropolis	Byzantine suffragans	Nationality of incumbent of diocese	Status of the diocese under Latin patriarchate
	(Adrianou Therai)	?	not attested
	(Dardanon)	?	not attested
	(Ilion)	?	not attested
	(Skamandros)	?	not attested
	(Poimanenon)	?	not attested
	(Hagios Kornelios)	?	not attested
	[Okè]	\	\
	[Melitopolis]	\	\
	[Adraneias]	\	\
Parion	(none)	Latin (1209) ⁷⁷	Archbishopric
Abydos	(none)	?	<i>united with Madytos circa 1220</i> ⁷⁸
Lopadion	(none)	?	<i>suffragan Kyzikos</i>
Lemnos	(none)	?	<i>united with Constantinople circa 1220</i> ⁷⁹
Lesbos		Latin (1215) ⁸⁰	archbishopric
	(Eressos)	?	not attested
	(Tenedos)	?	not attested

⁷⁷ At the request of the local (Latin) *homines*, Patriarch Morosini granted the town of Pegai to the bishopric of Parion circa 1209. This suggests that the bishop of Parion was a Latin. (Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 164 (XII, 144)).

⁷⁸ Legate Colonna (1218–1221) merged the bishopric of Abydos with the neighbouring bishopric of Madytos (Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 93). This piece of information escaped Cheynet's attention (Cheynet, *Les biens de l'église latine de Constantinople en Asie Mineure*, p. 164).

⁷⁹ Legate Colonna (1218–1221) entrusted control of the bishopric of Lemnos to the patriarch of Constantinople (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 5429).

⁸⁰ At a further unspecified time, Cono I of Béthune (†1219) donated a relic to Archbishop John of Lesbos. It is possible that he is the archbishop of Lesbos who in 1215 was present at the Fourth Lateran Council. After the Nicaean conquests of 1224–1225 Archbishop John returned to the West, where he appears to have been an important source of information on the Latin Empire for chronicler Aubry of Trois-Fontaines. He died in 1240 at the Cistercian Abbey of Clairvaux. Cf. Riant, *Exuviae Sacrae Constantinopolitanae*, II, p. 195. Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, II, p. 160. Eubel, *Hierarchia Catholica Medii et Recentioris Aevi*, I, p. 354. Albericus Trium Fontium, *Chronicon*, p. 855.

Table 12 (*cont.*)

I. The episcopal reorganization in Latin Asia Minor

Byzantine archbishopric / metropolis	Byzantine suffragans	Nationality of incumbent of diocese	Status of the diocese under Latin patriarchate
	[Berbinon]	\	\
	[Hiera]	\	\
	[Perperina]	\	\
	[Strongyle]	\	\
Methymna	(none)	?	<i>suffragan Lesbos—united with Lesbos circa 1220</i> ⁸¹
Prokonnesos	(none)		<i>suffragan Parion—united with Herakleia in 1223</i> ⁸²
[Ephesos]	Adramyttion	Latin ⁸³	<i>suffragan Kyzikos</i>
	Assos	?	<i>united with Lesbos circa 1220</i> ⁸⁴
[Rhodos]	Chios	?	<i>suffragan Lesbos (circa 1220)</i> ⁸⁵

⁸¹ Legate Colonna (1218–1221) merged the bishopric of Methymna—also known as Molyvos—with that of Lesbos, which was confirmed by Honorius III in 1222 (Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 92).

⁸² The Diocese of Prokonnesos probably figures in the *Provincialia* under the name *Destillariensis*, derived from the locality Estilarion near Marmara, the capital of the island of Prokonnesos. In all probability the same bishopric—now designated as *Marmoriensis*—was merged in 1223 with Herakleia (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 4508; Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, II, pp. 114, 149; Janin, *Les Eglises et les Monastères des Grands Centres byzantins*, p. 210). In the 1228 *Provinciale Romanum* it however again figures as a suffragan of Parion (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 4508; Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, II, pp. 114, 149; Janin, *Les Eglises et les Monastères des Grands Centres byzantins*, p. 210).

⁸³ In 1222 an unnamed bishop of Adramyttion was charged with a papal assignment. This suggests that the prelate in question was a Latin (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 3886).

⁸⁴ Legate Colonna merged the bishopric of Assos with Lesbos (Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 92).

⁸⁵ Legate Colonna made Chios a suffragan bishopric of Lesbos (Ibidem, n° 92a).

Table 13: The episcopal reorganization in the imperial quarter: new creations in Asia Minor.

II. New creations in Latin Asia Minor		
Name of bishopric	Nationality incumbent	Status under Latin patriarchate
Pegai	Latin	<i>new creation: suffragan Constantinople</i> ⁸⁶
Kantimoneia	?	<i>new creation: suffragan Kyzikos</i> ⁸⁷
Lentiana	?	<i>new creation: suffragan Kyzikos</i> ⁸⁸

Table 14: The episcopal reorganization in the imperial quarter: Latin imperial Thrace.

III. The episcopal reorganization in Latin imperial Thrace			
Archbishopric / metropole	Suffragans	Nationality of incumbent	Status under Latin patriarchate
[Herakleia]		\	\
	Theodoropolis	?	not attested
	Chariopolis	?	not attested
	Daonion	?	suffragan Herakleia
	Pamphylon	?	not attested

⁸⁶ As early as 1209 the population of Pegai, where previously there had been no bishopric, wanted to have their own bishop. In 1225 an unnamed bishop of Pegai is actually known; Pope Honorius involved this person in the organization of the projected crusading expedition in support of Thessalonike (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 5270, 5279). The bishopric also figures in both known *Provincialia Romana*.

⁸⁷ Figuring in the *Provincialia* is a bishopric *Candimonia*, which does not appear in the Byzantine *notitiae* of pre-1204. A late 13th-century *notitia* however, does report the elevation of the diocese of Kantimoneia to metropolis, which can doubtlessly be identified with *Candimonia*. It is possible that this relates to a bishopric that was created under Latin rule. Its location remains unknown (Darrouzes, *Notitiae Episcopatum*, pp. 161–162, 386, 496).

⁸⁸ Wolff's identification of *Lindinensis* in the 1228 *Provinciale Romanum* with Lentiana, where before 1204 no episcopal see is attested, is undoubtedly correct. The place was an important garrison town in the Latin period. Cheynet's objection that Lentiana is geographically too distant from Kyzikos does not sound convincing. The author offers no alternative and admits that phonetically speaking the identification is certainly a possibility (Wolff, *The Organization of the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople*, pp. 57–60; Cheynet, *Les biens de l'église latine de Constantinople en Asie Mineure*, p. 163).

Table 14 (*cont.*)

III. The episcopal reorganization in Latin imperial Thrace

Archbishopric / metropole	Suffragans	Nationality of incumbent	Status under Latin patriarchate
	Medeia	?	<i>united with Vrysis in 1210</i> ⁸⁹
	Sergentze	?	not attested
	Metrai	?	not attested
	Tzouroulon	?	suffragan Herakleia
	Athyra	?	<i>suffragan Constantinople</i>
Trajanopolis		Latin (1217) ⁹⁰	archbishopric
	Makri	Latin (1217) ⁹¹	bishopric or <i>archbishopric</i> ? ⁹²
[Adrianople]			
	Agathopolis	?	not attested
	Trapovizye	?	not attested
	Vrysis	Latin (1207) ⁹³	<i>Archbishopric</i>
Kypsella	(none)	?	<i>suffragan Vrysis</i>
Derkos	(none)	?	<i>suffragan Constantinople</i>
Salymbria	(none)	Latin (1207) ⁹⁴	<i>suffragan Constantinople</i>

⁸⁹ In 1210 Innocent III merged the vacant bishopric of Medeia with the archbishopric of Vrysis (Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 355 (XIII, 185)).

⁹⁰ In Ainos, a suffragan bishopric of Trajanopolis, a Latin bishop is attested in 1217 (cf. note 95). In Makri, a bishopric that probably also depended on Trajanopolis, a Latin bishop is attested in 1217 as well (cf. note 91). It is then very likely that the archbishop of Trajanopolis, who had no other suffragans, was also a Latin.

⁹¹ In 1217 Honorius III charged the bishop of Makri with a mission concerning the Thessalonican baron William of Bloville. This suggests that the prelate in question was a Latin (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 704).

⁹² In the *Provincialia*, Makri figures as an archbishopric. In the above-mentioned letter of 1217 from Honorius, the local prelate was however addressed as '*episcopus*' (cf. previous note), who then probably was a suffragan of Trajanopolis (like before 1204). Papal letters in our view rather reflect the real situation on the ground than the *Provincialia* (cf. also note 74).

⁹³ In 1207 Warin, the later archbishop of Thessalonike and imperial chancellor, was appointed archbishop of Vrysis. His successor (circa 1210) was charged with an ecclesiastical mission by Innocent III in 1211, which indicates that he was also a Latin (Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1130 (X, 35); CCXVI, col. 355 (XIII, 185), col. 455 (XIV, 90)).

⁹⁴ The bishop of Salymbria was frequently charged with ecclesiastical missions by Popes Innocent and Honorius, which betrays his Latin identity (Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, II, pp. 196–197).

Table 14 (*cont.*)

III. The episcopal reorganization in Latin imperial Thrace

Archbishopric / metropole	Suffragans	Nationality of incumbent	Status under Latin patriarchate
Vizye	(none)	?	not attested
Karavizye	(none)	?	not attested
Apros	(none)	?	<i>suffragan Vrysis</i>
Ainos	(none)	Latin (1222) ⁹⁵	<i>suffragan Trajanopolis</i>
Rhousion	(none)	?	<i>suffragan Vrysis</i>
Madytos	(none)	Latin (1220) ⁹⁶	archbishopric or <i>bishopric</i> ?—directly under Rome (circa 1220) ⁹⁷
Maroneia	(none)	?	<i>suffragan Makri</i>

The tables above show that in the region in question there were fifty-five bishoprics in existence prior to 1204, thirty-one in Asia Minor and twenty-four in Thrace. Under Latin rule there are thirty-two of these known, seventeen in Asia Minor and fifteen in Thrace. In addition, three new bishoprics were established. This brings the total attested dioceses under Latin rule to thirty-five. Consequently, we have no information with regard to more than twenty attested bishoprics prior to 1204. One solution to this would be to assume that these bishoprics were dispensed with and amalgamated with other dioceses. For the bishoprics that are known, the papal registers show that on a number of occasions such a measure was taken: in Asia Minor six bishoprics were

⁹⁵ In 1217 Honorius III charged the bishop of Ainos with a mission concerning the Thessalonian Baron William of Bloville. This suggests that the prelate in question was a Latin (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 704).

⁹⁶ In about 1222, a cathedral chapter was established in Madytos, which indicates that this episcopal see had a Latin incumbent (Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 93, p. 123).

⁹⁷ In the *Provincialia* Madytos figures as an archbishopric without suffragans, whilst in the papal registers the local prelate was addressed only as *episcopus* (Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 93, p. 123). Legate Colonna (1218–1221) took the diocese of Madytos—and the attached bishopric of Abydos (cf. note 78)—away from the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople and placed it directly under papal authority (*Ibidem*, n° 101).

amalgamated with another diocese, and in Thrace one. These figures indicate that the merging of bishoprics was a rather sparingly applied policy. As a consequence, this makes plausible the hypothesis that the greater part of the twenty-three missing bishoprics named were not abolished. We can explain the fact that they cannot be detected under Latin rule as a result of the fragmentary nature of the source material. From the *Provincialia* we can deduce that the papal registers contain data about only a limited number of dioceses in the Latin empire. At the same time we know that the *Provincialia* do not always report the ecclesiastical organisation of the empire in an accurate or comprehensive way.⁹⁸ For a number of pre-1204 episcopal towns that are not as such attested under Latin rule, we know that they continued to function as military or economic centers after 1204 (e.g. Daskylon, Poimanenon, Vizye, Pamphylon). It seems logical to us that these localities also retained their ecclesiastical status.

In summary, there would have been in existence approximately forty-eight dioceses in the region in question (fifty-five minus the seven unions). With regard to Asia Minor it is known that seven episcopal sees were held by Latin incumbents. In Thrace too six bishoprics were certainly under the control of Latin prelates. As against this, there is no evidence of a single Byzantine incumbent. Therefore of the total number of forty-eight bishoprics, the nationality of thirteen of the incumbents is known. Can a meaningful hypothesis then be formulated about the nationality of the incumbents of the other dioceses? We believe that it is probable that those incumbents were to a major extent Byzantine. The fact that the incumbents of these bishoprics were apparently never charged with a papal assignment regarding ecclesiastical issues in the empire would suggest this. As far as is known, the popes turned only to Latins in this respect. A number

⁹⁸ Inaccuracy: see for example notes 74 (Nicomedia) and 92 (Makri). Incompleteness: the 1228 *Provinciale* represents Adrianople as an archbishopric without suffragans. None of the pre-1204 suffragan bishoprics is mentioned (except for Vrysis, after 1204 an archbishopric in the imperial quarter). Adrianople now was the capital of a feudal principality under the Byzantine ruler Theodore Branas. It is implausible that all suffragan bishoprics would have been abolished under his rule (cf. Chapter IV, note 319). Cheynet at the beginning of his discussion of the Latin ecclesiastical organisation in Asia Minor also points out that the information contained in the 1228 *Provinciale* need not be an exact representation of the actual reality. A bit further however he nevertheless assumes, in our view mistakenly, that the document gives a complete oversight of the episcopal structure in the region (Cheynet, *Les biens de l'église latine de Constantinople en Asie Mineure*, p. 159, p. 165).

of papal letters support our hypothesis. From a document of March 1208 it appears that a number of Byzantine bishops had recognized Patriarch Morosini and the Church of Rome.⁹⁹ It seems logical that these prelates indeed to a certain extent must be situated in the region around Constantinople, where Morosini had his patriarchal seat. In Venetian Thrace in 1212, Innocent III congratulated the Byzantine bishop of Rhaidestos on his acceptance of the Roman *obedientia*. At the same time, the pope urged Bishop John to convince his Byzantine *coepiscopi* also to profess to the faith of the Roman Church.¹⁰⁰ It is probable that in doing so Innocent in the first place had in mind geographically neighbouring bishops, which indicates that in Thrace there were Byzantine bishops who had not accepted the Roman obedience.

On the strength of the argumentation set out above, the hypothesis can be built up that after 1204 the Byzantine clergy had a considerable share in the episcopate, which implies that they were not forced out of the higher regions of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. For the sake of nuance, it should be said that all the archiepiscopal sees in the region were indeed in Latin hands. Only Kyzikos possibly had a Byzantine incumbent. Of interest is that some of the Byzantine incumbents formally accepted the Roman obedience, whilst others clearly did not. This last group may have oriented themselves on the Byzantine patriarchate in exile in Nicaea. In this respect, the Latin patriarchs and the other Latin religious authorities possibly pursued a generally lenient policy. This attitude can be explained by the rather moderate policy vis-à-vis the Byzantine Church advocated in particular by Innocent III. In our opinion another important factor was however the imperial authority. This supported a policy in which Latin-Byzantine coexistence had a central role. From this point of view it is plausible that the Latin emperor supported the continued incumbency of Byzantine bishops, in particular in the core quarter.

The episcopal organization such as we believe developed in the years after 1204 in Latin Asia Minor and in Thrace must have contributed to the Latin-Byzantine model of coexistence that on imperial initiative came into existence in the years 1204–1217. For the local Byzantine aristocracy and population this token of respect for the Byzantine clergy was undoubtedly an element of vital importance in their preparedness

⁹⁹ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1353 (XI, 23).

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, CCXVI, col. 647 (XV, 134–135).

to co-operate with the Latins. The religious organization must have remained completely Byzantine in numerous dioceses. In the dioceses that had a Latin incumbent, it is probable that the local Byzantine community could always turn to a Byzantine bishop in the neighbourhood. Under the provisions of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) it is very probable that in many cases in such Latin dioceses a Byzantine vicar would be appointed who was responsible for his congregation.¹⁰¹ In this way the Latin and Byzantine clergy, in any event in the region studied, were able to find a way in which they could live with—or perhaps rather alongside—one another in relative harmony.

For the territories outside the region studied there are also quite a number of indications to be found that show that the Byzantine episcopate at least to some extent continued its incumbency. In the feudal principalities under Byzantine magnates—Adrianople-Didymoteichon, Paphlagonia, Epiros, the Rhodopes region and Prosek—there is nothing to indicate that a Latin episcopal hierarchy would have been introduced.¹⁰² Neither do the bishoprics of the principality of Philippopolis, that nonetheless stood under Latin lordship, figure anywhere in the *Provincialia* or in the papal correspondence.¹⁰³ In the Kingdom of Thessalonike, of the fifteen suffragans of Archbishop Warin of Thessalonike are known six Byzantine and one Latin bishop, who controlled two dioceses (circa 1208–1213).¹⁰⁴ Various papal letters also

¹⁰¹ Haluscynskij, *Acta Innocentii Papae III*, n° 3. Cf. Richard, *The Establishment of the Latin Church*, p. 48.

¹⁰² Cf. Chapter IV, p. 240.

¹⁰³ Cf. Wolff, *The Organization of the Latin Patriarchate*, pp. 51–56.

¹⁰⁴ Byzantine incumbents at Ardameres, Berroia, Hierissos, Kampaneia, Kassandrea and Kitros in 1213: Demetrios Chomatenos, *Ponemata Diaphora*, n° 106. A Latin bishop-elect *magister* R. in Kitros and Platamon in 1208–1212: Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1433 (XI, 115); CCXVI, col. 604 (XV, 86). Kitros thus seems to have had both a Latin and Byzantine incumbent at the same time (assuming that the Latin elect remained at his post after 1212 and that the Byzantine incumbent was already in place before 1213). A similar situation existed at Serres (before and after 1204 a metropolitan see without suffragans): a Latin Archbishop Arnulphus is attested in the years 1212–1219 (Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 582 (XV, 50); col. 594 (XV, 70); col. 597 (XV, 75); col. 826 (XVI, 30); Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 48) and a Byzantine Metropolitan, Paul Klaudiopolites, in 1216 (Lefort, *Actes de Vatopédi*, I, n° 12). Klaudiopolites was at the same time—and in the first place it seems since this office is mentioned first in his title—Metropolitan of Melnik, the capital of Alexios Sthlabos' principality in the Rhodopes mountains. It is conspicuous that in both Kitros and Serres one of the two incumbents also occupied another see. In any case this kind of situation—two incumbents occupying the same see—appears to have been exceptional within the Latin Empire and was never sanctioned by the popes, whose policy it was, as has been seen, that each see should have no more than one—Latin or Byzantine—incumbent

attest to a number of Byzantine suffragans of the Latin archbishop of Larissa (1208).¹⁰⁵ Outside the kingdom as Byzantine suffragans of the Latin archbishop of Athens are known: Theodore, bishop of Négrepont (1208), Demetrios Bardanes, bishop of Karystos (circa 1206–1208), and Ignatios, bishop of Thermia and Kea (circa 1231–1232).¹⁰⁶ In the Principality of Achaea the only known Byzantine bishops are in Maina (circa 1222–1223) and Damala (by means of a 13th-century seal).¹⁰⁷ The neighbouring island of Zakynthos also had a Byzantine bishop in 1207.¹⁰⁸ The Venetian enclaves and episcopal sees Modon and Koron in the Peloponnese also retained Byzantine incumbents.¹⁰⁹ In the first half of the thirteenth century there were on Crete two Byzantine bishops active within what for the rest was a predominantly Latin ecclesiastical hierarchy.¹¹⁰

The fact that, dependent on the region, the episcopate within the Latin Empire partially to exclusively remained Byzantine and that consequently numerous Byzantine bishops were prepared to function within the Latin Empire, means that we can no longer see the anti-Latin attitudes in the writings of prelates such as Michael Choniates, John Apokaukos, Demetrios Chomatenos and Georgios Bardanes as the representation of a general Byzantine standpoint, as often has been the case in the historiography.¹¹¹ In any event, the anti-Latin expressions of Apokaukos (1199/1200–1233/34), Metropolitan of Naupaktos, Chomatenos, Archbishop of Achrida (1216–1236/40), and Bardanes, Metropolitan of Corfu (1219–1238/39), date from after 1217–1218,

(see p. 313). Probably the mentioned exceptions arose from problems connected with administering to a mixed Latin-Byzantine flock.

¹⁰⁵ Larissa: Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1467 (XI, 152); col. 1468 (XI, 155).

¹⁰⁶ Theodore: Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1492–1493 (XI, 179); Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, n° 104, 146, 154. Bardanes: Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, n° 109; Herrin, *Realities of Byzantine Provincial Government*, pp. 262–263. Ignatios: Hirschbichler, *Monuments of a syncretic society*, p. 62. Circa 1222 the episcopal sees of Karystos and Négrepont were in Latin hands (Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 93, pp. 122–123; n° 123, pp. 165–166).

¹⁰⁷ Demetrios Chomatenos, *Ponemata Diaphora*, n° 22.

¹⁰⁸ Coureas, *The Establishment of the Latin Secular Church at Patras*, p. 147.

¹⁰⁹ Ibidem, p. 150. From 1318 onwards they were required to reside outside the town (Maltezou, *La Chiesa ortodossa*, p. 334).

¹¹⁰ Mcke, *Uncommon Dominion*, pp. 104–107.

¹¹¹ Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, n° 94–95, 102, 107, 110, 117, 124, 134–137, 161, 165. Lambropoulos, *Ioannis Apocaukos*, passim. Demetrios Chomatenos, *Ponemata Diaphora*, n° 22, n° 54, n° 102, n° 150. Hoeck & Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto*, pp. 147–235. Cf. an opposing view: Kordoses, *Southern Greece under the Franks*, p. 28.

when their ruler Theodore Doukas had achieved a number of resounding successes and had succeeded in making Epiros independent of the Latin Empire. In this context their correspondence took on a politically inspired propagandist character in relation to the Latin dominance, just as was the case for authors linked to the court of Nicaea. We can also nuance to some extent the anti-Latin passages in the exchange of letters of Choniates, Archbishop of Athens, who after 1204 went into exile on the island of Kea.¹¹² It was thus that he adjudged the Latin regime as being not as bad as the reign of terror of the Byzantine magnate Leo Sgouros, who circa 1203–1204 brought the region Argos-Beotia-Attica under his control for a short period.¹¹³ What is also interesting is that it appears from his letters that after a period of voluntary exile on Kea he remained, whilst his original companions had once more settled on the mainland under Latin rule, which indicates that his erstwhile associates found the life quite tolerable.¹¹⁴ Ultimately, in 1217 he was himself to return, to end his days in the Byzantine *Joannes Prodromos* monastery in Latin Bodonitza (†1222).¹¹⁵ We should remark here that the position that the exiled Choniates claimed for himself as shepherd of the Byzantine religious flock in his former diocese did not go unchallenged. In a letter of circa 1210–1216 he alludes to rumours that were spread by both Latins and Byzantines and that accused him of having amassed a large amount of money as metropolitan and of leading a lavish existence on Kea.¹¹⁶

Perhaps the position of Bishop Ignatios of Thermia and Kea was more representative of the attitude of the Byzantine clergy in the Latin Empire. Circa 1231/1232 he commissioned the decoration of a monastic church in Kalyvia-Kouvara, at the same time dedicating it to the apostles Peter and Paul, which would appear to imply more than a purely formal recognition of the papal and Latin religious authority. One of the new frescos depicted former metropolitan of Athens and exile the late Michael Choniates, who soon after his death gained the status of local saint in the region, which suggests genuine sympathy for the anti-Latin Choniates on the part of Ignatios.¹¹⁷ The example

¹¹² On Choniates' tendency to exaggeration: Kordoses, *Southern Greece under the Franks*, p. 26; Setton, *Athens in the later XIIth century*, p. 207.

¹¹³ Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, n° 100.

¹¹⁴ Ibidem, n° 99, 110, 118, 132, 135, 140–142.

¹¹⁵ Stadtmüller, *Michael Choniates, Metropolit von Athen*, pp. 191–193.

¹¹⁶ Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, n° 156.

¹¹⁷ Hirschbichler, *Monuments of a syncretic society*, pp. 62–63, 70–72.

of Ignatios shows that Byzantines in the Latin Empire could display a whole range of loyalties, which implies that in a study of the mutual relations an all too strict dichotomy Latin versus Byzantine would be relatively fruitless. Euthymios Tornikes, brother of *logothetes tou dromou* Constantine Tornikes, and who prior to 1204 was a member of the patriarchal clergy of Saint Sophia, also fits within this image. After the capture of Constantinople he travelled to Euboia, where he had family connections and probably also material interests. In his correspondence with Michael Choniates he expressed his abhorrence of the Latin tyranny, but at the same time declined invitations from Choniates to go to Kea. He also refused invitations from Apokaukos, Metropolitan of Naupaktos, and Theodore Laskaris, Emperor of Nicaea. Apparently he found life on Latin Euboia quite pleasant, and perhaps the anti-Latin passages in his letters to Choniates are to be understood in the light of his sympathy for the unfortunate metropolitan in exile. It was not until circa 1219, after the first spectacular successes of Theodore Doukas, that he was to settle in Epiros; here however he was to miss the opportunity of the appointment as Metropolitan of Neopatras, perhaps because of his long sojourn in Latin territory, which may have been viewed as displaying little patriotism.¹¹⁸ The examples of Ignatios and Tornikes show that despite mutual animosity and despite the inevitable conflicts between the Byzantine and Latin laity and clerics, between the Latin laity and clerics themselves and between the Byzantine laity and clerics themselves—about which the papal registers and, for example, Michael Choniates' letters carry extensive reports—there was in Byzantine prelates, also those outside the region that we have studied in detail, a degree of preparedness for peaceful coexistence with the new local Latin rulers.

The Patriarchal Authority within the Empire as a Whole

At the beginning of the Latin Empire, a number of elements impeded the development of a strong patriarchal authority. Firstly, the Venetian ambition to monopolize the patriarchate caused the coming into being of a Venetian and a non-Venetian party in the ecclesiastical

¹¹⁸ Darrouzes, *Notes sur Euthyme Tornikès, Euthyme Malakès et Georges Tornikès*, pp. 152–153. Kolovou, *Euthymios Tornikes als Briefschreiber*, pp. 64–65. The Byzantine bishops of Négrepont and Karystos on Euboia continued to correspond with Choniates: Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, n° 109–111, n° 146, 154.

sphere.¹¹⁹ Secondly, there was the Venetian ambition not to place the Venetian churches in the empire under the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople. For example, prior to his departure for the Queen of Cities in mid-1205, Morosini had to swear an oath that the Venetian churches in both the capital and the rest of the empire were exempt from his jurisdiction.¹²⁰ A third problem was the competition from the papacy, which—although Innocent III ascribed to the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate the highest rank after Rome itself—wanted to retain direct control over the Church in the Latin Empire.¹²¹ Indeed, the popes did not only attempt to realize their view of the ecclesiastical organization of the empire via the person of the patriarch, they also turned on many occasions to papal legates and local prelates. In doing so they did not hesitate to oppose the patriarchal standpoint.¹²²

Despite the difficult situation at the outset, the Latin patriarchs undertook initiatives to establish their authority. In this way, Thomas Morosini (1205–1211) took pains to ensure that he could exercise the patriarchal prerogatives vis-à-vis the episcopate. Circa 1206 he confirmed the election of Warin as archbishop of Vrysis, as he also did in the case of the bishops-elect of Athens and Thebes.¹²³ In 1209 he successfully resisted the attempt by the archbishop of Patras to have his diocese directly dependent on Rome.¹²⁴ In the same year he granted the town of Pegai to the bishop van Parion, and he excommunicated the population of Pegai when they refused to receive the bishop.¹²⁵ In the event of important appointments however, the patriarch could also be ignored. In the long procedural battle over Warin's appointment as archbishop of Thessalonike (1208–1212) the patriarch had

¹¹⁹ Cf. Chapter IV, p. 219.

¹²⁰ Santifaller, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des lateinischen Patriarchats*, n° 1. Longnon, *Le Patriarchat latin de Constantinople*, p. 178. A number of authors have assumed incorrectly that the question would relate only to the churches that Venice already possessed in the empire prior to 1204. Cf. Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, p. 234. Fedalto, *Il Patriarcato latino di Constantinopoli*, pp. 185–186.

¹²¹ Innocent's view on the hierarchy between the five patriarchates was confirmed at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 (Duba, *The Status of the Patriarch of Constantinople*, pp. 82–83).

¹²² Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, pp. 284–285.

¹²³ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1130 (X, 35).

¹²⁴ Ibidem, CCXVI, col. 163 (XII, 143). Coureas, *The Establishment of the Latin Secular Church at Patras*, p. 146. Schabel, *Antelm the Nasty*, pp. 89–99.

¹²⁵ Ibidem, col. 164 (XII, 144).

absolutely no influence, whilst the pope did involve the archbishops of Thebes and Larissa in the matter, and Emperor Henry and numerous other lay lords and prelates also intervened in the affair.¹²⁶

Morosini also undertook initiatives in other areas in order to establish patriarchal control. For example, in 1206 and 1210 the patriarch was actively involved in the agreements entered into with the secular authority vis-à-vis the ecclesiastical possessions in the empire.¹²⁷ In 1208 Innocent III, at the request of the patriarch, forbade the prior of the Pisans in Constantinople to continue to administer the rite of *confirmatio* to children, a right that was the entitlement of the local bishop, the patriarch therefore.¹²⁸ In the same year the patriarch, with papal support, was able to arrange that the Pisan, Lombard, Amalfitan, Danish and English *nationes* in Constantinople who resided in parishes that were under patriarchal authority, should pay tithes to him.¹²⁹ In 1209 the patriarch, again with papal support, defended his prerogatives with respect to a number of patriarchal monasteries.¹³⁰ In 1206 Morosini had attempted to add Cyprus, which prior to its conquest by Richard Lionheart in 1191 fell under the patriarchate of Constantinople, to his patriarchate, but was confronted in this with papal refusal.¹³¹ The fact that Morosini died in 1211 near Thessalonike where, inter alia, he had involved himself with a matter concerning the archbishopric of Neopatras, also shows the ambition to establish patriarchal authority in the empire as a whole.¹³²

The patriarchal aspirations did not prevent that all manner of conflicts with segments within the clergy must have seriously weakened Morosini's authority. With this we refer to the disputes regarding the appointment of canons in the Saint Sophia chapter and concerning

¹²⁶ Ibidem, col. 213–215 (XIII, 13). In April 1212 Innocent finally confirmed the appointment of Warin as archbishop of Thessalonike (Ibidem, col. 557 (XV, 18)).

¹²⁷ Ibidem, col. 967 (IX, 142). Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 115, pp. 157–159. Cf. Chapter IV, p. 202.

¹²⁸ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1352 (XI, 22).

¹²⁹ Ibidem, col. 1353 (XI, 24).

¹³⁰ Ibidem, CCXVI, col. 164 (XII, 145). A number of laymen and clerics denied him these rights. Innocent III instructed the archbishop of Herakleia, the bishop of Salymbria and the dean of the Church of Saint Mary in the Blacherna Palace to guard the patriarchal rights. The choice of the addressees suggests that the monasteries the patriarch claimed must be situated in Thrace.

¹³¹ Ibidem, CCXV, col. 962–966 (IX, 140–141). Cf. Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, p. 232, n. 21.

¹³² Ibidem, CCXVI, col. 459–460 (XIV, 97–98). Santifaller, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des lateinischen Patriarchats*, p. 28.

the *praepositurae*, in which the patriarch became diametrically opposed to the metropolitan non-Venetian clergy who enjoyed both imperial and papal support.¹³³ Financial conflicts too strained the relations between the patriarch and the metropolitan clergy, in which Innocent III again and again played the role of intermediary.¹³⁴ And just as the pope frequently intervened without reference to the patriarchal authority, so too did the local clergy go directly to the papal court in connection with local conflicts and requests concerning the confirmation of privileges or gifts.¹³⁵ The relations with the Venetian clergy were an additional worry for Morosini. Circa 1207 Morosini on his own initiative opposed the exemption of the Venetian churches in the empire and demanded the payment of tithes by the Venetian colony in Constantinople.¹³⁶ The issue of the *Hodegetria* icon in 1206 was another matter through which Morosini came into conflict with his fellow citizens, in this case the *podestà*.¹³⁷

After the vacancy of the patriarchal throne in the years 1211–1215, Gervasius (1215–1219) in the years 1216–1218 unfolded a policy that was aimed at establishing patriarchal authority via a more aggressive policy. For example, the patriarch claimed a large number of churches and monasteries in the Principality of Achaëa and in that of Athens as being directly dependent on the patriarch. In Thebes heard Gervasius legal cases that had not been referred to him. The patriarch had had also conferred prebends and had excommunicated local clerics and laymen without consulting the archbishop, former imperial chaplain Arduinus. Furthermore he had, without valid grounds,

¹³³ Cf. Chapter IV, p. 219.

¹³⁴ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1395 (XI, 78); CCXVI, col. 230 (XIII, 44); col. 355 (XIII, 186).

¹³⁵ Just a few examples: In 1206 Innocent III confirmed in Berardus, archbishop-elect of Athens, all the authority that his Byzantine predecessor had exercised in the diocese (Ibidem, CCXV, col. 1031 (IX, 194)). In 1207 the same pope confirmed to an unnamed chaplain of Modon a gift that had been made to him by William I of Champlitte, Prince of Achaëa (Ibidem, col. 1079 (IX, 247)). In 1208 the pope confirmed a certain Girardus his treasurership in Thebes (Ibidem, col. 1537 (XI, 222)). A number of further comparable papal confirmations: Ibidem, CCXV, col. 1472 (XI, 162); col. 1549–1550 (XI, 238–243); CCXVI, col. 226–227 (XIII, 33–36); col. 329–330 (XIII, 147–150); col. 392 (XIV, 17).

¹³⁶ Innocent charged a number of metropolitan prelates with the matter (Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1350 (XI, 17)). In 1209 the pope finally annulled entirely the forced exemption of the Venetian churches in the empire (Ibidem, CCXVI, col. 162–163 (XII, 140)).

¹³⁷ Cf. Chapter V, p. 275.

excommunicated Geoffrey I of Villehardouin, Prince of Achaea and Otto I of la Roche, ruler of Athens, because of their resistance to his policy. In Thessalonike too, Gervasius involved himself in matters that were outside his jurisdiction. The patriarch also despatched his own legates to various destinations in the empire and he disregarded the right of appeal of local clerics and laymen at the papal court, two initiatives that infringed papal prerogatives. Moreover, Gervasius permitted illegitimate exemptions of churches, following the example of his Byzantine predecessors. In the years 1217–1218 Pope Honorius protested repeatedly against Gervasius' policy, also after the complaints of local prelates and clerics. The papal protestations were inspired by the fear that in the long term a Latin patriarchate that was all too independent from Rome would come into being. Initially, Honorius' protests achieved nothing, but with the arrival of papal legate Giovanni Colonna (1218–1221) the patriarchal claims were at last curbed.¹³⁸

During the first years of his patriarchate, Mattheus (1221–1226) continued the ambitious policy of his predecessor. The patriarch paid no heed to measures promulgated by Legate Colonna, hindered appeals to the papal court, sought conflicts with the non-Venetian clergy in the capital, and claimed certain churches in far-away territories as being directly dependent on the patriarchate. In contrast to Gervasius, Mattheus also resolutely played the Venetian card. This is apparent from, inter alia, his confirmation of the exemption of the Venetian churches in the empire (1221), which Morosini circa 1207–1209 had abjured.¹³⁹ Honorius III reacted once again with repeated protests and regularly intervened to correct patriarchal actions. In doing so, Honorius turned to local prelates, who themselves conversely continued to turn to Rome with the intention of thwarting the patriarchal aspirations. One of Honorius' measures to subdue Mattheus' ambition was the placing directly under papal authority of the archbishopric of Patras in Achaea and the bishopric of Madytos in Thrace in 1222. After the heavy Latin territorial losses of 1224–1225 the patriarchal

¹³⁸ Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, pp. 274–275. Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz*, p. 275. Santifaller, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des lateinischen Patriarchats*, pp. 31–32. Fedalto, *Il Patriarcato latino di Constantinopoli*, pp. 214–215. Duba, *The Status of the Patriarch of Constantinople*, pp. 87–90.

¹³⁹ In our opinion there is no reason to assume that this exemption in the intervening period (1209–1220) under the patriarchs Morosini and Gervasius would actually have been in force, as is stated by Jacoby (*Jacoby, The Venetian Government and Administration*, p. 46).

ambitions came to an end. The explanation for this can be found in the geopolitical decline of the empire in the period 1224–1228. This situation placed a great strain on the patriarchal financial resources and prevented the furtherance of Mattheus' ambitious policy. In this changed context, in 1225 Honorius took measures to strengthen the patriarchal authority, which now was harmless vis-à-vis the papacy, with respect to the subordinate prelates and clerics in the empire.¹⁴⁰

In summary: the Latin patriarchs pursued a policy that was aimed at establishing effective authority in the entire empire. Whilst Morosini pursued a rather cautious policy, Gervasius and Mattheus, in the context of a politically and militarily stabilized empire, opted for a more aggressive approach, in which they did not fight shy of opposing papal authority. In their aspirations, the patriarchs did build in one restriction. They limited the establishment of their authority to the Latin principalities and territories within the empire. There is not a single attestation of patriarchal attempts at interference in the political entities that were ruled by Byzantine magnates. It is probable that the patriarchs were sufficiently realistic to recognize that this was not practicable, and that flexibility was a more desirable approach. However, they ultimately failed to establish any great degree of authority in the Latin territories. They were faced with the opposition of the popes, who preferred not to see an over-independent patriarch on the throne of Constantinople, and of both the Venetian and non-Venetian clerics, who were anxious to retain their own autonomy to the greatest possible extent. The frequently recurring alliance between the pope and segments of the local clergy had the additional support, when necessary, of imperial authority. Nevertheless, despite fierce opposition Patriarch Mattheus succeeded in continuing to pursue a centralist policy until 1224. In this way the patriarchs certainly did contribute at the ecclesiastical level to the idea of unity within the empire, albeit that this meet up with a great amount of resistance. After the political and military collapse of the region around Constantinople in 1224–1225, the patriarch no longer had the resources to continue to pursue the policy upon which he had embarked.

¹⁴⁰ Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, pp. 278–282. Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz*, p. 276. Santifaller, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des lateinischen Patriarchats*, pp. 33–34, 192–201. Fedalto, *Il Patriarcato latino di Constantinopoli*, pp. 216–217. Duba, *The Status of the Patriarch of Constantinople*, pp. 90–91.

THE MILITARY ORDERS

After 1204 the three great military orders—the Knights Templar, the Knights Hospitaller and the Teutonic Knights—settled in the Latin Empire, but until now rather meagre attention has been devoted to them in the historiography.¹⁴¹ They were present in various parts of the empire, and their establishments within the empire together formed a *provincia*, which gave the orders a supra-regional organization. From this point of view it is to examine whether they played any role vis-à-vis the unity of the empire.¹⁴² Lock has posited plausibly that the Knights Templar took part in the Fourth Crusade and were present in the empire at the outset. The contingent of Templars in the crusading expedition originated mainly in Northern Italy and therefore had a connection with the leader of the crusade Boniface of Montferrat. After the occurrences of April 1204, members of the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights came over from Syria-Palestine to Byzantine territory.

Initially, Baldwin I planned to grant the Templars and Hospitallers an important position in the empire. For example, he had charged Barochius, *magister* of the Knights Templar in Lombardy, with the responsible mission of reporting the taking of Constantinople to Innocent III.¹⁴³ Furthermore, in 1204–1205 Baldwin granted the important coastal city of Antalya to the Knights Templar, and he awarded the Hospitallers one quarter of the *ducat* of Neokastra.¹⁴⁴ In this way, the emperor attempted to involve the orders in the conquest

¹⁴¹ Lock, *The Military Orders in Mainland Greece*, pp. 333–339. Kiesewetter, *L'Ordine Teutonico in Grecia e in Armenia*, pp. 79–90.

¹⁴² Other western religious orders were also present in the empire, including the Benedictines, the Augustinians, the Premonstratensians, the Franciscans, the Dominicans and the Cistercians. Only this last order, which inter alia could count on the support of the emperors (cf. the *Sancta Maria Sancti Angeli* abbey in Constantinople), had establishments in different regions prior to 1228. However, these were linked administratively to their western mother institutions, without having a supra-regional organization within the empire's boundaries. Cf. Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean*, pp. 228–232. Brown, *The Cistercians in the Latin Empire*, pp. 79–94. Bolton, *A Mission to the Orthodox? The Cistercians in Romania*, pp. 169–181. Richard, *The Establishment of the Latin Church*, p. 52. Idem, *Laurum, une abbaye cistercienne fantôme*, pp. 409–410. Janin, *Notes d'Histoire et de Topographie: l'abbaye cistercienne 'Saint-Ange de Pétra'*, pp. 171–173. Clair, *Les Filles d'Hautecombe dans l'Empire latin*, pp. 263–273.

¹⁴³ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 454 (VII, 153). Lock, *The Military Orders*, p. 334.

¹⁴⁴ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1019–1020 (IX, 180). Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 285.

of territories not yet brought under Latin control. However, neither order took any initiative at all to take these territories effectively under their control. In the region around Constantinople, which actually was in Latin hands, the orders also obtained possessions. In 1208 there are unspecified properties of both the Hospitallers and the Templars attested in the area around the capital.¹⁴⁵ In the early years, representatives of both orders were on occasion present in the imperial entourage. In his letters of June 1205 to Innocent III and to western Christendom, Regent Henry reported the advisory role of Templars and Hospitallers in his vicinity.¹⁴⁶ Thereafter there remains no trace of either order in the imperial presence. As far as is known, the Teutonic Knights never had any imperial connection. Only from a 1247 charter of Regent Philip of Toucy is it known that the order had an establishment in Constantinople, which they probably acquired during the empire's heyday (pre-1224).¹⁴⁷

Other than in the region around Constantinople, the Knights Templar certainly did gain considerable properties in the Kingdom of Thessalonike and in southern Greece. This occurred in 1204–1205 in the context of the successful campaign of conquest led by Boniface of Montferrat, who had connections with the north Italian Templars in the crusading army. The Marquis himself gave the Knights Templar a number of properties, but the barons of his entourage also displayed their generosity.¹⁴⁸ In the Principality of Achaëa the Knights Templar acquired properties thanks to the magnanimity of the Princes William of Champlitte and Geoffrey I of Villehardouin, and from a number of local prelates. Furthermore, Prince Geoffrey gave the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights—just as the Knights Templar—four knight's fiefs.¹⁴⁹ In conclusion, the Hospitallers gained an establishment in Phthia in southern Thessaly, but further there is no trace of the Teutonic Knights in southern Greece.¹⁵⁰ Although during the first

¹⁴⁵ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1362 (XI, 35); col. 1363 (XI, 36).

¹⁴⁶ Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XVIII, p. 526. Pokorny, *Zwei unedierte Briefe*, p. 202.

¹⁴⁷ Tisserant, *La légation en Orient du Franciscain Dominique d'Aragon*, p. 340.

¹⁴⁸ An overview of these properties: Lock, *The Military Orders*, pp. 334–335.

¹⁴⁹ *The Chronicle of Morea*, v. 1939–1954. Lock, *The Military Orders*, p. 336. Bon, *La Morée franque*, p. 100.

¹⁵⁰ The Knights Hospitaller also usurped properties of the Latin bishop of Gardiki (Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 297 (XIII, 101); col. 304 (XIII, 116–117); col. 591 (XV, 19); col. 910 (XVI, 115)).

years of the Latin Empire the three military orders, and in particular the Knights Templar, possessed quite considerable possessions outside the imperial quarter, not one of these orders was to play a significant role in the empire. The anti-imperial attitude of the Knights Templar during the so-called Lombard revolt in the Kingdom of Thessalonike in 1208–1209 was in our opinion an important factor in this.¹⁵¹ In the aftermath of this conflict came the confiscation of Templars' possessions by Emperor Henry, his ally Margaret of Hungary, and a number of barons of the Lombard party, who in this way attempted to prove their renewed loyalty to the emperor and Margaret, and at the same time conveniently expanded their own possessions.¹⁵²

The episode of the Lombard revolt must have made it clear to the Latin emperor, and to other feudal rulers, such as Margaret of Hungary, that it was scarcely opportune to pursue a policy that granted the Knights Templar, or one of the other two traditional military orders, a substantial place in the administration of the empire. In this way there was, in the long term, the possible arising in the empire of a virtually independent force to be feared, which could turn against the imperial authority. The far-reaching feudalization and the partnership with Venice already formed in itself more than a sufficient challenge for the political unity of the empire. Even before 1208–1209 Emperor Henry must have had the idea that the traditional orders could only with difficulty be an instrument within the framework of a centralist imperial policy. This is witnessed by the establishment of the completely new Order of Saint Samson under imperial patronage circa 1206–1207.¹⁵³ The explanation for Emperor Henry's view of the role of the traditional military orders is twofold. Firstly, Henry was probably disappointed that neither the Knights Templar nor the Hospitallers had undertaken initiatives to conquer the territories in Asia Minor that Baldwin had granted them. Secondly, Henry had in his immediate entourage a number of prominent barons from the Kingdom of Jerusalem.¹⁵⁴ It is not improbable that they told him about the often-destabilizing role that the rivaling orders played in the kingdom, where in effect they had developed into autonomous forces to be reckoned with.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹ Lock, *The Military Orders*, p. 334. On this conflict: Chapter IV, p. 212.

¹⁵² Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 323–324 (XIII, 136–137), col. 327–331 (XIII, 143–147).

¹⁵³ Cf. p. 343.

¹⁵⁴ Inter alia Thierry of Tenremonde and Raoul of Tiberias (see Chapter V, pp. 255–256).

¹⁵⁵ Prawer, *Histoire du Royaume latin de Jérusalem*, pp. 591–592.

THE ORDER OF SAINT SAMSON

Until now, scarcely any attention has been devoted in the historiography to the military order of Saint Samson. In his study on the military orders of knighthood in Latin Romania, Lock does not even mention its existence.¹⁵⁶ Nonetheless, as a newly established military order in Latin Constantinople, and despite the fragmented nature of the available information, it forms an interesting object for study.

The order derived its name from its headquarters, the famous *xenon*—or hospital—of Saint Samson in Constantinople.¹⁵⁷ When the city was taken in 1204, crusaders stormed into the hospital and desecrated the local chapel. They reconstructed the iconostasis into a latrine for patients.¹⁵⁸ This last element indicates that, after the conquest and plundering of Constantinople, the hospital came immediately under Latin control and remained in use. From a papal letter of July 1208 it appears that the military order established in the hospital was founded during the mission of papal legate Benedictus in the years 1205–1207.¹⁵⁹ The cardinal fulfilled an instrumental role drawing up the *institutiones* of the new order. The founder, however, was the Latin emperor. In a charter of 1244 the later Emperor Baldwin II stated: '*hospitale Sancti Sansonis Constantinopoli quod parentes et antecessores nostri in honorem Dei et pauperum ac infirmorum subsidium fundaverunt.*'¹⁶⁰ The *antecessor* who founded the hospital, was without doubt Emperor Henry, who from the middle of April 1205 looked after imperial policy firstly as regent and subsequently as emperor, and who was was one of the most generous patrons of the order. In March 1210 the pope confirmed to the order the possession of the *castellum* of Garella in Thrace, which Henry had given to them.¹⁶¹ It is not

¹⁵⁶ Lock, *The Military Orders*, pp. 333–339. At the end of the nineteenth century only Brassart devoted several articles to the establishment of the order in Douai: Brassart, *Notes sur l'ancien hôpital Saint-Samson de Douai*, pp. 167–169. Richard touched briefly on the existence of the order: Richard, *The Establishment of the Latin Church*, p. 53.

¹⁵⁷ Miller, *The Sampson Hospital*, pp. 101–135. The author believes, incorrectly, that the military order that was established in the Saint Samson Hospital were the Knights Templar.

¹⁵⁸ Konstantinos Stilbes, *Mémoire contre les Latins*, §89.

¹⁵⁹ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1435 (XI, 123).

¹⁶⁰ S.n., *Examens de l'Ecole des Chartes en août 1871*, p. 218.

¹⁶¹ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 218 (XIII, 17).

surprising that with the establishment of the order Henry turned to Cardinal Benedictus; both worked well together in other fields.¹⁶²

Without doubt, Henry realized that an order of knights that was allied to the imperial authority and that would have daughter establishments over the entire empire could be a useful instrument in promoting the political unity of the empire. Apart from this imperial mission in daily practice the order is sure to have taken on the tasks that the traditional orders fulfilled, taking in and protecting pilgrims. There is here no reason to suppose with Timothy Miller that the Saint Samson Hospital lost its typical Byzantine character, *inter alia* 'its close link to the Greek medical profession.' For example, the Hospitallers establishment in Jerusalem was active as a true hospital, active in the purely medical field, and this was directly inspired by the Byzantine hospital tradition, as Miller himself established in an earlier article.¹⁶³ In our opinion, the Latinized Saint Samson Hospital incorporated a fusion of the charitable functions of its Latin and Byzantine models. Differently from the traditional orders, the military mission of the Order of Saint Samson appears to have oriented itself towards the defence of only the Latin Empire itself—which, according to imperial ideology, had a substantial role to play as a bastion in the interests of Christendom as a whole—since there is no known establishment in or connected with the Holy Land.¹⁶⁴ With respect to the internal organization of the order, which is to be ascertained only on the basis of scanty information in papal letters, we know that the head of the order was referred to as *praeceptor* or as *magister*. The heads of local establishments were also referred to as *magister*, whilst the other members were designated as *fratres*.¹⁶⁵ We have no information with relation to the existence of

¹⁶² Gerland, *Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches*, p. 121. Cf. Chapter V, p. 275.

¹⁶³ Cf. Miller, *The Sampson Hospital*, p. 129. Idem, *The Knights of Saint-John and the Hospitals of the Latin West*, pp. 727–733. We should state that the very best medical expertise was available in Latin Constantinople, about which Miller posits that this was attached to the *xenones* (Miller, *The Samson Hospital*, p. 125). Circa 1225–1228 in an attack by the troops of Theodore Doukas on Constantinople, Anseau II of Cayeux was struck by a lance in, *inter alia*, the cervical vertebra and the vocal cords, but a doctor was successful in healing what had been believed to be a mortal wound (Akropolites, §24).

¹⁶⁴ That the order had a military mission had already been assumed by Richard, who referred to their right to possess weapons and horses, together with their possession of the Garella fortress (Richard, *The Establishment of the Latin Church*, p. 53).

¹⁶⁵ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1435 (XI, 123); CCXVI, col. 218 (XIII, 17). Barbiche, *Actes pontificaux*, I, n° 396, 784.

other types of members, such as the *confratres* and *donati* of other military orders, or about other aspects of the internal working of the order.¹⁶⁶

A papal document of 1244, in which Innocent IV took the order under his protection just as his predecessors had done, gives a summary of the order's possessions.¹⁶⁷ In view of the fact that quite a number of the places mentioned were since circa 1224 no longer in Latin hands, we may assume that the document reports to a major extent the possessions of the order from before this date. In and around the capital Constantinople the order—in addition to the Saint Samson Hospital itself—owned a number of churches and palaces.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Luttrell, *The Military Orders—Some Definitions*, pp. 79–87.

¹⁶⁷ Haluscynskij & Wojnar, *Acta Innocentii Papae IV*, n° 15. From a geographical point of view, the summary of properties is random: firstly a number of places in Constantinople are named (e.g. the church of *Sanctus Andreas de Mangana*), then the island Oxia (in the Sea of Marmara), then, inter alia, Garella in Thrace, thereafter once again properties in the capital (e.g. the *cisterna* behind the Saint Samson Hospital), then properties at Kyzikos (*Skisico*) on the coast of Asia Minor, subsequently places in the Thracian hinterland of the capital (e.g. Litros—*Littrum*), then again properties on the coast of Asia Minor (e.g. Daskylion—*Diascelum*), then, in geographically hardly logical order, places near Ainos (Choirosphaktou—*Chierofactum*), Mosynopolis (e.g. Panagia—*Panagia*) and Xantheia (Langistro—*Lagidra*). An additional complication is that a number of place names in Innocent IV's summary are to be sought outside the Latin Empire. Most of these are named at the end of the summary, such as the order's possessions in Douai (in the County of Flanders) and in the Kingdom of Hungary (*possessiones terras et redditus ac Bona quae in Ungaria possidentis*). The hospital of *Stragon* was probably situated in Hungarian Esztergom (*Strigoniensis*). The possessions that are recorded between Esztergom and Douai can with a certain degree of probability also be located outside Romania: we might localize the *ecclesia Sancti Joannis de Bosco* in the French Saint-Jean-du-Bois in the County of Maine (Graesse, *Orbis Latinus*, II, p. 293). The *domus de Martha* could be situated in Marta, near Viterbo in the Papal States (Ibidem, I, p. 575). The *domus de Pellagravae* appears to refer to Palgrave in the county of Suffolk, which appears in the Domesday Book of 1086 as *Palegrava* (Ibidem, III, p. 93; in 1257 the English king Henry III granted simple protection for the master and brethren of the house of Saint-Samson and for their men, lands and goods, cf. Lyte, *Patent Rolls of the Reign of Henry III*, IV, p. 579). However, besides these places outside the empire listed at the end of the summary, between the localities within the empire the list perhaps also contains a few places outside the empire. One example of these is the toponym *domus in Obscura Vale*. This location seems to be identifiable with Orquevaux (*Obscura Vallis*—Ibidem, III, p. 59) in the Champagne region, where quite a number of Constantinopolitan barons originated.

¹⁶⁸ The churches named are: the *Sanctus Andreas de Mangana* (Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, pp. 28–33); the *Sanctus Georgius de Scutariis*, at Chrysopolis on the Asia Minor shore of the Bosphorus (Idem, *L'Eglise byzantine sur les rives du Bospore (Côte asiatique)*, p. 95); the *Sanctus Martinus iuxta Mare* is perhaps the *Mone Martiniake*, which was located close to the harbour of Sophia. The *ecclesia Sanctus Georgius cum cimiterio suo* can also perhaps be situated in the capital, in the absence of any other

In the Sea of Marmara the order acquired possessions on the island of Oxia, including one or more churches, and in the metropolitan hinterland in Thrace a number of *casalia*, including Litros.¹⁶⁹ On the Bithynian coast the order had possessions at Daskylion and on the Kyzikos Peninsula.¹⁷⁰ Outside the imperial quarter the order owned the castle of Garella in Thrace. Still in the non-imperial and non-Venetian part of Thrace the order acquired Choirosphaktou in the neighbourhood of Ainos.¹⁷¹ In the Kingdom of Thessalonike the order gained Panagia near Mosynopolis and Langistro near Xantheia.¹⁷² The *locum Constantiae* can probably be identified with an establishment in the town of Konstanteia, located halfway between Adrianople and Philippopolis.¹⁷³ The *hospitale de Caristim* can perhaps be situated in Kanstritzion, a few kilometres south of Agathopolis, which belonged to the imperial quarter.¹⁷⁴

The above overview shows how the Saint Samson Order did not succeed in becoming *the* order of knights of the empire, with a network of fortresses spread throughout the entire imperial territory. The order's acquisitions consisted almost solely of possessions in the imperial quarter or in territories in the ownership of imperial confidants. In the non-Venetian part of Thrace, the location of their possessions near Ainos corresponds with the location of the fiefdoms of a number of barons of the central administrative elite, Geoffrey of Villehardouin, who owned Trajanopolis, and his relative Geoffrey of Merry, Lord of Ainos. This suggests that in this region they were the benefactors of the order. Geoffrey of Merry was also lord of Daskylion and thus must have been the order's benefactor there. Peter of Bracheux may have been the order's patron on the Kyzikos Peninsula: he held this locality until 1207 and may have regained it after Emperor Henry's reconquest

description (Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, pp. 69–78), just as the *domos et curiam quae fuerunt comitis Bertrandi*.

¹⁶⁹ Designated as *Littrum* (Janin, *Constantinople byzantine*, Carte n° VIII). This locality is mentioned in a series of *casalia* that perhaps can all be situated in the same area: *Mintagnoe*, *Pregum*, *Semonum*, *Valacumen*, *Sirtericum*, *Plantacum*, *Singelu*, *Singuion*, *Manacum*.

¹⁷⁰ *Diascelum* (Graesse, *Orbis Latinus*, I, p. 629).

¹⁷¹ *Chierofactum* (Soustal, *Thrakien*, p. 171).

¹⁷² *Panagia en Lagidra* (Ibidem, pp. 332, 385).

¹⁷³ Prior to the thirteenth century, virtually nothing is known about Konstanteia: Ibidem, p. 314.

¹⁷⁴ Ibidem, p. 298. Cf. Chapter III, p. 104.

of the region in 1212.¹⁷⁵ The order's ownership of Konstanteia, situated on the border between the principality of Adrianople and that of Philippopolis, was with some probability thanks to Theodore Branas, ruler of Adrianople, Renier of Trith or Gerard of Estreux, lords of Philippopolis, all of whom also can be counted as being members of the central political elite.¹⁷⁶ In the Kingdom of Thessalonike the possessions at Mosynopolis probably stemmed from the generosity of again Marshal Villehardouin, who was Lord of the town. The possessions at Xantheia, which probably belonged to the domain of the rulers of Thessalonike, were perhaps a gift from Boniface of Montferrat or from his widow Margaret of Hungary, both of whom enjoyed a good relationship with Emperor Henry.¹⁷⁷ In Thessalonike the order had Archbishop Warin, at the same time imperial chancellor, as patron.¹⁷⁸

The order had not a single establishment the Latin baronies and principalities in Thessaly, Beotia, Attica, Euboia, Achaia or on the Aegean Islands. The same was true of the Venetian territories and in the territories under the control of Byzantine rulers, such as Paphlagonia and the Rhodopes Mountain region. The only possible exception was the town of Konstanteia, where Theodore Branas possibly donated possessions. The reason that the Order of Saint Samson did not succeed in building up a network of daughter-institutions in the empire as a whole can be explained by the explicit imperial patronage. In general, lords and barons were not particularly inclined to bring in on their own initiative an order that was closely linked to the imperial authority and of which it could be the permanent representative. The competition from the orders that were already established—and therefore more prestigious in the eyes of the lords and barons—was probably an additional factor that explains the small extent of the spread of the Order of Saint Samson. We can also add here that, in spite of Branas' potential grant, for the Byzantine princes in the Latin Empire the phenomenon of a religious order of knights was something strange to the Byzantine culture.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁵ Cf. Chapter V, notes 21, 23 and 82, and Chapter III, note 24.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Chapter V, pp. 354–359.

¹⁷⁷ As far as is known, Xantheia was not given in fief by either Boniface or Margaret.

¹⁷⁸ In 1218 Warin gave his house in his home town of Douai to the order (Wauters, *Exploration des chartes et des cartulaires belges*, n° 10, pp. 189–190).

¹⁷⁹ Angold, *Church and Society in Byzantium*, pp. 517–518.

CONCLUSION

The Church in the Latin Empire made no fundamental contribution to the unity of the empire. There was too little co-ordination between imperial and patriarchal authority for this, although in times of crisis there were occasional endeavours toward mutual solidarity. Furthermore, the Latin patriarchs were able to build up only limited authority within the empire. Patriarchal ambitions in that direction met up with unfavourable reactions from both the popes and the local Latin clergy. With regard to the Byzantine principalities in the empire, on the basis of pragmatism no attempt apparently was made to establish any patriarchal influence. Neither the patriarchs nor the military orders played a role to benefit the unity of the empire. Conversely however, the Latin patriarchate was neither a divisive element in the empire, in the sense that the prolongation of serious conflicts with the emperor or with local lords and prelates was avoided, often thanks to papal intervention. The military orders, that—differently from the situation in Syria and Palestine—never played a politically leading role, were also never a destabilizing factor in the empire, apart then from the Templar support for the shortlived Lombard rebellion.

The Latin take-over of the patriarchal throne of Constantinople of course created a situation of conflict with the Byzantine clergy and population in the empire. The presence of a rivalrous Byzantine patriarchate in Nicaea from 1208 contributed greatly to this. Some of the Byzantine clergy and faithful in the Latin Empire were religiously oriented towards Nicaea, which—it is to be noted—did not necessarily imply any loyalty to the Nicaean emperorship. Another group of Byzantine clergy and faithful was however formally loyal vis-à-vis the Latin religious hierarchy and displayed their inclination towards both coexistence and co-operation. All in all, the Latin patriarchs, under the influence of the relevant papal and imperial policies, pursued a fairly tolerant policy with regard to the Byzantine faithful. For example, the Byzantine clergy retained, in particular in the core quarter, a substantial share in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, even at the level of the episcopate. In essence, a liveable situation was created for both religious communities; however, this did not rule out the regular occurrence of conflicts.

Even though a liveable situation had been developed, because of the Latin-Byzantine differences in the ecclesiastical-religious sphere the Church was unable to form an element on which the unity of the

empire could be built. On the eve of the Fourth Crusade, the Church still had been one of the pillars that had actively supported the unity of the Byzantine Empire.¹⁸⁰ We should note, however, that the Church had certainly not always advanced the unity of the Byzantine Empire. On the contrary, prior to 1204 too, internal religious and ecclesiastical conflicts had repeatedly, and for the most part in a violent manner, torn Byzantium, and this was not to be different after 1261.¹⁸¹ Looked at from this perspective, the difficult religious and ecclesiastical situation in the empire of Constantinople after 1204 was in a certain sense a variation on a theme that is to be encountered regularly in Byzantine history.

¹⁸⁰ Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations*, pp. 313–318, 450.

¹⁸¹ We are thinking here about the Christological controversies in the fourth-seventh century, Iconoclasm in the eight-ninth century, Bogomilism in the eleventh-twelfth century, the various controversies under Manuel Komnenos (1156–1180), the contested Church Union in 1274–1282, and the Hesychastic controversy in the fourteenth century (Hussey, *The Orthodox Church*, pp. 9–29, 30–68, 156–163, 257–260; Angold, *Church and Society in Byzantium*, p. 499; Nicol, *The last centuries of Byzantium*, pp. 210–214; Lilie, *Byzanz. Das zweite Rom*, pp. 120, 195; Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel*, p. 217).

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE BYZANTINE SPACE

In answering the question as to what position was held by the Latin Empire in the Byzantine space,¹ with regard to Asia Minor we focus on the Empire of Nicaea and the Sultanate of Konya. In the absence of relevant source material—in itself a significant factor—we refer only indirectly to the Byzantine state that was founded by Alexios I (and his brother David) Komnenos—the so-called Empire of Trebizond, the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia and the Kingdom of Georgia. In the Balkans we devote attention to the Empire of Thessalonike (developed from the Principality of Epiros), the Empire of Bulgaria, the Principality and subsequently Kingdom of Serbia, the Kingdom of Hungary, and the Russian Principalities.

Two questions stand at the forefront. Firstly, we examine whether the Latin emperors either subscribed to the foreign policy pursued by their predecessors prior to 1204 or opted for far-reaching innovations. Secondly, we ask ourselves how the neighbouring states looked upon the Latin Empire and to what extent they regarded this empire as the legitimate successor to the Byzantine Empire of pre-1204.

THE RELATIONS WITH THE EMPIRE OF NICAEA

The Empire of Nicaea was founded in the years 1204–1208 by Theodore Laskaris, who prior to 1204 as the son-in-law of Emperor Alexios III had been vested with the title of *despotes*.² Laskaris was one of the Byzantine aristocrats that, after the taking of Constantinople in April 1204, fled the capital for Asia Minor. He established his authority over a considerable portion of north-western Byzantine Asia Minor, where in the years 1203–1204 a series of magnates had attempted to

¹ On this Byzantine space: Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth*, pp. 202–208. Raffensperger, *Revisiting the Idea of the Byzantine Commonwealth*, pp. 159–174.

² Gardner, *The Lascarids of Nicaea*, pp. 52–71. Angold, *A Byzantine government in exile*, pp. 12–13. Idem, *Church and Society in Byzantium*, pp. 514–518. Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, pp. 53–70. Idem, *Constantine XI Laskaris*, pp. 144–146.

develop autonomous regional principalities. Whilst it is probable that Laskaris acted initially in the name of his father-in-law, it is certain that he acted in his own right after the latter's capture by Boniface of Montferrat at the end of 1204. In 1206 he was in a sufficiently strong position to have himself proclaimed *basileus*, in doing so emphasizing simultaneously his independence of Latin and any other authority and claiming to be the legitimate Byzantine emperor. However, the legitimacy of his claims was problematic, also for the Byzantine population under Latin imperial rule. For example, patriarch John X Kamateros, who after 1204 had sought refuge in Didymoteichon, refused an invitation from Laskaris to come to the latter's court, which can be looked upon as an implicit rejection of his imperial claim.³

In 1207 some of the Byzantine clergy in Constantinople sent a request to Laskaris to organize the election of a new Byzantine patriarch after negotiations with the Latin ecclesiastical authorities about the integration of the Byzantine Church into the Latin Empire had in their eyes ended in failure.⁴ In the beginning of 1208 a patriarchal election took place in Nicaea, and one of the first initiatives of the new patriarch Michael IV Autoreianos was the formal coronation of Theodore Laskaris as *basileus kai autokrator ton Romaion*. Laskaris' claim to be the legitimate Byzantine emperor was made considerably stronger than it had been previously by his having at his side someone who by many was seen as a legitimate Byzantine patriarch of Constantinople, even though the latter was at that time in exile.

The Nicaean emperor's claim was in clear competition with the identical claim of the Latin emperor in Constantinople. As a consequence, in the eyes of the Latin imperial authority Theodore Laskaris could be nothing other than a usurper, and the territories that were part of his principality belonged *de jure* to the Latin Empire, and more specifically to the imperial quarter.

³ Akropolites, §7. The chronicler further states that Kamateros relinquished his office in writing, which enabled the election of a new patriarch in Nicaea. This element was adopted in: Wirth, *Zur Frage eines politischen Engagements*, pp. 250–251. However, Akropolites' additional information would appear to us to be propaganda which *post factum* was intended to legitimize the re-establishment of the Byzantine patriarchate in Nicaea circa 1207–1208. Choniates, who differently from Akropolites was a contemporary, does not report anywhere of such an abdication (Niketas Choniates, pp. 593, 633).

⁴ Cf. Chapter VI, p. 314.

*The Confrontation between Constantinople and Nicaea
in 1204–1213/1214*⁵

In the autumn of 1204 Emperor Baldwin embarked on an offensive in Asia Minor with the intention of bringing the Byzantine territories there under Latin control.⁶ This campaign, which initially was very successful, had to be discontinued in the spring of 1205 as the result of the rebellion of the Byzantine aristocracy in Thrace.⁷ Only a small number of bases on the coast of Asia Minor opposite Constantinople were retained. In the period 1205–1208 Laskaris made grateful use of the continuing Latin troubles with Bulgaria to consolidate his authority in north-western Asia Minor. On the one hand he beleaguered the remaining Latin positions on the Bithynian coast and on the other he did the same to the Latin vassal David Komnenos in Paphlagonia. However, after an alliance with the Bulgarian ruler Kalojan did not produce the desired result, in 1207 Emperor Theodore decided to enter into a two-year armistice with Emperor Henry, as the result of which a limited number of Latin strongholds were retained.

Despite the armistice, small-scale military operations continued unabated in the period up to 1212, with Laskaris achieving the greatest amount of success. In 1212 the Nicaean emperor planned a major offensive against Constantinople, but Emperor Henry's anticipation was infallible. The Latin emperor returned in great haste from Epiros, where he fought a campaign against his rebellious vassals Michael Doukas and Strez of Prosek, and commenced a successful invasion in Asia Minor, in which in 1212–1213 Laskaris' army repeatedly suffered defeat, and major portions of the empire of Nicaea—Henry's army reached as far south as Pergamon and Nymphaion—were trampled underfoot by the Latin emperor's troops. A treaty was concluded in the course of 1213, which resulted in Henry being able to annex a considerable part of the conquered territories into his empire. Akropolites states that he acquired northwest Asia Minor up to the region around Mount Kiminos and the village of Kalamos (which was to function as

⁵ Extensive accounts of the military confrontations between Constantinople and Nicaea in: Gerland, *Das lateinischen Kaiserreich*, pp. 33–39, 102–114, 210–219. Longnon, *L'Empire latin*, pp. 68–69, p. 98, p. 102. Savvides, *Constantine XI Lascaris*, pp. 165–168. For the dating of Henry's campaign in 1212–1213: Van Tricht, *La politique étrangère (2e partie)*, pp. 409–419. Cf. also note 8.

⁶ Cf. Chapter III, p. 106.

⁷ Cf. Chapter IV, p. 159.

an uninhabited border point), while Laskaris retained on the one hand the territories to the south of this and on the other the region around Lopadion, Prusa and Nicaea.⁸

In 1214 Laskaris launched an offensive in Paphlagonia, which initially he was able to take into his possession, thus profiting from the absence of Emperor Henry, who at about the same time was engaged in a campaign against Serbia.⁹ The ultimate outcome of the conflict is not entirely clear. It is possible that Laskaris brought the region as a whole under his continuing control, but it also may be that a number of strongholds remained under the authority of David Komnenos, the local Latin vassal. It is even possible that Henry on his return from Serbia undertook a counteroffensive in defence of his Paphlagonian vassal. At some point after the 1213 treaty between Henry and Laskaris the town of Lopadion fell into Latin hands. This may have taken place during a campaign by the Latin emperor to thwart Laskaris' conquest of Paphlagonia (in late 1214 or early 1215?). The final outcome of the confrontation concerning Paphlagonia in 1214 ultimately remains unclear. The region may have been entirely or partially conquered

⁸ Akropolites, §15. Saint-Guillain recently again suggested that Henry's campaign was continued in 1214 and that the peace treaty was concluded in the course of that year (Saint-Guillain, *Les conquérants de l'Archipel*, p. 221), hereby following the example of earlier authors like Longnon (for references see: Van Tricht, *La politique étrangère (2e partie)*, pp. 414–415). Such a chronology does not seem to leave time for Henry's rapprochement with Bulgaria at the end of 1213 or the beginning of 1214 and for the emperor's two consecutive expeditions against Serbia, which in our view are to be dated to the years 1214–1215. In addition Akropolites speaks explicitly of a campaign of relatively short duration (*Ibidem*, pp. 422–424; Akropolites, §16).

⁹ Booth's hypothesis that Paphlagonia had already been taken earlier by Laskaris is in our opinion unfounded. The author puts forward as his only argument that Akropolites places the account of the taking of Paphlagonia between his description of Laskaris' defeat at the hands of the Sultan of Konya at Antioch-on-the-Meander and Laskaris' defeat by Emperor Henry at the Rhyndakos, both of which took place in the same year (1212). However, this assertion is manifestly incorrect: Akropolites absolutely does not report the three incidents in succession. The chronicler gives in §7–11 an overview of Laskaris' reign (1204–1222) and the vicissitudes of ex-Emperor Alexios III Angelos, in which the Battle of Antioch is covered, and he ends this with briefly mentioning the acquisition of Paphlagonia. In the subsequent chapters he firstly gives an overview of the reigns of the Bulgarian tsars Kalojan and Boril (§11–13) and of the Epirote rulers Michael and Theodore Doukas (§14) until circa 1217. He then (§15–17) discusses briefly the marital alliance policy of Laskaris and the reign of Emperor Henry (1206–1216), in which mention is made, *inter alia*, of the Battle of the Rhyndakos. From this overview it is clear to see that Akropolites did not have the intention of putting his chronicle in strict chronological order. Cf. Booth, *The Sangarios Frontier*, p. 68. *Idem*, *Theodore Laskaris and Paphlagonia*, pp. 194–204.

by Laskaris, or Henry may have been (partially) succesful in aiding Komnenos to preserve his principality.¹⁰ It can be assumed that the

¹⁰ The main source—relatively neglected by Booth (see note 9)—for Laskaris' campaign in Paphlagonia in 1214: Mesarites, *Der Bericht*, §10–12, 20, 32, 52. That Paphlagonia in 1214 was still feudally dependent upon Constantinople, something that is missed by most authors, is in our opinion apparent from Mesarites' report: it is no coincidence that shortly after the commencement of Laskaris' offensive, papal legate Pelagius sends out emissaries from Constantinople to negotiate not only on ecclesiastical questions, but also about secular peace (§12). All the authors known to us also ignore the fact that, with respect to the end of Laskaris' expedition in Paphlagonia, Mesarites does not say that the region was brought completely under Nicaean control: on the contrary, not all the centres of resistance appear to have been restrained, possibly thanks to support from Latin Constantinople (§32, 52—see also *infra*). That David Komnenos, ruler of Paphlagonia and vassal of the Latin emperor had already died at the time of Laskaris' offensive is in our opinion a widely-held misconception.

A number of authors, relying on the following sources, have argued that David Komnenos perished in 1214 in the defence of Sinope. Bar-Hebraeus recounts how in the year 611 of the Hegira (13 May 1214–1 May 1215) Sultan Kay-kaus I took the town of Sinope and killed its governor, referred to by the name Alexios (Bar-Hebraeus, *The chronography*, p. 369). We find a similar account in a Greek *vita* of Saint Eugenios (Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Fontes Historiae Imperii Trapezuntini*, I, p. 131). However, from the narrative of Ibn-Bibi it appears that Sinope fell twice to the sultan in 1214, since after its first taking it was re-conquered briefly by Alexios Komnenos. The author does not however indicate the name of the defender of Sinope during the first Seljuk siege and capture (Ibn-Bibi, *Die Seldschukengeschichte*, pp. 64–67). The above-mentioned authors assume that Bar Hebraeus and the author of the *vita* of Saint Eugenios confused David Komnenos with his brother Alexios, who irrefutably did not die until 1222, and have treated the first and second capture of Sinope by the sultan as a single occurrence. There are however no arguments to state that the governor of Sinope during the first Seljuk siege would have been David Komnenos (cf. Miller, *Trebizond*, p. 18; Vasiliev, *The foundation of the empire of Trebizond*, pp. 26–29; Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, p. 69; Hoffman, *Rudimente von Territorialstaaten*, p. 76).

A number of other authors have identified David Komnenos of Paphlagonia as the David Komnenos who in December 1212 died at the Vatopedi monastery on Mount Athos, into which he had entered under the name Daniel (the note in a codex from the Vatopedi monastery that contains this information: Heisenberg, in: *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, t. 25, 1925, p. 185). Heisenbergs' hypothesis, which disproved the hypothesis of the aforementioned authors, was adopted by inter alia Kursanskis (*L'empire de Trébizonde*, p. 111), Oikonomides (*Cinq actes inédits*, p. 141; *The chancery of the Grand Komnenoi*, p. 321) and Longnon (*L'Empire latin*, p. 147). However, the remarkable entry of David Komnenos of Paphlagonia, then roughly thirty years old, into the Vatopedi monastery prior to 1212 would appear to us to be unlikely, and not a single author is able to cite a plausible motive for this. In view of David's Georgian background it would have been more credible to have traced him to the Greek-Georgian Iviron monastery on Mount Athos (Lefort, *Actes d'Iviron*, III, pp. 4–8). It would be more reasonable to assume that the David Komnenos of the Vatopedi monastery was not the ruler of Paphlagonia. In late twelfth-century Byzantium there was indeed known to be another David Komnenos. In 1185 one David Komnenos was *doux* of Thessalonike under Emperor Andronikos I (Vasiliev, *The foundation of the empire of Trebizond*, p. 6; Brand, *Byzantium confronts the West*, pp. 163–166). The

treaty of 1213 was modified to the developments in 1214, whatever these might have been exactly. In any event, we are able to establish that for some time after this date there were no longer any hostilities between Constantinople and Nicaea. The lengthy confrontation in the years 1204–1214 had clearly proved that neither ruler had the military means at his disposal to bring his rival to the acknowledgement of his own imperial authority. In this context the policy of confrontation was abandoned and a policy of rapprochement adopted.

In the entire period 1204–1214, Theodore Laskaris was viewed as a usurper by the imperial entourage. In his chronicle, Villehardouin refers to him unvaryingly only by name and without any form of title as *Toldres li Asgres*, although he does mention Laskaris' imperial ambitions.¹¹ In the same way, Valenciennes names Laskaris without title

further fortunes of this David Komnenos are unknown, but it is quite possible that later in his life he entered the Vatopedi monastery as the monk Daniel, and died there in 1212. In any event, he cannot have been particularly old in 1185 since at that time his mother was still living.

Heisenberg, whom we have already mentioned, in his edition of Mesarites' works (Mesarites, *Der Bericht*, pp. 78–79)—which was published prior to his discovery of the 1212 note in the Vatopedi codex—made an interesting suggestion in relation to David Komnenos' whereabouts in 1214. On the basis of Mesarites' report on the occurrences in Paphlagonia in 1214 Heisenberg proposed that the person—referred to by Mesarites as *ho echidnaios gonos, to drakonteion apophysema* (free translation: the viper's offspring)—responsible for organizing the military resistance in Paphlagonia against Theodore Laskaris after his initial and successful surprise attack on the region, was none other than David Komnenos himself, grandson of Emperor Andronikos I (1183–1185) whose short reign was remembered as a black page in recent Byzantine history. The opposition forced Laskaris into a second campaign in the region, the result of which Mesarites does not elaborate on, which in our view suggests that it was not a total triumph (§20, 32, 52). The reason why it was not a complete success may be related to Mesarites' observation that during Laskaris' second expedition *Agarenoi* were raiding the Sangarios area (§32). It seems not unlikely to us that David Komnenos—possibly after consulting his Latin suzerain—had solicited their help, in view of the Latin-Seljuk alliance that had been in force since around 1209–1211 (*infra*). We believe that this is the most plausible interpretation of the passage in question. There would then be nothing known about David's further life after 1214 and his ultimate death.

On the town of Lopadion having fallen into Latin hands sometime after 1213: Akropolites, *Epitaphios eis ton basilea Ioannen ton Doukan*, p. 15; in the treaty of 1213 Lopadion still had been assigned to the Nicaean empire (Akropolites, §15). An alternative context for the conquest of Lopadion is the shortlived Latin-Nicaean conflict in 1220 (*infra*). Paphlagonia, and its major towns Herakleia Pontika and Amastris, were in any case captured by Emperor Theodore before his death in 1222 (Akropolites, §11). In the eventuality that the region was not (entirely) taken in 1214, it (or the remaining part) may have been conquered in the context of the just mentioned Latin-Nicaean confrontation of 1220.

¹¹ Villehardouin, §313.

or mention of his imperial aspirations as *Thodres li Asgres*. From the text it can only be inferred that he controlled a number of towns in Asia Minor and claimed David Komnenos' territories.¹² In a letter of early 1213 to his western friends, Emperor Henry refers to Laskaris as '*Lascarus qui totam terram ultra brachium sancti Georgii usque in Turkiam tenuit et ibidem pro imperatore se gerens*.'¹³ It is apparent from a letter of 1208 that Pope Innocent III, following the imperial point of view, called upon Laskaris to recognize Henry's emperorship; in this letter Laskaris was ascribed only the title *nobilis vir*.¹⁴ In which way the treaty of 1213, on which only the chronicler Akropolites reports to any great extent, and the assumed modified version thereof in 1214, dealt with the conflicting claims of the Latin and Nicaean emperors is unknown, in view of there being available to us no charters or copies thereof recording these treaties. It is possible that the choice was made of a formulation that was analogous to that of the commercial agreement of 1219 between Theodore Laskaris and the Venetian podestà Jacopo Tiepolo, in which each figured with the title that he claimed for himself, although these claims were mutually contradictory.¹⁵

Interesting from this point of view is that the Byzantine chroniclers, both contemporary Choniates and the slightly later Akropolites (both of whom were associated with the Nicaean court), refer to the Latin emperors with the imperial title of *basileus*. It would thus appear that the Latin imperial title was recognized to some extent in Nicaea, although the Latin emperors were of course not ascribed the title of *basileus kai autokrator ton Romaion*. This was the prerogative of the legitimate Byzantine emperor. It is interesting to note however that in his *Historia* Choniates ascribes this title to none of the post-1204 contenders. He only states that both Baldwin I and Theodore I

¹² Valenciennes, §551–554.

¹³ Prinzing, *Der Brief*, p. 411. About the dating of this letter in 1213 and not in 1212 as the publisher and most other authors state: Van Tricht, *La politique étrangère (I^e partie)*, pp. 221–227.

¹⁴ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1372–1374 (XI, 47).

¹⁵ Only the Latin version of this treaty is known. In this, Laskaris is referred to as *Teodorus in Christo Deo fidelis imperator et moderator Romeorum et semper augustus Comnanus Lascarus*. The term *Romeorum* reflects the Greek *Romaion* which, notably enough, is translated at the end of the document as *Grecorum*. Tiepolo is referred to as '*de mandato domini altissimi ducis Venecie potestas Venetorum in Romania et despotis imperii Romanie et quarte partis et dimidie eius imperii vice sui dominator*' (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 252).

were proclaimed *basileus ton Romaion*.¹⁶ On the other hand, from a Latin point of view the treaties of 1213–1214 did represent a certain acknowledgement of Laskaris' legitimacy. We can in comparison refer to the 1228 truce between the Latin Empire and Theodore Doukas of Epiros, who had adopted the imperial title in 1227. Therein figure regent Narjot of Toucy as *cesar potestas et ordinator et baiulus imperii Constantinopolis* and Theodore Doukas as *imperator Grecorum*.¹⁷ This comparison demonstrates that, despite the conflicting claims, for both the empire of Nicaea and of Constantinople there also existed possibilities for mutual rapprochement in the formal sphere.

Whilst the imperial powers in Constantinople did not recognize the Nicaean emperor as the legitimate Byzantine emperor, this was certainly different in other regions within the Byzantine space. The reinstatement in exile of the Byzantine patriarchate of Constantinople in Nicaea played an important role in this. At the Nicaean court quite some rhetoric developed that was intended to propagate the Nicaean claims, in opposition both to the claims of the Latin emperors and of the emperors of Trebizond. Testimony to this are the writings of, inter alia, Nicolas Mesarites, Niketas Choniates, Constantine Stilbes and patriarch Michael IV Autoreianos.¹⁸ Various authors have assumed that this Nicaean court rhetoric represented the opinion of a major proportion of the Byzantine—and in particular Greek—population also outside Nicaean territory. The basis thereof could have been the shared Byzantine and Hellenic culture, of which a common religion and language formed important elements.¹⁹ However, we would like to formulate the hypothesis that this rhetoric was in the first instance functional in the empire of Nicaea itself. In establishing his authority in north-western Asia Minor circa 1204–1206 Theodore Laskaris had had to overcome numerous regionalist tendencies, and these trends also continued to be present afterwards in the Nicaean empire.²⁰ Booth

¹⁶ Niketas Choniates, pp. 596–598, 614, 625, 642. Akropolites, §8, 14, 17–18. Akropolites appears to be considerably more critical vis-à-vis Theodore Doukas of Epiros' imperial title (§21, 24). Cf. Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, pp. 125–126. Cf. recently: Page, *Being Byzantine*, pp. 79–80, 101.

¹⁷ Cessi, *Deliberazioni*, t. 1, n° 140.

¹⁸ Prinzing, *Das Byzantinische Kaisertum im Umbruch*, pp. 135–143. Konstantinos Stilbes, *Mémoire contre les Latins*, pp. 50–100. Cf. also note 19.

¹⁹ Irmscher, *Nikāa als "Mittelpunkt des griechischen Patriotismus"*, pp. 119–124. Angold, *Byzantine 'nationalism'*, pp. 53–55, pp. 59–60. Ahrweiler, *L'idéologie politique*, pp. 107–111. Gounarides, "Greks," "Hellènes" et "Romans," pp. 254–257.

²⁰ Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations*, pp. 463–470.

has already hypothesized that Laskaris' popularity with his own subjects need not be overestimated. This suggestion appears to be borne out by for example the following passage in Emperor Henry's January 1213 letter relating to his 1212 invasion of Laskaris' territory: '*Sed tandem videns terre populus, quod nos ad libitum nostrum equitaremus, congregatus est ad Lascarum dicens ei comuniter, quod hoc diutius sustinere nolebant vel poterant, sed aut ipse nobiscum pugnaret aut ipsi nobis se reddere non different.*' Also, during this campaign in northern Asia Minor in 1212–1213 the victorious Emperor Henry had no trouble in recruiting Byzantines as soldiers in towns that had previously belonged to Laskaris. Their loyalty towards the Latin emperor seems to have been rather firm, since Henry could, as Akropolites indicates, entrust these Byzantine contingents with the defence of his eastern border without this causing any problems.²¹

The international recognition of the Nicaean Empire as the legitimate Byzantine Empire was in our opinion rather limited in the period 1204–1228. The Byzantine clergy on Cyprus acknowledged the legitimacy of the Nicaean patriarchate, and in extension of that also the Nicaean imperial claim.²² In the Armenian kingdom in Cilicia, which until circa 1180 had been part of the Byzantine Empire, the Nicaean emperor was also acknowledged as being the legitimate Byzantine emperor. This is apparent from the use by the Armenian chroniclers of the imperial title when referring to the Nicaean rulers, whilst the Latin rulers were not allocated such a title, or indeed not even given a mention.²³ Fitting in the same context is the marriage in 1213 between Philippa, niece of King Leo II of Cilician Armenia, and Theodore Laskaris.²⁴ The reason for the Armenian standpoint may have had

²¹ Prinzing, *Der Brief*, p. 415. Akropolites, §16. Booth, *Theodore Laskaris and Paphlagonia*, p. 210. The author is of the opinion that many Byzantines may have viewed the Latin emperors simply as a new dynasty that had come to power in a most unorthodox way. In an earlier chapter we have made a similar suggestion (cf. Prologue, p. 39).

²² Angold, *Greeks and Latins after 1204*, pp. 72–73.

²³ Kiracos De Gantzag, *Histoire d'Arménie*, p. 177. *La Chronique Attribuee Au Connetable Smbat*, §42, 49. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, p. 618. Der Nersessian, *The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia*, pp. 640–650. Mutaftian, *Le Royaume arménien de Cilicie*, pp. 31–41, p. 46. In this context it should be remembered that Leo II—in exchange for the submission of the Armenian Church to Rome—had obtained his royal title in 1198 (or possibly 1199) from the pope (even though Emperor Alexios III shortly before had already sent a crown in an attempt to preserve some form of Byzantine influence in Cilician Armenia), a papal legate being present at the coronation.

²⁴ Cf. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunde*, III, n° 1684a, 1686.

nothing much to do with cultural or religious motives, but might rather have been related to the fact that the Latin emperors supported Bohemond IV as being the legitimate ruler of Antioch, while King Leo backed the claim of his nephew Raymond Roupen on the principality.²⁵ The Nicaean claim to the Byzantine emperors was also accepted by part of the Greek population in Cappadocia, which was part of the Seljuk Sultanate of Konya, as is apparent from a number of inscriptions from that region.²⁶ The legitimacy of the Nicaean patriarch was certainly acknowledged in the empire of Trebizond, but not that of the Nicaean emperors. The emperor of Trebizond himself claimed to be the lawful *basileus kai autokrator ton Romaion*.²⁷ Georgia, which at the end of the twelfth century was still part of the Byzantine commonwealth, appears to have maintained no bonds with Nicaea and was in the first instance oriented towards the Empire of Trebizond, which had been founded with Georgian support.²⁸ We shall address the acknowledgement of the Nicaean claims in the political formations in the Balkans later, but we can state at this stage that this was rather limited.²⁹

There was also a certain loyalty vis-à-vis Nicaea in a portion of the Byzantine population in the Latin empire. For example, the Nicaean patriarchs maintained contacts with the Byzantine community—inter alia with members of the Latin imperial court—in Constantinople, which indicates that their legitimacy was up to a point acknowledged there.³⁰ It is also known of Byzantine monasteries both in and outside the capital that they regarded the Nicaean patriarch as the legitimate patriarch of Constantinople.³¹ This loyalty on the part of the Byzantine de population vis-à-vis the Nicaean patriarch appears not to have been

²⁵ Cf. Chapter VIII, pp. 434–438.

²⁶ Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, pp. 123–124. Charanis, *On the Asiatic frontiers of the empire of Nicaea*, pp. 50–62. Wolff, *The Lascarids frontier once more*, pp. 194–197.

²⁷ Lampsidis, *La rivalité entre l'état des Grands Comnènes et celui de Nicée*, pp. 186–191. Karpov, *The Black Sea Region, before and after the Fourth Crusade*, pp. 287–288.

²⁸ Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, p. 104. Kursanskis, *L'Empire de Trébizonde et la Géorgie*, pp. 237–256.

²⁹ Cf. pp. 387, 396.

³⁰ Cf. letters of the Nicaean patriarchs Theodore II Eirenikos (circa 1214–1215) and Germanos II (circa 1223), and of the Latin imperial *meas doux* Philokales (Laurent, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat*, I/IV, n° 1219, 1233–1234). Cf. also Chapter VI, pp. 318–319.

³¹ Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 97, 118.

seen immediately as a problem by the Latin emperor. As the case of the empire of Trebizond indicates, such loyalty need not be coupled with the recognition of the legitimacy of the Nicaean claim to the Byzantine emperorship. On the contrary, in a certain sense it could even be used to increase the emperor's imperial prestige, via the image of a universal ruler that sways the sceptre over the diverse Christian nations with, inter alia, their own religious leaders and practices. For example, as a result of the actions of papal legate Pelagius against the Byzantine clergy in the capital, in 1213–1214 Emperor Henry acted as referee between the various Christian communities within his empire, over the heads of the ecclesiastical authorities.³² That the idea of religious tolerance was to some extent a reality is demonstrated by the case of *megas doux* Philokales, who circa 1214 was able to correspond freely with patriarch Theodore II Eirenikos.³³

The recognition of the Nicaean emperor as the legitimate Byzantine emperor appears to have been limited within the Byzantine population of the Latin Empire. From the correspondence of Michael Choniates, the exiled metropolitan of Athens who first withdrew to the island of Kea and ended his days in the *Joannes Prodromos* monastery near Bodonitza, it is clear that in addition to the legitimacy of the Nicaean patriarch this prelate also recognized Theodore Laskaris' imperial claims.³⁴ However, the question arises whether Choniates' opinion is representative of a majority of the Byzantine population under Latin rule. In this context, the previously mentioned 1213 letter from Emperor Henry contains an interesting passage. In it is related how Emperor Theodore, after his victory over Sultan Kaykhusraw I of Konya circa April–May 1212 at Antioch-on-the Meander '*misit literas ad omnes Grecorum provincias continentes honorem et lucrum sue victoriae significans etiam quod si eum vellent adiuvare cito Greciam de latinis canibus liberaret.*' Henry described the reaction to this as follows: '*ob hoc omnes submurmurare contra nos incipientes ei promittebant auxilium si veniret Constantinopoli pugnaturus.*'³⁵

On the face of it, this quotation could be interpreted as a general recognition of Laskaris' emperorship by the Byzantine population of the

³² Cf. Chapter VI, p. 314.

³³ Laurent, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat*, I/IV, n° 1219. Cf. also Chapter VI, p. 319.

³⁴ Gounaridis, *Formes de légimation de l'Etat de Nicée*, p. 158.

³⁵ Prinzing, *Der Brief*, pp. 414–415.

Latin Empire. In our opinion however, further reading of it indicates that the Byzantines in question viewed Laskaris principally as a credible pretender to the throne and not so much as the legitimate emperor in function. Furthermore, the term *omnes* appears to be a great exaggeration. The emperors Baldwin and Henry had shown a sympathetic attitude towards the Byzantine aristocracy and population.³⁶ In this sense it is improbable that Laskaris' plans were met with any great enthusiasm by the whole of the Byzantine aristocracy and population in the Latin Empire. Furthermore, from around 1207 Henry had been successful in establishing a relatively peaceful internal situation in Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly, regions that since 1190–1195 had almost continuously suffered under the threat of Bulgaria. This must have been of benefit to the welfare of the local population and created a benevolent attitude vis-à-vis Latin rule, which Emperor Henry himself actually encountered in both Thrace and Thessaly.³⁷ Gounarides also indicates that among the Byzantine clergy of Constantinople in these years there was a group that repudiated both the imperial prerogatives claimed by Theodore Laskaris and protested against the patriarchal elections organized under his leadership, which implicitly might point towards a certain loyalty vis-à-vis the Latin secular and ecclesiastical authority.³⁸ Interesting too is that at his imperial coronation in 1208 Laskaris probably introduced imperial anointing (with chrism) into the Byzantine coronation ritual, presumably following the model of the coronation ceremony of the Latin emperor, which in our view indicates that he felt somewhat uncertain of his position in comparison with that of the Latin emperor.³⁹

Nonetheless it is highly conceivable that, on the basis of emotional and cultural motives, a considerable proportion of the Byzantines in the Latin Empire would not have refused the coming of a Byzantine emperor and patriarch if the opportunity presented itself. The above-mentioned quotation however does indeed indicate that the support promised by a proportion of the Byzantine population to Laskaris' plans was rather conditional, and made dependent on a successful

³⁶ Cf. Chapter III, p. 151 and IV, p. 239.

³⁷ Villehardouin, §490. Valenciennes, §663, 671, 683.

³⁸ Gounaridis, *Formes de légimitation de l'Etat de Nicée*, pp. 158–159. Cf. Chapter VI, pp. 319–320.

³⁹ Dagron, *Empereur et prêtre*, pp. 282–283. Angelov, *Byzantine ideological reactions*, p. 308. Cf. also Chapter II, note 87.

expedition against Constantinople.⁴⁰ The population's loyalty vis-à-vis imperial authority—whoever held it—was in any event already rather limited prior to 1204.⁴¹ Nevertheless, we do not deny that within the Latin Empire there was doubtless a group of malcontents that was prepared to support Laskaris unconditionally and that acknowledged him as the legitimate emperor. It is possible that this group included for example those who had seen their ambitions destroyed by the occurrences of 1204 or who wished to safeguard the Byzantine religious traditions integrally (for example Michael Choniates).⁴² The proverbial term *omnes* in Henry's letter probably referred in the first instance to this group, and in the second to the relative indifference with regard to the prevailing powers within another section of the population, for whom both Henry and Laskaris were acceptable. The imperial encyclical in question was in any event of the nature of a triumphal bulletin that was not intended to put the imperial victories into perspective through an excess of nuances.⁴³

In this context we would in conclusion like to refer to an interesting passage in Akropolites' chronicle relating how the Byzantine aristocrats of Latin Constantinople told Emperor Henry in the context of the religious conflict with cardinal Pelagius in 1213 that he could rule their bodies, but not their souls.⁴⁴ This dichotomy in our opinion recalls Page's two proposed versions of Byzantine identity: the political Roman identity and the ethnic Roman identity—the author prefers the term Roman to the term Byzantine. In the first version being the subject of and loyalty towards the emperor in Constantinople is paramount. In the second a shared language and faith are the defining elements.⁴⁵ Starting from the first definition of Byzantine identity

⁴⁰ On the loyalty of the Byzantine population within Laskaris' own empire: cf. pp. 358–359 and references in note 21.

⁴¹ Savvides, *Some crucial issues concerning xith-xiiiith cent, Byzantine internal history*, pp. 119–122. Garland, *Political power and the populace in Byzantium*, p. 49.

⁴² Gounaridis, *Formes de légimitation de l'Etat de Nicée*, pp. 158–159. Cf. Chapter VI, pp. 314, 318–319.

⁴³ On the complexity of the political and religious loyalties of Latins and Byzantines in the Latin and Nicaean empires, see also: Palagyi, *Comment peut-on être Latin au 13e siècle?*, pp. 104–108.

⁴⁴ Akropolites, §17.

⁴⁵ Page, *Being Byzantine*, pp. 47–48. In his treatment of Byzantine identity in the years following 1204 (pp. 79–85, 106–107, 270–271) Page does not take into account the fundamental facts that the crusade leaders intended to continue (and not replace) the Byzantine empire and that the Latin emperor claimed to be the legitimate Byzantine emperor. In our view this invalidates his remarks on identity issues concerning

we would like to suggest that the part of the Byzantine elite which accepted the new Latin imperial dynasty and the Latin reorganization of the empire, could without problem identify the empire in which they lived as the Byzantine state (or *basileia ton Romaion*): they—or their bodies—were still being ruled by an emperor from Constantinople, who considerate himself to be the rightful *basileus ton Romaion* (or *imperator Romanorum*). At the same time the ethnic Roman identity lost its predominance under the new regime: Latin became the language of rule beside Greek, and the Constantinopolitan patriarchate became partly dominated by a Latin hierarchy. However, the ethnic Roman identity of course still had its place after 1204 under Latin rule, alongside others, the most prominent of which from a political perspective was now what we may call the Latin ethnic identity. In this respect the empire ruled from Constantinople after 1204 in some way again resembled—though on a much smaller scale—the multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-faith eastern Roman empire from a much earlier period, although ethnic heterogeneity always existed in Byzantium up to the twelfth century. The fact that the ethnic Roman identity relatively speaking got into a tight corner explains that the Byzantine elite within the Latin empire for the salvation of their souls also looked to centres of authority outside the Latin empire's borders where the ethnic Roman identity was still predominant, inter alia the Byzantine patriarchate in Nicaea.

*The Rapprochement between Constantinople and Nicaea
in 1213/1214–1222/1224*

Empress Yolande pursued further the policy of rapprochement inaugurated circa 1213/1214. At the end of 1218 or the beginning of 1219 she married her daughter Mary of Courtenay to Emperor Theodore Laskaris, without doubt in order to strengthen the bonds of peace with the empire of Nicaea.⁴⁶ The situation in Epiros, where Theodore

Byzantines within the Latin empire, especially when he states concerning the 'Roman' guides and soldiers who offered their services to Boniface of Monteferrat and Emperor Baldwin I (p. 80): *'These individuals who were willing to assist their new western ruler would clearly not consider themselves subjects of any nascent Byzantine Roman successor state'*, or when he attributes a 'Latin political identity'—and not a 'Roman political identity'—to the Constantinopolitan Byzantines who had accepted Emperor Henry as their ruler (p. 107).

⁴⁶ Albericus Trium Fontium, p. 906. Akropolites, §16. Nikephoros Gregoras, lib. I, §4. This latter, mid-fourteenth-century author indicates that Laskaris married Mary

Doukas had captured her imperial consort and declared himself independent, was a cause for concern, and the stability of the eastern border of the empire was of crucial importance.⁴⁷ In the longer term it could perhaps be hoped that, through the kinship between the two courts, the empires would be united. This was certainly one of Theodore Laskaris' motives for this marriage: obtaining a claim to the succession in Constantinople. After Yolande's death shortly before October 1219 Laskaris attempted to make good that claim. It is probable that the Nicaean emperor firstly made his claims known via diplomatic channels, but the Latin barons in Constantinople did not respond to them. The background to this reaction was probably the emergence of a Latin party within the central political elite, for whom a Greek candidate to the throne must have been unacceptable.⁴⁸ Laskaris however did not let matters rest at that, and in the course of 1220 pressed home his claim by military means, but without success.⁴⁹

Shortly after the succession of Emperor Robert of Courtenay (March 1221) the conflict was stilled thanks to a truce. In the event that Lopadion did not come under Latin control in the context of Emperor Henry's presumed reaction against Laskaris' Paphlagonian expedition in 1214, the town may have been acquired in this context.⁵⁰ At the same time, partly on the initiative of Laskaris' wife Mary of Courtenay, a marital alliance was negotiated in which Emperor Robert was to marry Laskaris' daughter Eudokia. The proposition met with a warm welcome in Constantinople, the more so because the Nicaean emperor held out the prospect of a dowry in the form of considerable territories.⁵¹ Laskaris also strove for peace in the religious sphere: at the end of 1219 he, together with the Nicaean patriarch, drew up a plan to

three years before his death. Since the date of Laskaris' death was 3 January 1222 (Loenertz, *La chronique brève de 1352 (1e partie)*, p. 338), the marriage must have taken place either at the end of 1218 or the beginning of 1219. In 1218 Laskaris was divorced from Philippa, niece of King Leo II of Armenia, whom he had married in 1213 (Bozoyan, *Les documents ecclésiastiques arméno-byzantins*, pp. 128–129). From this we may deduce that Laskaris chose peace with Latin Constantinople above his alliance with Cilician Armenia. With regard to the dowry we can perhaps venture the hypothesis that Empress Yolande gave up the Latin claims to Paphlagonia (in the event that the region had already fallen into Laskaris hands at this time, cf. p. 354).

⁴⁷ On the situation in Epiros: cf. p. 377.

⁴⁸ Cf. Chapter V, p. 300.

⁴⁹ Philippe Mouskes, pp. 405–406.

⁵⁰ Cf. p. 354 and note 10 for source references and the alternative possibility concerning Lopadion.

⁵¹ Philippe Mouskes, pp. 405–407.

convene a council of the Eastern patriarchs (Constantinople, Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria) in Nicaea in the spring of 1220, with the object of embarking on joint discussions with the papacy with regard to ecclesiastical unity.⁵² This last initiative indicates that despite the overtures towards Latin Constantinople the Nicaean emperorship did not abandon its claim to universality, which for example is also apparent from the bonds with the Serbian kingdom in the same years.⁵³

Ultimately, the planned marriage between Robert and Eudokia did not take place as the result of opposition to it in Nicaea, made concrete in the person of patriarch Manuel Sarantenos. Nonetheless, the Nicaean emperor appears to have wished the marriage to go through, but his death shortly afterwards prevented this (November 1221).⁵⁴ Although the patriarch based his objections formally on the non-canonical nature of the planned marriage, Langdon states correctly that the Nicaean religious leader acted as the representative of a party at the Nicaean court that was not enthusiastic about the policy of rapprochement pursued by Laskaris.⁵⁵ Via the planned marriage the Latin emperor would create for himself a realistic claim to the Nicaean throne and also the successive territorial concessions could have met with little approval. In the greater Byzantine space too, criticism had arisen with regard to the pro-Latin Nicaean policy, and in particular from Epiros, where after having taken Emperor Peter of Courtenay prisoner Theodore Doukas began increasingly to look upon himself more explicitly as being the legitimate Byzantine emperor. A letter of circa 1220 from John Apokaukos, metropolitan of Naupaktos, to patriarch Manuel relating to his invitation to the council planned for the beginning of 1220 in Nicaea testifies to the Epirote standpoint.⁵⁶

Theodore Laskaris' death in late 1221 heralded the beginning of a reorientation of the relations between Constantinople and Nicaea. In our opinion this change cannot be ascribed to Laskaris himself, who

⁵² Laurent, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat*, I/IV, n° 1222–1224. Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, III, n° 1704. Karpozilos, *The ecclesiastical controversy*, p. 54. Angold, *Church and Society*, p. 531.

⁵³ Cf. p. 403.

⁵⁴ Akropolites, §18. Philippe Mouskes, p. 407. On the date of death of Emperor Theodore: Prinzing, *Das byzantinischen Kaisertum in Umbruch*, pp. 143–161 (with further references).

⁵⁵ Langdon, *John III Ducas Vatatzes' Byzantine empire*, pp. 59–60.

⁵⁶ Vasiljevskij, *Epirotica saeculi XIII*, n° 15. Karpozilos, *The ecclesiastical controversy*, pp. 54–55.

according to Langdon in extremis would have designated his anti-Latin son-in-law John III Vatatzes as successor, given the circumstance that he himself had no adult male heir to the throne, as a concession to the anti-Latin faction at his court.⁵⁷ The view held by Angold, who doubts any formal indication by Laskaris of Vatatzes as successor to the throne, sounds more plausible. This author puts forward that Vatatzes as Laskaris' son-in-law, even though he only held the dignity of *protovestiarites* or *protovestiarior* (instead of that of *despotes*, the traditional title for the heir apparent), simply had the strongest claim to the throne.⁵⁸ In any event, the Nicaean succession was problematic. Theodore's brothers, the *sebastokratores* Alexios and Isaac, also made claims to the throne. When they were unable to substantiate their claims, they resorted to the friendly Latin imperial court.⁵⁹ The reception of these pretenders, who brought their sister Eudokia with them, to the throne at the Constantinopolitan court could easily be seen in Nicaea as a provocation, and in any event sent a threatening message to the new ruler of Nicaea. It is likely that the idea that was prevalent at the Latin court was that one of the two brothers should be installed on the Nicaean throne, or possibly Emperor Robert himself as, at that moment still future, husband of their sister Eudokia. In that threat lies the cause of the rapid deterioration (from 1222) in the relations between Constantinople and Nicaea and not as supposed by Langdon in any principled anti-Latin attitude of John Vatatzes which, contrary to what is put forward by this author, is not in evidence prior to 1222.⁶⁰ Although this situation did not lead immediately to a military confrontation, in 1222–1224 relations between the two kingdoms were nonetheless strained.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Langdon, *John III Ducas Vatatzes' Byzantine empire*, pp. 61–62. The only source that reports on this designation of Vatatzes as successor is a fourteenth-century *vita* of John III Vatatzes, which contains legendary elements: Heisenberg, *Kaiser Johannes Batatzes der Barmherzige*, p. 211. About the anti-Latin faction, whose strength the author in our opinion somewhat overestimates: Ahrweiler, *L'idéologie politique*, pp. 108–110.

⁵⁸ Angold, *A Byzantine Government*, pp. 40–41.

⁵⁹ Akropolites, §22. Nikephoros Gregoras, lib. 2, §1. One of the brothers had already spent quite some time as a prisoner in Constantinople circa 1220–1221: Philippe Mouskes, p. 407.

⁶⁰ Langdon, *John III Ducas Vatatzes' Byzantine empire*, pp. 61–63.

⁶¹ Nikephoros Blemmydes, lib. I, §6. Langdon, *John III Ducas Vatatzes' Byzantine empire*, pp. 64–65.

*The Renewed Confrontation between Constantinople and Nicaea
in 1224–1228*

In 1224 Vatatzes took the initiative of embarking on an offensive against the Latin Empire.⁶² The direct cause was without doubt Theodore Doukas' successful advance against the Kingdom of Thessalonike, from which the Nicaean obviously hoped to take advantage. Forces had been despatched from Constantinople to assist the kingdom, and these troops besieged the fortress of Serres in Macedonia. Via a campaign in Asia Minor, Vatatzes was able to force Latin Constantinople into fighting a war on two fronts, always a difficult undertaking. Langdon discusses in detail the course of the military conflict in Asia Minor in 1224–1225, but in our opinion misinterprets the most informative source available, Philippe Mouskes' *Chronique Rimée*. As a consequence, we feel the need to reconstruct the chain of events in a more accurate manner.⁶³

Three sources provide us with information about the military confrontation of 1224–1225: the Byzantine chroniclers Akropolites and

⁶² Akropolites writes that Vatatzes opened the new hostilities in Asia Minor (Akropolites, §22). On the other hand, the mid-fourteenth-century author Gregoras states that an offensive was commenced from Constantinople, with the Laskaris brothers as the initiators (Nikephoros Gregoras, lib. 2, §1). We opt for the evidence of Akropolites, which, chronologically speaking, is considerably closer to the events and which, for that matter, Langdon ignores (Langdon, *John III Ducas Vatatzes' Byzantine empire*, p. 68).

⁶³ We substantiate our postulation with regard to Langdon's misreading of Mouskes' chronicle on the basis of the following passage. The passage in question relates to the cancellation of the marriage between Emperor Robert and Eudokia as the result of Theodore Laskaris' death: '*Si fu remés cil mariages / Qui fais iert par lor hommes sages / Ceste noviele sans faillance / Si vint en Flandres et en France / Dont recommencièrent la guierre / Li Coumain par toute la terre / L'emperères Robiers le sot / Et cil plus tost k'il onques pot / I envoia ses chevaliers / [...]*' (Philippe Mouskes, pp. 408–409). Langdon interprets the phrase '*Robiers le sot*' wrongly as 'Robert the Fool.' The *hommes sages* are in his view Byzantine clerics who would have consecrated the marriage between Robert and Eudokia, whilst it is clear that the phrase refers to the advisers of the Emperors Robert and Theodore, who had negotiated the marriage that was never consecrated (Langdon, *John III Ducas Vatatzes' Byzantine Empire*, p. 70).

What is worse is that Langdon interprets the entire passage in v. 23155–23205 as the description of the hostilities in Asia Minor in 1224–1225 only. Earlier authors, such as Longnon and Nicol, had correctly recognized in this passage the war against Theodore Doukas near the city of Thessalonike on the one hand and against John III Vatatzes in Asia Minor on the other. However, in our opinion both authors assume incorrectly that v. 23155–23180 deals with the war against Vatatzes (with the Battle of Poimaneon), v. 23181–23194 the war against Doukas involving Salenike, and v. 23195–23206 again the confrontation with Vatatzes (Longnon, *L'Empire latin*,

Gregoras, and the aforementioned western author Mouskes, who provides the most detailed but at the same time also the most disordered information.⁶⁴ The combined accounts of Akropolites and Gregoras tell us that Emperor Robert mobilized his troops on hearing the news about Vatatzes' offensive. The Laskaris brothers were designated as commanders. The Latin army crossed over by fleet to the coastal city of Lampsakos, whence it continued over land almost to Poimananon, located in Latin territory, where it encountered Vatatzes. A pitched battle ensued, which initially the Constantinopolitan troops appeared to be winning. However, Vatatzes turned the tide and managed to vanquish the forces of his enemy. Mouskes confirms the Latin defeat, but in his account puts forward two Latin barons to the fore as being the leaders, Marshal Nicolas of Mainvault and Thierry of Walcourt. This might possibly explain Vatatzes' victory. In the absence of Emperor Robert the leadership of the Latin army does not appear to have been unified, which probably led to inadequate co-ordination between the various components of the army. The absence of an efficient chain of command in the Latin army is in our opinion linked with the rising factional struggle at the imperial court.⁶⁵

pp. 161–163; Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros*, p. 63; also: Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, pp. 73–74).

The occurrences related in v. 23155–23180 actually refer to the siege of Serres by Constantinopolitan troops, about which Akropolites provides more accurate information (cf. note 62). Mouskes in fact speaks of the siege (*fermoient*) of a *castiel* (...) *en une montagne*. There is nothing known about a siege by Latin troops during the war against Vatatzes in Asia Minor, and the town where the decisive battle was fought, Poimananon, is by no means situated in a mountainous area. Serres on the other hand does lie in a mountainous area, and was actually besieged by Emperor Robert's troops (cf. Akropolites' testimony). The enemy against whom was being fought at the *castiel* mentioned were, according to Mouskes *li Coumain*. Since absolutely no other source reports of the involvement of the Cumans in the hostilities of 1224–1225, we can perhaps suggest that the author (or his informant, or a copyist of Mouskes' text) has confused the Cumans with *li Comnenios*, as Theodore (Komnenos) Doukas is often referred to in Western sources (also by Mouskes himself, v. 23019). The war in Asia Minor against Vatatzes is described in v. 23181–23206. It is not such a problem that this account is situated by Mouskes *viers Salenike*. Other contemporary Western authors also confused Thessalonike with the capital van Vatatzes' Empire of Nicaea (*la Nike*) (Ralph Of Coggeshall, *Chronicon Anglicanum*, pp. 161–162). The interpretation Mouskes' text here presented also solves the issue of the capture and freeing of Nicolas of Mainvault and Thierry of Walcourt. According to the earlier interpretation, these two barons appeared to have been captured in the war against Doukas and subsequently freed by Vatatzes (cf. v. 23191–23193 and 23195–23199).

⁶⁴ Akropolites, §22. Nikephoros Gregoras, lib. 2, §1. Philippe Mouskes, p. 409.

⁶⁵ Cf. Chapter V, p. 300.

The defeat at Poimaneion did not have immediate disastrous consequences. Mouskes writes that a truce was reached, there was an exchange of prisoners, and plans were made once more for the marriage of Emperor Robert and Eudokia Laskaris. Apparently Vatatzes initially planned to restore the policy of harmony vis-à-vis the Latin Empire, after the Laskaris brothers, whom he had captured and had blinded, no longer represented a threat to him.⁶⁶ However, the serious defeat of Emperor Robert's troops at Serres in a battle with Doukas' forces shortly afterwards was instrumental in Vatatzes once again opting for confrontation. The double Latin defeat meant that Robert no longer had at his disposal the military means to offer effective resistance against a second offensive by Vatatzes. In the winter of 1224–1225 the latter began a series of successful sieges in Latin Asia Minor, also undertaking actions on European soil near Kallipolis and Madytos. In Thrace he managed to take control of the city of Adrianople after the local aristocracy had invited him to do so, in our opinion not so much to free themselves from Latin authority (which in any case no longer played a role), but rather to prevent their city falling into the hands of Theodore Doukas.⁶⁷ It is possible that Vatatzes also took the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Ikaria and Kos under his control at about the same time.⁶⁸ The Latin imperial powers could do little more than stand by and watch in resignation. An appeal to the French King Louis VIII, Emperor Robert's relative, for reinforcements in 1226 was to no avail.⁶⁹ Only the Latin alliance with the Sultanate of Konya, which in 1225 began an offensive against Nicaea, may have played a role in putting a stop to Vatatzes' offensive in Asia Minor and Thrace.⁷⁰ In the same year, the rebellion by a group within the Nicaean aristocracy

⁶⁶ Philippe Mouskes, p. 409.

⁶⁷ The Byzantine elite of Adrianople (inter alia Branas and Vatatzes) had closer ties with Nicaea than with Epiros (Laurent, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat*, I/IV, n° 1217; Ahrweiler, *L'histoire et la géographie de la région de Smyrne*, pp. 168–169; Langdon, *John III Ducas Vatatzes' Byzantine empire*, p. 78). Cf. Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, p. 131.

⁶⁸ Nikephoros Gregoras, lib. 2, §3.

⁶⁹ Philippe Mouskes, pp. 539, 549, 556. The imperial delegation reached Louis VIII at the time of his siege of Avignon circa June–September 1226. The French king promised to send a contingent of 200 to 300 knights at his expense. The presence in Louis VIII's entourage of Emperor Robert's brother Philip II of Courtenay, Count of Namur, was probably an important factor in this. However, the French ruler died shortly afterwards (8 November 1226) and the unstable political situation resulting from Louis IX's succession as a minor meant that the promised support never materialized.

⁷⁰ Cf. p. 376.

under the leadership of Andronikos Nestongos against Vatatzes also curbed his activities.⁷¹ Not long afterwards, possibly still in the course of 1225 or perhaps in 1226–1227, peace was concluded between Robert of Courtenay and John III Vatatzes, as the result of which the Latin Empire retained only Optimaton in Asia Minor and a number of strongholds on the coast of Bithynia close to Nicomedia, which also remained Latin.⁷² With this the Nicaean offensive of the years 1224–1225 in combination with the simultaneous Epirote campaign dealt a devastating blow to the geopolitical position of the empire of Constantinople, which within the Byzantine space must inevitably have weakened very considerably the extent to which the claim of the Latin emperors to the legitimate Byzantine emperorship was recongized.

THE RELATIONS WITH THE SELJUK SULTANATE OF KONYA

Prior to 1204, the relations between the Byzantine Empire and the Sultanate of Konya were characterized by alternating periods of mutual harmony and periods of conflict. Under Manuel Komnenos (1143–1180) the emphasis lay on a pattern of Byzantine-Seljuk alliance, until the imperial expedition to Konya in 1176 against Sultan Kilidj II Arslan (1156–1192) at Myriokephalon, which ended in a disastrous defeat. Thereafter, and until 1204 under Manuel's successors, the sultans of Konya were able to conquer some considerable territories from Byzantium, helped in this by their nomadic Turkoman allies and by separatist movements in Byzantine Asia Minor. This meant that in about 1204 the Sultanate of Konya had without doubt grown to become the most important political power in Anatolia.⁷³ The events of 1204 signified a fundamental change in the relations between Konya and Constantinople in the sense that the Nicaean Empire now came to lie between these two states. The sultan of Konya was then confronted with two principalities in north-western Asia Minor that claimed to be continuing the former Byzantine Empire. Important to note here is that one of the two powers, the Latin Empire (apart from the feudally

⁷¹ Akropolites, §23.

⁷² Akropolites, §22, 24. Philippe Mouskes, p. 409.

⁷³ Vryonis, *The decline of medieval Hellenism*, pp. 120–130. Werner, *Wandel im Osten*, pp. 222–223. Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, pp. 58–67. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 76–78, 95–100. Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations*, pp. 454–455.

dependent principality of Paphlagonia under David Komnenos), was no longer an immediate neighbour of Konya.

Some of the territories that had recently been captured by the Seljuk sultanate from the Byzantines had been claimed in the *Partitio* of 1204 as being part of the Latin Empire.⁷⁴ However, this was of no direct consequence in view of the fact that the Latin campaign to conquer the territories of Asia Minor in 1204–1205 was thwarted by the Byzantine uprising in Thrace in 1205–1206, as the result of which Theodore Laskaris was able to consolidate his empire round Nicaea. Latin Constantinople thus became permanently cut off from the claimed Seljuk territories. A first indirect confrontation between Constantinople and Konya was the taking in 1207 of the pre-1204 Byzantine seaport Antalya on the south coast of Asia Minor by Sultan Kaykhusraw I. The city, which was in theory part of the imperial quarter, had been given by Baldwin I to the Knights Templars circa 1204–1205.⁷⁵ However, the Templars did not take possession of the city, and circa 1205 it came de facto into the hands of the Byzantinized Pisan Aldobrandinos. Kaykhusraw began the siege of Antalya at the end of 1206 and in March 1207 he actually took possession of the city, despite the support of the Kingdom of Cyprus under the leadership of regent Walter of Montbéliard.⁷⁶ The claim to Antalya and the link between Latin Constantinople and Cyprus in these years leads us to the hypothesis that the Seljuk conquest of Antalya may have played a role in the commencement of diplomatic contacts between Constantinople and Konya.⁷⁷ In addition to this, their common enemy Nicaea drove Constantinople and Konya closer to one another.

The very first contacts between the Latins and Konya were however earlier, within the framework of the Fourth Crusade. After placing Alexios IV Angelos on the imperial throne in July–August 1203, the crusade's leaders entered into an agreement with the then sultan of Konya, Rukn-ed-Din. The sultan promised them any facilities necessary to their voyage along the coasts of his sultanate on their way to

⁷⁴ Inter alia the town of Baphra: Carile, *Partitio*, p. 217, p. 237. Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, p. 66.

⁷⁵ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1019–1020 (IX, 180).

⁷⁶ Hoffmann, *Rudimente von Territorialstaaten*, pp. 69–71. Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, pp. 86–88.

⁷⁷ On the contacts between Latin Constantinople and Cyprus, cf. Chapter VIII, p. 438.

the Holy Land.⁷⁸ However, as it is known, the crusade was not continued, and Sultan Rukn-ed-Din died shortly afterwards, being succeeded circa 1204–1205 by his brother Kaykhusraw I, who in 1197 had been deposed by Rukn-ed-Din.⁷⁹ Not a single source tells us how relations between Constantinople and Konya developed in the early years of the Latin Empire, but in 1212 there was in any event an alliance between Emperor Henry and Sultan Kaykhusraw. In his letter of January 1213 Henry writes: '*soldanus Yconii qui nobiscum amicitiam iuramento firmaverat et auxilium contra ipsum Lascarum pepigerat*'.⁸⁰ Gerland formulated the hypothesis that this alliance would have been concluded in secret circa 1209 by means of Venetian mediation. A Venetian commercial agreement with Konya would have functioned as a sort of cover for a secret alliance between the Latin emperor and the Seljuk sultan. The reason put forward for the secrecy was the disapproval of the West, and in particular of Pope Innocent III, of an alliance with an Islamic ruler.⁸¹ This reasoning, however, is not really tenable. In the above-mentioned letter of 1213, Emperor Henry tells of this alliance completely openly. With reference to the Venetian involvement, it would seem more plausible to us that the commercial treaty that the Venetian podestà in Constantinople certainly entered into during Kaykhusraw I's reign (1204–1212), followed the political alliance chronologically.⁸² By way of comparison, the commercial accord with Nicaea entered into by podestà Jacopo Tiepolo in 1219 did follow chronologically the peace agreement that Emperors Henry and Theodore Laskaris signed circa 1213–1214.⁸³

It is impossible to discover precisely when the Latin-Seljuk alliance was entered into. Gerland's argumentation for 1209 does not

⁷⁸ The only source that reports on this is an early thirteenth-century Syrian chronicle written by an anonymous author from Edessa: *Anonymi Auctoris Chronicon Ad A.C. 1234 Pertinens*, §502.

⁷⁹ Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, pp. 56–58.

⁸⁰ Prinzing, *Der Brief*, p. 414.

⁸¹ Gerland, *Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches*, pp. 210–212. Nagevolgd bij: Longnon, *L'Empire latin*, pp. 123–124. Martin, *The Venetian-Seljuk treaty of 1220*, p. 326. Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, p. 94. The latter asserts that the Latin authorities in Constantinople had already rejected the offer of an alliance with Sultan Kaykhusraw I in 1205. However, the reference indicated provides no such information (cf. Wolff, *The Latin Empire*, pp. 200, 210).

⁸² In the conclusion with Sultan Kaykubadh I of an agreement on trade in 1220, reference was made to earlier agreements with his father Kaykhusraw I (1204–1212) and his brother Kay-kaus I (1212–1220): Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 258.

⁸³ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 252. Cf. also Chapter IV, p. 192.

stand up to critical examination.⁸⁴ As evidence in favour of the year 1209 the author states that it was from that time that the hostilities on the part of Nicaea against Constantinople ceased. The explanation for this would have been the Latin alliance with Konya. However, the Nicaean aggression did not cease at all, as is displayed by a papal letter of December 1210.⁸⁵ Gerland seems to have missed this information and remarkably enough uses this letter as an additional argument for his premise. The letter, which is addressed to patriarch Morosini, is a reaction to a letter from Emperor Henry in relation to the threat from Michael Doukas in Epiros and Theodore Laskaris in Asia Minor, and is thought to display a very cool tone vis-à-vis the emperor because of his alliance with Konya. In our opinion however, Innocent III displays sincere concern about the fate of the empire of Constantinople and there is no demonstrable change of tone to be seen with regard to Henry's person. In the absence of data, it would seem that, as has been said, the period shortly after the Seljuk capture of Antalya in 1207 was possibly the best opportunity for the commencement of Latin-Seljuk diplomatic contacts, which then culminated in an alliance, that must have been entered into in 1212 at the latest. That Kaykhusraw and Emperor Henry in early 1206 and mid-1207 respectively had each declared a truce with their common rival Laskaris is not really a counter-argument in view of the fact that both truces were only intended to be very temporary arrangements.⁸⁶ The period 1209–1211 is the most suitable for the actual conclusion of the alliance. Prior to 1209 there is in the up to then relatively abundant source material not a single allusion to be found to such an alliance, and from 1211 Emperor Henry's attention was demanded by Michael Doukas' rebellion in Epiros.⁸⁷

As is evident from the aforementioned quotation, with regard to its content the alliance between Constantinople and Konya was directed against the Nicaean Empire. It is probable that in the first place the alliance was intended to be defensive, since there never seems to have been a question of a joint offensive against Nicaea. The alliance was certainly one of the factors that in the years 1209–1211 deterred Theodore Laskaris from undertaking anything but a few small-scale operations against the Latin bases on the coast of Bithynia. In March 1212 however,

⁸⁴ Hendrickx, *Regestes*, n° 121.

⁸⁵ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 354 (XIII, 184).

⁸⁶ Cf. p. 353, en Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, pp. 62, 94–96.

⁸⁷ Cf. Chapter IV, p. 213.

Laskaris planned a large-scale offensive against Latin Constantinople, whilst Emperor Henry was engaged in a campaign against Michael Doukas in Epiros. Before it came to that however, Sultan Kaykhusraw, under the pretext of helping pretender ex-Emperor Alexios III to gain the Nicaean throne, opened an offensive in the Meander valley.⁸⁸ Although Henry's letter of 1213 does not indicate that Kaykhusraw's offensive was the direct result of the Latin-Seljuk alliance, it may be assumed that this fell within the framework of this alliance. Laskaris' planned expedition in north-western Asia Minor was a good opportunity for the sultan to snatch some of his territories in the south, to destabilize the Nicaean Empire by supporting pretender to the throne Alexios III, and at the same time to help his Latin ally by preventing Laskaris' offensive against Constantinople. However, Theodore Laskaris succeeded in beating the Seljuks in a battle at Antioch-on-the-Meander in which Kaykhusraw himself was killed.⁸⁹

Apart from its orientation against the common neighbour Nicaea, the alliance with Konya may have contained another important element. The text of podestà Jacopo Tiepolo's 1220 commercial agreement with Kaykhusraw's successor Kaykubadh, which was a renewal of a similar treaty of pre-1212, determined that the *peregrini* that would be found on the ships taken by the sultan, would not be taken prisoner, but would instead be allowed to retain their freedom.⁹⁰ It is likely that the political agreement between Emperor Henry and Kaykhusraw I would also have contained a clause in the same tenor, in particular with regard to the freedom of movement of *peregrini* through the territories of the sultanate. In this way the Latin emperor was able to put forward the alliance with Konya as being in support of the Latin principality in Syria and Palestine. Thanks to this alliance, and in particular after the peace treaty with Nicaea and Bulgaria in 1213–1214, the land route to Jerusalem from Western Europe was again completely open.⁹¹

⁸⁸ After Alexios III's freedom from his imprisonment in Montferrat was purchased by Michael Doukas of Epiros, the former emperor had betaken himself to Kaykhusraw's court. He had himself welcomed the Seljuk sultan to his own court in 1197, when the latter was ousted from the throne by his brother Rukn-ed-Din (Loenertz, *Aux origines du despotat d'Épire*, pp. 370–376; Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, pp. 95–96).

⁸⁹ Savvides, *The Byzantine revanche*, pp. 40–46.

⁹⁰ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 258.

⁹¹ Longnon, *L'Empire latin*, p. 148. Cf. also Chapter VIII, p. 460.

This concern was also one of the factors that played a role in the alliance policy of Emperor Manuel Komnenos vis-à-vis Konya.⁹²

It is difficult to discover the way in which the alliance with Konya evolved after the death of Sultan Kaykhusraw in 1212. The fact that the Venetian podestà in Constantinople also entered into commercial treaties with Kaykhusraw's successors suggests that the political alliance also continued under Kay-kaus I (1212–1220) and Kaykubadh I (1220–1237).⁹³ In 1217 it appears that Emperor Peter of Courtenay nonetheless had considered abandoning the alliance. During Peter's fateful journey in Epiros, Theodore Doukas promised him his support in his planned conquest of Laskaris' territories, of the Sultanate of Konya, and of Jerusalem.⁹⁴ Given that Peter of Courtenay never actually ruled in Constantinople, as far as it is known this planned change of course produced not a single concrete result. Peter's vision is illustrative of the Western view of the Sultanate of Konya as an Islamic power to be combatted, within which framework the Latin-Seljuk alliance should be viewed with suspicion.⁹⁵

The Latin-Seljuk alliance may have played a role in the relatively small-scale conflict in 1214 between Constantinople and Nicaea about Paphlagonia.⁹⁶ As far as is known this was not the case in Laskaris' unsuccessful offensive in 1220–1221 that was intended to support his claim to the throne of Constantinople with military force. It is probable that in the more important offensive by John III Vatatzes in 1224–1225 the Latin-Seljuk alliance did again come into effect. Langdon has demonstrated convincingly that in 1225 Kaykubadh I embarked on an offensive against Vatatzes. The Nicaean-Seljuk hostilities were to

⁹² Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, p. 95.

⁹³ Cf. note 82.

⁹⁴ *L'estoire D'eracles*, pp. 291–293.

⁹⁵ Cf. Philippe Mouskes, pp. 537–538.

⁹⁶ Cf. note 10. Kursanskis' hypothesis that Theodore Laskaris and Kay-kaus I acted in mutual agreement when in the autumn of 1214 they attacked, respectively, the region of Paphlagonia (under Latin vassal David Komnenos) and the city of Sinope (under David's brother Emperor Alexios Komnenos of Trebizond), does not sound convincing. In his account of these occurrences Nicolas Mesarites indicates that Laskaris simply made use of the Seljuk successes against Alexios Komnenos in order to launch an offensive himself against his brother David Komnenos in Paphlagonia. Cf. Mesarites, *Der Bericht*, §4, 11. Kursanskis, *L'empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs*, p. 112.

continue until 1231.⁹⁷ It is not implausible to assume that the sultan reacted to the Nicaean aggression against the Latin Empire in 1224–1225, whether at a direct request from Constantinople, or in a manner comparable with the situation in 1212: profiting from Vatatzes' absence in north-west Asia Minor in order to make personal gains and, at the same time, rendering a service to an ally. Consequently it was partly the Latin-Seljuk alliance that prevented an even more dramatic advance by Vatatzes in Asia Minor and in Thrace.⁹⁸ In the years after 1225, Latin Constantinople continued to maintain contact with the Seljuk court, as a mission from Regent Narjot I of Toucy in 1228 demonstrates. Nothing further is known as to the subject of this mission, but most likely it included a plea for some kind of help against the Nicaean empire.⁹⁹ The occurrences of 1212 and 1225 however make it clear that the Seljuk alliance, just as in pre-1204 under Manuel Komnenos, could in essence only be directed at the defence of the eastern imperial border, without offering much offensive possibilities.¹⁰⁰

THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRINCIPALITY OF EPIROS, LATER THE EMPIRE OF THESSALONIKE

Apart from the emperors of Nicaea and Trebizond, from 1217 there came into the picture another Byzantine ruler who claimed to be the legitimate Byzantine emperor, the former Latin vassal Theodore Doukas, ruler of Epiros. His incarceration of Emperor Peter of Courtenay in that year was nothing less than a spectacular declaration of independence and Doukas was to base the legitimacy of his claim to the emperorship partly upon this fact, in doing so indicating at the same time to have viewed the Latin claim to the emperorship prior to 1217 as being—to a certain extent—legitimate.¹⁰¹ In the years that followed, Doukas undertook a particularly successful offensive against the Kingdom of

⁹⁷ Langdon, *John III Ducas Vatatzes' Byzantine empire*, pp. 99–106. Idem, *Byzantium's last imperial offensive in Asia Minor*, pp. 15–24.

⁹⁸ Cf. p. 370.

⁹⁹ Cf. the brief report of the mission in the Venetian chancellery registers: Cessi, *Deliberazioni*, I, n° 134.

¹⁰⁰ Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, p. 78.

¹⁰¹ Cf. a letter of 1225 from John Apokaukos, metropolitan of Naupaktos: Vasiljevskij, *Epirotica Saeculi XIII*, n° 26. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros*, p. 53.

Thessalonike. His spectacular advance inspired the Epirote episcopate to support his imperial aspirations energetically, starring roles in this being played by the metropolitans of Naupaktos and Achrida, John Apokaukos and Demetrios Chomatenos respectively.¹⁰²

In 1217 Honorius III reacted with repugnance at Doukas' imprisonment of Emperor Peter and papal legate Giovanni Colonna. In November 1217 the pope launched an appeal, inter alia, in France for a crusading expedition against Doukas, whom he excommunicated. Honorius also attempted to exercise pressure via rulers and others, both in power within the Latin Empire (Regent Cono I of Béthune, patriarch Mattheus, Prince Geoffrey I of Villehardouin, and the archdeacon of Thessalonike), and those beyond (King Andrew II of Hungary and the Venetian doge Pietro Ziani). At the same time, the pope entered into negotiations with Doukas about the freeing of his prisoners. The threat of a crusade moved the Epirote ruler to agree to free the legate; in the interim Emperor Peter appears to have died in imprisonment. At the same time, Doukas acknowledged Honorius' papal authority and promised to pay tithes in aid of the Holy Land. In January 1218 the pope reacted to this by taking him and his principality under papal protection. At this, the crusade against Epiros was called off, although Honorius' appeal in this short time appears to have met with quite some success: the pope forbade all crusaders explicitly from attacking Doukas' principality.¹⁰³ This was a remarkable display of faith in Doukas' loyalty on the part of the pope. Honorius' naivety, which in retrospect appears to have blinded the pontiff to Doukas' real objectives, was no doubt linked to his concern about distracting with other expeditions the smallest possible number of potential troops for the Fifth Crusade, which in the years 1217–1221 took a central position in papal policy.¹⁰⁴

Early in 1218, Theodore Doukas began an offensive in southern Thessaly.¹⁰⁵ Neopatras and Lamia, which was part of the imperial

¹⁰² Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, p. 102.

¹⁰³ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 684–691, 720, 859. Tautu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, n° 23–25. Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz*, n° I–III, pp. 747–749. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros*, pp. 52–53.

¹⁰⁴ Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, p. 108.

¹⁰⁵ There is no reason to assume that in this context Alexios Sthlabos, ruler of the Rhodopes Mountains, would have terminated his feudal tie with the Latin emperor by concluding a (marital) alliance with Theodore Doukas, as earlier authors have asserted (cf. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, p. 162; Dujcev, *Melnik au Moyen Âge*, p. 34;

barony around Zetounion, were quickly taken. A local Latin counter-offensive against Naupaktos had little effect. The source material provides little additional information about the progress of Doukas' offensive. In any event, in 1219 both Platamon and Prosek fell in his hands. Without doubt, many other towns and cities in Thessaly and Macedonia came under his control in this same year and in the following years, for example Berroia which was conquered by February 1220 and Serbia which at an unspecified time was taken without force.¹⁰⁶ The Latin-Byzantine aristocracy of the Kingdom of Thessalonike was powerless to stop Doukas' offensive. The internal dissension within this group must have played an important role in this, each magnate perhaps trying to defend his own lands, without much cooperation with his colleagues and without much coordination from the Thessalonikan court. The support from the neighbouring principalities and baronies in Beotia, Attica, Euboia and Achaia was of small comfort.¹⁰⁷

In 1221 the situation had become so serious that an imperial counteroffensive was launched from Constantinople. It is probable that this had been delayed until the coming of the new Emperor Robert

Cankova-Petkova, *A propos des rapports bulgaro-francs*, p. 58; Adziewski, *Der Despot Aleksj Slav*, p. 92). Not one source reports precisely when Sthlabos—after the death of his first wife, the daughter of Emperor Henry († after 1213, cf. Prinzing, *Der Brief*, p. 418)—married again, this time with a daughter of John Petraliphas, who was the brother of Theodore's wife Mary Petraliphas. If this took place in the years 1214–1217 the marriage cannot be interpreted as an expression of an anti-Latin alliance. That Sthlabos still referred to himself in a *sigillion* of 1220 as *despotes*, the title awarded to him by Emperor Henry and which therefore referred to his political dependence on Constantinople, in our opinion indicates that he did not at that moment renounce the feudal bond with the Latin emperor (Lefort, *Actes de Vatopédi*, I, n° 13).

¹⁰⁶ Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros*, pp. 57–58. Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, pp. 66–67. Vasiljevskij, *Epirotica saeculi XIII*, n° 3–4. Lambropoulos, *Ioannis Apokaukas*, n° 26, 33, 35. Chomatenos, *Ponemata*, n° 20, 89, 150. A passage in this last letter by the metropolitan of Naupaktos suggests that the Prosek region remained part of the Latin empire after Strez' death around 1213–1214: it states that Theodore Doukas' capture of the town was a severe blow for (Latin) Thessalonike; Apokaukos made a similar statement about Doukas' conquest of Platamon which without doubt was under Latin rule. The Latin claim to Prosek (*terra [...] que fuit de Straces*) was in any case mentioned in the 1229 agreement between Emperor-elect John of Brienne and the barons of Constantinople (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, n° 273). Neighbouring Prilep also seems that have remained under Latin rule: in 1241 Emperor Baldwin II granted a theoretical claim on the town to William I of Verona, *tercierus* of Euboia (Loenertz, *Les seigneurs tiersiers de Négrepont*, n° 1, p. 268).

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Chapter IV, p. 247.

of Courtenay, who arrived in the capital circa March 1221.¹⁰⁸ Also in 1220, prior to Robert's arrival, Theodore Laskaris performed some small-scale hostilities against Latin Constantinople, albeit without success. The most important source for the imperial expedition is a letter from Honorius III of June 1222. In this letter the pope wishes Robert success against the enemies of the orthodox faith, by which is doubtless meant Doukas and his partisans, although the emperor himself and the empire had already suffered greatly at the hands of these enemies.¹⁰⁹ This papal reference to Robert's personal commitment to the defence of the Kingdom of Thessalonike, no doubt has to be interpreted as an allusion to an imperial campaign in support of this kingdom. A passage in the fourteenth-century Chronicle of Morea can be used in confirmation of this interpretation. In this legendarily tinted passage a *parlement general* takes place at *Larisse*, where were present *l'empereour Robert, Goffroys de Villehardouin, le seignor de la Morée* and from the *duchiamme d'Atthenes* lord *Guillermes de la Roche*. According to the chronicle, the occasion for this was a conflict between Emperor Robert and Geoffrey I of Villehardouin who without imperial permission was said to have married Robert's sister, who was intended for the king of Aragon.¹¹⁰

This fictitious reason alludes clearly to the marriage of Geoffrey II of Villehardouin (Geoffrey I's son) and Agnes of Courtenay (Robert's sister), arranged by Empress Yolande in 1217. The cited parliament at Larissa is identified in the historiography with the parliament of Ravennika in 1209, which was organized by Emperor Henry—with whom in the Chronicle of Morea Emperor Robert is confused continually, and vice versa—and in which Geoffrey I and the Athenian ruler Otho I of La Roche (and not William) participated. The statement in the Chronicle of Morea that Geoffrey I paid homage to the emperor at Larissa and received the title of seneschal means without doubt that this passage indeed refers to the parliament of Ravennika. However, this in no way prevents the text from referring also, in a chaotic manner, to an expedition by Robert in the neighbourhood of

¹⁰⁸ In all probability, during his sojourn at the Hungarian court whilst on the way to Constantinople, Emperor-elect Robert had concluded a marital alliance with the Serbian ruler Stefan II Nemanja, doubtless with the intention of breaking the political bond between Serbia and Epiros (cf. p. 405).

¹⁰⁹ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 4059. Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, XIII, §14–15.

¹¹⁰ *Chronique De Moree*, §177–185. *The Chronicle Of Morea*, p. 144, v. 2472–2620.

Larissa, which was possibly coupled with the holding of a parliament convened to consult with and at the same time receive the oath of fealty from the imperial vassals on the Greek mainland.¹¹¹ That the barons of southern Greece would have been involved in the imperial relief expedition for the Thessalonikan kingdom sounds logical since their fiefdoms were contiguous to it. In addition, one of these barons—Nicolas of Saint-Omer, who held possessions near Thebes—had married Margaret of Hungary, guardian to her underage son King Demetrios of Montferrat.¹¹²

¹¹¹ In the account of the parliament at Larissa the Chronicle of Morea also reports the relinquishment of the suzerainty over the *ducatus* of Naxos and Andros to Geoffrey I, which actually took place under Baldwin II's reign (Jacoby, *La Féodalité en Grèce médiévale*, pp. 21–23). Cf. also Chapter IV, note 106.

¹¹² This marriage has gone relatively unnoticed in the historiography, although Werner Mor already discussed the topic convincingly in 1903, basing himself on a funerary inscription in the cathedral of Split and a (confused) passage in the Chronicle of Morea (*Chronique De Moree*, §507; Mor, *Margit császárné fia*, p. 604; Tautu, *Margherita di Ungheria*, p. 60). The marriage is further confirmed by a late thirteenth-century Flemish chronicle, albeit in a somewhat chaotic way (*Chronique Dite De Baudouin D'avesnes*, p. 585). The marriage must have taken place after 1213, since Margaret was still a widow at that time (Demetrios Chomatenos, *Ponemata Diaphora*, n° 106). Possibly it is to be dated even after 1217, since the Thessalonikan baron Berthold of Katzenelnbogen—who just as Margaret belonged to the camp that advocated Latin-Byzantine cooperation—is attested as regent in that year and it would seem logical that had Margaret been married in 1217 her husband would have occupied this function (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 526). Margaret's marriage to Nicolas probably has to be viewed in the context of the factional strife in Thessalonike (cf. Chapter IV, p. 247). In 1216–1217 the Lombard party succeeded in convincing the new Emperor Peter of Courtenay to co-invest Marquis William VI of Montferrat with the rights to the kingdom. Margaret and her entourage may have thought it wise to bolster her own position by marrying a prominent baron of southern Greece, who in all likelihood circa 1209 had been installed in the region by his fellow-countryman, the pro-Byzantine Emperor Henry (cf. Chapter IV, note 26). There is no way of knowing if the imperial court played any role in arranging this marriage, but Empress Yolande—who after the demise of her husband again steered imperial policy in the direction of Latin-Byzantine co-operation (cf. Chapter V, p. 299)—must certainly have favoured Margaret's marriage to this baron of Flemish origin.

The confusion concerning Nicolas of Saint-Omer's marriage to Margaret of Hungary in the Chronicle of Morea relates to the fact that the passage in question states that it was Nicolas' son Bela who married *la suer du roy d'Ongrie*. The earlier and more reliable *Chronique dite de Baudouin d'Avesnes* however rightly states that Bela married *la dame d'Estives*, who must have been a daughter of the then lord of Thebes, Guy I of La Roche (Longnon, *Les premiers ducs d'Athènes et leur famille*, pp. 72–73). The muddled passage in the latter chronicle mentioning Nicolas' marriage to Margaret runs as follows: '*Il print à femme la roine de Salenike, suer monseigneur Guillaume de la Roche qui estoit dus d'Atainnes. Il ot de li ii fils. Li aînés ot non: Bylaus, et li autres: Guillaume. Cil moru sans hoir de sa char, et Bylas prist à femme la dame d'Estives qui siet en la Mourée.*' In our view the anonymous chronicler here refers

Perhaps the immediate reason for the imperial expedition was the fall of Serres at the end of 1221 or the beginning of 1222, which resulted in the risk of the city of Thessalonike becoming completely isolated, although it is just as much possible that the capture of Serres was a consequence of the imperial campaign to relieve the Thessalonikan kingdom, since it was indeed unsuccessful.¹¹³ Again, the internal disension within the political elite of the kingdom may have been an important factor in this, possibly coupled with Emperor Robert's lack of experience as a military commander and the discord that was also in existence within the Constantinopolitan elite.¹¹⁴ The undiminished threat against Thessalonike then caused the local and imperial authorities to seek support from abroad, in particular from the papal court, from William VI of Montferrat, the half-brother of King Demetrios of Thessalonike, who in 1217 was co-invested with the rights to the kingdom by Emperor Peter of Courtenay, and from the Hungarian King Andrew II.¹¹⁵ In March 1222 King Demetrios was at the papal court.¹¹⁶ Included in his entourage was Warin, Archbishop of Thessalonike and imperial chancellor.¹¹⁷ The mission swiftly proved successful in the

to two consecutive marriages that Nicolas entered into. Firstly he married Margaret of Hungary, with whom he had two sons, Bela—his name being a clear reference to the royal Hungarian lineage and thus to Margaret—and William. Obviously however, Margaret was not a daughter of Guy I of La Roche as the chronicler says, nor was she ever queen of Thessalonike (in contemporary sources she is never referred to as such: Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 226–227 (XIII, 33–35); Valenciennes, §595). She had only been the consort of Boniface of Montferrat, Lord of Thessalonike, who was never crowned nor ever referred to himself with a kingly title. After his death she had been the guardian to her underage son Demetrios of Montferrat, who himself was crowned king by Emperor Henry in 1209. It is thus clear to us that *la roine de Salenike, suer monseignour Guillaume de la Roche qui estoit dus d'Atainnes* cannot refer to Margaret of Hungary. In fact there is only one person to whom the title queen of Thessalonike applies: King Demetrios' spouse Hermingarde (cf. Chapter IV, note 151). Nicolas' marriage to Hermingarde must have taken place after Demetrios' and Margaret's decease respectively in 1230 and circa 1230–1231 (Wellas, *Das westliche Kaiserreich*, pp. 118–120; Tautu, *Op. cit.*, p. 68).

¹¹³ Breidenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, pp. 67–68.

¹¹⁴ In another letter of June 1222 to the political elite of the Latin Empire, Honorius III emphasizes the necessity to unite in support of Emperor Robert (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 4060; Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, XIII, §15).

¹¹⁵ More extensively on the contacts with Honorius III and William VI: Wellas, *Das westliche Kaiserreich*, pp. 27–29. The pope had already excommunicated Theodore Doukas in December 1220 because of his invasion of the Kingdom of Thessalonike (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 2858).

¹¹⁶ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 3854.

¹¹⁷ In March 1223 Warin, together with Demetrios, figures as a witness in a charter of Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II. (Huillard-Breholles, *Historia Diplomatica*

sense that in June 1222 Honorius III announced to Emperor Robert the coming of a contingent of troops under the leadership of Oberto II of Biandrate, the former regent of Thessalonike and related to the house of Montferrat. The pope granted them an indulgence that was identical to that given to crusaders destined for Jerusalem.¹¹⁸ In 1222 (or possibly 1223) Demetrios of Montferrat and a certain Hugh, who was the representative of the Constantinopolitan baron Narjot I of Toucy, who as has been seen occupied an exceptional position within the imperial entourage, are attested in Hungary, where they no doubt sought to obtain aid from Demetrios' uncle King Andrew II.¹¹⁹ Andrew's reaction is not known, but it would seem likely to us that he did provide some military or financial assistance.¹²⁰

Biandrate's relief expedition did not diminish Theodore Doukas' pressure on Thessalonike. Neither did Doukas respond to a papal initiative in September 1222 that was intended to prompt him to conclude peace with the Latin emperor.¹²¹ In this context the Constantinopolitan-Thessalonikan delegation urged Honorius III and William VI to undertake a larger scale campaign. Wellas has said quite plausibly that

Frederici Secundi, II, p. 328). Imperial chancellor Warin's presence in the delegation demonstrates that Latin Emperor Robert was actively involved in the organization of this diplomatic mission to the West (on the chancellor's role during the mission: see also note 122). Warin would continue to serve the interests of the Latin empire and its emperors until his death in 1240, while ties with the Thessalonikan king Demetrios are not attested after 1225 (Auvray, *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, n° 1175; Wauters, *Exploration des chartes et des cartulaires*, n° 13, p. 194; S.n., *Documents concernant Auvelais, extraits du cartulaire de l'abbaye de Floreffe*, pp. 371–373; Voordeckers & MILIS, *La croix byzantine d'Eine*, pp. 481–484). Another member of Demetrios' retinue who originated from the Latin emperor's home region, in particular the diocese of Tournai, was his chaplain Eustachius (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 4059). It seems likely that Eustachius was introduced to Demetrios by either Warin, Eustace of Hainaut, Emperor Henry's brother and agent in Thessalonike in the years 1209–1217 (cf. Chapter IV, p. 171), or one of the Latin emperors themselves (cf. Chapter IV, p. 247).

¹¹⁸ Cf. note 109. Haberstumpf (*I conti di Biandrate in Oriente*, p. 174) calls into question Biandrate's actual participation in this expedition. Nevertheless, in February 1224 he actually appears to be present in Latin Romania (Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 4754).

¹¹⁹ Tautu, *Margherita di Ungheria*, p. 61. On Narjot of Toucy: cf. Chapter V, pp. 286–288. The presence of a representative of the Constantinopolitan court at Demetrios' side in Hungary again demonstrates that the imperial authority was closely involved in the search for foreign support for Thessalonike. It should in this context be remembered that in the years 1217–1224 Empress Yolande or her son Emperor Robert probably married Mathilde of Courtenay, Yolande's granddaughter and Robert's niece, to John Angelos, Margaret of Hungary's son (cf. Chapter IV, note 87).

¹²⁰ Cf. p. 420.

¹²¹ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 4121.

in March 1223 at Ferentino it was probably resolved to organize an actual crusading expedition to Thessalonike under the leadership of Marquis William.¹²² In May 1223 Honorius issued a general call for a crusade, but in reality it was in essence the episcopacy in the region from Burgundy to Provence and in northern Italy that was ordered to advocate the campaign. In the summer of 1224 the crusading army was ready to depart, but William fell ill and the departure had to be postponed until the spring of 1225. In the meantime, Doukas had begun the siege of Thessalonike circa mid-1223.¹²³ This circumstance, together with the news of the postponement of William's expedition led the imperial powers in Constantinople once more to undertake a campaign themselves without waiting any longer for the arrival of the marquess. Before Thessalonike could be relieved however, the fortress Serres had to be recaptured from Doukas' troops. This siege of Serres by imperial troops was probably the reason for Vatatzes to embark on an offensive in north-western Asia Minor.¹²⁴ The news about the defeat at Poimananon caused panic in the imperial army at Serres, which withdrew in chaos in the direction of Constantinople and was therefore defeated decisively by Doukas' troops.¹²⁵ In turn, the further development of Vatatzes' campaign in Asia Minor in 1224–1225 linked to the defeat at Serres ensured that the imperial powers no longer had the means to halt Doukas' advance in the western part of the empire.

Despite an additional emergency measure taken in November by Honorius III, through which he obliged the clergy of the entire Latin Empire to make a very substantial financial contribution towards the defence of Thessalonike and the empire as a whole, at the end of 1224 (probably in December) Doukas succeeded in taking possession of Thessalonike.¹²⁶ William VI's expedition, which was also supported financially by Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II who had lent the marquis the substantial sum of 9.000 silver Cologne marks, and

¹²² Wellas, *Das westliche Kaiserreich*, pp. 30–35. Huillard-Breholles, *Historia Diplomatica Frederici Secundi*, II, p. 328. Present in Ferentino were Honorius III, Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II, King of Jerusalem John of Brienne, King of Thessalonike Demetrios, Marquis William VI of Monferrat and Archbishop of Thessalonike and imperial chancellor Warin. In addition to the Thessalonikan expedition Frederick II's proposed crusade to Jerusalem was discussed.

¹²³ Ibidem, pp. 36–44. Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, p. 71.

¹²⁴ Cf. p. 368.

¹²⁵ Akropolites, §22. Philippe Mouskes, p. 408.

¹²⁶ Sinogowitz, *Zur Eroberung Thessalonikes*, p. 28. Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, pp. 77–78.

which landed at Halmyros in Thessaly in the spring of 1225, ended in failure.¹²⁷ The marquis himself and a considerable part of his army fell prey to a dysentery epidemic circa September 1225. Nonetheless the crusade did succeed in preventing Doukas' troops from advancing further in the direction of Beotia and Attica.¹²⁸ In the meantime, Latin Thrace had become an easy prey for Doukas' troops as the result of the successive defeats in 1224. In 1225, or possibly in 1226, Doukas marched on unstopably via Christopolis, Mosynopolis, Xantheia, Makri and Didymoteichon. As has been seen he also succeeded in taking possession of the city of Adrianople from Vatatzes.¹²⁹ War raged in Thrace until 1228, with Doukas advancing right up to the walls of Constantinople.¹³⁰ Finally, circa August-September 1228, a one-year's truce was concluded between regent Narjot I of Toucy and Theodore Doukas, who in the meantime had officially pronounced himself emperor and had himself crowned in 1227.¹³¹ The border between the two empires was established roughly along an imaginary line from Ainos to Vrysis. This meant that the imperial core quarter in Thrace

¹²⁷ On Frederick II's involvement: Wellas, *Das westliche Kaiserreich*, pp. 53, 106–112. The author maintains that this sizeable loan was a purely financial affair that had no political significance. Wellas arrives at this conclusion reasoning that aiding Latin Thessalonike was not in line with Frederick's later friendly relations with Theodore Doukas (first attested in 1229). However, we do not see why Frederick could not have changed his policy vis-à-vis Doukas and the Latin Empire between 1223 and 1229, especially in view of his papal excommunication in 1227. In our view the imperial loan from March 1223 to William VI without doubt did have political meaning. Besides taking into consideration that having a loyal vassal in northern Italy was of primary importance, Frederick must have realized that the Thessalonikan expedition was an opportunity to gain a measure of political influence in the Latin Empire's largest feudal principality, which would demonstrate in a concrete way the superiority of his imperial title vis-à-vis that of the Latin emperor. Robert of Courtenay on the other hand probably preferred to view Frederick's support in the context of the *divisio imperii* theory (cf. Chapter II, p. 77), with the western emperor displaying solidarity by coming to the aid of his troubled eastern colleague. In September 1223 William VI again approached Frederick *consilium ab eo et auxilium petiturus* (Richardus De San Germano, *Chronica*, p. 344). The result of this request is not known, but it is interesting to note that Archbishop of Thessalonike and imperial chancellor Warin was at this time also present at Frederick's court (Huillard-Breholles, *Historia Diplomatica Frederici Secundi*, II, p. 458).

¹²⁸ Longnon, *L'Empire latin*, pp. 163–164. Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, pp. 104–106. Wellas, *Das westliche Kaiserreich*, pp. 45–46. Haberstumpf, *Dinastie*, p. 86. Halmyros and the surrounding area also remained under Latin control until ca. 1246 (Koder & Hild, *Hellas und Thessalia*, p. 171).

¹²⁹ Cf. Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, pp. 108–109, 130–133.

¹³⁰ Akropolites, §24.

¹³¹ Cessi, *Deliberazioni*, I, n° 140.

and some of the surrounding region were at least preserved, which may have due to possible Bulgarian support in the years 1225–1228.¹³² The treaty also stipulated several clauses linked to the commercial relations between the two empires, and with respect to the right of return of refugees. Lastly, Geoffrey I of Villehardouin and the other, unnamed Latin barons of southern Greece (in inter alia the region Attica-Beotia and on Euboia) were not compelled to participate in the truce.

As the result of the truce, Doukas gained sufficient opportunity to enable him to prepare for his primary objective, the taking of Constantinople. In doing so he could establish his claim to the emperorship incontestably. However, the time-consuming construction of a fleet, inter alia, was essential to this.¹³³ The truce provided Latin Constantinople with some breathing space, the opportunity of reorganizing its considerably reduced territory, and to seek support in the Byzantine space and in the West. At the same time, the Latin barons in Southern Greece, who had not been so dramatically affected militarily as Latin Constantinople and the surrounding territories, were given the opportunity of continuing the fight against Theodore Doukas on their own initiative.

The heavy territorial losses that the Latin Empire suffered in 1218–1228 as the result of Theodore Doukas' offensive, coupled to the equally heavy defeats at the hands of John III Vatatzes, resulted in the geopolitical position of the empire being changed severely, especially within the so-called Byzantine space. The collapse of circa 1224–1225 must in particular, as already mentioned earlier, have weakened the credibility of the Latin emperor's claim to the legitimate Byzantine emperorship considerably.

On the other hand however, Doukas' claim on the Byzantine emperorship outside the territories that he had succeeded in bringing under his control appears to have found no acceptance. The collapse of the Thessalonikan Empire in 1230, after Doukas' crushing defeat at Klokotnitza at the hands of Ivan II Asen of Bulgaria, meant that in any event Doukas' claim did not have sufficient time to gain

¹³² Cf. the previous note, and Auvray, *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, n° 6089. On the possibility of Bulgarian support in the years 1225–1228: cf. p. 395.

¹³³ Breckenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, pp. 150–151. Langdon, *John III Ducas Vatatzes' Byzantine empire*, p. 91.

wider recognition.¹³⁴ In the Latin Empire Doukas was seen initially as a rebellious vassal and subsequently as an unlawful ruler, as the treaty between Emperor-elect John of Brienne and the Constantinopolitan barons demonstrates.¹³⁵ Sometimes however, for the sake of diplomacy a compromise was sought, as is witnessed by the truce of 1228, in which Doukas was assigned the title of *imperator*, but only that of *imperator Grecorum*. The Latin Empire is referred to as the *imperium Constantinopolis*.¹³⁶ With this, each party exhibited a certain degree of mutual recognition, albeit certainly not particularly heartfelt, but neither was prepared to allow to the other the actual title used for the legitimate emperor or his empire (*imperator Romanorum* and *imperium Romanum*).

Of course in Nicaea too, Doukas' claims met with resistance, and his imperial claim received absolutely no recognition. The tension between the Nicaean and Thessalonikan emperors even led to a rift in the ecclesiastical relations between the Nicaean patriarch and the episcopate in Doukas' territories.¹³⁷ In that sense, Doukas' claim to the emperorship offered the Latin Empire opportunities for the future. After all, Nicaea and Thessalonike were also each other's ideologically irreconcilable opponents.

THE RELATIONS WITH THE EMPIRE OF BULGARIA¹³⁸

From circa 1185 Bulgaria had fought a battle of independence vis-à-vis Constantinople, which in 1202 ended in a de facto recognition of the Bulgarian state by Emperor Alexios III.¹³⁹ The Bulgarian ruler Kalojan, who had assumed the title of *imperator Bulgarorum et Vlachorum*, had in the meantime already established diplomatic links with Innocent III. It was his hope that the pope would give him an imperial crown and that he would grant the Bulgarian Church the status of patriarchate.

¹³⁴ Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, pp. 103–152.

¹³⁵ Doukas was simply referred to as 'Comninianus' (Komnenos) (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 273).

¹³⁶ Cf. reference in note 131.

¹³⁷ Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, pp. 129–140. Karpozilos, *The ecclesiastical controversy*, pp. 70–86.

¹³⁸ The following work was accessible to us only through the French summary: Danceva-Vasileva, *La Bulgarie et l'Empire latin [Bulgarian]*, Sofia, 1985.

¹³⁹ Wolff, *The "Second Bulgarian Empire"*, pp. 180–190. Gagova, *La Thrace du Nord*, p. 197. Stephenson, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier*, pp. 288–309.

However, Innocent was not prepared to go so far, and after years of negotiation he promised Kalojan a royal crown, also giving his official recognition to the archbishop of Tirnovo and making him primate of the Bulgarian Church. In November 1204 papal legate Brancaloni anointed Archbishop Basilios of Tirnovo and at the same time crowned Kalojan as king. Kalojan was gratified by the papal recognition, but did not renounce his imperial claim.¹⁴⁰

*The Confrontation between Bulgaria and Constantinople
in 1204-circa 1212*

In the meantime, Constantinople had fallen into the hands of the Latin crusading army on 12 April 1204. The Bulgarian King Kalojan had however not waited for this occurrence to make a diplomatic approach to his potential new neighbours. De Clari, the only chronicler to report this, states that at the beginning of 1204 the Bulgarian king asked '*as haus barons de l'ost que se il le voloient coroner a roi a estre sires de se tere de Blakie, que il tenroit se tere et sen roiaume d'aus.*' In exchange he would supply reinforcements for the capture of Constantinople. It is difficult to estimate the extent to which the author, who did not occupy a leading position in the army, was aware of the precise nature of Kalojan's overtures. In the light of the independence gained prior to 1204, the idea that the Bulgarian king would have displayed a preparedness to be politically dependent on a Latin Constantinople does not sound very convincing. Yet it certainly is plausible that Kalojan was seeking peaceful relations. However, the leaders of the crusade refused the proposal and had on the contrary threatened Kalojan and his kingdom with invasion.¹⁴¹ Nonetheless, immediately after the capture of Constantinople Kalojan tried once more to achieve peaceful relations with the Latins, but again met up with rejection.¹⁴²

This attitude was based on the Byzantine position of shortly before 1204 vis-à-vis Bulgaria. Kalojan was looked upon as a rebellious potentate that was in an unlawful manner occupying territories that belonged to the Byzantine Empire. In this light, peaceful relations were

¹⁴⁰ Wolff, *The "Second Bulgarian Empire,"* pp. 190–198. Sweeney, *Innocent III, Hungary and the Bulgarian coronation,* pp. 321–323. Stephenson, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier,* pp. 309–312.

¹⁴¹ De Clari, §64–65.

¹⁴² Niketas Choniates, pp. 612–613. *Gesta Innocentii III,* §108.

out of the question, and the Latin powers in Constantinople could not acknowledge him as an equal partner.¹⁴³ In concreto, Boniface of Montferrat had via his new bride Margaret of Hungary a claim on Bulgarian soil. Upon her marriage to Isaac II Angelos, Margaret had received as a dowry from her father Bela III territories that probably encompassed Belgrade and Branicevo on one side and Nis and Sardika on the other. In 1204 this area was in Kalojan's hands, but the marquis probably aspired to recovering these territories. In 1204 the Hungarian King Andrew II, Margaret's brother, also made similar attempts in this direction via Innocent III, but with only little success. It is not improbable that the Hungarian court and Boniface co-operated in this.¹⁴⁴

The hostile Latin reaction to Kalojan's approaches had disastrous results. In late 1204-early 1205 the Bulgarian king complied with a request for support from members of the former entourage of Emperor Alexios III who had been unable to find a place at the court of either Emperor Baldwin in Constantinople or Marquis Boniface in Thessalonike. An extra motivation was probably the intimidation experienced by Kalojan from the threatening Latin action at Philippopolis, very close to Bulgarian territory.¹⁴⁵ The Bulgarian-Byzantine alliance resulted in a rising against the Latin powers in Thrace and Macedonia in 1205-1206. Kalojan also clearly nursed the ambition of gaining the Byzantine emperorship in Constantinople. After various military successes, including a resounding victory (on April 14, 1205) at Adrianople over Emperor Baldwin, who was to die in Bulgarian captivity, at the beginning of 1206 the Bulgarian-Byzantine alliance was terminated because of mutual distrust of each other's ultimate political intentions and the Byzantines sought rapprochement with the Latins.¹⁴⁶ The devastating Bulgarian incursions in Thrace and Macedonia continued however. The Bulgarian military success was partly the result of the alliance that Kalojan had entered into in early 1207 with Theodore

¹⁴³ Primov, *The papacy, the fourth crusade and Bulgaria*, pp. 206-207. Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens und Serbiens*, pp. 25-26.

¹⁴⁴ Prinzing, *Op. cit.*, pp. 32-34. Sweeney, *Innocent III, Hungary and the Bulgarian coronation*, p. 330. Stephanson, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier*, p. 283.

¹⁴⁵ In a letter of 1204 Kalojan stated to Innocent III that he would defend his *imperium* against possible aggression from Latin Constantinople (Migne, *PL*, CCXIV, col. 552-553 (VII, 230)).

¹⁴⁶ Villehardouin, §345-346, 382, 399-423. Niketas Choniates, pp. 618-633. Asdracha, *La région des Rhodopes aux XIII^e et XIV^e siècles*, pp. 54-55.

Laskaris in Asia Minor, with the intention of fighting the Latin Empire in a co-ordinated manner on two fronts.¹⁴⁷

It was only after reaching an armistice with Laskaris in Asia Minor circa May 1207 that Emperor Henry could effectively offer any efficient response against the Bulgarian threat. Kalojan's death at the end of 1207 meant a further strengthening of the Latin position. The problematic succession, coupled with separatist movements, weakened the Bulgarian empire.¹⁴⁸ Nonetheless, Kalojan's successor Boril continued to pursue his predecessor's policy vis-à-vis the Latin Empire. Renewed incursions into Latin territory only achieved limited success however, and in July 1208 Emperor Henry managed to achieve a significant victory at Philippopolis.¹⁴⁹ This success entailed that to some extent the initiative in the Bulgarian-Latin conflict was returned to the Latin camp. The victory at Philippopolis resulted in Alexios Sthlabos, the Bulgarian ruler of the Rhodopes region, acknowledging the suzerainty of the Latin emperor. At the same time, Emperor Henry conferred on Alexios a claim to the Bulgarian empire, and in the years that followed the new Latin vassal did indeed take possession of some of Boril's territories, including the town of Melnik.¹⁵⁰ In Latin eyes, Boril's legitimacy as the Bulgarian ruler was non-existent, as is apparent from Henry's letter of January 1213 in which Boril's *imperator* title was treated as usurpation.¹⁵¹ Furthermore, in imperial letters in the years 1206–1213 the war against Bulgaria was portrayed as being a war against enemies of the true Christian faith.¹⁵² Nonetheless under Boril's reign the Bulgarian Church continued formally to adhere to the union with the Church of Rome, albeit with little enthusiasm.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁷ Villehardouin, §459. Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens und Serbiens*, pp. 78–79. Prinzing's hypothesis about an anti-Latin Bulgarian-Seljuk alliance sounds unlikely.

¹⁴⁸ Dujcev, *Das Synodikon*, pp. 116–118. Gjuselev, *Bulgarien und das Kaiserreich von Nikaia*, pp. 56–57.

¹⁴⁹ Valenciennes, §544. Longnon, *L'Empire latin*, pp. 102–104.

¹⁵⁰ Akropolites, §24. Valenciennes, §545–549, 555–557. In 1209 one of Boril's bailiffs was reported as still being in place in Melnik (§619). Gerland's interpretation of Sthlabos as having already taken possession of Melnik in 1208, losing it to Boril in 1209, and retaking it again, is unfounded (Gerland, *Das lateinischen Kaiserreiches*, p. 175). Dujcev's interpretation of the bailiff as being Sthlabos himself is equally unfounded: Valenciennes refers unchangingly to Sthlabos as *Esclas* (§505, 545–549, 555–559, 571).

¹⁵¹ Prinzing, *Die Briefe*, p. 411.

¹⁵² Cf. Chapter II, p. 96.

¹⁵³ Tarnanidis, *Byzantine-Bulgarian ecclesiastical relations*, p. 29. Cankova-Petkova, *A propos des rapports bulgaro-francs*, p. 57.

Although after 1207–1208 the existential Bulgarian threat vis-à-vis the Latin Empire had receded, occasional incursions into Latin territory continued. In 1209, during the imperial campaign in the Kingdom of Thessalonike and Southern Greece, there was a short-lived Bulgarian threat on the northern imperial border.¹⁵⁴ In 1212 Boril briefly threatened the surroundings of Constantinople, simultaneously with Laskaris' planned offensive against the Latin capital. Later that year Boril attempted an invasion in the Kingdom of Thessalonike, but suffered defeat at the hands of Eustace of Hainaut and Berthold of Katzenelnbogen. The military support by Boril of the rebellious imperial vassal Strez of Prosek resulted in the same year in a second Bulgarian defeat near Pelagonia by these two Latin barons.¹⁵⁵

*The Rapprochement between Bulgaria and Constantinople
(1213–1228)*

The Latin successes in north-western Asia Minor in 1212–1213 against Theodore Laskaris and the peace treaty with Nicaea that followed in 1213—and was probably adjusted in 1214 after Laskaris Paphlagonian campaign—enabled Emperor Henry to focus on a solution of the Bulgarian question in the course of 1213. The objective was securing the stability of the northern imperial border. The Asia Minor campaign of 1212–1213 had shown that the emperor had neither the means at his disposal to annex sizeable territories directly into the empire, nor was he in a position to bring a powerful rival to the acceptance of his suzerainty. Consequently, the only possibility was the negotiation of a bilateral agreement. Fortunately there were good reasons to believe that the Bulgarian ruler would be open to this. Boril's position within the Bulgarian empire was under pressure. Circa 1211, Kalojan's nephew Ivan II Asen returned from exile in Russia. Being seen by many as the legitimate successor to Kalojan, he embarked on an uprising against Boril. The Bogomil heresy that Boril was combating was also a factor of internal instability.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, the Latin successes in Asia Minor were disturbing, in the sense that a future Latin invasion of the Bulgarian territory also gained in probability. In the light of the recent

¹⁵⁴ Valenciennes, §686.

¹⁵⁵ Prinzing, *Die Briefe*, pp. 412–414, 417.

¹⁵⁶ Idem, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens und Serbiens*, p. 115. Dujcev, *La bague-sceau*, p. 183.

Bulgarian defeats, this can have been a scarcely encouraging prospect for Boril.

As is apparent from De Clari's chronicle, the Latin emperor took the initiative of concluding an agreement with Bulgaria.¹⁵⁷ As the only one to do so, this author gives us a number of details about the outcome of the negotiations. Henry's delegation requested the Bulgarian ruler to give him his daughter's hand in marriage, which implied the conclusion of mutual peace and an alliance. The Bulgarian king agreed, and shortly afterwards the marriage took place in Constantinople.¹⁵⁸ All these events occurred in late 1213-early 1214.¹⁵⁹ Although there is not a single source that provides further information about the content of the Latin-Bulgarian pact, nonetheless a number of matters can be assumed on the basis of the political context. Without doubt the treaty that was concluded established the mutual borders, with the Latin military superiority circa 1213 being taken into account. We can tentatively reconstruct the border between the two empires as running slightly to the north of the imaginary line that links the following towns Vizye—Vrysis—Adrianople—Philippopolis—Tzepaina—Melnik—Prosek—Achrida. It is possible that part of the territories in Thrace and Macedonia claimed prior to 1213 by the Bulgarian king were formally relinquished by Boril to Henry as a dowry. The Latin-Bulgarian treaty functioned further as an instrument with which to increase the influence of each of the rulers within the Byzantine space, as the joint expedition against Serbia in 1214 demonstrates.¹⁶⁰

In our opinion however, the significance of the Latin-Bulgarian peace does not limit itself to these conditions. The fact is that Boril did not have a son to succeed him, and Henry's wife was Boril's eldest

¹⁵⁷ The postulation that a papal legate, identified as Cardinal Pelagius, played an instrumental role in the creation of Latin-Bulgarian peace is founded on an incorrect interpretation of a passage by Aubry de Trois-Fontaines (cf. Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens und Serbiens*, p. 108; Erszegi, *Eine neue Quelle Quelle zur Geschichte de bulgarisch-ungarischen Beziehungen*, p. 93; Albericus Trium Fontium, *Chronica*, p. 886).

¹⁵⁸ De Clari, §116–117. Cf. also: Albericus Trium Fontium, *Loc. cit.* Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 391. Andreas Dandolo, *Chronica per extensum descripta*, p. 285.

¹⁵⁹ After Henry's campaign against Theodore Laskaris in 1212–1213 and before the Bulgarian-Latin expedition against Serbia in 1214 (infra). Cf. Hendrickx, *Regestes*, n° 135.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. p. 397.

daughter, the heir presumptive to the Bulgarian kingdom.¹⁶¹ It is probable that Boril and Henry planned the long-term union of their respective empires: the child born of the marriage between Henry and Boril's eldest daughter could be the heir to both the Latin and Bulgarian empires, or at least would have a viable claim also to the Bulgarian throne. In this way, the Latin emperor could still achieve his universal ambitions vis-à-vis the Bulgarian kingdom in a peaceable manner, whilst Boril protected his inheritance against the claims of Ivan II Asen.

In any event, the Latin emperor's universalist aspirations vis-à-vis the Bulgarian kingdom to being the legitimate Byzantine emperor were probably already safeguarded in the treaty of circa 1213–1214. Prior to 1230, the title of the Bulgarian ruler was limited to *tsr' Bl'garom* (the Latin equivalent of which was *imperator Bulgarorum*). It was only as of 1230 that Ivan II Asen would occasionally extend the Bulgarian royal title to *tsr' Bl'garom i Gr'kom* (*imperator Bulgarorum et Grecorum*) and the same monarch would introduce into his title the term *samodrzac* (or *moderator*, the Latin equivalent of the Greek *autokrator*).¹⁶² From this it can be gathered that the Bulgarian ruler Boril no longer claimed the Byzantine emperorship himself, as his predecessor Kalojan had done. As a consequence his emperorship was from a Byzantine point of view to be looked upon as being subordinate to the Byzantine (i.e. Roman) emperorship, which Emperor Henry and his successors claimed to be theirs. In this way Henry vis-à-vis Bulgaria tried to realize the universality claim subsistent in his emperorship via the Byzantine political theory of the hierarchy of states.

This political ideology, which had already been in force for centuries in Constantinople, stipulated that the Byzantine (i.e. Roman) emperor was the highest power in the world, to whose rank all other rulers were subordinate. The recognition of the superior position of the Emperor of Constantinople by other monarchs was from that point of view sufficient to substantiate the Byzantine claim of universality. In the tenth century the Byzantine emperors had thus agreed

¹⁶¹ A second, known, daughter of Boril was in 1214 engaged to Bela (IV), the eldest son of King Andrew II of Hungary, who at the time was eight years old (Erszegi, *Eine neue Quelle zur Geschichte der bulgarisch-ungarischen Beziehungen*, p. 93). His fiancée was doubtless of a similar age. Logically, Emperor Henry's bride is unlikely to have been younger.

¹⁶² Ibidem, p. 94. Djuric, *Titles of the rulers of the second Bulgarian empire*, pp. 32–33, 48.

to recognize the Bulgarian ruler as *basileus* of the Bulgarians, on the provision that the Bulgarian ruler gave to them the exclusive title of *basileus kai autokrator ton Romaion*.¹⁶³ Later too, in the twelfth century, Manuel Komnenos based his attempts in the Balkans to realize his claim of universality on the hierarchy of states principle in his relations with the Serbian principality and the Hungarian Kingdom.¹⁶⁴ It appears that from 1213 Latin Emperor Henry based his relations with Bulgaria on the same principle, after the conquest of Bulgaria or the installation of a Bulgarian sovereign that would acknowledge his suzerainty had apparently seemed impossible.¹⁶⁵ That Boril as the ally of Emperor Henry as far as is known used a title that, looked on formally, was subordinate to that of the emperor of Constantinople, suggests that the concept of the hierarchy of states was accepted at the Bulgarian court.

After the peace of 1213–1214, Latin-Bulgarian relations can be characterized as having been harmonious. This is evidenced by the joint expedition against Serbia in 1214, and by Henry's second expedition against Serbia in 1215, on this occasion in collaboration with Andrew II of Hungary, in which the Latin emperor crossed Bulgarian territory without problems.¹⁶⁶ Henry's death without issue in 1216 however meant that the plan for the union of the two empires did not come to fruition. However, in 1217–1218 Empress Yolande appears to have immediately strengthened the ties again by concluding a new marital alliance with Boril: she seems to have arranged the marriage of one of her daughters to Boril.¹⁶⁷ This initiative produced little in

¹⁶³ Ibidem, p. 40.

¹⁶⁴ Stephenson, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier*, pp. 35–38, pp. 269–271.

¹⁶⁵ We do not agree with the view that the Latin-Bulgarian alliance of 1213–1214 and the adoption by Boril of certain imperial insignia meant the end of the universalistic ambitions of Constantinople (cf. Cankova-Petkova, *Certains aspects du pouvoir royal*, p. 104).

¹⁶⁶ Cf. p. 397.

¹⁶⁷ Philippe Mouskes and the anonymous author of the *Chronique dite de Baudouin d'Avesnes* who was probably dependent on Mouskes for this information—both of whom as regards names confuse Boril with his predecessor Kalojan (*Jehannins*; Ivan II Asen is referred to as *Ausens* by Mouskes)—are the only two chroniclers to report this marriage, that until now remained unnoticed in the historiography. Both sources report simultaneously the marriages of two other daughters of the imperial couple Peter and Yolande to, respectively Andrew II of Hungary and Theodore Laskaris (Philippe Mouskes, *Chronique Rimée*, pp. 402–403; *Chronique dite de Baudouin d'Avesnes*, p. 674). The historicity of the latter alliances is beyond dispute. There is then also no reason to doubt the marriage of a third daughter to Boril. The fourteenth-

the way of results in view of the fact that in 1218 Ivan II Asen succeeded in dislodging Boril from the Bulgarian throne. The lack of source material makes it impossible to discover the extent to which Latin Constantinople supported her ally Boril in the years 1213–1218 in his struggle with the internal opposition to his authority.

The change in the occupancy of the Bulgarian throne did not lead to a breach in the good relations between Constantinople and Tirnovo. This is evidenced by Emperor-elect Robert of Courtenay's problem-free passage from Hungary through Bulgarian territory on his way to Constantinople in the spring of 1221. Ivan II Asen appears even to have personally accompanied the emperor-elect for some time on this journey.¹⁶⁸ Without doubt the mutual consanguinity between the Constantinopolitan, Hungarian and Bulgarian courts played an important role in the continuing good relations.¹⁶⁹ The Latin-Bulgarian alliance however served no purpose in the conflict in 1218–1225 with Theodore Doukas who, in addition to Latin territories, also to a more limited extent took Bulgarian territories in Macedonia under his control.¹⁷⁰ The explanation for this lies probably in the fact that in the period in question Ivan II Asen was compelled in the first instance to devote his energy to the internal stabilization of the kingdom he had wrested from Boril. The two related chronicles written in the Holy Land, *L'Estoire d'Eracles* and the *Chronique* by Ernoul and Bernard le Trésorier indicate nonetheless that it was thanks to Bulgarian support that Emperor Robert still managed to retain part of his territory—and Constantinople itself.¹⁷¹ It is possible that in the later years of the struggle against Doukas the Latin emperor had Bulgarian military support at his disposal, perhaps in the period 1225–1228 in particular, when conflict raged in Thrace.¹⁷²

century *Chronique dite de Baudouin d'Avesnes* asserts that Emperor Henry brought about this marriage. In our opinion, however, it was negotiated by Yolande, since the well-informed De Clari (see note 158) makes no report of such a marriage in his account of the peace of 1213–1214.

¹⁶⁸ Philippe Mouskes, pp. 404–405.

¹⁶⁹ The Hungarian King Andrew II was married to Robert's sister Yolande of Courtenay. Ivan II Asen was himself married to Andrew II's daughter Anna-Maria, born of Andrew's first marriage to Gertrude, daughter of Margrave Berthold IV of Meran (cf. p. 406).

¹⁷⁰ Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros*, pp. 59–60.

¹⁷¹ Ernoul & Bernard Le Trésorier, *Chronique*, p. 393. *L'estoire D'eracles*, p. 394.

¹⁷² The undated agreement that Asen concluded with Doukas at about this time could then be set in about 1228, when Doukas also concluded a truce with the Latins (Akropolites, §25; cf. Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, pp. 148–149).

The fact that the relations with Bulgaria remained harmonious until 1228 is also apparent from the fact that after the death of Emperor Robert in 1227 the Constantinopolitan barons concluded an, eventually abortive, agreement with Ivan II Asen which stipulated that Baldwin II, Robert's brother who at the time was still a minor, was to marry Asen's daughter and that in exchange the Bulgarian tsar was to reconquer for the Latins their lost territories. Although the Latin-Bulgarian accord concerning this ultimately fell through, it is interesting to note that as seems evident from this pact the idea of a union of the two empires through a marital alliance may still have been in existence, just as circa 1213–1214. Ivan Asen in any case saw for himself a position as regent of the Latin empire for his intended young son-in-law.¹⁷³ After the said agreement had fallen through and Asen in 1230 had won a resounding victory over Theodore Doukas at Klokotnitsa, the Bulgarian tsar was no longer prepared to grant Constantinople a precedence of honour in the sense of the hierarchy of states theory, as is clear from the title he from then on claimed for himself (*supra*).

THE RELATIONS WITH THE PRINCIPALITY (AND LATER KINGDOM) OF SERBIA

Just as in the case of Bulgaria, quite some time prior to 1204, Serbia had become *de facto* independent of Constantinople. After the death of Manuel Komnenos in 1180 the Serbian Grand *Zupan* Stephen I Nemanya definitively repudiated Byzantine authority. Nemanya expanded his original principality in the region of Raska without opposition by attaching to it the region of Zeta (Diocleia), which extended as far as the coast of the Adriatic. A defeat in 1190 by Emperor Isaac II did not prevent Serbia from developing into a (virtually) autonomous principality. Nonetheless, for the time being it continued to be part of the Byzantine commonwealth: as a result of the military confrontation in 1190 Nemanya's son Stephen II married Eudokia Angelos, a niece of Isaac II, and he received the major court title of *sebastokrator*. However, circa 1200–1201 the link with Constantinople had become so politically unimportant that Grand *Zupan* Stefan II repudiated his

¹⁷³ Cf. Chapter V, p. 294. In our opinion, Tarnanidis' hypothesis about rapprochement between Tirnovo and Nicaea at about this time sounds implausible (Tarnanidis, *Byzantine-Bulgarian ecclesiastical relations*, pp. 31–40).

wife Eudokia, daughter of the new Emperor Alexios III, in an offensive manner without any form of reprisal from the Byzantine side. Culturally, Serbia did remain strongly oriented towards Byzantium, although the coast of the Adriatic province was oriented towards Rome from an ecclesiastical point of view. In this context both Stephen I (monastic name: Symeon) and his son Rastko (monastic name: Sava) became monks on Mount Athos, where together they later founded their own Serbian monastery, Hilandar.¹⁷⁴ Both were later canonized.

The occurrences of 1204 disturbed the political situation of Serbia only little. Apart from the fraternal struggle between Grand *Zupan* Stephen II Nemanya and Vukan in 1202–1205, with support from, respectively, Bulgaria and Hungary, in the early years of the thirteenth century Serbia experienced a relatively peaceful period.¹⁷⁵ Stephen II was nonetheless aware of the changing political situation in the Balkans, and his marriage—probably in 1207—to Anna Dandolo, granddaughter of the Venetian doge Enrico Dandolo, joint commander of the Fourth Crusade, can be placed in this context.¹⁷⁶ This marital alliance was clearly an attempt to establish good relations with the city of Venice, which was an important factor of power in both the Adriatic and in Latin Romania. This somewhat indirect overture to the Latin Empire was however not what the Emperor Henry in Constantinople had in mind for Serbia. In the initial years after 1204 there was for the emperor no opportunity whatsoever for any form of foreign policy vis-à-vis Serbia, confronted as he was with ensuring the internal stability of the empire and with fending off external enemies, in particular Bulgaria and Nicaea. When by 1213–1214 relations with these two neighbours had been normalized, and internal peace was assured—especially in Thessalonike and Epiros, he had the opportunity for a more ambitious policy with regard to the Balkans.

In this context, Emperor Henry, together with his new ally Emperor Boril of Bulgaria, undertook an expedition against Serbia in 1214. The only source that provides information about this is a hagiographic account, a *vita* of Saint Symeon (Stephen I Nemanya), drawn up by

¹⁷⁴ Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth*, pp. 221–223. Stephenson, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier*, pp. 269–309. Maksimovic, *La Serbie et les contrées voisines*, pp. 269–275.

¹⁷⁵ Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens*, pp. 93–96. Obolensky, *Six Byzantine Portraits*, pp. 135–136.

¹⁷⁶ Andreas Dandolo, *Chronica per extensum descripta*, p. 287. Maksimovic, *La Serbie et les contrées voisines*, p. 278.

his son Stephen II Nemanya (1196–1227/28).¹⁷⁷ Stephen II's political intention with this *vita* was the legitimization of his own position as Serbian king and the exaltation of his dynasty.¹⁷⁸ The Latin-Bulgarian expedition in question is portrayed as one of the miracles that Saint Symeon performed after his death in 1199. The report of the campaign is therefore of a somewhat visionary nature, as the result of which it is difficult to ascertain the actual course of events. According to the text, the initiative for the Latin-Bulgarian campaign came from Boril.¹⁷⁹ Boril's motive in this was probably Stephen II's seizure of territory considered to be Bulgarian. Under Kalojan the city of Nis still belonged to Bulgaria, but was subsequently taken under the Serbian prince's control. Furthermore, Stephen II had actively supported Boril's brother Strez in the expansion of a principality round Prosek that was autonomous from Boril, which to him constituted a threat to the internal stability of Bulgaria.¹⁸⁰

This Serbian interference in the region around Prosek was probably the concrete reason for the Latin emperor to take part in the expedition initiated by his Bulgarian ally. Strez had recognized the suzerainty of the Latin emperor since circa 1209–1210, but his loyalty in the years that followed turned out to be rather inconstant. It is not unthinkable that in his rebellion against Latin authority he enjoyed the support of his former Serbian patron, as Strez in any event received from Bulgaria in 1212. Such real or potential Serbian interference in the region must have been seen by the Latin emperor as an element of instability. However, within a broader framework Emperor Henry probably felt that, according to the political model of his Byzantine predecessors, Serbia was in principle part of his empire and consequently should be integrated into it one way or another. Whilst Boril's aim was the recovery of a number of his lost territories (Nis), Henry's objective would have been to bring the Serbian king to the recognition of his emperorship—this being the Byzantine emperorship—possibly by the

¹⁷⁷ Stevana Prvovenčanoga, *Zitije Simeona Nemanje od St. Prvovenčanoga*, II, pp. 1–76 (translation: Stefan Der Erstgekrönte, *Das Leben des Hl. Simeon Nemanja*, S. Hafner (tr.), Köln, 1962).

¹⁷⁸ Stefan Der Erstgekrönte, *Das Leben*, pp. 68–69.

¹⁷⁹ The relevant passages about the Latin-Bulgarian campaign: Stevana Prvovenčanoga, *Zitije Simeona Nemanje*, pp. 58–60 (tr. Stefan Der Erstgekrönte, *Das Leben*, pp. 112–114).

¹⁸⁰ Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens*, pp. 100–106. Maksimovic, *La Serbie et les contrées voisines*, p. 278.

recognition of imperial suzerainty. In short, Serbia too should be fitted into the universalistic political theory of the hierarchy of states adopted from the Byzantine emperors of the period prior to 1204.

The Latin-Bulgarian campaign however came to nothing. Stephen II describes its outcome: '*Und auf einmal, um Mitternacht, erhob sich ein Geschrei, und der Erhwürdige (= Sint-Symeon) zerstreute unsichtbar die in Schlacht-ordnung aufgestellten Feinde. Durch diese Erscheinung meines heiligen Herrn in große Angst versetzt und schon durch sein Zeichen allein besiegt, flohen sie davon, sich selbst vernichtend, einer den anderen. Und sie besiegten sich gegenseitig und richteten sich selbst zugrunde und zogen fort mit der Schmach ihrer Vernichtung und in großer Schande.*'¹⁸¹ A number of authors have interpreted this passage as an allusion to a nocturnal attack by Stephen II, who forced the Latin-Bulgarian army into retreat.¹⁸² An alternative interpretation would appear to be more plausible however. The passage quoted contains three notable elements. Firstly, it seems to us very unlikely that the Latin-Bulgarian army would have positioned itself in battle array around midnight. Secondly, the account is exceptionally vague and abstract, certainly in comparison to Stephen's account of the Latin-Hungarian expedition against Serbia in 1215 (*infra*), where the author emphasizes his personal and active contribution to Saint Symeon's miracle. Lastly, in the description of the Latin-Bulgarian failure the accent lies firmly on a conflict within the allied army. These three elements can be explained when the assumption is made that Stephen never undertook an expedition against the aggressors and that the failure of the campaign could be ascribed wholly to internal tensions or problems within the allied army. In this, one could think of a conflict between the allies about the hoped-for proceeds of the expedition: the recovery of Nis, the suzerainty over Serbia, the distribution of the spoils of war. What is more likely however is that Boril had to decide not to proceed with the expedition because of the current internal troubles in Bulgaria. This hypothesis is supported by the circumstance that in 1215 Boril was apparently not in a position to participate in a new Latin-Hungarian expedition against Serbia. As the result of Boril's withdrawal from the venture, Emperor Henry was probably unable to pursue the expedition. The abandonment of the campaign possibly

¹⁸¹ Cf. note 179.

¹⁸² Stefan Der Erstgekrönte, *Das Leben*, p. 66.

led to displeasure in the Latin contingent vis-à-vis the Bulgarian ally. However, that serious violent hostilities resulted, as Stephen puts it, sounds unlikely, as the relations between Constantinople and Tirnovo continued to be good after 1214.

Finally, we should remark with respect to Henry's campaign in 1214 that this was possibly to a certain extent connected or co-ordinated with the campaigns of Michael I Doukas of Epiros and Strez of Prosek against Serbia, which can be dated to about the same time. In 1214 Michael Doukas succeeded in taking the coastal town of Skutari from Stephen II.¹⁸³ Strez also launched an offensive against Serbia at about this time, about which however no details are extant.¹⁸⁴ It would seem to us quite plausible that these virtually simultaneous actions against Serbia by Emperor Henry himself and a number of his vassals could have been linked, although this is not demonstrable.

The failure of the aforementioned campaign in 1214 did not mean that Emperor Henry abandoned his ambitions vis-à-vis Serbia. In 1215 he, together with his Hungarian ally Andrew II, undertook a new expedition against Serbia. Once more, Stephen II's *vita* of Saint Symeon is the only source that provides any information about this. The events related therein can be summarized as follows: 1. Emperor Henry and King Andrew convene a meeting at Nis with their respective armies. 2. The objective of the expedition was to oust Stephen and to divide his land between one another. 3. Shortly after Easter (19 April 1215) Stephen himself was also invited to a friendly meeting at Nis. 4. Not convinced of the peaceful intentions of the two allies, prior to the planned gathering in Nis the Serbian king manages to meet Andrew in Ravno, where they come to a mutual agreement. 5. Henry subsequently meets Stephen and Andrew in Nis, but is unable to move the Serbian ruler to pay any form of honour to him. 6. In the absence of any means—military included—of reaching a satisfactory form of mutual understanding, the Latin emperor finds himself compelled to

¹⁸³ Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens und Serbiens*, pp. 110–114.

¹⁸⁴ Teodosije, *Zivot svetoga Save napisao Domentijan [sic]*, pp. 107–114. Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens und Serbiens*, pp. 105–106, 127–128. Maksimovic, *La Serbie et les contrées voisines*, p. 279.

return empty-handed. 7. Andrew ensures that Henry has a problem-free return journey by means of mediation with Stephen.¹⁸⁵

From the above account it seems unlikely that the objective of the expedition undertaken by Henry and Andrew really would have been the actual conquest of Serbia. Stephen's report gives the impression rather that the two monarchs wished to divide Serbia into a Latin and a Hungarian zone of influence, respectively. Just as been done by the Byzantine (and later Latin) Emperor, since the end of the twelfth century the Hungarian king laid certain claims on the Serbian principality.¹⁸⁶ The precise modalities according to which the creation of such zones of influence should take place are not clear, but one could think of the recognition of the Latin imperial suzerainty (over the southern territories) and the Hungarian royal suzerainty (over the northern territories) respectively. In the first instance, Henry and Andrew seem to have wished to achieve their objective through negotiation with Stephen, with their combined military might as, almost literally, a second string to their bow. However, Stephen managed to thwart this preconceived plan by approaching Andrew separately at Ravno. It would seem logical to assume that the Serbian ruler made certain concessions, by which one can think of the recognition of Hungarian suzerainty or the relinquishment of certain territories. The depiction by Stephen that it was the Hungarian king that showed him all manner of marks of honour without receiving anything in return is, in the light of the concrete military context, hardly plausible. Andrew's motivation to respond to the Serbian approaches and thus call off the Latin-Hungarian campaign was probably connected to serious problems at that time relating to his Galician policy, on which Stephen possibly capitalized.¹⁸⁷ It was surely better for Andrew to deal with the relations with Serbia swiftly and in a more or less favourable manner than to embark on a campaign with the Latin emperor, the duration and outcome of which were uncertain. Emperor Henry was then not in a position to gain any form of acknowledgement of his imperial authority from Stephen in Nis without the support, either by military or diplomatic means, of his ally. As a result, the second Serbian expedition also proved fruitless.

¹⁸⁵ Stevana Prvovenčanoga, *Zitije Simeona Nemanje*, pp. 71–74 (tr. Stefan Der Erstgekrönte, *Das Leben*, pp. 124–129).

¹⁸⁶ Kristo, *Die Arpaden-Dynastie*, pp. 151–152, 172.

¹⁸⁷ Homan, *Geschichte des ungarischen Mittelalters*, II, pp. 12–14.

Despite this, by 1216 an understanding of some form or other appears to have been reached between Constantinople and Serbia. Circa 1216–1217 Sava, Stephen II Nemanya's brother and most important adviser, entered once more the Hilandar monastery on Mount Athos, where he had also sojourned for some time prior to 1207.¹⁸⁸ The presence within imperial territory of such a high-ranking personage as the brother of the Serbian ruler can hardly have gone unnoticed at the Thessalonikan and Constantinopolitan courts, which suggests harmonious relations.¹⁸⁹ How these mutual relations are to be interpreted is less clear. In this respect, an element in Stephen II's circa 1216 *vita* of Saint Symeon would appear to be significant. Stephen namely refers unvaryingly to Henry as the 'Greek emperor', the term with which his brother Sava in his own *vita* of Saint Symeon refers respectfully to the pre-1204 Byzantine emperor.¹⁹⁰ Had Stephen—after renewed diplomatic contacts—by 1216 perhaps nevertheless formally acknowledged the emperor in Constantinople as the legitimate Byzantine emperor and the superior position of his rank vis-à-vis his own princely title, without this however implying any actual political influence in Serbia on the part of the Latin emperor? In this way the hierarchy of states theory that prevailed at the imperial court would have been realized and at the same time the Serbian desire for complete autonomy in practice would have been fulfilled.

Despite the surmised formally harmonious relations with the Latin emperor in about 1216, in fact Serbia was politically in no way oriented towards the maintenance of strong or exclusive links with Constantinople. Stephen II's principal objective was and continued to be the expansion of Serbian autonomy on all fronts. For example, in 1217 he was successful in gaining the grant of a royal crown from Honorius III, after a similar attempt to be awarded the title of king by the pope circa 1200–1201 had been thwarted by Hungarian intervention. On this occasion however, Nemanya profited from the absence of Andrew II of Hungary, who was otherwise occupied with the Fifth Crusade. To this we can also add that the succession in Constantinople

¹⁸⁸ Obolensky, *Six Byzantine Portraits*, p. 143.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. also p. 405.

¹⁹⁰ Stevana Prvovencanoga, *Zitije Simeona Nemanje*, pp. 59, 71, 73 (tr. Stefan Der Erstgekrönte, *Das Leben*, pp. 113, 125, 128). Corovic, *Spisi sv. Save*, pp. 153, 157 (tr. HL. Sava, *Das Leben Simeons*, pp. 37, 41).

in 1216–1217 was also a possible factor that facilitated this matter. Through his royal crown, Stephen obtained via international papal authority the recognition of the legitimacy of Serbia as an autonomous kingdom outside the Byzantine political frame of reference. Conversely Honorius believed to have gained the integration of Serbia within the Church of Rome, shortly after Bulgaria had also confessed to the faith of the same Church.¹⁹¹ Stephens new status was reflected in the title he adopted after his coronation. This title displays the combined use of the concepts *krali* (king) and the typically Byzantine *samodrzac* (*autokrator*), both of which emphasize the autonomous nature of Nemanya's dominion. However, we cannot agree with Prinzing and Ferjancic, who infer from this title that the Serbian king thus expressed a position of complete equality with the Byzantine emperor, apart from the question as to who this might have been in Serbian eyes. In our opinion, from a Serbian point of view the imperial title (*cari*) on the contrary appears to have enjoyed a certain precedence in honour, as will become apparent later.¹⁹²

The recognition of Serbian autonomy in the secular sphere was followed circa 1219–1220 by the additional gaining of ecclesiastical autonomy. Until then, the bishoprics in the Serbian hinterland were part of the Byzantine autocephalous archbishopric of Achrida, whilst on the coast of the Adriatic was located the Roman archbishopric of Bar. In order to obtain this ecclesiastical autonomy the Serbian court turned not to Rome, as for the royal crown, but to Nicaea. Various reasons can be given for this. Firstly, indicated in the existing historiography is that Serbia lay on the line that separated the Roman and Byzantine sphere of influence. In this sense the approach to Nicaea was not surprising from an ecclesiastical point of view, after the earlier approach to Rome in connection with the royal crown. Furthermore, the then Serbian leader of the church, Stephen II's brother Sava, was personally strongly oriented towards the Byzantine Church, after his long sojourn at the monastery on Mount Athos.¹⁹³ A second reason to turn to Nicaea with respect to ecclesiastical autonomy was in our

¹⁹¹ Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens und Serbiens*, pp. 155–156. Obolensky, *Six Byzantine Portraits*, pp. 141–142. Mavromatis, *Peut-on parler d'un état médiéval serbe?*, p. 420. Maksimovic, *La Serbie et les contrées voisines*, p. 280.

¹⁹² Cf. Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens*, pp. 156–159. Ferjancic, *Rayonnement de la culture*, pp. 4–7. Maksimovic, *La Serbie et les contrées voisines*, pp. 274, 280.

¹⁹³ Obolensky, *Six Byzantine Portraits*, pp. 147–149.

opinion the circumstance that the Byzantine patriarchate there was the international body that could promise Serbia the greatest possible degree of ecclesiastical independence. As was the case with Bulgaria, the most the pope would have allowed Serbia was the creation of an archbishopric (and possibly coupled to that a position as primate of all Serbia for the archbishop concerned), which would have been subject to papal jurisdiction.¹⁹⁴ Within the Byzantine Church however, there were administratively completely autonomous or autocephalous churches, the archbishops of which owed the patriarch only a precedence in honour. From the conclusion that Serbian policy was primarily directed at the development of the greatest possible degree of autonomy in all areas, it may be assumed that this latter element was a determining factor in the orientation on Nicaea with respect to the gaining of ecclesiastical autonomy. Nicaean Emperor Theodore Laskaris and Patriarch Manuel Sarantenos were of course delighted about the approach from Serbia, which brought with it international prestige for both their positions. On the orders of Laskaris, the patriarch enthroned Stephen's brother Sava, who fulfilled the mission in Nicaea, as archbishop of Serbia, and on the instructions of the same emperor the Serbian Church was granted an autocephalous status by the patriarchal synod.¹⁹⁵ In this way, the Serbian court acknowledged the legitimacy of the claims of the Nicaean emperor and patriarch on the Byzantine inheritance.

This last element may be interpreted as suggesting that as a consequence the claims of Latin Constantinople were not or no longer recognized. However, this conclusion is in no way compelling. In the historiography the dating of Sava's mission in Nicaea varies from 1219 to 1220 in the absence of accurate indications of this in the source material available.¹⁹⁶ This therefore may well have taken place just at the time in which the Latin emperorship and patriarchate were vacant.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁴ Tarnanidis, *Byzantine-Bulgarian ecclesiastical relations*, pp. 29–30.

¹⁹⁵ Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens*, pp. 169–171. Obolensky, *Six Byzantine Portraits*, pp. 149–152. Ferjancic, *La Serbie et le monde byzantin*, pp. 146–147. Karpozilos, *The ecclesiastical controversy*, p. 67.

¹⁹⁶ In any event Sava's elevation to archbishop took place prior to May 1220 (Laurant, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat*, I/IV, n° 1225; Obolensky, *Six Byzantine Portraits*, p. 150).

¹⁹⁷ Empress Yolande died circa September 1219 and Emperor-elect Robert of Courtenay did not arrive in Constantinople until early 1221. Patriarch Gervasius died on 9 November 1219, and in March 1221 there was a new patriarch, Mattheus (Longnon, *L'Empire latin*, pp. 157, 159; Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, pp. 279–280).

Consequently, there may at that moment actually have been only one emperor and patriarch that claimed the Byzantine inheritance, notably in Nicaea. The chronology of the Serbian approach to Nicaea with the intention of gaining ecclesiastical autonomy could as a consequence possibly be linked with Serbian concern not to cause (too much) affront to Latin Constantinople. In this connection we should also remember that after the death of Empress Yolande, Laskaris defended a claim on the Latin emperorship and at the same time attempted an approach to Rome. Sava himself continued to maintain good relations with those in power within the Latin Empire both at the time of and after his enthronement as Archbishop of Serbia. It appears that at the same time as his mission in Nicaea, Sava also took care of the interests of the Hilandar monastery in Constantinople.¹⁹⁸ In Thessalonike, where he stayed for some time after his mission in the Philokales monastery before departing for Serbia, Archbishop Sava maintained good relations with the local archbishop and imperial chancellor Warin.¹⁹⁹

There is indeed a good chance that Serbia, despite its approaches to Nicaea, at the same time remained oriented towards Latin Constantinople after 1220. This is witnessed by the marriage between Stephen II Nemanya and a real or supposed relative of Emperor Robert of Courtenay in 1221, something that we believe to have remained unnoticed in the historiography until now. Two Western sources provide information about this: Philippe Mouskes' *Chronique Rimée* and the anonymous *Chronique dite de Baudouin d'Avesnes*, written in the years 1240 and 1280 respectively. Mouskes' account describes

¹⁹⁸ Cf. the *vitae* of Saint Sava by Domentijan and Teodosije. Both authors recount how Sava travelled to Constantinople (indicated respectively as Carigrad—the traditional Serbian expression for the Byzantine capital—and as Constantinople) to attend to the interests of his monastery. There he received a hearty welcome from Emperor Laskaris. They then held discussions about the creation of the Serbian archbishopric. Neither author reports that at that time Constantinople was under Latin rule. Their information can be interpreted in two ways: 1. Sava visited Constantinople in connection with the Hilandar-monastery and Nicaea regarding the autonomy of the Serbian Church; 2. By way of convention Laskaris' residency is (incorrectly) called Constantinople. Our preference is for the first option, by analogy with a later journey during which Sava circa 1235 certainly did visit Constantinople (Domentijan, *Zivot svetoga Simeuna i svetoga Save. Napisao Domentijan*, p. 217; Teodosije, *Zivot svetoga Save napisao Domentijan [sic]*, pp. 126–132; translation: Chodzko, *Légendes slaves du Moyen Âge*, pp. 56–58; Obolensky, *Six Byzantine Portraits*, pp. 150, 168).

¹⁹⁹ Teodosije, *Zivot svetoga Save napisao Domentijan [sic]*, p. 226; tr. Chodzko, *Légendes slaves du Moyen Âge*, p. 59.

as follows how this marriage came about during Robert's stay at the Hungarian court in the winter of 1220–1221, whilst he was on the way to Constantinople as emperor-elect:

*Si fist li rois [= Andrew II] i mariage
D'une niéçain à cel Robiert,
Et si nos fait l'estore ciert
Que rois Ausens l'ot et plévie,
Ki sire iert et rois de Servie.²⁰⁰*

The interpretation of this passage is problematic in the sense that a number of elements are impossible to reconcile with one another. For example, the king of Serbia was by no means *rois Ausens* or Ivan II Asen, who on the contrary was the ruler of Bulgaria. As a consequence, the question then is whom Mouskes meant: Ivan II Asen of Bulgaria or Stephen II Nemanya of Serbia. It would seem that we can exclude Asen in view of the fact that he had already entered into a marriage in 1218 with Anna-Maria, Andrew's daughter from his first marriage to Gertrude, daughter of Duke Berthold IV of Merania. Nonetheless, since Anna-Maria as Andrew's daughter, who since circa 1214 had been married to his second wife Yolande of Courtenay, could easily have been taken by a Western chronicler as a niece of Robert of Courtenay, Mouskes still may perhaps allude here perhaps to this Bulgarian-Hungarian marriage, despite the reference to Serbia. The only problem with this is that Mouskes' dating in 1220–1221 is difficult to reconcile with the actual conclusion of the marriage in 1218.²⁰¹

Fortunately, the slightly later *Chronique dite de Baudouin d'Avesnes* provides information that enables us to solve this impasse. The chronicle describes how the marital alliance came about during Emperor Robert's stay at Andrew's court as follows: '*Il [= Robert] avoit avec li un sergent qui estoit nés de Lisle en Flandres. Aucun disoient que il estoit oncles de bas cestui Robert qui aloit pour estre emperères. Cil vallès avoit une belle damoiselle qui estoit sa fille. Robers d'Aussoirre la fist richement apparillier et disoit que ce estoit sa cousine, puis fist parler de mariage de li et dou roi de Servie. Li rois qui cuida que ce fust voirs, s'acorda au mariaige. Si furent faites les noces à grant sollempnité. Par ce*

²⁰⁰ Philippe Mouskes, p. 404.

²⁰¹ Marsina, *Codex Diplomaticus et Epistolaris Slovaciae*, n° 237. Erszegi, *Eine neue Quelle zur Geschichte der bulgarisch-ungarischen Beziehungen*, p. 94.

*mariaige et par l'aide des Blas ala Robers d'Ausoirre seurement jusques en Constantinoble là où il fut receus à grant joie. Mais il n'osa mener le père la damoiselle avec lui pour ce que la chose ne fust seue, ains li donna deniers et le renvoia en Flandres.*²⁰² Although this chronicle is partly tributary to Mouskes' work, it is apparent from this passage that with regard to Robert's sojourn at Andrew's court the anonymous author clearly had access to other, independent information. From the passage quoted it appears unambiguously that Emperor-elect Robert, via an unidentified relative—near or distant—in the winter of 1220–1221 was successful in concluding a marital alliance with the Serbian king, Stephen II. In a certain sense the whole episode in this relatively late chronicle sounds somewhat fanciful perhaps, but in itself there is no reason to doubt its credibility. After the death of his second wife Anna Dandolo in about 1217 Stephen was in any case a widower and he had already entered into a Latin marriage.²⁰³ Furthermore, as has been said, Mouskes' earlier chronicle also mentions the Latin-Serbian marriage. In the light of the information contained in the anonymous chronicle, the quoted passage by Mouskes in our view needs to be interpreted as a simultaneous, confused representation of the Hungarian-Bulgarian marital alliance of 1218 and the Latin-Serbian marital alliance of 1221. The author's confusion was probably caused by a limited knowledge of the political situation in the Balkans and the presence of a number of common elements in each of the marital alliances: the Hungarian connection, the chronological closeness, and the involvement of an—actual or not—relative of Robert of Courtenay.

For the Latin emperor the marital alliance with the Serbian king in the area of political ideology must have fitted within the framework of the hierarchy of states theory. Through this marriage the political orientation of Serbia towards Constantinople could possibly come closer to reality than previously had been the case. We should remember here that at the end of the twelfth century Isaac II Angelos had arranged the marriage of his niece Eudokia (who was also the daughter of the later Emperor Alexios III Angelos) to the same Stephen II Nemanya with the same objective in mind. More concretely, from an imperial point of view an attempt was made via this marital alliance to integrate Serbia into the Latin-Bulgarian-Hungarian axis, which was supposed to bring

²⁰² *Chronique dite de Baudouin d'Avesnes*, p. 675.

²⁰³ Obolensky, *Six Byzantine Portraits*, p. 140.

about political stability in the Balkans. For the Serbian king the primary objective was to build up good relations between his newly independent kingdom and the surrounding political formations that had until recently been a threat to this autonomy. A prestigious marital alliance with the imperial lineage in Constantinople, which itself was related to the Hungarian court and consequently indirectly to the Bulgarian court, fitted in well within this policy. Serbian foreign policy however was not exclusively oriented towards the Latin-Bulgarian-Hungarian axis, but also towards other surrounding political formations that were less favourably inclined towards the Latin Empire. For example, at the end 1219/beginning of 1220 Stephen arranged the marriage of his son Radoslav to Anna Doukas, the daughter of Theodore Doukas, the ruler of Epiros, who had already embarked on his rebellion against the Latin emperor at about this time. This alliance was in clear anticipation of Theodore Doukas' imperial aspirations, which in the longer term could possibly have been a threat to Serbian independence.²⁰⁴

Despite the concession to the increasing Epirote power, the possibility exists that the Serbian court nevertheless retained a certain loyalty vis-à-vis Latin Constantinople. A possible indication of this is a fresco in the Serbian monastery of Mileseva, founded by Stephen II's younger son Vladislav. On the fresco in question Vladislav presents a model of the monastery's church to Jesus Christ, in the presence of his father Stephen II and his brother Radoslav. Of importance is that in addition to these figures are portrayed Saint Constantine, Saint Helena and an unnamed Byzantine emperor. This indicates that in Serbian court circles there was still a certain politico-cultural orientation towards the Byzantine emperorship, of which the *suzerainité idéale* was recognized, as Babic describes it. The question now is who is the unnamed Byzantine emperor in the fresco. On the basis of the persons named, the fresco itself can be dated accurately as being from between 1220 and 1228. Prevailing opinion in current historiography presumes that the emperor probably is John III Vatatzes, whose reign commenced in 1222.²⁰⁵ In view of the Nicaean involvement in the emancipation of the Serbian Church circa 1219–1220 this is a plausible hypothesis. Strictly speaking it could even be Theodore Laskaris († early 1222),

²⁰⁴ Ferjancic, *La Serbie et le monde byzantin*, pp. 146–147. Bredenkamp, *The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki*, p. 81.

²⁰⁵ Babic, *Le portrait du roi Vladislav*, pp. 15–16.

the emperor that granted Serbia ecclesiastical autonomy. Nevertheless, another possibility also presents itself in the light of the marital alliance mentioned previously. It is not implausible that the imperial portrait denotes Robert of Courtenay (1221–1227), with whom King Stephen II had entered into a family relationship in the winter of 1220–1221. The portrayal of Emperor Constantine, whose throne and city were in the hands of the Latin emperor, can perhaps be interpreted as a pointer in this direction.

In spite of these actual and possible bonds between Constantinople and Serbia, after the geopolitical collapse of the Latin Empire circa 1224–1225, and in particular after the death of Stephen II (dated variously as having taken place in 1227 or 1228), the Serbian kingdom oriented itself politically towards Theodore Doukas' principality and later empire around Thessalonike. In this, the previously mentioned marital alliance concluded by the new King Radoslav and Doukas played an important role.²⁰⁶ With this in about 1228 came a temporary end to the attempts by Latin Constantinople to bring Serbia into its political sphere of influence. In any event, for Serbia in the years 1214–1228 it was only the expansion of her own autonomy that counted, thus continuing the political evolution that had commenced at the end of the twelfth century. In this, bonds with the Latin imperial powers in Constantinople were sometimes opportunistically viewed as being useful.

RELATIONS WITH THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY

From the middle of the tenth century the principality and later Kingdom of Hungary started to become part of the Byzantine commonwealth. Through, inter alia, the crowns that the Emperors Constantine IX Monomachos (1042–1055) and Michael VII Doukas (1071–1078) granted to the Hungarian rulers Andrew I (1046–1060) and Geza I (1074–1077) respectively, the Hungarian kingdom was from the Byzantine standpoint formally incorporated within the hierarchy of states theory. At the same time, because of its geographical location between the Byzantine and Holy Roman Empires the Hungarian kingdom was oriented towards the Latin West. The

²⁰⁶ Obolensky, *Six Byzantine Portraits*, pp. 161–162.

Hungarian ruler Stephen I (997–1038) had recognized papal authority, and the Hungarian Church thus came to fall under papal jurisdiction. In exchange for this, the same ruler had been granted a royal crown by Pope Sylvester II (999–1003) in the year 1000.²⁰⁷

In the twelfth century, Hungarian-Byzantine relations were particularly concentrated on the competing claims of each power vis-à-vis the control over the region of Dalmatia and the area around Sirmium, and also on Byzantine attempts to encroach upon Hungarian internal matters—in particular the succession. Both matters led repeatedly to armed conflicts. Emperor Manuel Komnenos made the recovery of Dalmatia and Sirmium and the restoration of real Byzantine influence in Hungary one of the priorities of his foreign policy. Towards 1165 he was able to restore Byzantine authority in the regions mentioned, and in 1172 with Manuel's support Bela III (1173–1196) gained the Hungarian throne. This Bela III, brother of the earlier King Stephen III (1162–1172), who had remained as pretender to the throne at Manuel's court, was married off by the emperor to his sister-in-law Agnes, daughter of the princely couple of Antioch Constance and Raymond of Poitiers (1136–1149), and was granted the court title of *kaisar*. In this way Hungary, until Manuel's death in 1180, under Bela III was a client state vis-à-vis Byzantium, by which the hierarchy of states principle to a certain extent became a tangible reality for a short period.

After Manuel's death however, Bela III once again quickly annexed Dalmatia and Sirmium, and relations between the two powers were again characterized by political equality, despite the theoretical Byzantine position. Initially, the concrete relations continued to be quite good. This is witnessed by the marriage between Isaac II Angelos and Margaret (Maria) of Hungary, which was concluded in 1185 and which ended the renewed conflict relating to Dalmatia and Sirmium. In line with this was the Hungarian support lent—though with little effect—to Isaac II in his struggle against the Bulgarian rebellion of the brothers Asen and Peter. In the late twelfth century and early thirteenth century King Emmerich I (1196–1204) made use of the internal weakening of Byzantium resulting from pluriform regionalist and separatist

²⁰⁷ Idem, *The Byzantine Commonwealth*, pp. 153–163. Stephenson, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier*, pp. 38–45, 188–194.

tendencies in order to expand Hungarian influence over territory that was formerly viewed as being Byzantine, and in particular Serbia.²⁰⁸

When in 1204 the Byzantine Empire was taken over by the Latin crusaders, direct links with Hungary quickly came into being. Shortly after the election of Baldwin IX (VI) of Flanders/Hainaut as emperor in early May 1204 these relations became concrete through the marriage of Marquis Boniface of Montferrat to Isaac II's widow Margaret of Hungary. Although this marriage to the ex-empress was in the first place intended to reinforce Boniface's position vis-à-vis the Byzantine aristocracy and population, the Hungarian connection was also taken into account in the marquis' political thinking.²⁰⁹ Boniface urged that the territories in Asia Minor originally granted him as compensation for his not being elected as emperor be exchanged for a territory in the area of Thessalonike, using the argument, inter alia, that this was geographically closer to the kingdom of his brother-in-law Emmerich of Hungary. From Thessalonike, Boniface and his wife Margaret established diplomatic contacts with the kindred Hungarian court, and Marquis Boniface appears to have received limited military support from Hungary circa 1204–1205.²¹⁰

Apart from the consanguinity between the Hungarian and Thessalonikan courts, the common enmity towards Bulgaria meant that in principle the Latin Empire and Hungary were objective allies, although at the same time they did have conflicting claims vis-à-vis Bulgaria. As has been seen, the Latin crusaders were ill disposed towards Kalojan's Bulgarian kingdom, which they regarded as part of the empire of Constantinople. On the Hungarian side attempts were made to ensure that the formal emancipation of Bulgaria, for which Kalojan was striving through his negotiations with the pope about the acquisition of a royal crown, would take place under Hungarian supervision. However, Innocent III was not prepared to share this Hungarian point of view. This brought about serious tension between Bulgaria and Hungary, and circa August 1204 King Emmerich complained

²⁰⁸ Stephenson, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier*, pp. 226–284. Kristo, *Die Arpadendynastie*, pp. 135–155, 171–174. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 78–83. On Bela III whom for a while Emperor Manuel had considered to be his own heir, cf. also Prologue, p. 39.

²⁰⁹ Cf. Chapter I, note 24.

²¹⁰ Villehardouin, §393–394. Niketas Choniates, p. 619.

to Innocent III that Kalojan had taken part of his territory. That he complained at the same time that Kalojan had also taken the territory that his father Bela III had given as a dowry on the marriage of his daughter Margaret to Isaac II Angelos, suggests that on this occasion Emmerich was not only defending his own interests but at the same time acting as an ally of Margaret and Boniface. The probable Hungarian military support provided to Thessalonike can be viewed in the same context.²¹¹

After 1204–1205 the Latin-Hungarian alliance does not appear to have been continued immediately. In the early years of 1204–1205 its working had anyhow been limited. The imperial court in Constantinople was not directly involved, for example. There were various reasons for the discontinuation. Firstly there was the difficult Hungarian succession. In November 1204 Emmerich I died. He was succeeded by his son Ladislaus III, who was a minor. However, his right to the throne was contested by Emmerich's younger brother Andrew, who already during his brother's reign had displayed kingly ambitions, with internal armed conflicts as a result. In May 1205 the young King Ladislaus died, having lived as an exile at the Austrian ducal court. Andrew could thereupon realize his aspirations and he gained the royal crown. Secondly, under Andrew a reorientation of Hungarian foreign policy took place in 1205. In the summer of that year the Hungarian ruler was requested by part of the aristocracy of the neighbouring Russian principality of Galicia to intervene in the conflict for the throne that had flared up there. The result of this was that in the years that followed, Andrew's foreign policy was wholly directed at the installation of a ruler in Galicia who would be politically dependent on him.²¹²

For Hungary, the Bulgarian question lost all its urgency as the result of the internal weakening of the Bulgarian kingdom after Kalojan's death in 1207. Under Boril, who was confronted repeatedly with internal opposition, the expansion northwards, which under Kalojan had been embarked upon at the expense of the land claimed by Hungary, was not continued. Consequently Bulgaria no longer represented a threat to Hungary's southern border. Andrew dedicated himself to maintaining a relatively stable Bulgaria in order to be able to pursue his

²¹¹ Sweeney, *Innocent III, Hungary and the Bulgarian coronation*, pp. 326–328. Kristo, *Die Arpadendynastie*, p. 172. Prinzing, *Die Bedeutung Bulgariens*, pp. 32–33.

²¹² Homan, *Geschichte des ungarischen Mittelalters*, II, pp. 12–13. Kristo, *Die Arpadendynastie*, pp. 174–175.

Galician policy undisturbed. The Hungarian military support for Boril in 1210, when he was confronted with a rebellion in the neighbourhood of Vidin, should be looked upon from this point of view.²¹³ At the same time this Hungarian support for Boril indicates that in those years there was no longer a Latin-Hungarian alliance in operation, in view of the fact that until 1213 Bulgaria had been on a war footing with the empire of Constantinople. The Hungarian ruler would have had little profit by running the risk of destabilizing his southern border through an alliance with the Latin Empire. The Hungarian intervention in Bulgaria in 1210 indicates further that Andrew made use of the Bulgarian internal troubles in order to strengthen his influence in Bulgaria. In this context the Hungarian king certainly must have had little inclination to work to any extent on the realization of the imperialistic ambitions of the Latin emperor vis-à-vis the same Bulgaria.

About 1213–1214 however, the geopolitical situation in the region was profoundly changed in the sense that the Latin emperor Henry and the Bulgarian emperor Boril had abandoned their mutual hostilities and had concluded an alliance. In the light of this it seemed rather obvious to supplement the Hungarian-Bulgarian and the Latin-Bulgarian alliance with a Latin-Hungarian alliance. It could be hoped that such a network of complementary alliances would have benefited political stability in the entire region. Mouskes indicates that Emperor Henry took the initiative for the Latin-Hungarian alliance by putting forward to Andrew II the idea of a marriage with his niece Yolande of Courtenay, the daughter of the later imperial couple Yolande and Peter.²¹⁴ It is impossible to discover the extent of the possible involvement in the realization of this alliance by Andrew's sister Margaret of Hungary, guardian of her son Demetrios of Montferrat, King of Thessalonike. The source material does not give even the slightest concrete indication of this, but the fact that Margaret and Andrew were brother and sister on the one side and the good relations between Emperor Henry and Margaret on the other make such a supposition not improbable. The marriage probably took place in 1214, given that Andrew's first wife had died at the end of September 1213, and that as early as the spring of 1215 a joint Latin-Hungarian expedition against Serbia had

²¹³ Erszegi, *Eine neue Quelle zur Geschichte de bulgarisch-ungarischen Beziehungen*, pp. 92–93.

²¹⁴ Philippe Mouskes, p. 402. Albericus Trium Fontium, *Chronica*, p. 906. *Chronique dite De Baudouin d'Avesnes*, p. 674.

been launched.²¹⁵ This last element indicates that the alliance had not only the defensive intention of stabilizing existing political relations in the Balkans, and in particular the relations between Bulgaria, Hungary and the Latin Empire. Each ruler also clearly wanted to employ the alliance to bring other political formations in the region within their respective spheres of influence by means of joint offensives, although in 1215 in the case of Serbia this produced little in the way of tangible result.

The failure of the Serbian campaign in 1215 did not lead to a breach in the Latin-Hungarian alliance. On the contrary, after the death of Emperor Henry in June 1216, King Andrew was for some time under consideration by the Latin barons of Constantinople as a possible successor, with his marriage to Yolande of Courtenay providing a dynastic link. However, at the same time Henry's sister Yolande of Flanders/Hainaut and her husband Peter of Courtenay were also being considered by the Latin baronage, and it was this second couple that was to gain the emperorship of Constantinople. In current historiography this ultimate choice is conceived as having been made under pressure from Pope Honorius III, who was concerned that after many years of postponement Andrew would actually honour his crusading vow in 1217 within the framework of the Fifth Crusade. In the papal eyes, his election as emperor of Constantinople could only have led to a further postponement, and from this point of view Honorius would have prevailed upon the barons of the Latin Empire to award the imperial title to Peter and Yolande.²¹⁶

In our opinion however, a more plausible hypothesis can be formulated about the final choice made by the Latin baronage. The only source that reports on the Latin barons' consideration of several candidates for the imperial crown is a papal letter of January 1217. This letter is an answer to a missive from Andrew II, in which the latter informed Honorius, *inter alia*, about the provisional double option concerning the imperial election. The pope displayed his pleasure with Andrew's possible choice as emperor (and also about the other option, being Peter of Courtenay), but at the same time the pope warned the Hungarian ruler that he would not allow the interests of

²¹⁵ Kristo, *Die Arpadendynastie*, p. 180.

²¹⁶ Homan, *Geschichte des ungarischen Mittelalters*, II, pp. 16–17. Longnon, *L'Empire latin*, p. 153. Kristo, *Die Arpadendynastie*, p. 177.

his possible empire take precedence over the fulfilment of his crusading vow.²¹⁷ As a consequence, it is clear that the reaction of Honorius cannot be characterized as dismissive of Andrew's possible succession in Constantinople, although he certainly did display concern as to its potential repercussions on the impending crusade.

Consequently, the reason for the non-election of the Hungarian ruler should be sought within the group of the central elite of the empire. The fact that this group initially put forward two candidates for the imperial throne points to an internal difference of opinion with regard to the imperial election. The reason for this dissension could be looked for in the different profiles of the two candidates. The attraction of the choice of Andrew II lay in the fact that his emperorship would have meant the personal union of the Latin Empire and the Hungarian kingdom, and this prospect created splendid perspectives for the Empire on the international stage. This joining of forces implied the promise of creating an actual and enduring hegemonic position in the Byzantine space within the framework of the universalist imperial ideology. Internally however, succession by Andrew threatened to bring with it serious disruption. Firstly, a part of the imperial entourage would evidently be filled by members of the Hungarian ruling elite, as the result of which some of the existing political elite would be threatened with the loss of their prominent position. In Hungary many nobles were discontent because Andrew had admitted a lot of German barons to his entourage (cf. his marriage to Gertrude of Merania), granting them large estates and incomes. This kind of self-willed attitude, which may well have been known about in Constantinople, must not have been a pleasant perspective for a group within the Constantinopolitan elite. Secondly, Andrew's accession would probably also have been a difficult prospect for the Lombard party in the Kingdom of Thessalonike because of the close connection with the leader of the competing, pro-Latin-Byzantine cooperation party in the kingdom, his sister Margaret of Hungary, guardian of King Demetrios of Montferrat. It is in this context perfectly conceivable that the Lombard party would have exercised its influence.

As against Andrew, Peter and Yolande represented much less of a threat to the interests of the particularist-inclined group within the central elite in Constantinople. The personal entourage that this

²¹⁷ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 291. Donovan, *Pelagius and the Fifth Crusade*, p. 29.

imperial couple would bring with them would, because of the region of their origins, be more familiar for the Constantinopolitan barons. There was also no danger that the situation in the imperial couple's home principalities—the counties of Auxerre, Tonnère, Namur and a number of smaller possessions—would determine the political agenda of the empire, which with the Hungarian option could have turned out differently. Peter and Yolande were also seen as more neutral figures by the Lombard party in Thessalonike, that is to say more acceptable, without direct links with opponents. This second option was consequently more palatable for broader layers within the central and regional elites in the empire. Also, the group within the central elite that originally may have opted for Andrew were unable to put forward any major principal objections to the choice of Peter and Yolande. The international position of the empire vis-à-vis the neighbouring states seemed to be quite favourable and stable in late 1216-early 1217, so that support from Andrew II through a personal union between Constantinople and neighbouring Hungary was neither necessary, nor urgently needed. Presumably it was because of this that the particularist group within the central political elite was able to force through their point of view. A lack of source material means that it is difficult to provide a more detailed description of this group; however, it does not seem unlikely that they can be identified with the Latin party, which from 1217 came increasingly to the fore within the central elite. Indeed, this Latin party was characterized by a particularistic reflex with respect to the idea of a balanced division of power with the Byzantine aristocracy.²¹⁸

Andrew's non-election appears not to have clouded relations with Constantinople, a circumstance to which his wife Yolande of Courtenay, daughter of the new imperial couple will doubtless have contributed. Indeed, it is possible that Andrew's influence was instrumental in the short-lived rapprochement by Theodore Doukas in late 1217-early 1218 to Pope Honorius, and in the brief pause that the Epirote prince arranged in his anti-Latin offensive of that period, after his capture and incarceration of Emperor Peter and legate Giovanni Colonna earlier in 1217. At the end of July 1217 Honorius III urged King Andrew to pressure Doukas into freeing Emperor Peter and

²¹⁸ Cf. Chapter V, p. 300.

legate Colonna.²¹⁹ At that moment the Hungarian king was on the point of departing for the Holy Land with a considerable army.²²⁰ The eventuality that in the worst case this army could well be used against him possibly played a role in Doukas' brief change of attitude.

The imprisonment and subsequent death of Peter of Courtenay gave Andrew II renewed hope that he might obtain the imperial throne of Constantinople, as is demonstrated by the marital alliances that he entered into on his return journey from his crusade in early 1218. The Hungarian ruler chose not to return to his kingdom via the sea route that had become customary towards the beginning of the thirteenth century, but instead opted for the route overland through Asia Minor. On this journey Andrew concluded a number of marital alliances; firstly with King Leo II of Cilician Armenia, whose daughter Andrew's eponymous-named youngest son Andrew was to marry; secondly with Theodore Laskaris of Nicaea, whose daughter Mary married his eldest son Bela (IV); and thirdly with Ivan II Asen of Bulgaria, to whom he gave his daughter Mary in marriage. He also negotiated on a possible marital alliance with Sultan Kay-kaus I of Konya. This comprehensive network of alliances with the empire of Constantinople's neighbouring states reflects incontrovertibly the Hungarian king's imperial aspirations, which he as the son-in-law of Empress Yolande planned to realize in the longer term, as Homan has already indicated.²²¹ This policy of arranged marriages also fitted in perfectly with the policy pursued at around this time or shortly before by Emperor Henry and Empress Yolande vis-à-vis Nicaea, Bulgaria and Konya. The overland route through Asia Minor of course took Andrew II to Constantinople, but not a single source provides us with any further information about this visit to the imperial capital. It is nonetheless very probable that the Hungarian ruler had contact with his mother-in-law Empress Yolande with regard to his imperial aspirations. Owing to a lack of source material, the response to this from Yolande or her entourage is difficult to discover. Still, we may conjecture that the empress was ill-disposed towards Andrew's ambitions, since we have already seen

²¹⁹ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 684.

²²⁰ In the autumn of 1217 Andrew left from the Adriatic seaport of Spalato (Split) (Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade 1213–1221*, pp. 123, 127).

²²¹ Homan, *Geschichte des ungarischen Mittelalters*, II, pp. 20–21.

in an earlier chapter that she tried to secure the imperial throne for her own lineage.²²²

After the death of Empress Yolande at the end of September 1219 the majority of the Latin barons were not favourably disposed towards Andrew's imperial ambitions. Their professed loyalty to Empress Yolande and her heirs was no doubt an important factor in this. Unequivocally the barons chose Yolande's eldest son Philip of Courtenay to be emperor, apparently without any internal discord.²²³ That Philip refused the imperial crown and in his place sent his younger brother Robert to Constantinople, who was there accepted as the new emperor without a sign of trouble, reinforces the premise that the Hungarian ruler had absolutely not been considered as a possible successor.²²⁴ In our opinion the reason for this lies in the fact that after 1217 the particularist Latin party had only increased in strength. Relatively recently arrived persons in the central political elite belonging to the pro-Byzantine party, such as Narjot I of Toucy who was related to the Courtenays, were also probably less than enthusiastic about their recently achieved prominent position being threatened by a Hungarian presence at the imperial court.²²⁵ Furthermore, in 1219 the empire's situation had still not become hopeless, as the result of which decisive Hungarian support for the empire via a personal union was again not of an urgent nature. At that moment the rebellion of Theodore Doukas in Epiros and his offensive against the Kingdom of Thessalonike had indeed taken on serious—but not yet dramatic—proportions.

Andrew II's interest in gaining the imperial throne in Constantinople provides some insight into the perception that existed at the Hungarian court about the politico-theoretical relations between the Hungarian kingship and the Latin emperorship. Andrew's preparedness and striking diplomatic initiatives to gain this emperorship

²²² James of Vitry, Bishop of Acre, reports in a letter of 1218 to Honorius III that Andrew II's return journey from the Holy Land went via Constantinople (Huyghens, *Lettres de Jacques de Vitry*, n° 3). Cf. also Chapter V, p. 294.

²²³ Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, II, n° 257.

²²⁴ Longnon, *L'Empire latin*, pp. 158–159.

²²⁵ Cf. Chapter V, p. 300. These two failed attempts to gain the imperial crown caused Andrew to amend his policy on marital alliances: in 1221 he obtained from Honorius III the dissolution of the engagement of his son Andrew to Leo II of Armenia's daughter, and in early 1222 tried to have the marriage between his son Bela (IV) and Mary Laskaris dissolved; this was however ultimately unsuccessful (Homan, *Geschichte des ungarischen Mittelalters*, II, pp. 22–23).

in the years 1217–1219 indicate that he saw the imperial crown of Constantinople as being particularly prestigious and that he viewed his own kingship as not being entirely equal. With this, the Byzantine hierarchy of states theory as pursued by Constantinople vis-à-vis Hungary prior to 1204 still appears to have retained some topicality at the Hungarian court. It is difficult to establish whether the imperial court itself looked upon the Hungarian kingdom as belonging to the circle of principalities that in principle should fall under the political sphere of influence of Constantinople within the hierarchy of states theory. The fact that the Latin emperors adopted this political ideology vis-à-vis Bulgaria and Serbia suggests however that this was also the case for Hungary. The acquisition of possessions by the military order of Saint Samson in the Hungarian kingdom—the only region outside the empire where the order gained substantial possessions—can possibly be looked upon in this light. This order, founded by Emperor Henry, was specifically affiliated with the Latin Empire and stood under explicit imperial patronage. In this sense the establishment of the order in Hungary can be interpreted as a means whereby the emperor hoped to exercise some measure of influence in the Hungarian kingdom and as an indication of a certain Hungarian politico-cultural orientation towards Constantinople. This interpretation can be put forward with some plausibility because the Order of Saint Samson was installed in Hungary probably thanks to royal favour and through the royal connections with the Latin imperial court.²²⁶

Again, the non-election to the emperorship of Andrew II in 1219 led neither to a breach nor a perceptible cooling in Latin-Hungarian relations. It should not be forgotten that the Latin-Hungarian alliance was a useful instrument in maintaining political stability in the region, and in particular with regard to Bulgaria and Serbia. In an analogous manner the Byzantine-Hungarian axis, despite regular occurrences of mutual tension, had been a factor of stability in the Balkans prior to 1204.²²⁷ Evidence of the continuing good Hungarian-Latin relations is Emperor-elect Robert of Courtenay's sojourn at the court of his sister Yolande and her consort in the winter of 1220–1221 while on his journey to Constantinople. Furthermore, it is quite conceivable that Andrew was involved in the marital alliance that Robert concluded

²²⁶ Haluscynskij & Wojnar, *Acta Innocentii IV*, n° 15. Cf. Chapter VI, p. 345.

²²⁷ Stadtmüller, *Die ungarische Grossmacht des Mittelalters*, pp. 69–70.

at that time with the Serbian king. In any event, the Hungarian ruler accompanied the emperor-elect on the journey through his kingdom, and his son—and at that moment already joint king—Bela IV travelled all the way to Constantinople with Robert.²²⁸

Despite the good relations, it would appear that the Latin-Hungarian alliance played only a very minor—or certainly not very efficient—role with regard to Theodore Doukas' offensive of circa 1218–1219 against the Latin Empire. Nonetheless Andrew II undertook a number of initiatives to support his sister Margaret in the defence of the Kingdom of Thessalonike. For example, at the request of the Hungarian king, Honorius III took Margaret, her children and her possessions under papal protection in March 1219.²²⁹ Furthermore, probably as compensation for her losses in Thessalonike, Margaret was given a considerable amount of land in Hungary by her brother, her ownership of which the pope confirmed in March 1223.²³⁰ It is not improbable that Andrew also provided his sister—and the Latin Empire in general—with concrete military support. It is indeed likely that the above-mentioned journey made by Bela IV at the side of Emperor-elect Robert in early 1221 must be viewed in this light. As we have hypothesized Emperor Robert undertook an expedition against Theodore Doukas circa mid-1221-early 1222. The presence of Demetrios of Montferrat and Constantinopolitan Baron Narjot of Toucy's representative Hugh in Hungary in 1222 (or possibly 1223) suggests that King Andrew may have continued to give military or financial assistance after Robert's failed campaign.²³¹

These varying forms of Hungarian support could however not contribute to the prevention of the advance by Theodore Doukas, and from 1224 also John III Vatatzes, against the Latin Empire. This is not surprising, as this Hungarian help appears to have been rather modest. The reason for this can be sought mainly in the internal problems that Hungary had to deal with in the period in question. In those years King Andrew II was confronted with severe opposition of some of his

²²⁸ Philippe Mouskes, pp. 404–405.

²²⁹ Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 1905.

²³⁰ Theiner, *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam*, I, n° 80. Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 4269. McDaniel, *On Hungarian-Serbian relations in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 44. Tautu, *Margherita di Ungheria*, pp. 61–62. The latter author deduces from this papal confirmation that Margaret had left Thessalonike some time before 1223. This interpretation is in our view however not imperative.

²³¹ Cf. p. 383.

major vassals and local barons to his domestic policy. His deteriorating relations with his son and joint king Bela IV also created serious problems. In the area of foreign policy it was principally Hungarian interests in neighbouring Galicia that occupied the foremost position on the agenda in those years. Still in the area of foreign policy, Bela IV's marriage to Mary Laskaris, sister of John Vatatzes' wife Irene Laskaris, is unlikely to have greatly furthered Hungarian support of Latin Constantinople against Nicaea after the defeat at Poimenenon in 1224, although for King Andrew this marital bond had lost its significance.²³² Ultimately the Latin-Hungarian alliance was thus of little use to the Latin Empire in maintaining its position in the Balkans, in concreto in the struggle against Doukas and later also Vatatzes.²³³ The Latin-Hungarian ties in a moment of crisis proved themselves to be neither very solid nor effective in the military-political sphere. As a consequence, after the death of Emperor Robert of Courtenay in late 1227 there probably seemed little point in considering the election of the Hungarian ruler—Andrew II or possibly Bela IV—as the new emperor. It was rather Ivan II Asen of the immediately contiguous Bulgaria that then became eligible.²³⁴

THE RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN PRINCIPALITIES

The first contacts between Byzantium and the principalities of Kievan Russia date back to the second half of the ninth century. Since then the region gradually came to be part of the Byzantine commonwealth. In terms of political ideology and ecclesiastical organisation these principalities oriented themselves upon Constantinople. This measure of primarily cultural dependence however did not imply that the Byzantine emperors enjoyed any direct influence in the governance of these principalities. There were times when the emperors could count on the Russian princes as their allies, for example when Emperor Basil II (976–1025) in 987–989 obtained help from the Kievan ruler Vladimir (980–1015) against the usurper Bardas Phocas or around 1200 when

²³² Kristo, *Die Arpadendynastie*, pp. 186–192, 197–198.

²³³ Before 1204 Bela III's support of his son-in-law Emperor Isaac II and the latter's brother Alexios III similarly did not bring an end to the Bulgarian uprising, which from 1186 was to lead to the coming into being of an independent Bulgarian kingdom (Iorgulescu, *L'Eglise byzantine Nord-Danubienne*, p. 65).

²³⁴ Cf. p. 396.

a Cuman attack against Constantinople was prevented by a military intervention of the prince of Galicia. On other occasions the Russian princes could pose a serious threat to Byzantium, for example in 1043 when the Kievan prince Yaroslav launched a naval attack on the Byzantine capital. After the middle of the eleventh century however there were longer any more military confrontations, partly due to the political fragmentation of Kievan Russia that set in about that time.²³⁵

The most direct and permanent link between Constantinople and Russia was the fact that the metropolitans of Kiev, who were the head of the Russian Church, were appointed by the Byzantine patriarch and the patriarchal synod, who frequently had to take into consideration the will of the emperor. In this way until the end of the twelfth century all Kievan metropolitans were Greeks appointed from Constantinople. The only two exceptions were Hilarion (1051–1054) and Clement (1147–1155), both Russians chosen by the Kievan rulers and a synod of Russian bishops, which in each case performed the consecration. Hilarion's appointment is presumably to be seen in the context of a church reform movement in Kiev at that time. Clement's appointment should solely be explained by political motivations: the then ruler of Kiev, Iziaslav II (1146–1149 and 1151–1154), was not on very good terms with Emperor Manuel Komnenos.²³⁶

In the existing historiography there is a consensus that after 1204 the Kievan metropolitans continued to be appointed by the Byzantine patriarchs of Constantinople, who now resided in Nicaea. There thus would have been no break in the Russo-Byzantine relations and without problem the Nicaean emperors would have been considered to be the legitimate Byzantine emperors by the Russian princes.²³⁷ The sources available for the years 1204–1224/1225 however do not seem to allow for such an unambiguous view. In fact for this period there is

²³⁵ Obolensky, *The Relations between Byzantium and Russia (11th–15th centuries)*, pp. 2–7. Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia*, pp. 4–8. Poppe, *The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus'*, pp. 197–198.

²³⁶ Poppe, *The Christianization and Ecclesiastical Structure of Kyivan Rus' to 1300*, pp. 340–341. Vodoff, *Naissance de la chrétienté russe*, pp. 115–121.

²³⁷ Irmscher, *Das nikänische Kaisertum und Russland*, pp. 377–384. Zavoronkov, *The Emperorship of Nicaea and the Old-Russian Principalities* [Russian—thanks to Freya De Lombaerde for translating], pp. 81–89. Fennell, *A History of the Russian Church*, p. 103.

not a single source that mentions any kind of direct contact, ecclesiastical or other, between Russia and Nicaea.²³⁸

The last metropolitan of Kiev appointed before 1204 was probably Nicephore II. He commenced his term before 1183, but it is uncertain when it ended. However, since he is still cited in the historical sources during the nineties of the twelfth century, it seems not unlikely that he is to be identified with the unnamed metropolitan mentioned in the Russian Chronicles in 1198 and 1201. Another possibility is that the metropolitan cited in 1198 and/or 1201 is to be identified with one Dionysius, who is mentioned by name only in metropolitan lists of a later date and not in (near-)contemporary narrative, documentary or other sources, making the factuality of his metropolitanate very questionable. The first metropolitan mentioned in the sources after 1204 is Matthew, who is cited in the Chronicle of Suzdal under the year 1210. Some historians assume that he was appointed before 1204 (suggesting that he is the metropolitan cited in 1201), while others maintain that he was consecrated by the Byzantine patriarch of Constantinople in exile in Nicaea around 1208–1209.²³⁹

Fact is that there is no source material whatsoever available concerning the appointment of metropolitan Matthew. However, the constation that no occupant appears in the sources between 1201 and 1210 suggests that the Kievan see was vacant for the greater part of this period. Consequently Matthew would have been appointed shortly before 1210. The questions then remains by whom. One possibility indeed is that he was consecrated in Nicaea. This hypothesis to us seems however rather implausible in view of the observation that there are no known contacts at all with Nicaea during Matthew's metropolitanate. By way of comparison, his successor Cyril I for example, whose consecration in Nicaea circa 1224/1225 is effectively attested in the sources, maintained a correspondance with the Byzantine

²³⁸ Irmscher's statement (see previous note) that '*die altrussischen Annalen von vielfachen Begegnungen mit Nikäa [wissen] zu berichten*' does not stand up to scrutiny, at least not for the period in question: none of the cited passages concerning these years undisputedly refers to contacts between Nicaea and Russia. On the contrary, most refer to contacts with (Latin) Constantinople or with Mount Athos (in the Kingdom of Thessalonike).

²³⁹ Irmscher, *Das nikänische Kaisertum und Russland*, pp. 380–381. Zavoronkov, *The Emperorship of Nicaea and the Old-Russian Principalities*, pp. 82–83. Shchapov, *State and Church in Early Russia*, p. 52.

patriarch.²⁴⁰ A more probable supposition in our view is that in the context of the Latin capture of Constantinople Matthew was appointed by the Prince of Kiev and the Russian bishops between 1204 and 1210, after the example of the eleventh and twelfth century metropolitans Hilarion and Clement.

Of course the absence of source material mentioning ecclesiastical—or other—rapports between Kiev and Nicaea in the years 1204–1224/1225 does not necessarily imply that in this period there was an actual break in the relations between the Russian metropolitanate and the Byzantine patriarchate of Constantinople. It is however noteworthy that contacts with the Latin Empire are attested in this same period. In this respect we should first of all mention that shortly after 1204 the papacy undertook an attempt to induce the Russian Church into accepting the Roman obedience. In October 1207 Innocent III sent a letter to the Russian archbishops, bishops, clerics and laymen inviting them to return *ad devotionem apostolicae sedis*, just as the *Graecorum imperium et ecclesia* had done already. The pope would send a legate, cardinal Gregorius, to discuss these matters.²⁴¹ Whether this mission effectively took place or what its results were, cannot be ascertained.

In any case in the following years a number of prominent ecclesiastical and lay figures from Russia visited the Latin Empire. In 1218 the bishop of Polotsk, returning from Constantinople, presented Prince Constantine of Vladimir with several Passion relics and relics of saints.²⁴² The fact that the bishop had obtained Passion relics in the Queen of Cities strongly suggests that he entered into contact with Empress Yolande's court or possibly that of Patriarch Gervasius. Most of these relics were indeed preserved in the imperial palaces of Boukoleon and Blacherna, while some were kept in the Church of Saint-Sophia.²⁴³ It is well-known that the Latin emperors made good use of such relics in the context of their relations with foreign rulers and ecclesiastical institutions, just as their Byzantine predecessors had

²⁴⁰ Cf. patriarch Michael IV Autoreianos' 1228 letter addressed to Cyrill II (Laurent, *Les registres des actes du patriarcat*, I/4, n° 1247).

²⁴¹ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1232 (X, 138).

²⁴² Irmscher, *Das nikänische Kaisertum und Russland*, p. 381. Shchapov, *State and Church in Early Russia*, p. 168.

²⁴³ Magdalino, *L'église du Phare et les Reliques de la Passion à Constantinople (VII^e/VIII^e–XIII^e siècles)*, pp. 15–30. Kalavrezou, *Helping Hands for the Empire*, pp. 54–61.

done.²⁴⁴ For the Latin patriarchs we only know of donations of such relics to fellow Venetians.²⁴⁵

In 1210 Dobrynia Yadreikovich, the future archbishop of Novgorod under the name of Anthony, also seems to have visited Constantinople and probably had contact with the imperial or patriarchal court in view of the pact that he also obtained a relic connected with the Christ. A passage under the year 6719 of the Byzantine era (1 September 1210—31 August 1211) in the Chronicle of Novgorod reads as follows: ‘*The same year, in the winter, on January 22, St. Kliment’s Day, the evil-doer who from the first wished no good [to man] put envy in the people with Knyaz Mstislav against Vladyka Mitrofan; and they did not allow him to clear himself, and led him to Toropets; but he took this gladly, like Ioan Zlatoust and Gregory of Akragas; he accepted a like wrong glorifying God. At that time, before the expulsion of Vladyka Mitrofan, Dobrynia Yadreikovich had come from Tsargrad and he brought with him the Lord’s tomb, and he had himself shorn at Khutin at the Holy Saviour’s [monastery]; and by the will of God Knyaz Mstislav and all the people of Novgorod came to love him, and they sent him to Russia to get himself appointed; and he came appointed as Vladyka Anthony, and he made the palace of Mitrofan a church in the name of St. Anthony.*’²⁴⁶ In our opinion the phrase ‘at that time’ refers to a point in time shortly—and certainly not years—before Mitrofan’s expulsion. Dobrynia then appears to have visited the imperial capital while it was already under Latin dominion.

A chronological difficulty is however presented by the fact that Dobrynia/Anthony is generally accepted as the author of the *Kniga Palomnik* (or Pilgrim’s Book), an account of a pilgrimage to Constantinople (giving a detailed account of the relics preserved in the capital’s religious institutions), which can be dated very precisely

²⁴⁴ For the ideological implications of the distribution of such relics: cf. Chapter II, p. 76. Some examples for the reign of the emperors Baldwin I, Henry and John of Brienne: Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 291. Riant, *Exuviae*, II, n° 31–32, 40. Tarnanidis, *Byzantine-Bulgarian ecclesiastical relations*, pp. 34, 51–52. Mergiali-Sahas, *Byzantine Emperors and Holy Relics*, p. 48.

²⁴⁵ Cf. for example: Tafel & ThomaS, *Urkunden*, II, n° 70.

²⁴⁶ Michell & Forbes, *The Chronicle of Novgorod 1016–1471*, pp. 51–52—thanks to prof.-em. Jeannine Vereecken for checking and revising the English translation of this passage on the basis of the original old-Russian text. On a twelfth-century Constantinopolitan Stone of the Holy Sepulchre reliquary: Evans & Wixom, *The Glory of Byzantium*, p. 441.

to the year 1200.²⁴⁷ Further research is needed to solve this problem. Two hypotheses can however already be put forward. One solution is to suppose that Dobrynia visited Constantinople twice: once in 1200 and a second time in 1210. This is not impossible, though maybe rather improbable in view of the fact that one would have expected Dobrynia/Anthony to have adapted his original account with references to the changed circumstances of the post-1204 period (cf. the transfer of many important relics to Western Europe). A second solution is to assume that Dobrynia/Anthony is not the author of the *Kniga Palomnik*. The text has only been preserved through a number of later copies (from the sixteenth century onward) and not all of these copies mention Anthony as the piece's author.²⁴⁸ It is moreover conspicuous that the *Kniga* does not mention the acquisition of a Passion relic (cf. the Lord's tomb mentioned in the Novgorod chronicle), while the text does refer to other, rather less important personal experiences. It would then seem to us that the *Kniga* may originally have been an anonymous account, which in later times was attributed to archbishop Anthony of Novgorod, on the basis of the mentioned passage in the Novgorod chronicle and with the intention of lending more authority or prestige to the text.

Apart from visitors to Constantinople in the sources we also find two Russian clerics with links to Mount Athos while it formed a part of the Latin Empire, and more specifically of the Kingdom of Thessalonike. In 1220 archimandrite Dosifej from Kiev went to the Holy Mountain in order to write a book on the life of the athonite monks. In 1225 is mentioned bishop Evfrosin of Rjazan, who probably was a Greek monk from Mount Athos, as is indicated by his surname *svjatogorets*. It is however not known whether he was appointed before or after the fall of Latin Thessalonike in 1224.²⁴⁹ The contacts between Russia and the Latin Empire discussed, and the absence of such documented contacts

²⁴⁷ The year is mentioned in the text itself in a passage describing the presence of a Galician diplomatic delegation at the Byzantine court: Ehrhard, *Le livre du pèlerin d'Antoine de Novgorod*, p. 55. Seemann, *Die Altrussische Wallfahrtsliteratur*, p. 213.

²⁴⁸ Arrignon, *Un pèlerin russe à Constantinople: Antoine de Novgorod*, p. 34. Ehrhard, *Le livre du pèlerin d'Antoine de Novgorod*, pp. 48–49 (cf. the manuscripts C and L). Cf. also: Podskalsky, *Christentum und theologische Literatur in der Kiever Rus'*, p. 200: 'Die Textüberlieferung ist nicht sehr einheitlich und gab Anlass zu umfangreichen Konjekturen, Umstellungen und Rekonstruktionsversuchen.'

²⁴⁹ Cf. Irmscher, *Das nikänische Kaisertum und Russland*, p. 382 (notes 2–3), for further references.

between Russia and Nicaea, at the very least indicate that the Russian church and worldly leaders hesitated as to which attitude to take vis-à-vis the events of 1204. In our view there certainly does not seem to have been a general or fundamental rejection of the Latin claims to the Byzantine emperorship and patriarchate in the first two decades after the conquest of Constantinople.²⁵⁰ After the geopolitical collapse of the Latin Empire in 1224 however the Russian principalities unambiguously acknowledged the legitimacy of the Nicaean claims, as is demonstrated by the from then on in the sources recorded appointment of the Kievan metropolites by the Byzantine patriarchs of Constantinople residing in Nicaea.²⁵¹

CONCLUSION

The foreign policy of the Latin Empire in the period in question can be characterized as having been typically Byzantine in its basic principles. The Latin emperors pursued an ambitious policy, which within the Byzantine space was aimed at gaining recognition for their empire as the legitimate heir to the Byzantium of pre-1204. In the best Byzantine universalistic tradition, imperial policy in essence aspired to procuring from the discussed political formations in the Byzantine space both their loyalty and their acknowledgement of the emperors' imperial dignity as being the highest authority in the region, upon which the other princes and rulers were in principle dependent. The success of this policy was rather inconsistent, just as had been the case before 1204 and in particular at the end of the twelfth century.

In the Byzantine space the Latin emperors were in the first place confronted with a number of powers that, just as they themselves, claimed the Byzantine inheritance. This relates firstly to the Nicaean Empire, the rulers of which from 1204 onward saw themselves as the legitimate Byzantine emperors. As far as is known, the Latin imperial powers did not come into contact with the geographically far-distant

²⁵⁰ The author of the anonymous Russian account of the Fourth Crusade, probably written shortly after 1204 and later inserted in the Chronicle of Novgorod, nevertheless depicts the Latin take-over of Byzantium in a rather negative way (Patri, *La relation russe de la quatrième croisade*, pp. 497–499).

²⁵¹ Cyril I was appointed in the year 6733 of the Byzantine era (1 September 1224–31 August 1225): Shchapov, *State and Church in Early Russia [Russian edition]*, p. 191.

empire of Trebizond, the emperors of which also laid claim to the Byzantine inheritance. The rulers of Epiros were not to express imperial aspirations until circa 1220. The Latin emperors looked upon these rulers, as indeed upon the Bulgarian emperor too, without exception as usurpers, and in Latin eyes their imperial titles were illegitimate.

From this point of view, initially a policy of confrontation was pursued with regard to neighbouring Nicaea; this policy was directed at annexing the Nicaean territory. Even when Emperor Henry circa 1213–1214 concluded peace with Emperor Theodore Laskaris—in view of the fact that neither ruler could destroy the other or obtain from the other acceptance of his imperial authority—the competing claims of each party continued to exist, although the treaty reached did imply a certain measure of mutual recognition. In the period 1214–1222 a political climate was reached in which it was not inconceivable that the legitimacy issue would be solved by means of a fusion of the two empires, which as a result of the marital alliances that were actually achieved or discussed, could have come about.

All in all the Latin Empire in Asia Minor was not very successful in defending its claim to the Byzantine emperorship. Apart from Nicaea, also the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia for example, would not recognize the Latin claim. On the contrary: the Armenian rulers looked upon the Nicaean emperor as the legitimate Byzantine emperor, as did Byzantine groups of population in the Sultanate of Konya and on Cyprus. The re-establishment of the Byzantine patriarchate of Constantinople in exile in Nicaea—and the geographical proximity with respect to the Nicaean Empire of the regions mentioned—was an important factor in this. With respect to Cilician Armenia however, the local conflict regarding the Antiochene succession appears to have chiefly determined Armenian policy. The relations of Latin Constantinople with the Seljuk Sultanate of Konya nevertheless show the Byzantine orientation of imperial foreign policy in Asia Minor. Without any reserves an alliance was sought with this Islamic power for the defence of the eastern imperial border, even though this was directed at Christian (but schismatic) Nicaea.

In the Balkans, the Latin emperor was initially only confronted with the imperial ambitions of the neighbouring power of Bulgaria. After having first pursued a fruitless policy of aggression, which was aimed at the direct incorporation of Bulgaria into the Latin Empire—whilst the Bulgarian rulers attempted to achieve the opposite effect, circa 1213 the two powers opted for a diplomatic solution, which from the

Latin viewpoint was based on the Byzantine hierarchy of states principle. The Latin-Bulgarian peace that was concluded probably implied the recognition of the Bulgarian imperial title, as long as Tirnovo recognized the Roman/Byzantine character of the Latin imperial title, and consequently the superior nature of this title. Here too consideration was given to the possible fusion of the two empires in the context of a number of marital alliances so that, just as in Nicaea, the legitimacy problem would be solved in an elegant manner.

The other principalities in the Balkans—that did not have imperial ambitions, but which certainly were fervent about their independence or the acquisition of the greatest possible degree of autonomy—were also looked upon in Latin Constantinople with the hierarchy of states theory approach. However, the attempts to bring Serbia to acknowledging Latin imperial authority brought forth scarcely any concrete results. Although on occasion the Serbian ruler Stephen II Nemanya gave the appearance of a certain measure of recognition of the imperial authority in Constantinople—or at least his actions could be interpreted in that way at the imperial court—Nemanya was interested principally or even exclusively in the expansion of the political autonomy of his kingdom. The Serbian recognition of the Nicaean emperorship and patriarchate should however be seen in the same light and consequently was in our opinion not much more sincere.

With regard to Hungary, Latin Constantinople probably also based its approach on the hierarchy of states theory, but here again the results were rather meagre, although the Hungarian king probably did place a value on the imperial throne of Constantinople that was higher than that of his own kingdom. By means of a number of marital alliances, a military alliance and the installation of the Order of Saint Samson in Hungary, the Latin emperor gained the impression that Hungary belonged to the political sphere of influence of his empire, but this was a rather more optimistic than realistic assessment of the geopolitical reality. Nonetheless, at the Hungarian court Latin Constantinople was doubtless looked upon as the legitimate successor of Byzantium, which otherwise did not form an obstacle to establishing good relations with Nicaea.

In the Russian principalities in the first two decades following the events of 1204 it appears that no definite position was adopted as to who—Nicaea or Constantinople—represented the legitimate imperial and patriarchal authority. The Latin Emperors seem to have intended to create a measure of benevolence towards their rule by donating

important relics relating to the Passion and the Christ to Russian ecclesiastical and lay visitors to the capital city, while at the same time in doing so they may have wanted to demonstrate the unique position they held vis-à-vis the Christian *oikoumene* after the example of their Byzantine predecessors.

In the Balkans the Latin emperors then did achieve a certain degree of political influence, together with the recognition as being the legitimate successors to the pre-1204 Byzantine emperors. In any event, the acknowledgement of the Nicaean Empire in this part of the Byzantine space in the period was certainly not general, and the Latin Empire in this respect could be seen as a real rival. The methods that the Latin emperor employed to control the Balkans can further be seen within a Byzantine frame of reference. For example, as early as the twelfth century Byzantium attempted to gain or maintain the control over the Balkans by working with local potentates whose autonomy was recognized, but of whom it was expected that they would be loyal with regard to imperial authority.²⁵² The Latin emperors did not have the means to aspire to more than such an indirect form of hegemony, but it should be clear that in this respect the Komnenoi and Angeloi had not been in a much better position.

The separatist course and imperial ambitions of Theodore Doukas, ruler of Epiros and subsequently self-declared Byzantine emperor in Thessalonike, meant that the Latin emperors had to abandon their ambitious foreign policy and that the Latin Empire lost its position of aspirant-hegemon—which it had held in the years 1212–1218—in the Byzantine space. Doukas' offensive in combination with the subsequent advance of John III Vatatzes in Asia Minor was unstoppable, in the context of the internal weakening of the Latin Empire as the Latin-Byzantine harmony model came under pressure in the two most important centres of power—Thessalonike and Constantinople. The Seljuk alliance and the Latin-Bulgarian-Hungarian axis proved themselves not to be very efficient in the defence of the empire, which emphasizes the nature of the empire as *aspirant* hegemon. As a result of the dramatic territorial losses of 1224–1228 the Latin Empire suffered an enormous loss of political prestige. Because of this, on the international stage the empire could no longer put forward a very credible claim to the Byzantine emperorship.

²⁵² Stephenson, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier*, p. 319.

Although the geopolitical situation of the Latin Empire in the Byzantine space by circa 1228 had evolved into a state that can be described as difficult or even precarious, the study of the imperial foreign policy in the years 1204–1224 supports the characterization of the empire of Constantinople as being a Latin *renovatio* of Byzantium, given that this foreign policy was inspired by that of the Byzantine emperors of pre-1204. That the ambitions of the Latin emperors were only slightly in line with the geopolitical reality does not detract from this conclusion, since the Byzantine theoretical position with regard to foreign policy of pre-1204 was in general equally out of line with reality, a postulation that applies in particular to late twelfth-century Byzantium.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE LATIN ORIENT

Prior to 1204, from their formation at the end of the eleventh century in the context of the First Crusade, the Byzantine emperor looked upon the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine as being politically dependent on his imperial authority. In the first half of the twelfth century however, the succession of attempts to establish a certain measure of direct Byzantine governance of these principalities failed. In the course of the 1150s, Manuel I Komnenos tried a different approach and contented himself with the formal recognition by the various Latin princes of his imperial suzerainty or supremacy. In so doing, in the period 1158–1180 the Byzantine emperor was able to establish effective political influence in the region. After Manuel's death in 1180 however, this Byzantine influence was lost once more.¹ From 1204 onwards, the concern for the Latin Orient was an important element in the imperial ideology of the Latin emperors.² The question is whether Outremer also acquired a place of any importance in the Latin Empire's concrete foreign policy, and the extent—if any—to which this was inspired by the earlier Byzantine policy vis-à-vis the Latin Orient.

THE PRINCIPALITY OF ANTIOCH

During the greater part of the twelfth century the relations between Byzantium and the Principality of Antioch were strained. The emperors repeatedly tried to establish either direct control of or their suzerainty over the principality. Although at times the princes of Antioch were prepared to recognize their feudal dependence on Constantinople, such recognition usually being the result of direct military pressure, actual Byzantine interference in Antioch was limited. Only in 1158–1180 was Manuel Komnenos able to establish any real influence in the region, thanks to a mild and conciliatory policy of co-operation. After 1180

¹ Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States*, pp. 246–258.

² Cf. Chapter II, p. 96.

this influence was lost as the result of the general internal and external weakening of the empire, although the theoretical Byzantine claims continued to be maintained. The alliance that Andronikos Komnenos and Isaac II Angelos entered into with Saladin, sultan of Damascus and Egypt at the end of the twelfth century caused a complete breach with the Latin principalities in the Holy Land.³

After Saladin's resounding success at Hattin in 1187, as a result of which the Latin states in Syria and Palestine were almost entirely lost, Prince Bohemond III offered the suzerainty over his principality successively to King William II of Sicily and Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa with the aim of obtaining much-needed military support. Barbarossa took up his offer, and the crusade that he undertook in 1189–1190 was to a major extent intended as a relief expedition for Antioch. After Barbarossa's death during the expedition, in the summer of 1190 his younger son Frederick of Swabia accepted Bohemond III's homage at Antioch.⁴ After 1190, nothing further is known about the feudal relationship between the Holy Roman Emperorship and the Principality of Antioch. In any event, the troublesome succession in the Holy Roman Empire following the death of Emperor Henry VI in 1197, with the struggle for the throne between Philip of Swabia and Otto IV of Brunswick in the years 1198–1208, prevented the Holy Roman monarchy from lending any support.

Shortly after the seizure of the Byzantine capital, Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch (1201–1216 and 1219–1233) and count of Tripoli (1187–1233) on his own initiative displayed his preparedness to recognize the suzerainty of the Latin emperor over Antioch. As early as 1204, mindful of the theoretical feudal tie with Constantinople, he journeyed to Acre to pay Antioch's homage to Mary of Champagne, wife of Emperor Baldwin.⁵ For Bohemond this was principally a politically calculated move. In the beginning of the thirteenth century the prince was embroiled in a drawn-out conflict with King Leo II of Cilician Armenia, who contested the Principality of Antioch with him and who maintained the claims of his young relative Raymond Roupen.⁶ In

³ Lilie, *Op. cit.*, pp. 222–245.

⁴ Hiestand, *Antiochia, Sizilien und das Reich*, pp. 70–115.

⁵ Albericus Trium Fontium, p. 884. On the presence of Mary of Champagne in Acre in 1204, who in 1203–1204 followed her husband on the crusade: Wolff, *Baldwin of Flanders and Hainaut*, pp. 288–289.

⁶ Bohemond IV succeeded his father Bohemond III in 1201. Leo II supported the claim of Raymond Roupen, the underage son of Bohemond III's oldest and

this context the link with and potential support of the Latin emperor could strengthen Bohemond's position, the more as in 1204 it was still anticipated that the Fourth Crusade would be continued to the Holy Land. The rivalry with the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the ruler of which looked on Antioch as politically dependent, was an added motivation for Bohemond to recognize the suzerainty of far-away Constantinople in order to safeguard the autonomy of his principality.⁷

Conversely, the feudal relationship between Constantinople and Antioch increased the political prestige of the Latin emperor, as this gave credibility to two key elements of the imperial ideology: the concept of solidarity between the empire of Constantinople and the Holy Land, and the idea of the Latin emperorship as being the legitimate Byzantine emperorship. The feudal bond with Antioch also strengthened the Latin emperor's claim of universality vis-à-vis the eastern half of Christendom, particularly in relation to the Holy Roman Emperorship. However, at the same time the recognition by Bohemond as prince of Antioch worked counter-productively within the universalistic frame of thought, in the sense that—no doubt at least partly because of this—Bohemond's rival King Leo II of Cilician Armenia decided to look upon the emperor of Nicaea as the legitimate Byzantine emperor.⁸

Apart from the prestige that the imperial authority derived from the feudal relationship with Antioch, the Latin emperor also attempted to gain real political influence in the principedom. This is witnessed by Mary of Champagne's involvement in the initiative to recommence negotiations between Bohemond and Leo in order to create a solution to the impasse concerning Antioch.⁹ However, Baldwin's wife

prematurely deceased son Raymond and Alice, who was Leo's niece. Under pressure from the Armenian ruler, in 1198 Bohemond III had instructed his barons to swear allegiance to Raymond Roupen as his future successor, but shortly before his death in 1201 the prince once more supported the claims of his son Bohemond IV. In this context Bohemond, with the support of the commune of Antioch, was able to take the principality into his possession in 1201, which led to a protracted conflict with Cilician Armenia (Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 590–606).

⁷ Nickerson Hardwicke, *The Crusader States 1192–1243*, pp. 526–534. Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States*, p. 244.

⁸ Cf. Chapter VII, p. 359.

⁹ Letter of the end of 1204 from King Leo to Innocent III (wherein Mary of Champagne is mentioned as *comitissa Flandriae*): Baronius, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, XX, pp. 200–201, §33–35. Dating: Röhrich, *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani*, n° 798. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, p. 606.

died shortly thereafter in Acre (August 1204) and the renewed discussions did not lead to any results.¹⁰ The extent to which Emperor Baldwin continued his attempts to bring the conflict to a solution cannot be assessed owing to the inadequacy of the source material available. In any event, during the years that followed, the feudal link between Antioch and Constantinople continued to exist, as is apparent from a papal letter of 1213. Innocent's letter recounts how on his instructions papal legate and patriarch of Jerusalem Albert of Castro undertook one of the many attempts to find a solution to the issue of Antioch, in doing so making contact with Bohemond IV. However, Bohemond answered that he held Antioch in fief of the *imperator Constantinopolitanus* and that as a consequence he was only bound by the *iudicium* of the latter. Bohemond added that the Latin emperor had gained the promise of Innocent III that the pope would not reserve to himself the issue of Antioch via ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The pope vehemently denied this to patriarch Albert.¹¹ Nonetheless the fact that the patriarch of Jerusalem did not regard the papal promise as being not entirely implausible—which is witnessed by his request to Rome for advice—does suggest the existence of diplomatic contacts between Constantinople and Antioch. Innocent's letter seems to imply further that the Latin emperor had defended his rights as suzerain of Antioch vis-à-vis papal authority. Circa 1213 the Latin emperor in any case continued to be involved in the Antioch question.

A prosopographical fact might also attest to the imperial ambition to exert a certain degree of political influence in the principality. In April 1216 a certain *Johannes Flandrensis* fulfilled the function of *dux*

¹⁰ Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 606–607. Luykx, *Johanna van Constantinopel*, p. 55, n. 4.

¹¹ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 792–793 (XVI, 7): 'Verum cum praedictum comitem [= Bohemond IV, who is only cited as count of Tripoli] convenisses [= patriarch Albert] ut pro tantis malis tantisque periculis evitandis in jam dicta controversia juxta mandatum et dispositionem nostram [= Innocent III] ad justitiam se offeret, respondit se Antiocham ab imperatore Constantinopolitano tenere, nec sibi videri tutum aut justum ut de ipsa conventus in alterius quam ejusdem domini sui iudicio responderet. Addidit etiam ipsum imperatorem hanc a nobis indulgentiam impetrasse ut deinceps comitem non cogeremus eundem de Antiochia sub ecclesiastico iudice litigare.' The papal reaction to Bohemond's standpoint to patriarch Albert: 'Illud autem quod praefatus comes Tripolitanus nos imperatori Constantinopolitano asserit indulsisse, non dubites penitus esse falsum; et quod dicit se non teneri de Antiochia et principatu ejus ecclesiasticum subire iudicium, reputes omnino frivolum et inane.'

of Antioch.¹² It is striking that this position of responsibility was occupied by a person who does not appear to have belonged to the local aristocracy.¹³ Given that the imperial throne of Constantinople was in the possession of a member of the family of the counts of Flanders, it is possible that the *Flandrensis* mentioned had connections with the court in Constantinople. This nobleman from Flanders might perhaps even have been a bastard member of this Flemish aristocratic family.¹⁴ The extent to which imperial intercession might have influenced the choice of this Johannes for the function of *dux* remains an open question. Perhaps he was selected by Bohemond as a token of esteem for his suzerain. One problem with regard to the proposed hypothesis about the identity of *Johannes Flandrensis* is that the charter in which he figures as a witness has as its author Raymond Roupen, who in 1216 by means of intrigues and with the help of the Armenian King Leo II managed to take away the Principality of Antioch from Bohemond IV. Since the Latin emperor continually seems to have supported Bohemond IV's claim, the link of *Johannes Flandrensis* with the imperial court can appear to be somewhat dubious. However, it certainly is possible that the *dux* had already held the position under Bohemond IV.¹⁵ Raymond Roupen could have retained him in this function in order to prevent the internal relations in Antioch from

¹² Witness in a charter of April 1216 by the prince of Antioch Raymond Roupen: Langlois, *Le Trésor des chartes*, n° 16.

¹³ The *duces* of Antioch traditionally belonged to the higher or middle nobility. The person indicated is the only person known to us from the Principality of Antioch that bore the cognomen *Flandrensis* (Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 457, 534–546). In the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1180–1181 are attested the brothers *Hugo Flandrensis* and *Reginald Flandrensis* as vassals of Baldwin of Ibelin, lord of Ramla, with property near the castle of Mirabel (Röhricht, *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani*, n° 597, 603, 611). There are however no compelling reasons to view them as being related to the *Johannes Flandrensis* known of thirty-five years later in Antioch.

¹⁴ Emperor Henry's bastard brother Eustace of Hainaut too is only known via his career in, and via sources from, the Latin Empire. In addition, present in the empire was also a bastard son of Count Philip of Alsace (and therefore cousin of Emperors Baldwin I and Henry), Thierry of Flanders (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 145). The latter is mentioned in a 1200 charter of Count Baldwin IX as *Theodericus de Flandria* (Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 154).

¹⁵ The *dux* of Antioch prior to *Johannes Flandrensis* was Hugh of Corbeil, who is only attested in 1201. The change of power in 1216 does not appear to have been accompanied by reprisals against Bohemond IV's former supporters (Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 464, 621–622, 628–630).

being completely disrupted, and perhaps also to placate the emperor in Constantinople with respect to the change of control.¹⁶

In 1219 Bohemond IV succeeded in regaining control of Antioch, after Raymond Roupen had to a large extent lost the local support for his policy in the preceding years. There is no trace of any involvement of the Latin emperor in this. Neither in the years that followed did Constantinople exercise any demonstrable influence on the complex politics of the principality.¹⁷ The explanation for this must lie in the increasingly dramatic situation in which the Latin empire found itself as the result of Theodore Doukas' offensive of circa 1218 against the Kingdom of Thessalonike, and Emperor John III Vatatzes' successes of 1224. Nevertheless, the prince of Antioch appears to have continued to look upon himself as the vassal of the Latin emperor, as is demonstrated by an episode during the crusading expedition of Holy Roman Emperor and King of Jerusalem Frederick II of Hohenstaufen. Initially Bohemond IV viewed Frederick's coming to the Holy Land positively, and he visited the emperor during the latter's sojourn on Cyprus in the summer of 1228. When however within the framework of his universalistic claims, and probably on the more specific basis of the feudal tie between the Holy Roman Emperor and Antioch of circa 1190, Frederick suddenly requested that Bohemond pay homage for the Principality of Antioch and for the County of Tripoli, the prince feigned illness and immediately left the island in secret without acquiescing to the imperial request.¹⁸ Although the situation between them subsequently became more or less normalized, relations between the two rulers continued to be strained. Illustrative of this is the fact that Antioch and Tripoli were not included in the peace treaty that Frederick concluded with Sultan al-Kamil of Egypt in 1229.¹⁹

¹⁶ Here it should be noted that before his death in June 1216 Emperor Henry was planning to play a major role in the upcoming Fifth Crusade, a commitment that his successor Peter of Courtenay took over (cf. p. 461). Also interesting to observe is that a number of knights of the Flemish crusading fleet, who in 1203 arrived in Acre, had joined the service of King Leo II for some time. Among them was Thierry of Flanders, who had married in Marseille the daughter of the former ruler of Cyprus Isaac Komnenos. The mother of Thierry's wife was a daughter of Thoros II, ruler of Cilician Armenia (1140–1169) (cf. p. 440).

¹⁷ Ibidem, pp. 631–635).

¹⁸ Filippo Da Novara, *Guerra di Federico II in Oriente*, §34, 38. Jacoby, *La dimensione imperiale oltramare*, p. 32.

¹⁹ Nickerson Hardwicke, *The Crusader States 1192–1243*, p. 544. Van Cleve, *The Crusade of Frederick II*, p. 456.

It would seem apparent to us from this episode that the feudal bond with the—after 1224–1225 impotent—Latin emperor could still be a useful instrument for the safeguarding of the autonomy of Bohemond's principality. Doubtless this feudal relationship in our opinion indeed must have been one of Bohemond's arguments for not recognizing Frederick II's claims. Although in 1228 the Latin emperor had of necessity given up all attempts to gain political influence in Antioch, the recognized suzerainty over this principality in the Holy Land must nonetheless have been a continuing source of prestige. A piece of prosopographical information that transcends our chronological framework establishes that concrete links between Antioch and Constantinople indeed continued to exist. In 1238 Milo Tirel was a member of the imperial *consilium*.²⁰ The Tirel family was one of the most prominent families of Antioch, and inter alia held the hereditary court office of marshal.²¹

THE KINGDOM OF CYPRUS

Until 1184, Cyprus was a Byzantine province. In that year the local governor Isaac Komnenos, a great-nephew of Emperor Manuel, proclaimed himself emperor as a reaction to the seizure of power by Andronikos Komnenos in 1183, which was viewed as usurpation. Attempts from Constantinople to recover the island failed, and until 1191 Isaac governed the island as if it were an autonomous principality. In the same year Richard the Lionheart arrived at Cyprus with a fleet in the context of his participation in the Third Crusade. As the result of a conflict with Isaac, the English king conquered the island and took the local ruler prisoner. Richard then sold the island to the Templars who, however, returned it to the English monarch, who ultimately in 1192 sold it to the dethroned king of Jerusalem, Guy of Lusignan (1192–1194). His successor and brother Amaury received a royal crown from Holy Roman Emperor Henry VI in 1197 in exchange for the former's recognition of imperial suzerainty. In doing so the Cypriot ruler ensured the autonomy of the island

²⁰ Teulet, *Layettes du Trésor des Chartes*, II, n° 2744, 2753.

²¹ Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 453, 535.

vis-à-vis the Kingdom of Jerusalem and protected himself against a possible Byzantine expedition to recapture Cyprus.²²

Cyprus became involved in the Fourth Crusade in a somewhat unexpected manner. In the winter of 1202–1203 Thierry of Flanders, bastard son of the count of Flanders Philip of Alsace (†1191) and cousin of Count Baldwin IX, married in Marseille the daughter of Isaac Komnenos.²³ Together with John II of Nesle, Thierry was one of the leaders of the Flemish crusading fleet, which had overwintered in Marseille in 1202–1203. Through this marriage with Isaac's heir-ess, Thierry gained a claim to Cyprus, which he doubtlessly hoped to make good during the crusade.²⁴ It is impossible to establish whether the marriage took place prior to Baldwin's messengers from Zara had reported to the fleet in Marseille the diversion of the crusade to Constantinople. In any event the Byzantine connection of the crusade increased the political capital of Thierry's marriage to a member of the Komnenos family. After the Flemish fleet, against Baldwin IX's orders, had sailed to the Holy Land in the spring of 1203, Thierry asked King Amaury of Cyprus, who since 1197 had also been King of Jerusalem, for the Kingdom of Cyprus, being supported in this by the knights from the Flemish fleet. However, King Amaury refused, and ordered the former to leave his kingdom, whereupon Thierry departed for Cilician Armenia, the homeland of his wife's mother.²⁵ It seems probable that shortly after the taking of Constantinople and Baldwin's election as emperor, Thierry and his wife travelled to the New Rome, although he is not attested as being present in the empire until 1207. In any event, his co-commander of the Flemish fleet, Nicolas of Mailly, was present in Constantinople at the end of 1204.²⁶

²² Rudt De Collenberg, *L'empereur Isaac de Chypre et sa fille*, pp. 135–153. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 3–11.

²³ The only source for what follows: Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, pp. 352–353. Rudt de Collenberg has identified convincingly the husband of Isaac's daughter, who is indicated as being related to Baldwin IX and as one of the knights of the Flemish fleet, as Thierry of Flanders (Rudt De Collenberg, *L'empereur Isaac de Chypre et sa fille*, pp. 155–171).

²⁴ Hendrickx, *À propos du nombre des troupes*, pp. 31–41.

²⁵ Rudt De Collenberg, *L'empereur Isaac de Chypre et sa fille*, p. 131.

²⁶ Thierry in 1207: Villehardouin, §493. Nicolas at the end of 1204: Ibidem, §310, 315, 319, 322. On the activities of Fourth Crusade contingents in the Latin Orient in 1203–1204: Queller, Compton & Campbell, *The fourth crusade: the neglected majority*, pp. 454–458.

The imperial court was doubtless informed about the Byzantine claim on Cyprus through Thierry's presence in Constantinople, and probably also by Byzantine members of the imperial entourage. The Arabian chronicler Ibn al-Athir indicates that the Latin emperor also effectively undertook an attempt to bring the island within his sphere of influence. The writer recounts under the year 604 of the Hegira (28 July 1207–15 July 1208) how sultan of Egypt al-Adil (1200–1218) undertook an expedition against Acre. The occasion for this was the earlier seizure of a number of Egyptian ships by the Latins from the kingdom of Cyprus. As the result of this, the sultan had demanded atonement from the authorities the Kingdom of Jerusalem in Acre. The then regent John of Ibelin had answered '*qu'il ne possédait aucune autorité sur les habitants de Chypre qui dans leurs besoins avaient recours au Francs établis à Constantinople*,' as a result of which al-Adil decided against taking measures of reprisal against Acre. Ibn al-Athir continues: '*Dans la suite les gens de Chypre se rendirent à Constantinople à cause d'une disette qui les atteignit et par suite de laquelle les vivres vinrent à leur manquer. L'autorité sur l'île de Chypre revint au prince d'Acca et al-Adil lui envoya un nouveau message*.' The authorities in Acre however once more refused to make atonement, which gave the sultan sufficient grounds for his campaign.²⁷

The information provided by Ibn al-Athir is to some extent problematic. After the death of King Amaury in 1205, there no longer existed a personal union of the Kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus during al-Adil's reign. By assuming that the chronicler made a chronological error we shall attempt to provide an answer to this problem. It would seem to us quite possible that the hostilities reported by al-Athir under 1207–1208 can be identified as the short-lived military confrontation between the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Egyptian sultan in 1210–1211, which was the result of the ending of the treaty concluded by the two powers in 1204. With the exception of Ibn-al-Athir, not a single source reports any hostilities in the period 1204–1210.²⁸ In 1210 there was further a change of power both in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and

²⁷ Ibn Al-Athir, *Extrait de la chronique intitulée Kamel-Altevarykh (suite)*, p. 107.

²⁸ Runciman, *The Kingdom of Acre*, pp. 104, 133. Nickerson Hardwicke, *The Crusader States 1192–1243*, p. 532. Ibn al-Athir's chronology can also be criticized on other points (Van Tricht, *La politique étrangère (Ire partie)*, pp. 223–224). Nonetheless, Richard accepts al-Athir's dating (Richard, *Le Royaume latin de Jérusalem*, pp. 172–173).

on Cyprus. In Jerusalem an end came to the regency of John of Ibelin as the result of the marriage of the French baron John of Brienne to the successor to the kingdom, Mary of Montferrat. On Cyprus the regency of Walter of Montbéliard came to an end at the majority of heir Hugh I (1205–1218). In our opinion al-Athir's incorrect postulation that Cyprus again came under the control of Jerusalem refers to these changes of power. An element that may have contributed to his mistaken account is that on Hugh's ascension to the throne the former regent of Cyprus Walter of Montbéliard immediately left the island for Acre as the result of a conflict with the new king.²⁹

On the basis of the passage quoted we can now conclude that in the period between King Amaury's death in 1205 and 1210, the Kingdom of Cyprus became linked politically with Latin Constantinople. The exact circumstances in which this link came into being and what the content was of the authority that Constantinople possessed vis-à-vis Cyprus are however unclear. This might relate to a feudal bond, although no source can be found that supports this hypothesis. That Cyprus was still part of the Byzantine Empire for a relatively short period before this, and that in Latin Constantinople there was present a pretender to the Cypriot throne in Thierry of Flanders, might possibly explain why regent Walter of Montbéliard may have agreed to the recognition of imperial suzerainty. The Cypriot court, just as that of Antioch, perhaps hoped in this way to gain support from Latin Romania for the defence of the still young kingdom. Another possibility is that the Kingdom of Cyprus in a more vague manner recognized a certain imperial hegemony. The island would then have been a client state of the Latin empire, just as the Kingdom of Jerusalem was under Emperor Manuel Komnenos.³⁰ Although the information available is meagre, the case of Cyprus shows that, as in Antioch and again on the basis of former Byzantine claims, the Latin emperor was prepared to defend his universalistic claims in the eastern Mediterranean Basin.

Apart from the political link with Constantinople, the above quotation from Ibn al-Athir also demonstrates that there was in existence in Cyprus a certain economic orientation towards the New Rome. For example, during a shortage of food the Cypriot authorities turned to

²⁹ Nickerson Hardwicke, *The Crusader States 1192–1243*, p. 536. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades*, p. 44.

³⁰ Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 69–75. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, p. 606.

the imperial capital.³¹ For the rest, the data that reports links between Constantinople and Cyprus is extremely limited. In any event, in Constantinople claims on Cyprus were also made in the ecclesiastical sphere. Patriarch Thomas Morosini claimed that the archbishopric of Nicosia was subject to his *obedientia*. In 1206 Innocent III agreed to investigate the issue and ordered the archbishop of Nicosia to come to the papal court to substantiate his point of view.³² Although ultimately the Church of Cyprus did not come to fall under the authority of Constantinople, we can view the patriarchal claim as an extension of the imperial aspirations.³³ In addition we must perhaps look upon the support given (in vain) by regent Walter of Montbéliard in 1206–1207 to the town of Antalya that was under siege by Kaykhusraw I, sultan of Konya, and which at that time was in the possession of the Byzantinized Pisan Aldobrandinos, and his probable attempts at the same time to bring the town under his own control, in the light of the political bond between Cyprus and Constantinople. After all, the Latin emperors claimed Antalya as belonging to their empire.³⁴

With regard to the foreign policy of Cyprus, another notable parallel with the policy pursued in Constantinople can be found. At the end of 1213 negotiations were initiated with the Sultanate of Konya, which resulted in a series of commercial treaties in 1214–1216.³⁵ Although there is no reference to the Empire of Constantinople in these treaties, this rapprochement can perhaps be framed within the good contacts that the Latin emperors maintained with Konya.³⁶ However, Cypriot foreign policy also displayed a divergence when compared with the policy pursued by Latin Constantinople. Although regent Walter of Montbéliard had taken Bohemond IV's side in the matter of Antioch, King Hugh chose rather to seek a rapprochement with King Leo of Cilician Armenia, with whom he agreed a double marital alliance circa 1210. This did not however lead to active support of

³¹ The supplying of food in times of shortage can also be seen in the context of the feudal *auxilium* obligation: in 1206 David Komnenos, vassal prince of Paphlagonia, sent shiploads of provisions to Constantinople where at that time there was a shortage (cf. Chapter IV, p. 188).

³² Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 962 (IX, 140); col. 966 (IX, 141). Wolff, *Politics in the Latin Patriarchate*, p. 232, n. 21.

³³ Coureas, *The Latin Church of Cyprus*, p. 90.

³⁴ Cf. Chapter VII, p. 372.

³⁵ Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, pp. 140–145.

³⁶ Cf. Chapter VII, pp. 373–376.

the Armenian claims, and as early as 1217 the links with Bohemond IV strengthened, which in 1218 resulted in a marital alliance being agreed.³⁷ Consequently, the divergence vis-à-vis Constantinople could be described as rather innocuous.

Prosopographical material seem to further support the hypothesis of some political link between Constantinople and Cyprus. According to the *Lignages d'Outremer* Henry of Grand Gerin, lord of Pegai (in the imperial core quarter), married his daughter Philippa to the Cypriot lord Raymond of Aguilers.³⁸ Unfortunately it is not completely clear as to when Henry of Grand Gerin, who originated from the Kingdom of Jerusalem, gave his daughter's hand in marriage, so that the possibility cannot be excluded that the marriage might have taken place prior to his arrival in the Latin Empire, the precise date of which cannot be ascertained. However, the fact that Philippa's husband is to be found as still having performed as a witness in various Cypriot charters in 1247–1248 suggests that the marriage is more likely to have taken place after 1204 rather than prior to this date.³⁹ It is probable that Henry of Grand Gerin himself emigrated from the Kingdom of Jerusalem to Romania shortly after the Latin capture of Constantinople, as did a number of other barons and knights from the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine. Henry's probable father-in-law Peter of Bracheux, lord of Pegai and Kyzikos, had in his entourage squire John of Cyprus.⁴⁰

Our interpretation of the above-mentioned passage by Ibn al-Athir implies that perhaps the link between Cyprus and Constantinople also continued after 1210. The chronicler's postulation that the political bond between Cyprus and Jerusalem was re-established is indeed incorrect. A few of the suggestions made above—those that relate to the years after 1210—support this hypothesis. Taking it a step further, it is not unlikely that by means of his planned participation in the Fifth Crusade the Latin emperor considered making the idea of the Kingdom of Cyprus as a client state of the empire into more of a reality.⁴¹ However, in the light of the fact that neither Emperor Henry nor Emperor Peter actually took part in the expedition, this idea must

³⁷ Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 618, 630–631. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus*, p. 46.

³⁸ On Henry of Grand Gerin: cf. Chapter III, note 184.

³⁹ Röhrich, *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani*, n° 1149, 1156.

⁴⁰ Cf. p. 453. On John of Cyprus: cf. Chapter III, note 184.

⁴¹ Cf. p. 460.

remain of a speculative nature. The decline of the Latin empire circa 1224–1225 ultimately brought an end to all imperial aspirations vis-à-vis the island. It is in this respect telling that during the period of regency after the death of King Hugh in 1218 the Latin emperor did not play the least role in the internal problems of the kingdom that started circa 1224. In this context, the feudal claim of the Holy Roman Emperor on Cyprus once more took the foreground. During Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen's crusade to the Holy Land in 1228–1229 his suzerainty over the kingdom was recognized without any problems.⁴²

THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM

Prior to 1204 the Kingdom of Jerusalem was always a state that was entirely independent of Byzantium, despite the repeated attempts of the emperors of Constantinople to bring it within their sphere of influence. Only during the period 1158–1180 did the kingdom have the status of a satellite state that could be called politically dependent on Emperor Manuel Komnenos.⁴³

Virtually no information is available about the course of the first contacts between the Latin emperor and the royal court in Acre. In any case, shortly after his coronation Emperor Baldwin sent his messengers to the kingdom's capital announcing the capture of Constantinople and his elevation to the imperial throne.⁴⁴ Imperial messengers carrying similar tidings were also sent to the other principalities of the Latin Orient, including Cilician Armenia.⁴⁵ Baldwin furthermore had it announced *en le terre d'Outremer* that all those who wished to be granted land by him were welcome.⁴⁶ The great response to this meant a weakening of the kingdom, which can hardly have met with a favourable reception with Amaury, King of both Jerusalem and Cyprus.⁴⁷ The promises to proceed further with the crusade once the internal situation in the empire had been stabilized, must have been

⁴² Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus*, pp. 49–51. Jacoby, *La dimensione imperiale ultramare*, pp. 31–32.

⁴³ Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States*, pp. 246–258.

⁴⁴ Villehardouin, §317.

⁴⁵ Thomson, *The Crusaders through Armenian Eyes*, p. 77. On the position of King Leo vis-à-vis the Latin Empire: cf. Chapter VII, p. 359.

⁴⁶ Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 378.

⁴⁷ Cf. p. 453.

viewed at the court of Jerusalem as being hollow words, particularly after the imperial defeat at Adrianople in April 1205.⁴⁸ An additional reason for Amaury's probably being little pleased by the events at Constantinople may relate to Thierry of Flanders' claim to Cyprus.⁴⁹ Thierry's close relationship to Baldwin can have made Amaury suspicious of the attitude that the Latin emperor would take vis-à-vis this question. Looked at in a broader perspective, perhaps Amaury feared that, following the Byzantine example, the emperor would claim political hegemony vis-à-vis the Latin Orient. The restoration of the feudal tie between Constantinople and Antioch could be interpreted in that sense. In concreto with regard to the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the election of Baldwin's chancellor John Faicete of Noyon as bishop of Acre (†summer 1204) could have been perceived as a threat.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271–274. The Fourth Crusade had nonetheless a number of positive results for the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Thanks to the funds collected in the West, the defensive works at Acre, Tyre and Beirut could be repaired and expanded. The threat posed by the successful crusading army in Constantinople (even if not for long: Hamblin, *Arab perspectives*, pp. 176–178) also placed King Amaury in a position to enter into an advantageous truce with the Egyptian Sultan al-Adil in 1204, which created for the kingdom a not inconsiderable territorial expansion and which in 1211 was to be prolonged (Kedar, *The Fourth Crusade's Second Front*, pp. 91–95, 100–103). In comparison, the results of the Fifth Crusade, which ended in Egypt in a complete fiasco, were rather more disappointing (Donovan, *Pelagius and the Fifth Crusade*, pp. 94–97; Van Cleve, *The Crusade of Frederick II*, pp. 436–438; Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, pp. 201–202).

⁴⁹ Cf. p. 440.

⁵⁰ It is not known how John's election came about (Longnon, *Les compagnons*, pp. 165–166). Emperor Alexios IV addressed a letter dated August 25, 1203, to the pope wherein John—who is mentioned after the bishops of Soissons, Halberstadt and Troyes and also after Peter, Abbot of Locedio—is still only referred to as *magister Joannes Noviomen*. In a papal letter probably to be dated in early February 1204 he is likewise called *magister Jo. Noviomensis* (Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 237, 262 (VI, 210 & 232)). In Emperor Baldwin's letter to Innocent III of circa the end of May 1204 John is for the first time attested as *Acconensem electum*: he is cited as taking part in the imperial election which took place on May 9th (Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271). In theory there are two possibilities: either John was already bishop-elect at the time of the election or he was not, in which case he would be referred to in Baldwin's letter with a title that he only acquired until after the election. This last option seems rather implausible however since one author explicitly states that only bishops and abbots partook in the election (De Clari, §94; the chronicler in his list of crusaders at the outset of his account states regarding John that he was *eslis a estre evesques d'Acre* (§1), but this cannot be interpreted in the sense that he was already bishop-elect at the start of the crusade because it would be in contradiction with how he is named in the 1203 papal letter). We may then hypothesize that John's election took place in the context of the communication exchanges with the Latin Orient during the crusading army's stay at Constantinople: in Hugh IV of Saint-Pol's letter it is stated that shortly after the first capture of Constantinople (18 July 1203) messengers

When at the court in Jerusalem there was little immediate enthusiasm to create close links with Latin Constantinople, Emperor Baldwin felt himself called upon to fulfil a position as patron of the Holy Land, as is apparent from his letter of circa the end of May to Innocent III: '*Aderant [at the imperial coronation] incole Terre Sancte, ecclesiastice militaresque persone, quorum pre omnibus inestimabilis erat et gratulabunda letitia, exhibitumque Deo gratius obsequium asserebant, quam si civitas sancta christianis esset cultibus restituta, cum ad confusionem perpetuam inimicorum Crucis, sancte Romane Ecclesie, terreque Ierosolimitane sese regia civitas devoveret, que tam diu tam potenter adversaria stetit et contradixit utrique.*' The sending of the chain that had protected the entrance to the Golden Horn to Acre, where it was likewise to be used to defend the entrance of the harbour, sometime after the capture of the Byzantine capital may be interpreted in this light.⁵¹ It is difficult to see how the religiously inspired dedication of Latin Constantinople to the *terra Ierosolimitana* could not have been politically translated into a pursuit of hegemony over the Kingdom of Jerusalem. This implied a return to the period of Manuel Komnenos, when Byzantium was not *potenter adversaria* vis-à-vis the *terra Ierosolimitana*, but when on the contrary there was a harmonious co-operation between the empire and its client state. The defeat at Adrianople in April 1205 however meant that imperial ambitions had to be postponed indefinitely as the result of both the external and

were sent to the crusader states to inform them of the latest developments (Pokorny, *Zwei unedierte Briefe*, p. 195), while in Baldwin's letter it is mentioned that inhabitants of the Holy Land, both clerics and military men, were present at the imperial coronation on May 16th (Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271); they must have come over to the Byzantine capital in the context of the crusading army's prolonged stay at the Byzantine capital. In the context of these exchanges, Count Baldwin—informed of the vacancy of the see of Acre—may have suggested the election of his chancellor to the episcopal chapter. John Faicete certainly was a valid candidate: he was both talented and much respected (Villehardouin, §290; Gunther of Pairis, p. 125) and one of the leading clerics of the crusade (Longnon, *Loc. cit.*; Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 237 (VI, 210)). Count Baldwin himself was of course one of the most important princes taking part in the expedition and after the conclusion of the March Pact—together with Boniface of Montferrat—one of the two most likely candidates for the Constantinopolitan emperorsip. In both these cases, or even in the period before the pact was concluded and the crusader army still intended to in the short run continue to the Holy Land, securing a important position in the Kingdom of Jerusalem for a trusted man of his must have seemed very useful.

⁵¹ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271. Albericus Trium Fontium, p. 882.

internal problems with which the empire was confronted in the years that followed.

The preparations for the Fifth Crusade probably led to closer contacts between the courts of Jerusalem and Constantinople. Both king of Jerusalem John of Brienne and Emperor Henry were involved in the initiative for the new expedition. Although the initial impulse for the initiative for the crusade lay with John of Brienne, it appears that consultation with Constantinople on the subject took place quite quickly.⁵² We can maybe interpret this orientation on the Queen of Cities as preparedness on the part of King John to acknowledge a certain patronage with regard to the Latin emperor. This preparedness can be explained by the consideration that the gaining of a major commitment from the Latin emperor must have been worth a political sacrifice. It is possible that another, more concrete element also played a role. In 1207 Raoul of Tiberias, who had sojourned in Constantinople in 1204–1206, was once more present in the kingdom, where he bore the title of *senschal*. In that year he, together with the then regent John of Ibelin, appeared in a charter of patriarch Albert of Jerusalem.⁵³ It is conceivable that through a person such as Raoul of Tiberias, Constantinople came to become more perceptible on the political horizon of the royal court of Jerusalem.

By means of a convincing participation in a successful Fifth Crusade, the opportunity had existed for the Latin emperor to effectively establish his hegemony vis-à-vis the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Ultimately however, neither Emperor Henry, nor his successors Emperor Peter, Empress Yolande or Emperor Robert were in a position to take part in the expedition. In this context, after the failure of the Fifth Crusade in the summer of 1221 at Damietta, at the end of 1222 John of Brienne sought support for his kingdom not in Latin Constantinople but in Western Europe. In the beginning of 1223 through papal mediation the marriage was negotiated between Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen and Yolande of Brienne, who was the heir to the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The marriage between Frederick II and Yolande

⁵² Cf. p. 461.

⁵³ Röhrich, *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani*, n° 821. On Raoul of Tiberias: Chapter V, note 34. The *comes Bertoldus Theutonicus* mentioned in the charter is not to be identified with Berthold of Katzenelnbogen, as long has been assumed (cf. Todt, *Graf Berthold II. von Katzenelnbogen*, p. 76), but with Berthold of Nimburg (Mayer, *Drei oberrheinische Kreuzfahrer des 13. Jahrhunderts*, pp. 47–53).

actually took place in 1225, and thus the Holy Roman Emperor gained the title of king of Jerusalem by virtue of his marriage to Yolande. This brought to an end any ambitions from Latin Constantinople vis-à-vis Jerusalem.⁵⁴

THE COUNTY OF TRIPOLI

In the first half of the twelfth century the count of Tripoli occasionally recognized Byzantine suzerainty, however without this leading to any substantial Byzantine influence there. At the same time, the king of Jerusalem too had a claim of suzerainty vis-à-vis Tripoli. In general, the local rulers also recognized these claims, but this led only occasionally to any real influence from Jerusalem. In the period 1158–1180, under Emperor Manuel Komnenos, the kingdom had a position as a client state of the Byzantine Empire, just as the Kingdom of Jerusalem. And just as the other Latin principalities in the region, the death of Emperor Manuel in 1180 also meant a break in the relations with Byzantium.⁵⁵

In 1204, under Bohemond IV, Tripoli was united in a personal union with the Principality of Antioch, which was to continue for the entirety of the thirteenth century. It is not impossible that Bohemond also recognized the suzerainty of the Latin emperor for the county of Tripoli. The passage by Albericus Trium Fontium about the homage paid by Bohemond IV for Antioch to Mary of Champagne in Acre in 1204 allows this hypothesis: '*Cum imperator Balduinus comitissam Flandrie mandasset et illa ad eum venisset, facta de eo gravida, ad partes transmarinas abiit, ubi cum esset in Acra princeps Antiochie ad eam venit, et ei vice mariti sui tanquam imperatrici Constantinopolitane homagium fecit.*'⁵⁶ In view of the fact that we may perhaps assume that for the chronicler, who wrote a universal chronicle, the exact feudal situation was not a particular point of interest, it is conceivable that it is more by chance that Bohemond IV is referred to only as *princeps Antiochie*—his most prestigious title—and that he also recognized the

⁵⁴ Richard, *Le Royaume latin de Jérusalem*, pp. 173–175. Van Cleve, *The Crusade of Frederick II*, pp. 438–442. Jacoby, *La dimensione imperiale oltramare*, p. 31.

⁵⁵ Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States*, p. 246. La Monte, *Feudal monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, pp. 187–191. Richard, *Le Comté de Tripoli*, pp. 26–43.

⁵⁶ Albericus Trium Fontium, p. 884.

imperial suzerainty in his capacity as count of Tripoli. We could view in this light Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II's request in 1228 to Bohemond to recognize him as suzerain not only over Antioch, but also Tripoli—although it must be said that Frederick at that moment was also King of Jerusalem.⁵⁷ In any event, the mere fact of the personal union between Antioch and Tripoli meant that the Latin emperor could hope that Tripoli following Antioch would become part of the political sphere of influence of the empire.

THE LATIN RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN THE HOLY LAND

The most important Latin religious institutions in the Holy Land gained daughter institutions and possessions in the Latin empire.⁵⁸ In 1207 the chapter of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem in Constantinople owned a church that was dedicated to the Holy Sepulchre.⁵⁹ Prior to 1204 too, the chapter of the Holy Sepulchre had possessions in the Byzantine capital, as is apparent from a number of charters. However, these documents do not provide any concrete information about the nature or whereabouts of these possessions.⁶⁰ Consequently, it is impossible for us to ascertain whether the church mentioned in 1207 was already in their possession prior to 1204. In 1210 the chapter of the Holy Sepulchre furthermore owned the Church of Saint Demetrius in Thessalonike, which was possibly given to them by papal legate Benedictus.⁶¹ In any event, the same legate had granted the chapter the *Hosios Loukas* monastery in Beotia.⁶² The chapter also owned unspecified possessions in the region around Constantinople, in the Kingdom of Thessalonike, and in other territories that are not further specified.⁶³ However, ownership of these possessions and daughter institutions was not without problems. For example, the canons of the *Hosios Loukas* monastery came into conflict with the local community of Byzantine monks, who refused to recognize the granting of their monastery to the chapter; they were supported in this by local

⁵⁷ Filippo Da Novara, *Guerra di Federico II in Oriente*, §38. Cf. also p. 440.

⁵⁸ On the military orders: Chapter VI, p. 340.

⁵⁹ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1376–1377 (XI, 53–54).

⁶⁰ Bresc-Bautier, *Le Cartulaire du Chapitre du Saint-Sépulcre*, n° 150–151, 170.

⁶¹ Janin, *Les églises et les monastères des grands centres byzantins*, pp. 366–367.

⁶² Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 303 (XIII, 104).

⁶³ Bresc-Bautier, *Le Cartulaire du Chapitre du Saint-Sépulcre*, n° 181.

lords and by the Latin emperor.⁶⁴ With regard to the Church of Saint Demetrius, the chapter became involved in a long and drawn-out conflict with Archbishop Warin of Thessalonike. It was not until 1212 that a compromise acceptable to both parties was reached.⁶⁵

The *Templum Domini* chapter of Jerusalem also owned dependent institutions and properties in various regions of the empire. Those about which concrete information is available are the *Sanctus Nicolaus de Varvar* church in Constantinople, a Holy Trinity church in Athens, a Church of Saint Nicholas in Thebes, a Church of Saint Nicholas in Négrepont and the *Sancta Maria de Clusurio* monastery in the bishopric of Thermopili.⁶⁶ In addition, the Abbey of Saint Mary of Josaphat near Jerusalem also had possessions in the empire. In the capital, the abbey was granted the further unidentified *Sancta Maria de Taranito* church by patriarch Morosini in 1205.⁶⁷ In Thessalonike, Boniface of Montferrat and papal legate Benedictus gave to the same institution the *Philantropos* church in 1206.⁶⁸ Papal legate Pietro Capuano in 1205 gave to the abbey of Mons Thabor the further unidentified *monasterium Sanctae Mariae de Constantinopoli*.⁶⁹ Lastly, the sisters of the Cistercian convent *de Percheio*—Saint Mary of Le Perchay—in Constantinople were for some time dependent on the Saint Mary Magdalene convent in Acre. In 1223 the convent came to fall directly under the mother abbey of Cîteaux, after the mediation of the general chapter.⁷⁰

⁶⁴ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 303–304 (XIII, 105). Cf. Chapter IV, p. 233.

⁶⁵ Ibidem, col. 604–605 (XV, 86). Brown, *The Cistercians in the Latin Empire*, n° I, p. 119. Pressutti, *Regesta*, n° 5126.

⁶⁶ Innocent III confirmed ownership of these possessions in 1208 (Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1555 (XI, 250)). The *Sanctus Nicolaus de Varvar* church can be identified with the *Kelludrion tou hagiou Nikolaou* near the St Barbara Gate (Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, p. 376). On the other churches: Idem, *Les églises et les monastères des grands centres byzantins*, p. 337. Koder & Hild, *Hellas und Thessalia*, p. 189.

⁶⁷ Delaborde, *Chartes de la Terre Sainte provenant de l'abbaye de Notre Dame de Josaphat*, n° 45.

⁶⁸ Köhler, *Chartes de l'Abbaye de Notre Dame de la Vallée de Josaphat*, n° 61, 63. On this church: Janin, *Les églises et les monastères des grands centres byzantins*, pp. 417–418.

⁶⁹ Delaville Le Roulx, *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers*, II, n° 24.

⁷⁰ Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique*, pp. 583–584. Brown, *The Cistercians in the Latin Empire*, pp. 79–94. A special case of a religious institution from the Holy Land is the Byzantine *Theodosius Coenobiarcha* monastery, which after the Muslim conquest of Jerusalem in 1187 appears to have relocated to Berroia. After 1204 the monastic community seems to have entertained rather good relations with the local Latin authorities (cf. Chapter VI, note 33).

Just as in the case of the military orders, the presence of daughter establishments of the above-mentioned institutions expressed the solidarity of Latin Romania with the Holy Land, both symbolically and materially through the income that the mother institutions gained from their possessions in Romania. In his assignment of the *Philantropos* church in Thessalonike, papal legate Benedictus stated explicitly that it was quite normal that in the empire, which was expected to support the Holy Land, *beneficia* and *possessiones* were allocated to the religious institutions of Syria and Palestine that had suffered heavy losses of their possessions since Saladin's conquests at the end of the twelfth century.⁷¹ Just as was the case for the military orders, this mark of ideological orientation towards the Holy Land did not exclude regular occurrences of conflict between the religious institutions in question and local secular and ecclesiastical authorities, as has already become apparent in our discussion of the possessions of the chapter of the Holy Sepulchre. However, between a sense of responsibility for the *Terra Sancta* and the engaging in conflicts with the religious institutions from this indigent region, there was no insurmountable antithesis in the line of thought of the political elite of Latin Romania, as Archbishop Warin of Thessalonike's letter of circa 1212 to Innocent III about the agreement reached with the chapter of the Holy Sepulchre about the Church of Saint Demetrius illustrates. In this letter, Warin expresses explicitly the awareness that the Latin Empire bore an exceptional responsibility vis-à-vis the Holy Sepulchre. At the same time however, for many years previously Warin had, on the basis of his archiepiscopal rights, disputed the ownership of the Church of Saint Demetrius with the chapter. Ultimately, the link between the chapter of the Holy Sepulchre and the Holy Land certainly was for Warin one of the reasons for accepting an accommodation on the issue.⁷²

The religious institutions from the Holy Land possessed daughter institutions and possessions not only in the Latin Empire. In the

⁷¹ Cf. note 68.

⁷² Warin's letter is contained in the confirmation of the agreement by Innocent III (May 1212): '*Sane quamvis praedicta ecclesia Sancti Demetrii ad jurisdictionem meam pertinere noscatur, tamen ob reverentiam Domini sepulcri, ubi redemptio humani generis operata est, et ad cujus subventionem cruce signatorum exercitus terram Romaniae dicitur acquisisse, ne etiam dicti canonici sua spe et laboribus penitus fraudarentur [...] mihi, quantum in me est, visum est utile pariter et honestum ut memorati canonici Dominici sepulcri de omnibus possessionibus [...]*' (Migne, PL, CCXVI, col. 604 (XV, 86)).

twelfth century the majority of them acquired properties in the various kingdoms and principalities of Western Europe, as an expression of the collective responsibility of the Latin West for the Holy Land.⁷³ In this sense the presence of these institutions in the Latin Empire was nothing new, but rather something that was self-evident. The remarkable, and as far as we know relatively unique concentration of such institutions in the empire's capital Constantinople, and to a lesser extent in the empire's second city Thessalonike, was nonetheless the reflection of the exceptional responsibility that Romania bore for the *Terra Sancta* on an ideological level. The extent to which these institutions actually also heightened the concrete awareness of the local elite and population to a special responsibility towards the Latin Orient is virtually impossible to assess. In any event, in the years 1217–1221 the empire was to play a role during the Fifth Crusade, although despite an initially promising engagement this was ultimately very limited.

MIGRATIONAL MOVEMENTS BETWEEN THE LATIN ORIENT AND ROMANIA

The capture of Constantinople and the partial take-over of the Byzantine Empire led to the permanent establishment of a considerable part of the crusading army in Romania. It is often emphasized in the historiography that with this were lost large numbers of potential immigrants for the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine. Furthermore, after the fall of Constantinople many Latins from Syria and Palestine Romania would have come to Romania in order to settle there, where there were plenty of fiefdoms on hand, which was not the case in the principalities in Syria and Palestine that had been amputated by Saladin. In this way, the Fourth Crusade and the Latin Empire would have meant a twofold weakening of the Latin Orient in the years after 1204.⁷⁴

Several sources recount unambiguously how shortly after the taking of Constantinople a sizeable emigration had taken place from Syria and Palestine, both of the autochthonous Latin population and

⁷³ Rey, *Chartes de l'Abbaye du Mont Sion*, pp. 30–56. Köhler, *Chartes de l'abbaye de Notre-Dame de la Vallée de Josaphat*, passim. Richard, *Le Chartrier de Sainte-Marie-Latine*, pp. 605–612. Bresc-Bautier, *Le Cartulaire du Chapitre du Saint-Sépulcre*, passim.

⁷⁴ A few authoritative authors: Runciman, *The Kingdom of Acre*, pp. 129–130. Richard, *Le Royaume latin de Jérusalem*, pp. 168–169. Mayer, *The Crusades*, pp. 193, 205.

of contingents of crusaders that originally had not taken part in the diversion of the crusade to Byzantium.⁷⁵ In his letter to Innocent III relating to the capture, Emperor Baldwin reports that there were Latins from the *Terra Sancta* present at his imperial coronation on 16 May 1204.⁷⁶ The early thirteenth-century chronicle of Ernoul and Bernard le Trésorier tells how Baldwin had it proclaimed in the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine that all those who wished to acquire land in Constantinople were welcome. The response was considerable: according to the chronicle 100 knights and 10,000 other persons came over to the imperial city.⁷⁷ Villehardouin reports the coming of ‘*grant plenté de la gent del país, de chevaliers, de Turchoples, et de ser-janz.*’ In concreto the marshal names Hugh of Tiberias, his brother Raoul, former seneschal of Jerusalem, and Thierry of Tenremonde, who via his wife Agnes of Francieu was Lord of Adelon near Sidon in the Kingdom of Jerusalem.⁷⁸ In his assignment of the *Philantropos* church in Thessalonike to the abbey of Saint Mary of Josaphat (1206) papal legate Benedictus attests to the arrival in Romania of many clerics from the Holy Land.⁷⁹ This migration did not escape the attention of the west. In July 1205 Innocent III expressed to papal legate Pietro Capuano—who to the displeasure of the pope had left the Holy Land in 1204 for Constantinople—his deep concern about the departure of large numbers of *peregrini* and *indigenae* from the *Terra Sancta* to Romania, as a result of which *remansit ergo terra illa recedentibus vobis viris et viribus destituta*.⁸⁰ The early thirteenth-century *Continuatio anonymi appendicis Roberti de Monte ad Sigebertum*, drawn up in the abbey of Jumièges in Normandy under the year 1205 states on the basis of a letter from the archbishop of Caesarea: *Peregrini et fere omnes ad Balduinum imperatorem transibant*.⁸¹

The question is to what extent this—despite possible exaggerations—clearly sizeable group of emigrants settled permanently in the empire.

⁷⁵ Cf. Kedar, *The Fourth Crusade's Second Front*, pp. 103–104.

⁷⁶ ‘*Aderant incole Terre Sancte ecclesiastice militaresque persone*’ (Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271).

⁷⁷ Ernoul & Bernard Le Trésorier, *Chronique*, p. 378.

⁷⁸ Villehardouin, §316.

⁷⁹ ‘*multae personae religiosae de terra Syriae venerint ad has partes [= imperium Romaniae] pro beneficiis impetrandis*’ (Köhler, *Chartes de l'Abbaye de Notre-Dame de la Vallée de Josaphat*, n° 63).

⁸⁰ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 700 (VIII, 136).

⁸¹ *Continuatio Anonymi Appendicis Roberti De Monte Ad Sigebertum*, p. 342.

This was hardly the case as regards the barons from the Kingdom of Jerusalem.⁸² Until 1206, Raoul of Tiberias was at the imperial court, but in 1207 he was in the Kingdom of Jerusalem once more.⁸³ There is nothing known about his brother Hugh after 1204, but he was certainly dead by 1210, and as far as is known any successors that he might have had, did not settle in Romania.⁸⁴ Thierry of Tenremonde, as imperial constable, was killed in action in early 1206 in the defence of Rhousion in Thrace. His successors remained in the Kingdom of Jerusalem.⁸⁵ Only of Henry of Grand Gerin is it known that he settled definitively in the empire, where he probably gained the town of Pegai via a marital alliance with the Bracheux family.⁸⁶ Furthermore, barons from Syria and Palestine are to be found neither in Constantinople nor in other regions of the empire.

There is virtually no information available about the permanent or temporary settlement in the empire of emigrants of a more modest status. Some of the *Turcoples*—lightly armed cavalry—of either Latin or other origin that had come to the empire appear to have remained there.⁸⁷ However, the chronicle of Ernoul and Bernard le Trésorier indicates that generally the immigrants were disappointed. After all, Baldwin refused to give the land promised to them, which led to them to *par le tiere* go there *ou il porent miex faire*.⁸⁸ In our opinion, it can be understood from this passage that the Latin emperor hardly offered the migrants any fiefdoms that were ready to occupy in the area already under his control, but expected that they would assist in the further conquest of the Byzantine imperial territory. We can look upon the participation of Thierry of Tenremonde in Henry of Flanders/Hainaut's expedition near Adramyttion in Asia Minor at the end of 1204/beginning of 1205 from this point of view.⁸⁹ The immigrants' disappointment can have led to a large number of them quickly leaving the empire to return to Syria and Palestine, particularly after

⁸² Kedar, *The Fourth Crusade's Second Front*, pp. 104–106.

⁸³ Cf. Chapter V, note 34.

⁸⁴ His widow Margaret of Ibelin is in 1210 attested as being the wife of Walter III, lord of Caesarea (La Monte, *The Lords of Caesarea*, pp. 155–156).

⁸⁵ Cf. Chapter V, note 26.

⁸⁶ Cf. Chapter III, note 184.

⁸⁷ In 1206 there is still a contingent present in the empire (Villehardouin, §438). On the *Turcoples*: France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000–1300*, pp. 219–220.

⁸⁸ Ernoul & Bernard Le Trésorier, *Chronique*, p. 378.

⁸⁹ Villehardouin, §322.

the disastrous Latin defeat at Adrianople in April 1205. In any event, this defeat led to the definitive departure of a large number of crusaders to their western homelands.⁹⁰

The acquisition of properties and daughter establishments in the empire by religious institutions from the Holy Land implied that Latin clerics from Syria and Palestine also emigrated to Latin Romania. It is difficult to estimate their numbers. Looked at quantitatively, the daughter establishments in Latin Romania of the military orders and other institutions cannot in any event be seen as being overwhelming.⁹¹ Furthermore, it would be wrong to suppose that the communities in the daughter institutions in the empire would have been exclusively made up of clerics from the Holy Land. In addition to those sent by the monastic institutions to take responsibility for local possessions, other clerics also travelled to Romania in order to try their luck. Known among these are the titular bishops Peter of Bethlehem and Radulphus of Samaria. Bishop Peter fell in the Battle of Adrianople in 1205 and Radulphus settled in Thessalonike, where he was entrusted with the care of Mount Athos.⁹²

From the above it appears that the postulation that the empire of Constantinople robbed the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine of their military reserves should at least be given some nuance. Although the initial migration was certainly considerable, there is no evidence that establishes that this also led to a permanent settlement of any substantial size in Latin Romania. In our opinion it was for the great majority of the initial migrants more of a temporary and transitory nature. We should mention in passing that after the politico-military decline of the empire circa 1224–1225 a reverse migration must have been set in motion to a certain extent. A concrete example of this is Guillelmus of Thessalonike, archdeacon of Lydda and afterwards bishop of Tiberias.⁹³

It is an irrefutable fact that the Latin take-over of Byzantium denied the Holy Land many potential immigrants in the event that the Fourth Crusade had been able to gain military successes in the Latin Orient.

⁹⁰ Ibidem, §376–377. Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 388.

⁹¹ Cf. p. 450 and Chapter VI, pp. 340–342.

⁹² Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271; Villehardouin, §361. Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1030 (IX, 192); CCXVI, col. 229 (XIII, 40).

⁹³ Guillelmus became bishop of Tiberias in 1273; he died in 1274 (Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, II, p. 228).

Only a very limited number of participants in the Fourth Crusade made their new home in the Holy Land. Known of among the barons are only Walter of Montbéliard, Guy of Montfort and William of La Mandalée.⁹⁴ In the years that followed too, the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine to a great extent lacked the coming of western pilgrims and crusaders, for whom the Latin empire was indeed the principal pole of attraction for a number of years. In May 1204 Baldwin issued a general call to western Christendom to come and assist the consolidation of the Latin take-over of Byzantium, in which he held out to all the prospects of gaining *veras immensasque divitias [...] temporales pariter et eternas*.⁹⁵ The emperor asked Innocent III to grant the crusade indulgence to all who came to the empire.⁹⁶ The pope took his request to heart, and at the end of May 1205 he circularized all the archbishops and bishops of the Kingdom of France with the request that they encourage both laymen and clerics to depart for the Latin Empire, saying that those willing to do so would be granted the crusade indulgence. Specific appeals were made on the one hand to the various religious orders and on the other to the *magistri* and *scholares* of Paris.⁹⁷

The initial response to the imperial and papal appeals is not known. The defeat at Adrianople in April 1205 in any case gave additional impulse to the initiatives to gain western support. At the beginning of June 1205 Regent Henry sent to Innocent an urgent request for help for the distressed empire. A similar letter was destined for the whole of western Christendom. A delegation consisting of Bishop Nivelon of Soissons, Nicolas of Mailly and Jean Bliaud was given the assignment to organize an expedition for the support of Constantinople in Western Europe.⁹⁸ The pope promised the enterprise his full support, confirmed the crusade indulgence for all those who travelled to Constantinople, and during the years 1205–1207 fulfilled a co-ordinating role in the preparations.⁹⁹ The efforts of Bishop Nivelon and his companions were

⁹⁴ Kedar, *The Fourth Crusade's Second Front*, p. 106. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility*, pp. 23–24. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 20.

⁹⁵ Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 274.

⁹⁶ Ibidem, n° 271.

⁹⁷ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 634–638 (VIII, 69–71).

⁹⁸ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 706–710 (VIII, 131). Pokorný, *Zwei unedierte Briefe*, pp. 199–202.

⁹⁹ Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 706 (VIII, 130); col. 854 (IX, 45); col. 1035–1037 (IX, 197–199).

concentrated on northern France and in the homelands of the Latin emperor, the counties of Flanders, Hainaut and Namur.¹⁰⁰ A few chronicles indicate that the response was considerable.¹⁰¹ The Liège *Annales Sancti Jacobi* by Reinerus reported under the year 1207: '*Innumerabilis turba clericorum, monachorum, laicorum zelo fidei accenditur, et suasionem episcopi Suessionensis Constantinopolim proficiscitur.*'¹⁰² The universal chronicle of Laon states that Bishop Nivelon *multos ex omni Gallia collectos in auxilium Latinorum secum duceret*, before he died in 1207, at the point of crossing to Romania, in the southern Italian port of Bari.¹⁰³ The anonymous chronicle from the Benedictine Abbey of Jumièges states that in 1207 *episcopus Suessionum cum magna multitudine Constantinopolim adiit.*¹⁰⁴

After 1207 the stream of pilgrims, crusaders and other migrants going to the Latin Empire dried up. In his letter of January 1213, written on the occasion of the recent successes against inter alia Theodore Laskaris of Nicaea and Boril of Bulgaria, Emperor Henry called upon his Western friends to come and settle in his empire. Apparently neither the initial influx of 1204 nor the relief expedition of circa 1207 had alleviated the need for permanent Latin immigrants.¹⁰⁵ However, there is not a single source that suggests that this time there was a substantial response in the West to Henry's request. This is probably related to the fact that later that year Innocent III, as we shall argue in consultation with inter alia Henry, launched an appeal for a new crusade. In 1217 the imperial couple Peter and Yolande nonetheless managed to muster a not inconsiderable army for their crossing to Constantinople. Peter's status of *crucesignatus* within the framework of the Fifth Crusade probably played a role in this.¹⁰⁶ It is not indeed unlikely that some of his troops were also *crucesignati*, who journeyed to Constantinople in order to take part in the crusade from there. When subsequently

¹⁰⁰ Bishop Nivelon made gifts to religious institutions in Soissons, Longpont, Châlons-sur-Marne and Namur (*Anonymi Suessionensis De Terra Iherosolimitana*, p. 8; Riant, *Exuviae Sacrae Constantinopolitanae*, t. 2, n° 4, 15–16, 18).

¹⁰¹ Peter of Douai (1207) and Eustace of Hainaut (1206), inter alia, answered the calls (cf. Chapter V, notes 27 and 35).

¹⁰² Reinerus, *Annales Sancti Jacobi Leodiensis*, p. 660.

¹⁰³ *Chronicon Universale Laudunensis*, p. 713.

¹⁰⁴ *Continuatio Anonymi Appendicis Roberti De Monte Ad Sigebertum*, p. 343.

¹⁰⁵ Prinzing, *Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs*, p. 418.

¹⁰⁶ A well-informed contemporary chronicler estimated Peter and Yolande's military force at 160 knights and 5,500 horse and infantry (Robertus Autissiodorensis, *Chronologia*, p. 284).

during his passage through Epiros Peter was taken prisoner by the rebellious Theodore Doukas, for a short period Honorius III threatened the ruler of Epiros with a crusade. Ultimately however, the pope was not prepared to partially divert the Fifth Crusade to Romania.¹⁰⁷ After this, the Latin empire no longer formed a serious rival for the Latin Orient with regard to attracting support from the West.¹⁰⁸

THE JACOBITE VIEW ON 1204

An interesting link between the empire of Constantinople and the Latin Orient is formed by the recognition by the Jacobite community of the Latin take-over of the Byzantine Empire as being legitimate. This is apparent from the so-called *History of Dynasties* by the Jacobite prelate and historiographer Bar Hebraeus (1226–1286). In this work the chronicler provides an overview of human history on the basis of ten dynasties to which God had granted the dominion of the world. Ludger Bernhard has demonstrated that in this work, Hebraeus viewed the Latin conquest of New Rome as legitimate and the Nicaean seizure of the city in 1261 as usurpation. Bernhard explains Hebraeus' way of thinking from the traditional view in Jacobite chronicles according to which the Franks could be identified with the Romans. In this light the age-long Greek (or Byzantine) world dominion (= the eighth dynasty), which had first been in Roman hands (= the seventh dynasty), was looked upon as illegitimate and the Latin invasion of 1204 as legitimate.¹⁰⁹ Perhaps for the background to this Jacobite view we should look in the ages-long difficult relations between the Byzantine and Jacobite Churches.¹¹⁰

We may assume that Bar Hebraeus' outlook voiced the opinion of the Jacobite community in the Middle East. The author was after all a prominent cleric who ended his career as *maphrian* of the East, the second highest office in the Jacobite hierarchy. What is also interesting is that in his youth he spent part of his time studying in the Latin

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Chapter VII, p. 378.

¹⁰⁸ In 1221 Emperor-elect Robert of Courtenay departed with a rather modest retinue for Constantinople, despite the difficulties the empire was experiencing (Ernoul & Bernard Le Tresorier, *Chronique*, p. 393).

¹⁰⁹ Ludger Bernhard, *Die Legitimität des Lateinischen Kaiserreiches*, pp. 133–138.

¹¹⁰ On these difficult relations between the Byzantine and Jacobite Churches: Hussey, *The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire*, p. 174.

principalities in Syria and Palestine, and in particular in Antioch and Tripoli, which suggests that he empathized with the local Jacobite community there.¹¹¹ In the eyes of Jacobite Christendom the Latin emperors were therefore in rightful possession of the empire of Constantinople and they ascribed the same emperors a legitimate place in the overview of succeeding dynasties that had held world dominion. This international prestige ascribed by part of eastern Christendom bestowed some degree of reality to the universalistic claims of the Latin emperors. At the same time the Jacobite position further nuances the supposed general recognition that the Nicaean Empire would have enjoyed as the legitimate successor to the Byzantine Empire.¹¹²

THE FIFTH CRUSADE

Shortly after his imperial coronation, Emperor Baldwin had in 1204 pledged to Innocent that he would push on with the Fourth Crusade to the Holy Land once Latin control of Romania was assured.¹¹³ However, until 1213 the Latin emperors were confronted with a succession of problems that prevented a relief expedition to the Latin Orient. In the intervening years, Innocent did not fail to remind the emperor and his vassals of their responsibility to the Holy Land.¹¹⁴ Circa 1213 the empire's internal and external situation was finally sufficiently stable to make new initiatives possible. In addition the peace treaties with Nicaea and Bulgaria, and the alliance with Konya assured that the land route from Western Europe to Jerusalem was again completely open. Although by this time the sea route to the Holy Land had become customary—partly precisely because of the unavailability of the land route—there is no reason to assume why a reopened land route could

¹¹¹ For Bar Hebraeus' biography: Goettsberger, *Barhebraeus*, col. 967–969 (with further references).

¹¹² Cf. Chapter VII, p. 359.

¹¹³ Cf. p. 433.

¹¹⁴ In a letter of March 1207 to *universis Christi fidelibus cruce signatis in Romaniae partibus constitutis* the pope expresses the hope that God will still bring their *iter ad finem optatum* (Migne, *PL*, CCXV, col. 1131–1132 (X, 38)). In a letter of October 1211 to Emperor Henry: 'Grave gerimus et molestum quod cum tu et alii cruce signati ad hoc debueritis circa captionem et detentionem imperii Romaniae intendere principaliter ut per illud subveniretis commodius terrae sanctae tu non solum eidem nullum curasti adhuc subsidium ministrare, verum etiam fratribus militiae Templi, qui pro ipsius terrae defensione totis viribus elaborant, infers molestias et jacturas [...]' (Ibidem, CCXVI, col. 470 (XIV, 109)).

not have regained its usefulness. Indeed, as has been seen, in 1218 King Andrew II of Hungary opted for the land route on his return journey from his crusade in the Holy Land in 1218.¹¹⁵

The Liège *Annales Sancti Jacobi* of Reinerus states that in 1213 Emperor Henry played an instrumental role in the launch of the papal call for the Fifth Crusade: '*Innocentius papa III instructus divinorum librorum autoritate et maxime libri Apokalipsis et persuasus a rege Grece scripsit universis Christi fidelibus quatinus crucem Christi sibi asumerant et in exemplum illius qui pro nobis crucem in angaria tulit in orientali ecclesia que adhuc peccatis nostris facientibus sub potestate est Saracena in remissionem omnium peccatorum suorum contra inimicos crucis adsumerent.*'¹¹⁶ As far as we know, the information concerning the imperial influence on the papal decision to organize a new crusade has been handed down only in the source mentioned. However, the author does appear to have utilized reliable sources. In this way the allusions to the *divini libri* and the Revelation of St John are references to Innocent's bull *Quia major* of April 1213, which announced the new crusade.¹¹⁷ That other sources do not report the imperial involvement can be explained by the fact that the Latin emperor ultimately did not play a role during the actual crusading expedition. It was only in his home region that Henry's initial involvement in the Fifth Crusade was recorded.¹¹⁸ The imperial role in the initiative for the crusade demonstrates that, as against what the existing historiography would have us believe, initially the Fifth Crusade was not planned as '*above all else a papal crusade.*'¹¹⁹

The passage quoted is vague about the Latin emperor's exact role in the initiative for the Fifth Crusade. In addition to Henry and Innocent III, the king of Jerusalem John of Brienne was in any case also involved in it. It was probably the latter that, after concluding a five-year truce circa 1211–1212 with Sultan al-Adil of Egypt (commencing in July 1212), made contact with the papal court in connection with the desirability of a new crusade at about the time that the truce came to an end.¹²⁰ The information from Reinerus suggests that

¹¹⁵ Prinzing, *Der Brief*, pp. 414–417. Cf. also Chapter VII, p. 417.

¹¹⁶ Reinerus, *Annales Sancti Jacobi Leodiensis*, p. 667.

¹¹⁷ Migne, *PL*, CCXVI, col. 817–821 (XVI, 28).

¹¹⁸ Van Tricht, *De jongelingenjaren van een keizer van Konstantinopel*, p. 190.

¹¹⁹ Van Cleve, *The Fifth Crusade*, p. 378. Ook: Mayer, *The Crusades*, p. 205.

¹²⁰ *L'estoire D'eracles*, p. 319: the chronicle relates how King John in the context of (the preparations of) the Fourth Lateran Council sent messengers to the pope

the Latin emperor was contacted at the same time. Evidently the reaction in Constantinople was positive—which must have been related to the internal and external stabilization of the empire by that time, and Emperor Henry actively confirmed to Innocent his support of the idea of a new crusade. At the same time, Henry promised to participate personally, which would make the idea of the Latin emperor as patron of the Holy Land a reality.¹²¹ During the expedition, the imperial dignity would have given Henry a leading position, which, combined with the claims of imperial suzerainty, could have formed the basis for the establishment of the hegemony of Constantinople vis-à-vis the Latin Orient. Circa 1213–1217 the empire of Constantinople was by far the most important Latin political power in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin.¹²² This consequence was possibly taken into account at John of Brienne's court and not found to be undesirable. Ultimately in the years 1158–1180, when it had the status of client state of Byzantium, the kingdom had experienced a period of relatively good fortune without losing its governmental autonomy.¹²³

In April 1213 Innocent launched the call for a new crusade, which was anticipated to take place in the year 1217. Preparation for the expedition was to form one of the principal themes of the concurrently announced Lateran Council of 1215, at which Emperor Henry's envoys were present. In the meantime, in Latin Constantinople diplomatic preparations were possibly made for the crusade. It is indeed conceivable that Latin Constantinople was involved in the formation of the alliance that came into being at about this time between the Latin rulers in Syria and Palestine and the sultan of Konya, Kay-kaus I.¹²⁴ Henry's death in 1216 however, meant the beginning of the end of an

to explain the needs of the Latin Orient. See also: Runciman, *The Kingdom of Acre*, p. 133. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, pp. 115–128.

¹²¹ This can be deduced from Reinerus' passage about Henry's death in 1216: '*Eodem anno non multo post obiit Henricus imperator Constantinopolitanus qui Greciam post fratrem suum Balduinum feliciter et efficaciter rexit de cuius morte tota christianitas doluit quia signatis nostris multa promiserat et se iturum in virtute armorum in negotium orientalis ecclesie predixerat.*' (Reinerus, *Annales Sancti Jacobi Leodiensis*, p. 675).

¹²² Cf. Chapter VII, p. 430.

¹²³ Baldwin, *The Latin States under Baldwin III and Amalric I*, pp. 542–561. Idem, *The Decline and Fall of Jerusalem*, pp. 592–595.

¹²⁴ Mayer, *The Crusades*, p. 210. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, pp. 133–135. Emperor Henry entered into a military alliance with Kay-kaus' predecessor Kaykhusraw I; after Kaykhusraw's death in 1212 the alliance seems to have been continued with his successors (cf. Chapter VII, p. 376).

imperial involvement in the crusade. To be sure, Henry's successor Peter of Courtenay had taken the crusading vow, as the result of which he became successor to the imperial engagement in the expedition.¹²⁵ Theodore Doukas' rebellion in Epiros however put an end to the plans for participation in the Fifth Crusade. Peter died as prisoner of Doukas, and neither his widow Empress Yolande nor his son Emperor Robert took on his engagement.¹²⁶ The explanation for this is the deterioration of the empire's internal situation as the result of Doukas' rebellion and his offensive against the Kingdom of Thessalonike from 1218 onwards.¹²⁷

The lack of imperial engagement probably did not prevent contingents from various regions of the empire from participation in the expedition. To be found in the Principality of Achaia in July 1218 were *crucesignati* who planned to participate in the Fifth Crusade. Although at the request of Prince Geoffrey I of Villehardouin Honorius III advised them to postpone their participation so that they could assist their ruler in the defence of the principality against Theodore Doukas, we may perhaps assume that a number of crusaders nonetheless departed for Egypt.¹²⁸ We can also assume that a number of barons from the imperial entourage and from the region around Constantinople had also taken the crusading vow. It would seem likely to us that a number of them would have actually taken part in the expedition. The fact that painstaking research within the quite abundant source material for the Fifth Crusade reveals no names of residents of the empire shows however that the participants from the empire were quantitatively insignificant; neither did they make a qualitatively notable contribution.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ On Peter's status as *crucesignatus*: cf. Chapter II, p. 97. On his concrete crusading plans: see *infra*.

¹²⁶ A papal letter of August 1218 cites a letter to Honorius III in the name of the crusading army at Damietta, that reports that the support expected from inter alia the Latin emperor had not materialized: '*Ac de vestra [= Honorius III] celeri subventionē sperantes illud attentavimus negotium licet rebus et viribus impares infidelibus inimicis quod nec a regibus vel ab imperatoribus novimus attentatum*' (Brial, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, XIX, pp. 663–664).

¹²⁷ Cf. Chapter VII, p. 377.

¹²⁸ Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz*, n° IV–V, pp. 749–750.

¹²⁹ A leading figure of whom it is assumed that he took part in the Fifth Crusade, Berthold of Katzenelnbogen, regent of Thessalonike (cf. Longnon, *Les compagnons*, p. 245), was in fact not involved in this expedition. The misconception is based on a passage in the fifteenth-century *Cronike van der Duytscher Oirden van der ridderscap van den huyse ende hospitaal Onser Lieve Vrouwen van Jherusalem*. In this is recounted how circa 1217 the *grave van Catsenellebogen* departed on a crusade (Matthaeus,

It is interesting to note that possibly a number of Byzantines from the Latin Empire also took part in the Fifth Crusade. The early thirteenth-century *Chronicon Turonense* sketches the discord in that part of the crusading army that had stayed behind in Damietta after the defeat of the main force at Mansourah in August 1221 as follows: 'Porro quibusquam volentibus reddere civitatem, quibusquam nolentibus, orta est disensio inter eos. Nam Veneti, Pisani, Ianuenses et Siculi cum omni de imperio nobilibus, civitatem defendere conabantur, et ex alia parte *Graeci*, Syrii, Armenii, cum Hospitalis et Templi militibus et Hamerico vicecomite Toarcii, et aliis nobilibus Francie, qui in urbe remanserant, eam reddere minabantur.'¹³⁰ The following arguments support the hypothesis that Byzantines from Latin Romania are meant by the term *Graeci*. Firstly, the *Chronicon Turonense* uses this term only to refer to inhabitants of the Byzantine Empire.¹³¹ Consequently, it is plausible that in the passage in question it relates to Byzantines from (Latin) Romania. Secondly, circa 1217 there were actually in the Latin Empire Byzantine aristocrats that planned participation in the crusade. For example, Theodore Doukas had promised Emperor Peter that he would participate in the crusade.¹³² The fact that Doukas did not fulfil that engagement does not exclude the possibility that others actually did take part in the expedition.

The following considerations also make a modest Byzantine participation in the Fifth Crusade not inconceivable. The view that in Byzantium the idea of Holy War was totally unknown is contradicted by a document of circa 1208 from patriarch of Nicaea Michael IV Autoreianos.¹³³ We should also not forget that in 1203 Alexios (IV) Angelos had promised his support to the Fourth Crusade if the crusaders would help him to ascend the imperial throne.¹³⁴ In addition, in the recent historiography Manuel Komnenos' Asia Minor expedition of 1175–1176, which ended in his defeat at Myriocephalon, has been

Veteris Aevi Analecta seu Vetera Monumenta hactenus nondum visa (editio secunda), V, §74, p. 673). This person should however be identified as Diether IV of Katzenelnbogen, Berthold's nephew, of whom it is also known from other sources that he took part in the Fifth Crusade (Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, p. 118; Todt, *Graf Berthold II. von Katzenelnbogen*, p. 84).

¹³⁰ *Chronicon Turonense*, p. 302.

¹³¹ A few passages for comparison: *Chronicon Turonense*, pp. 291, 307, 310–311.

¹³² Cf. Chapter IV, pp. 187, 243.

¹³³ Laurent, *Les Regestes des actes du patriarchat*, I/4, n° 1205, p. 4. An opposing view: Lemerle, *Byzance et la croisade*, pp. 614–620.

¹³⁴ Queller & Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, p. 83.

characterized as a Byzantine crusade.¹³⁵ A counter-argument for our hypothesis that with the term *Graeci* are meant Byzantines from Latin Romania is their possible identification with Greek inhabitants of the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine, who are commonly referred to with the same term. The term *Syrii* mentioned in the same passage would then refer to eastern Christians from Syria and Palestine who did not belong to the Byzantine Church, for example Jacobites and Maronites.¹³⁶ Another possibility is that the Greek minority of Damietta itself, which belonged to the Byzantine Church, is meant. Finally, it is of course possible that at the same time *Graeci* from the Latin Empire, the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine and Damietta are meant. Unfortunately the source material prevents the achievement of a conclusive interpretation.

THE LAST ROMAN EMPEROR

One last point that we would like to address in relation to the crusading designs of the Latin emperors Baldwin, Henry and Peter, concerns the question as to whether these two rulers might have viewed their planned participation in a crusading expedition in support of the Latin Orient within an eschatological framework. An element that prompts this issue is the finding that their biographies in their main features correspond rather well to that of the apocalyptic Last Roman Emperor, as represented in some western versions of this popular medieval prophetic tradition.¹³⁷ In Adso of Montier-en-Der's mid-tenth century adaptation, which took the form of a tractate on the Antichrist, a king of the Franks obtains the entire Roman Empire and after governing it successfully, he goes to Jerusalem where he lays down his crown and sceptre.¹³⁸ By the end of the eleventh century there circulated prophecies in Italy concerning a Western ruler being crowned in Constantinople before going on to liberate Jerusalem.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States*, pp. 211–213. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 95–97.

¹³⁶ Prawer, *Social Classes in the Crusader States*, pp. 59–94.

¹³⁷ On the origins of the legend of the Last Roman Emperor: McGinn, *Visions of the End*, pp. 44–45. Alexander, *The Byzantine Apocalyptic Tradition*, pp. 181–184.

¹³⁸ Verhelst, *Adso Dervensis—De ortu et tempore Antichristi et Tractatus qui ab eo dependunt*, p. 26.

¹³⁹ Magdalino, *Prophecies on the Fall of Constantinople*, pp. 41–42. Erdmann, *Endkaiser Glaube und Kreuzzugsgedanke im 11. Jahrhundert*, pp. 405–414.

The parallel with the respective careers and crusading plans of the emperors mentioned is obvious. Baldwin as Count of Flanders and Hainaut and Peter as Count of Namur were western rulers, while Henry belonged to a ruling family. They held no royal title, but Peter was a grandson of the French King Louis VI and Baldwin and Henry could claim descent from the Carolingian emperor Charlemagne.¹⁴⁰ All three of course obtained the Roman imperial crown of Constantinople and entertained designs of liberating Jerusalem.

However, no source known to us links these emperors' reigns with the cited apocalyptic traditions. One reason for this may be that in the end none of them actually undertook an expedition to Jerusalem. Nevertheless it seems probable to us that they were acquainted with the prophecies in question, considering that the court of Flanders at the end of the twelfth century was by no means a cultural backwater. On the contrary, there existed a keen interest in history and literature.¹⁴¹ In the context of the long-standing crusading commitment of the Flemish counts the comital entourage may have come into contact with the Italian prophecies mentioned. From the end of the eleventh century onward and throughout the twelfth century many Flemish crusaders, inter alia several counts, en route to the Holy Land passed through the Italian peninsula, sometimes spending considerable time there.¹⁴² In addition, Italians were well represented in the Latin Orient. Suffice it here to refer to the Venetian, Genoese and Pisan merchant colonies in seaports like Acre and Tyre and the Norman aristocracy of southern Italy in the Principality of Antioch founded by Bohemond of

¹⁴⁰ The comital lineages of Flanders and Hainaut both descended from Baldwin I, Count of Flanders (†879), and Judith, daughter of the Carolingian Emperor Charles the Bald (875–877), who himself was Charlemagne's grandson: Ganshof, *Les origines du comté de Flandre*, pp. 367–385. On Baldwin and Henry's father Baldwin V of Hainaut's interest in his Carolingian ancestry: Ehlers, *Der Pseudo-Turpin in den Grandes Chroniques de France*, pp. 107–109. Tischler, *Tatmensch oder Heidenapostel. Die Bilder Karl der Grosses bei Einhart und im Pseudo-Turpin*, pp. 7–9. Jaspert, *Karolingische Legitimation und Karlsverehrung im Katalonien*, p. 139.

¹⁴¹ Count Baldwin IX/VI of Flanders and Hainaut is reported by a later source to have commissioned a vernacular history of his lineage and homelands and a concise world history (Wolff, *Baldwin of Flanders and Hainaut*, p. 283). The roman courtois *Escoufle* (circa 1200–1202) was dedicated to Baldwin by its author Jean Renard, while another work titled *Eracle* by Gauthier d'Arras was dedicated to his father Baldwin VIII/V of Flanders and Hainaut (Trotter, *Medieval French Literature and the Crusades*, p. 133).

¹⁴² Adair, *Flemish Comital Family and the Crusades*, p. 109. Van Werveke, *Een Vlaamse graaf van Europees formaat. Filips van de Elzas*, pp. 59–60.

Taranto.¹⁴³ Alternatively the comital court may have come into contact with the prophecies in question against the background of the existing diplomatic relations with the papacy or in the context of the rather intensive commercial links between the two regions.¹⁴⁴ For the court's acquaintance with the tradition reported by Adso there exists a more tangible argument. In the early twelfth century Lambert, canon of Saint-Omer, included an adaptation of Adso's text in his *Liber Floridus*. It was copied several times during the twelfth century and it seems reasonable to assume that this work was known by members of the comital entourage. Interestingly enough the *Liber Floridus* also contains the *Revelationes* by Pseudo-Methodius, a Latin version of an apocalyptic tractate dating from the seventh century and originally written in Syriac. This text is one of the earliest prophesying the reign at the end of times of a Last Roman Emperor, who will resign his kingship to God in Jerusalem whereupon the rule of Antichrist will commence.¹⁴⁵

While no source thus links any of the Latin emperors to the westernized versions of the Last Roman Emperor prophecy discussed, there is however one text which appears to provide a link between the Emperor Henry and a Byzantine version of this apocalyptic tradition. Chronicler Henry of Valenciennes has the following to say about the reaction of the Byzantines to Henry's crossing of the frozen Maritsa river—the ancient Hebros—in December 1208: '*Et de chou furent Grifon molt dolent; car il avoient sorti que chil qui passeroit cel flun sans moillier, seroit .xxxij. ans sires de la terre; ne il ne cuidoit mie que che peust estre se verités non. Et d'autre part, il n'avoient onques oï dire que chil fluns fust engielés au montant de l'espece d'un seul denier; car a miervalles estoit grans et parfons, et couroit trop ravinouement, et si avoit bien une grant archie de lé. Et pour chou disoient Grifon entre els que Nostre Sires aime tant cest empereour, que che ne*

¹⁴³ Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land bis zum Tode Heinrichs von Champagne (1098–1197)*, passim. Balard, *Communes italiennes, pouvoir et habitants dans les Etats francs de Syrie-Palestine au XII^e s.*, pp. 43–63. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, passim.

¹⁴⁴ Van Werveke, *Een Vlaamse graaf van Europees formaat. Filips van de Elzas*, pp. 62–64. Stabel, *Italian merchants and the fairs in the Low Countries (12th–16th centuries)*, pp. 131–159.

¹⁴⁵ Verhelst, *Adso Dervensis—De ortu et tempore Antichristi et Tractatus qui ab eo dependunt*, pp. 140–152. This original version does not attribute a western origin to the Last Roman Emperor (for references see note 137).

*seroit mie legiere chose de lui chacier hors de la tierre, ains le doivent servir si comme il dient. Et d'autre part, il ne lor fait chose qui lor anoit.*¹⁴⁶ In the existing historiography we have found no other reference to a Byzantine prophecy stating that he who crossed the Maritsa river without getting wet would reign as emperor for thirty-two years. However, two so-called Visions of Daniel, as a number of Byzantine reworkings of the apocalypse by Pseudo-Methodius were called, cite an emperor reigning for thirty-two years.

The Slavonic Daniel (circa 827–829) in a succession of emperors immediately preceding the rise of the Last Roman Emperor mentions an emperor who is proclaimed and anointed in the West, and subsequently while victoriously driving away the Ismaelites proceeds via Lombardy and Rome and then by a dry road to Constantinople, where he rules successfully for thirty-two years. A section in the Daniel *Kai estai* (or Second Greek Vision of Daniel—post 869), heavily dependent upon the Slavonic Daniel, also mentions the prosperous and beneficial rule of a good emperor ruling for thirty-two years, defeating the Ismaemites, and preceding the rise of the Last Roman Emperor.¹⁴⁷ As Alexander has pointed out the functions normally attributed to the Last Roman Emperor in these Visions of Daniel have been distributed over several consecutive eschatological rulers. The same holds true for the also Pseudo-Methodius inspired Andreas Salos Apocalypse, probably datable to the tenth century, which contains a passage describing the victorious, peaceful and just reign of an emperor ruling for thirty-two years, that precedes the rise of the Last Emperor who lays down his crown in Jerusalem.¹⁴⁸ Finally, chronicler Niketas Choniates states that patriarch of Constantinople Dositheos (1190–1191) assured Emperor Isaac II Angelos that he was destined to liberate the Holy Land and reign in prosperity for thirty-two years.¹⁴⁹ In doing so Dositheos must have based himself on a tradition related to the cited Visions of Daniel in which the emperor reigning for thirty-two years himself was the Last Roman Emperor, as is evident from the cited journey to the Holy Land, which can be identified as one of the Last Emperor's prime characteristics.

¹⁴⁶ Valenciennes, §567.

¹⁴⁷ Alexander, *The Byzantine Apocalyptic Tradition*, pp. 69–71, 88–89, 162.

¹⁴⁸ Ryden, *The Andreas Salos Apocalypse*, pp. 203, 856B.

¹⁴⁹ Niketas Choniates, p. 432. Magdalino, *Prophecy and Divination in the History*, pp. 67–70.

Our finding that the character of an emperor reigning for thirty-two years, apart from the oracle recorded by Valenciennes, before 1204 only seems to appear in the two cited versions of the Visions of Daniel, in the Andreas Salos Apocalypse, and in Dositheos' prophecy regarding Isaac II, leads us to the hypothesis that the prophecy mentioned by this Western chronicler must have been part of a Pseudo-Methodius inspired apocalyptic tradition—possibly going under the name of a Vision of Daniel, the full version of which is no longer extant today. Magdalino also sees the element of a thirty-two year reign as being particularly associated with Last Roman Emperor prophecies.¹⁵⁰ In the thirteenth century Pseudo-Methodius inspired eschatological prophecies, and the attribution of these to the Old Testament prophet Daniel, were in any case still very much alive, as is for example evident from the so-called Last Vision of Daniel, which refers to the Byzantine reconquest of Constantinople in 1261 and once again mentions a victorious, merciful and righteous emperor ruling for thirty-two years.¹⁵¹ If our hypothesis is correct then Emperor Henry on the strength of his fulfilment of the cited prophecy probably was identified by, at least part of, the Byzantine population as the Last Roman Emperor or as one of the eschatological emperors immediately preceding this ruler. Henry and his entourage for their part surely must have recognized the potential of this fulfilled prophecy in legitimizing the Latin emperors' rule in Constantinople. Valenciennes indeed explicitly states that the fulfilment of the prophecy, along with the emperor's conciliatory policy, stimulated the Byzantine population to accept Henry's rule. The established direct link—assuming the correctness of our hypothesis—between Henry and the Last Roman Emperor prophecy further leads us to think that it is not implausible that the Latin emperor in the context of his renewed crusading commitment (circa 1213) may also have associated himself with the Last Roman Emperor legend vis-à-vis the

¹⁵⁰ Magdalino, *Op. cit.*, p. 69. The number thirty-two probably refers to Constantine the Great (306–337), who reigned for around thirty-two years (Ryden, *The Andreas Salos Apocalypse*, p. 233). It also may be a symbolic reference to Christ's approximate age or even an allusion to Herakleios (610–641), who before 1204 was the only Byzantine emperor ruling for about thirty-two years besides Constantine the Great (Vereecken & Hadermann-Misguich, *Les oracles de Léon le Sage*, p. 181).

¹⁵¹ Alexander, *The Byzantine Apocalyptic Tradition*, p. 62. Ryden, *The Andreas Salos Apocalypse*, p. 234. Magdalino, *Prophecies on the Fall of Constantinople*, p. 44. *Ibidem* (pp. 51–52) also examples of Western sources (tenth-thirteenth centuries) referring to versions of the 'Visions of Daniel' of which the full text is no longer extant today.

western half of Christendom, on the one hand basing himself on the said prophecy come true, and on the other hand on the westernized versions of the Last Emperor tradition already discussed. The initiating role that Henry—together with Pope Innocentius III and King of Jerusalem John of Brienne—played in starting up the Fifth Crusade, and the leading part he aspired to play during this expedition, fit in well within this hypothesis. In the eleventh and twelfth century several Holy Roman Emperors—Henry IV, Frederick I Barbarossa and possibly Henry VI—already had been associated with the Last Emperor legend by contemporary authors who all seem to have been attached to the German court.¹⁵²

Henry's successor Peter of Courtenay also possibly associated himself with the Last Emperor legend. It is in our view rather conspicuous how Peter's short reign displays some remarkable similarities with the career of the eschatological emperor ruling for thirty-two years in the Slavonic Daniel. Firstly, Peter could be considered as an emperor who was proclaimed in the West (by the Constantinopolitan envoys). Secondly, on his way to Constantinople he passed through Lombardy and Rome, where he was crowned. In the third place, from Dyrrachion he took the overland route to Constantinople. Finally, Peter—according to *L'Estoire d'Eracles* on the suggestion of the Epirote vassal prince Theodore Doukas, who inter alia is said to have addressed the emperor by saying '*Sire, je voi que Dex vos a amené en ces parties por le profit de la Crestienté*'—made it his goal to conquer, besides the Nicaean empire, the Sultanate of Konya, and to liberate the Holy Land.¹⁵³ The first three elements mentioned can of course be simply explained as matters of political expediency, without having to have recourse to any apocalyptic prophecies.¹⁵⁴ The last element however may be interpreted in the sense that Peter saw himself as an emperor with a special mission, on which Doukas then seems to have capitalized. Of course Peter had taken the crusading vow, but that in itself obviously did not make him responsible for conquering or liberating—speaking from a Latin point of view—the whole of Asia Minor and the Middle East. The fact that he agreed to Doukas' grand designs suggests that Peter

¹⁵² Shaw, *Friedrich II as the 'Last Emperor'*, pp. 323–325. McGinn, *Visions of the End*, p. 115. Magdalino, *Prophecies on the Fall of Constantinople*, p. 48.

¹⁵³ *L'Estoire D'eracles*, p. 292.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Chapters II, p. 85, IV, pp. 242–244 and V, p. 275.

previously had already entertained the idea of a glorious destiny for himself as emperor. It then seems not implausible that he inherited from his predecessor Henry not only his throne, but also his presumed association with the Last Roman Emperor legend. This tradition may then, together with the political considerations referred to, have had some influence on Peter's decisions to be crowned in Rome and to take the overland route to his capital. After Peter's capture and death at the hands of Doukas the association with the Last Emperor legend appears to have been dropped by the succeeding Latin emperors, who were no longer in a position to undertake an expedition of any importance in aid of the Holy Land and whose reigns no longer could be considered to be particularly successful or peaceful.

CONCLUSION

The policy of their Byzantine predecessors partially determined the policy of the Latin emperors vis-à-vis the Latin Orient. The clearest manifestation of this was the renewal of the feudal tie between Constantinople and Antioch. Following the Byzantine model the emperors also nursed hegemonic claims vis-à-vis the other principalities in Outremer. The imperial ambitions were of course also determined by a second important aspect of their political ideology: the idea that the Latin Empire should be at the service of the Holy Land, which was translated into the notion of imperial patronage of the Latin Orient. The Fifth Crusade could have established the claimed imperial hegemony, but the engagement that the Latin emperors had taken upon themselves as regard this undertaking, was ultimately not to produce any tangible results.

The imperial policy was characterized by many aspirations, but a lack of sustained internal stability in the empire meant that, as often was the case in the Byzantine period before 1204, in reality the emperors never held much influence in the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine. These principalities were perhaps prepared to allow the emperor to play the role of patron, but only on condition that he had effectively offered his support. In the context given, the rulers of the Latin Orient were not looking for special relationships with the Latin Empire. Although Constantinople was thus of no great help for the Latin Orient, on the other hand neither did the empire have any lasting seriously negative impact on the region. In comparison with the

Fifth Crusade that was not diverted, the result of the Fourth Crusade can perhaps even be described as having been more positive for the Latin Orient.

From an imperial point of view the most important aspect in the relations with Outremer was the international prestige that the Latin emperor derived from it. For example, the feudal relationship with the Principality of Antioch and the recognition that the Latin emperor enjoyed with part of eastern Christendom were elements that gave a certain degree of reality to the universalistic component of the imperial ideology. If our hypothesis about Henry's and Peter's association with the Last Roman Emperor tradition is correct, similarly these should be seen as attempts to enhance the international status of their emperorship.

CONCLUSION

At the turn of the thirteenth century the Byzantine empire was going through a deep political crisis. Important elements therein were an upcoming regionalism and separatism in the provinces of the empire, which lead to substantial territorial losses, and a growing lack of loyalty vis-à-vis the imperial authority and the person of the emperor, also in the ranks of the Constantinopolitan imperial elite. The events of 1204 of course meant a catastrophe for the internally weakened Byzantine state as it had existed until then, but at the same time this cataclysm offered an opportunity for a drastic restructuring of the empire, which anyhow had been in a state of almost permanent turmoil since the death of Emperor Manuel in 1180. The Latin conquest of Constantinople can be seen as the onset of such a reform of the Byzantine empire. The leaders of the Fourth Crusade as is evident from the March agreement indeed adopted the plan to continue the existing empire, albeit with serious changes to its governmental organization. At no point did the crusade's leaders intend to destroy the Byzantine empire.

In the years after 1204 the Latin emperors were the main advocates of the idea that the Byzantine empire was simply continued under a Latin dynasty and with a partially Latin elite. To a considerable extent they took over elements from Byzantine state symbolism and also as regards content they associated themselves with the Byzantine imperial ideology. In this way the emperors presented themselves as the rightful heirs of their Byzantine predecessors. A major reason for this was the emperors' concern to legitimize their rule towards the Byzantine elite and population. However, because of their own Western background and because of a concern not to alienate their Latin vassals and barons or friendly Western powers, the Latin emperors also introduced several substantial changes in the Byzantine imperial ideology and state symbolism. In particular the religious character of the Byzantine emperorship was reduced at the Latin imperial court. Apart from the need to legitimize themselves vis-à-vis the Byzantine population the Latin emperors had an additional motive for basing their political thinking on Byzantine state theory. It was an ideal ideological foundation for the development of a strong imperial authority and could thus become

an antidote for the basic treaties of 1204–1205, via which it had been attempted to drastically curb imperial powers.

In their own core quarter the Latin emperors to a large extent governed by means of the administrative organization that had been in place before 1204. Again one of the main motives was the need to legitimize themselves vis-à-vis the local elite and population. Also from a pragmatist point of view to continue the existing structures was the more obvious option, instead of replacing them by new governmental mechanisms. This was all the more so because the Byzantine system with its extended bureaucracy permitted to establish a firm measure of control over the core quarter. Thanks to an efficient exploitation of their quarter the first Latin emperors acquired the means to pursue rather ambitious domestic as well as foreign policies, respectively towards the feudal regional princes and barons and towards the neighbouring states in the Byzantine space and the crusading principalities in the Latin East.

Outside the imperial quarter the former Byzantine administrative mechanisms were also maintained to a larger or lesser extent. In the feudal principalities under Byzantine rulers (Paphlagonia, Adrianople, Epiros, the Rhodope Mountains and Prosek) the existing administrative organization must have been continued well-nigh completely, albeit within a regionalized framework. In the Principality and later Kingdom of Thessalonike, under the Monferrat dynasty, governmental continuity was fairly substantial and observable at the central as well as the regional and local administrative levels. In a number of other territories ruled by Latin princes—namely in Southern Greece (inter alia Attica, Beotia, Euboia and Achaia)—or in the territories under Venetian dominion continuity was much more restricted and mainly to be found at the local level. Although within the territories under Latin rulers the extent to which the former administrative organization was maintained thus could differ greatly, the Byzantine basis nevertheless ensured the empire a certain measure of continued governmental uniformity, despite the feudalization of the empire and the accompanying fragmentation of state authority. In this respect we should of course add that in the mentioned regions at the same time administrative innovations were introduced which could be related to the local Latin rulers' Western origins.

Vis-à-vis the empire in its entirety the Latin emperors pursued a centralist policy, which took shape most clearly under Baldwin I and Henry. Their centralist rule was partly inspired by the Byzantine

imperial ideology, even though it was more Western in its execution. The strategies used were comparable with those applied by for example the French king or the Holy Roman emperor: ensuring the loyalty of important vassals through the bestowal of prestigious court titles or the creation of marital alliances, appointing clerics from their own entourage as bishops—and thus as imperial agents—in the various regional principalities, to a limited extent setting up *baillis* in territories situated far from their own imperial quarter, and introducing confidants from their own court or household in the feudal principalities. The Latin emperors of course never intended to fundamentally question the feudal superstructure of the empire or to reinstate a form of direct rule from Constantinople over the totality of the empire's territories after the Byzantine model. They only wished to establish an essentially indirect, but nevertheless real imperial influence within the entirety of their empire. Before 1204 the Byzantine emperors for that matter had already utilized some of the mentioned strategies vis-à-vis a number of autonomous princes in peripheral parts of the empire that were not ruled through the provincial imperial bureaucracy.

For the majority of the Latin regional princes and barons the moderate centralist policies of the emperors, which did not aim at dominating the feudally dependent territories, were unproblematic. The so-called Lombard rebellion in 1208–1209 was the exception to the rule. The Latin princes and barons also for the greater part supported the idea propagated by the imperial court that the Latin empire basically was the continuation of the Byzantine state from before 1204. For quite a few of them we have attested that on the symbolic level, for example through the titles they assumed, they tried to associate themselves with the Byzantium from before the Latin invasion. This concern to stress continuity with the preceding period can be explained by their aspiration to legitimize themselves vis-à-vis the local elites and population, just like it was the case for the Latin emperor. Yet the Latin regional rulers and barons approached the Latin takeover of Byzantium from a typically Western perspective. This is for example evident from the fact that they did not refer to or showed themselves aware of the Roman character of the Byzantine empire, unlike the Latin imperial court which as we have seen did adopt this and other fundamental elements of the Byzantine political ideology. Apart from their Western background the explanation for this is of course to be found in their attachment to their governmental autonomy. It was not in the regional princes and barons' best interest to go along with the

key aspects of Byzantine imperial ideology. Nevertheless the acceptance by these rulers of the empire as the umbrella political entity and their generally loyal attitude towards the imperial authority made that the centrifugal potential inherent in these largely autonomous principalities and baronies did not in itself threaten the political unity of the empire in the period under consideration.

In the government of the empire as it took shape in the years after the Latin conquest a place was also reserved to a greater or lesser degree for the Byzantine metropolitan elite and regional aristocracies, partly determined by the position that these elites had occupied in the various imperial provinces before 1204. A substantial number of Byzantines belonging to the former metropolitan elite participated in the administration at the various governmental levels, both within the emperor's core quarter and within the central imperial elite. Apart from that there was room for previously unattested families, who in this way seem to have made a remarkable social promotion under Latin rule. Also in a number of regions under Latin rule outside the core quarter did the Byzantine aristocracy participate in the administration at the various governmental levels. Pre-eminently this was the case in the Kingdom of Thessalonike, where both members of families belonging to the former imperial elite and regional magnates occupied important positions. In the Southern Greek principalities and baronies and in for example the Venetian territories as well the Byzantine elite only played a secondary role, but they were not entirely absent at the lower echelons of the governmental organization. These regional differences with regard to the significance of the Byzantine elite in the territories under Latin rulers are partly to be explained by the social position of the Byzantine aristocracy in the various regions before 1204.

Quite a few regions that in the years 1204–1228 were feudally dependent upon the Latin emperor for a longer or shorter period of time, were ruled by Byzantine princes (inter alia Paphlagonia, Adrianople, the Rhodopes region, Prosek, Epiros). The political loyalty which these Byzantine rulers displayed towards the Latin emperor and the Latin empire was of a strongly opportunistic nature. The empire's feudal structure provided an answer to the ambitions of a number of Byzantine magnates to acquire a position as autonomous regional princes. This feudal structure thus went some way to meet the regionalist and separatist tendencies and challenges that had existed in Byzantium in the build-up to the events of 1204. That these Byzantine magnates contented themselves with a position as regional ruler feudally dependant

upon the Latin emperor can be explained by several factors. In some cases the external, notably Bulgarian or Nicaean, threat that existed vis-à-vis the regions controlled by these rulers was an important element (Paphlagonia, Adrianople, the Rhodopes region). In other cases the Latin emperor's military ascendancy was the predominant factor (Epiros, Prosek). As in the other regional principalities the Latin emperor tried to tie these Byzantine magnates closer to the imperial court through the creation of personal bonds (marriages, court titles). The prestigious descent of these Byzantine princes, who were related to the Byzantine and Bulgarian imperial lineages, however seems to have caused that the imperial presence in the internal affairs of these regions was smaller than in the case of the Latin principalities. Probably the Latin emperor did not want to offend the Byzantine princes within his empire, who substantially strengthened his claim on the Byzantine emperorship, by interventions that could be perceived as posing a threat to their regional autonomy.

That a significant part of the former Byzantine imperial elite and of the regional aristocracies was prepared to live within the framework of a Latinized empire can be explained by pragmatistical motives. The Latin emperor and a rather large number of his Latin vassals were prepared to offer the Byzantine elite a fairly prominent place at the various governmental levels. This implied that a fairly large group within this elite did not suffer any considerable loss as regards political and social status. On the contrary, the change of regime in this respect amounted for this group to a relative status quo in comparison with the period before 1204. The Byzantine regional princes within the empire even knew to improve their position in a substantial way. Apart from these materialistic motives there were for the Byzantine elite also cultural and religious reasons which made that they could reconcile themselves with the Latin take-over of Byzantium. To be sure the patriarchal see of Constantinople just like the imperial throne was now occupied by a Latin, but this did not mean that the higher echelons of the ecclesiastical hierarchy became completely Latinized. In a number of regions under Latin rulers the Byzantine clergy retained a substantial share in the episcopate. This was inter alia the case in the imperial core quarter, in the Kingdom of Thessalonike and probably also in the *ducatus* of Philippopolis. In the Byzantine feudal principalities the ecclesiastical organization remained entirely Byzantine and was in addition completely autonomous vis-à-vis the Latin patriarch. By contrast in the Southern Greek Latin principalities and for example also in Venetian

Crete the episcopal hierarchy became nearly entirely Latinized, although at the local level the Byzantine clergy of course continued to occupy a dominant position.

The introduction of a Latin ecclesiastical hierarchy in Romania evidently caused serious religious tension and conflicts. The creation of a Byzantine patriarchate in exile in Nicaea in this respect was a critical factor. The Nicaean patriarchate served as a centre to which the Byzantine clergy and laymen who did not wish to submit themselves to the partly Latinized hierarchy could direct themselves. However, the Latin emperor and a considerable number of his vassals, as well as the Latin patriarch and the pope in Rome, generally managed the Latin-Byzantine religious differences in a quite flexible manner and tried to avoid open confrontation. In this way under the first Latin emperors a situation came into being in which the dividing nature of the religious conflict was curbed. Indeed a relative, but delicate equilibrium was reached that was deemed workable by both the Latin and Byzantine elites, although we have observed that as regards the religious relations there existed great regional differences. It is clear that the willingness of a substantial part of the ecclesiastical Byzantine elite to function within the framework of the Latin empire must have strengthened appreciably the credibility of Latin emperor's claim of being the legitimate successor of the former Byzantine emperors.

The analysis of the Latin emperors' foreign policy in the years 1204–1228 further substantiates our hypothesis that Byzantine components contributed very considerably to the political identity of the Latin empire, besides the evident Latin influences that hitherto have been emphasized in the historiography. The Latin emperors in theory ascribed to their empire a universalist character, just like this had been the case before 1204. When in practice it proved impossible to incorporate all former Byzantine territories the Latin emperor appealed to the Byzantine concept of the hierarchy of states, wherein the highest political dignity was attributed to the emperor of Constantinople while all other princes were subordinate to him. It was then only a matter of obtaining some form of recognition from these rulers, without aspiring to any real political influence in these territories. The emperors applied this theory both within the Byzantine space and vis-à-vis the Latin Orient, which from a Constantinopolitan point of view belonged to the traditional Byzantine sphere of influence. Regarding the relations with the Latin Orient however a typically Western element also played a role. As sovereigns of an empire which they had acquired in

the context of a crusading expedition gone astray, the Latin emperors saw themselves as the special protectors of the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine, even though in reality this amounted to nothing much in spite of great ambitions.

In circa 1206–1217 the Latin emperors nevertheless succeeded in developing their empire into the strongest power within the Byzantine space, as a result of which it obtained a leading position in the region. Notably in the Balkans Bulgaria, Hungaria and Serbia subscribed to a certain extent to the Latin emperor's hierarchy of states theory, which for that matter did not preclude good contacts with the Nicaean imperial court. This degree of international recognition made that the Latin emperors' claim of being the legitimate successors of the Byzantine emperors from before 1204, was strengthened and that a certain measure of acceptance or recognition was not restricted to Western powers. In other regions within the Byzantine space, for example in Cilician Armenia and with the Greek population on Cyprus—and of course also with parts of the Byzantine aristocracy and population in Latin Romania, in this same period the Nicaean empire—the Latin empire's immediate rival—counted as the legitimate successor state to Byzantium. Still Latin Constantinople was a more than serious competitor for Nicaea, particularly because a substantial part of the Byzantine elite in Latin Romania could subscribe to the Latin restructuring of the Byzantine empire.

After it had become clear that the Latin and Nicaean empires could not destroy one another, in the years 1213/1214–1222 both states up to a point granted each other the right to exist, without however abandoning their contradicting claims. Thus a situation came into being wherein the imperial lineages of Constantinople and Nicaea, where certainly part of the aristocracy deemed it acceptable to pursue a policy of rapprochement towards Latin Constantinople, entered into or planned close family relationships with one another. In our view it is very well conceivable that the ultimate purpose behind the creation of these ties in the long run was the fusion of both empires through a dynastic union. In this way the events of 1204 could have lead to a mixed Latin-Byzantine empire, which would have incorporated most Byzantine territories from before 1204 and which—with its partly regionalized structure and its better relations with the West—might have been (geo)politically stronger than the Byzantium in crisis of the end of the twelfth century. The developments in the period mentioned thus show that the Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204 did not

necessarily have to lead to the commencement of the definitive political decline of Byzantium. Furthermore it is an important finding that the Latin empire as it took shape during the first two decades of its existence was by no means a polity that was anyhow doomed to go down, a proposition that is however omnipresent in the modern historiography on the political evolution in the Byzantine space after 1204.

The political and military downfall of Latin Romania in the years 1218/1224–1228 lead to the fact that the empire at the end of the studied period could no longer substantiate a credible claim to being the legitimate heir of Byzantium. The decline of the empire was caused by a complex combination of factors. By way of starting point we can state in a general way that the period 1204–1218/1224 in any case was a very short amount of time to set up a new and solid political order within the feudalized empire, which had to be capable of efficiently offering resistance to the fairly constant and serious external military pressures. A first element of internal weakness was the lack of a stable division of power between the different groups (the Lombard versus the Latin-Byzantine component) within the local governmental elite of the Kingdom of Thessalonike, the major regional principality within the empire. Repeated imperial interventions did not lead to a permanent solution for this chronic problem. A second element was that from circa 1217 onwards the Latin-Byzantine model of co-operation that had come into being within the central elite at Constantinople, was questioned by newcomers from the West who gained admittance to the imperial court. The attitude of these newcomers can be attributed to a combination of their personal ambitions, their typically western view of Byzantium and the Byzantines (with the corresponding prejudices and invectives), and their scant familiarity with the subtle balance of power that in the previous years with ups and downs had been brought about.

In this context the feudal prince of Epiros Theodore Doukas, who felt threatened by the politics of emperor Peter of Courtenay which he deemed too pro Latin, saw an opportunity to break loose from the empire and he started a successful offensive against the Kingdom of Thessalonike. The Doukai of Epiros had never completely willingly resigned themselves to a position as feudal princes within the Latin empire, but the military might of the emperor had left them little choice and after all they enjoyed a very large measure of regional autonomy. The internally weakened Thessalonike was an easy prey for Doukas, also because Constantinople—caught up in faction strife—

could not provide any effectual support, although several efforts were undertaken. Against the background of Doukas' persistent successes emperor John III Vatatzes of Nicaea in 1224 saw his chance to launch an attack against Latin Constantinople. A significant stimulus for this action was that emperor Robert had granted political asylum to Alexios and Isaac Laskaris (the brothers of the deceased emperor Theodore I), who represented a threat to Vatatzes' throne, which resulted in soured relations between Constantinople and Nicaea after 1222. The already weakened Latin empire was in no condition to victoriously cope with a two front war. After a number of infortunate and shattering defeats the military resources of the Latin emperor were depleted to the extent that an adequate defence of the empire was no longer possible.

A third internal weakness of the empire became visible in the outlined situation. In the Byzantine regional principalities, such as the Rhodopes region and Adrianople, the local Byzantine elite turned out not to be prepared to defend the vacillating Latin empire to the last ditch. Two decades proved too short a time to build up a political loyalty between the various partners which would have ensured a staunch and concerted defence of the empire in a moment of crisis. The local elites concerned however opportunistically made overtures to the attacking rulers, thus siding with whoever for the moment seemed to be the winning party. Thus in the years 1224–1228 the empire of Constantinople was reduced to no more than one of the regional players in the Byzantine space. The dramatic territorial losses in the imperial core quarter moreover meant that the Latin emperor had to renounce his centralising policies, which in the preceding years had already been tempered because of the faction strife at the imperial court, for good.

In retrospect the creation of the Latin empire in 1204 in the context of the deviated Fourth Crusade did not necessarily have to be a dividing factor in the relations between Byzantium and the West. In a certain way at the outset the empire even offered opportunities in drawing the West and Byzantium, which partially had grown apart, closer to each other again. Walter Norden already proposed that the healing of the breach between these both halves of Christianity only could have been brought about through a political solution.¹ The Latin

¹ Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz*, pp. 35–37.

empire—or rather the fusion of the Latin and Nicaean empire which at one point did not seem unfeasible—just could have been this solution. In the West the Latin conquest of Constantinople was seen in this light and during the first two decades of the empire it seemed like a Latin-Byzantine transformation of the Byzantium from before 1204 would actually be possible. In the years 1204–1217 a political construction was set up characterized by a relative Latin-Byzantine equilibrium as regards institutional organization and composition of the ruling elite, albeit with substantial regional differences.

Both domestically—with the local Byzantine aristocracy and population—and on the international level—not only in the West, but also within the Byzantine space and outside of it—the Latin empire enjoyed a certain recognition as the legitimate continuation of the Byzantine empire. These constataions lead us to consider the conventional designation Latin empire of Constantinople as rather inadequate for the studied political construction as it took shape in the years after 1204, because the Latin element appears to be overrated. The more neutral appellation Empire of Constantinople, to be understood as a Latin *renovatio* of Byzantium and as a mixed Latin-Byzantine state as regards political identity, to us seems to be more appropriate.² By consequence it would be appropriate to treat this political construction not so much as an aberration as hitherto has often been the case, but as an integral part of Byzantine history. In the end the forces working against this attempt of a Latin-Byzantine renaissance of Byzantium, which were to be found both inside and outside of the empire, proved to be stronger than those supporting this evolution. Thus a chance was missed to draw the West and Byzantium closer to one another again. After circa 1224 the empire of Constantinople then all the same developed into an unambiguous dividing factor in Latin-Byzantine relations on the stage of world history.

² The early thirteenth-century chronicler Robert of Auxerre, author of a world history, in his account of the developments taking place at Constantinople in 1204, which is largely based on Emperor Baldwin's circular letter relating these events, describes the Latin take-over of Byzantium explicitly as a *renovatio imperii* (Robertus Autissiodorensis, *Chronologia*, p. 272; the text of the various preserved versions of Baldwin's letter in: Prevenier, *De oorkonden*, II, n° 271–274).

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